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#1
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AHC: Have the CSA retake the Mississippi river!
Here is a challenge for you. During any time during the war by whatever means have the CSA retake control over the Mississippi river. Extra respect to those who can do it later in the war.
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#2
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Not doable. You might - just might - be able to find a way the Confederacy can delay what happened OTL, but it doesn't have the resources to retake the Mississippi.
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#3
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In Guns of the South, they were still having tremendous trouble doing it.
You could have them retake part of it, though, after tremendous Union troop movements. In Gingrich's civil war trilogy, there's an offhand mention that they grabbed Port Hudson again after the entire Army of the Susquehanna was moved east. I agree that's about the limit.
__________________
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#4
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This is nearly impossible for three reasons:
1) New Orleans. 2) New Orleans. 3) New Orleans. |
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#5
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reasons they cannot retake all of ther river but what about them retaking part of it river or having them hold onto key cities they did not in OTL? |
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#6
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I think you need to look at the geography of just why the CSA can't retake the Mississippi. They might reclaim individual parts of it if the USA has a sufficient-scale disaster in other theaters but so long as the USA's holding onto the mouth of the Mississippi they're doomed no matter what to having it choked off from being useful for them.
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#7
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They might be able to launch harassment raids but retaking the river is nigh-impossible, especially after Vicksburg. It would require more more resources than the CSA could muster and would still need a strategist beyond what the CSA had available.
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#8
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To turn it into a useful port again for the CSA, obviously a huge benefit, it seems like it would take British or French naval intervention to lift the U.S. blockade, which'd also likely open up the port of Galveston, Texas as well and diminish the long delays, supply losses of shipping European imports from the Mexican port of Matamoros up into the South. The French Navy is passing by supplying Emperor Maximilian's forces in Mexico while I don't know how the British Navy resources in the Carribbean and Bermuda stack up for a quick relief but certainly after some time the British could do it given they got Edward Pakenham's army there with 1814 technology/capacity. Timing is probably best with the Trent incident, regaining access to CSA cotton for Britain's textile industry (a $600 million/yr industry then according to Amanda Foreman's superb book) more of a casus belli than many wars.
The sizable Confederate forces in Texas could in theory have linked up with Lousiana and Mississippi regulars and Arkansas irregulars like Stand Watie's Cherokee cavalry, perhaps organized by either more capable Western commanders or at the behest of Albert Pike in Little Rock. Considerable troops and resources were being held back in the individual CSA states so maybe it was feasible in 1864 on the land-side after Grant and Sherman had headed East and Ben Butler had been infuriating New Orleans residents for awhile. Coordinating with a French or British Naval assault would be key as a port you can't leave is... You could throw in success with the Chicago attempt to breakout and arm the thousands of CSA prisoners there with the support of Southern Illinois sympathizers rising up and John Hunt Morgan's raid turning into leadership of the effort...losing Chicago as a vast rail center (comparatively) would be nearly as harmful to the Union as losing the port of New Orleans to the Confederates. |
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#9
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Maybe you could have a general in the west not make stupid forts? That seemed to be the way the did things there. A better defense of NO, would make any offensives in that area a great deal harder for the Union. Same with Memphis, they had no real defensive works
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#10
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After Vicksburg, this scenario is beyond implausibility. Let's say, just for the sake of argument, the Army of Tennessee destroys the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga. That in and of itself is a leap, because no major field army was ever annihilated in the Civil War (destroying a field army is a rare achievement in general, but in the Civil War?)
The next thing that happens is Bragg reoccupies Middle Tennessee and lays siege to Nashville, which is where Grant gets him. Bragg can't even GET to liberating the Mississippi Valley until he liberates Middle Tennessee, so you must assume that Bragg either destroys Grant (hah!) or wins a series of grinding battles (hah hah!) in 1864. Any link in this chain is just beyond plausibility. All of them together are the realm of science fiction. IMO, the best chance the Confederacy had for turning back the clock in the Mississippi Valley was in 1862. Instead of invading Kentucky, Bragg could have consolidated his army with Van Dorn and Price, and gone after Grant and Rosecrans. At that time, Grant's force was broken up into many garrisons, and he was on the defensive. Given how Iuka and Corinth went, its not implausible that Bragg could have gobbled up an isolated garrison or two, and then given Grant a mauling in a major battle. The result might very well have been to forestall the Vicksburg Campaign. That said, this trades the Mississippi Valley for Chattanooga, because while Bragg is slugging it out with Grant, Buell is slowly advancing into East Tennessee and chasing off Kirby Smith's tiny army... |
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#11
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#12
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Thomas didn't "destroy" Hood's army. There was enough left to cannibalize and send off to North Carolina, eh?
George Thomas won a crushing victory, but I think this boils down to what you mean by "destroy." Hood still got away with a substantial force. Nashville wasn't even an Austerlitz, let alone a Cannae, and so in no way did Thomas destroy Hood by the standard definition. Besides, my assertion isn't at all radical. It appears in virtually every single book and section dealing with military art in the Civil War. |
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#13
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It does indeed depend on what you mean by 'destroy'. If you mean 'completely annihilate', then, no, that did not occur in the ACW. If you mean 'render completely ineffective', then a few battles produced such a result, but Nashville was not one of them; it was the battle plus the retreat afterward which destroyed the AOT as an effective force.
To the OP, the problem for the Confederates is the Union fleet of riverine ironclads; they have no effective counter to it, especially after the naval battle of Memphis destroyed their own fleet. The only way they can secure communication across the Mississippi in the face of that fleet is to fortify one or more points such as Vicksburg and mount batteries of heavy cannon to deny the Union fleet passage. The moment they do that the fort becomes a target for Union attack; sooner or later the Union will bring superior force to bear on that point and the fort will fall. Even if the Confederates support it with a field force the Union will defeat or drive off that force before turning to take the fort. The Confederates can certainly delay the process (IOTL for nearly an entire year, from the fall of Corinth to the fall of Vicksburg), but they cannot stop it.
__________________
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#14
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You're committing the logical fallacy of "argument from authority".
__________________
"The progress of freedom depends on the maintenance of peace, the spread of commerce, and the diffusion of education." -Richard Cobden |
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#15
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In my timeline I have Joe Johnson looking at retaking New Orleans. He (really my research) is struggling to find the troops to do it or how to neutralise the Union Naval support the New Orleans garrison can expect.
I also agree that the South can delay the fall of Vicksburg (most of us could do a better job than Pemberton), but it is delay only.
__________________
A Glorious Union or America: The New Sparta - Turtledove Nominee |
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#16
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And why? Why as in, why is he suddenly trying to do this when what he's assigned to do has little or nothing to do with New Orleans? |
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#17
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#18
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Nashville was the last major gasp of the Confederacy west of the Appalachians. Hood's army was broken, period. Thomas prepared carefully, had a logistical advantage, and neutralized his opponent. Atlanta broke the back of the Confederacy, Nashville just about slit its throat.
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#19
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I wish the Forum had "Like" voting buttons. I'd use it here.
Among other things, it points to another dimension - Union naval power (and you can't really have much of a navy without lots of heavy industry) points straight to the fact that even if the CSA could secure the banks of the Mississippi, they could never reassert control over the river itself. The best they could do would be to deny it to the USA. Quote:
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#20
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You would be correct only if I were saying "it is true because so and so says it is."
You are wrong in this instance, because the many so-and-so's have mountains of evidence. I'm talking about academics, not the Pope. If someone is going to make a contrary case, the burden of refuting the evidence is on them. All I'm doing is pointing to the fact it exists. |
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