The Germans will probably give up their mega-tank designs, but will continue experimenting with flying saucers, and possibly even Tesla-style energy coil weapons.
I think you melted my brain. *checks ears* Yeah. You did.
There seems to be a bit of an instinctive tilt towards the Soviet-style of warfare, when in fact if anything the Germans were very much more in the mold of Western militaries. If we're looking for analogues in the real world for something the Germans would be using in a neo-colonial African setting we should be looking less at Soviet weapons and more at what was actually used by the powers that be in those countries.
The Portuguese, during their wars of decolonization in the 50s, 60s, and 70s, made extensive use of the German G3 rifle, as well as the Belgian FN-FAL. They both used the standard 7.62mm NATO long round, not to be confused with the 7.62mm Warsaw Pact medium round. It's a heavy round: it does it's damage by pure blunt force delivered by a single hit. If you are hit with a NATO long round, 9 times out of 10 you will NOT get up. The used the MG42 (originally in the regular 7.92mm and later in NATO standard) until the end of the war.
They used the smaller Alouette III helicopter in a number of roles, including CASEVAC and transport. Perhaps one of the most pertinent aircraft they used (as far as this scenario is concerned) is the Ju52, which they were using for paradrops into the 1960s. It's not the C-47, but it's definitely a reliable aircraft. To get a good idea of how the Junkers could last with adequate support, I'd put forward the facts that the Spanish and French were both building them after the war, and that the Swiss were operating the aircraft until the early-80s.
The Rhodesians, in their Bush War, were armed with the FAL (and small amounts of G3s towards the end) as their primary battle rifle. Just like the G3 the Portuguese used, the FAL was a heavy rifle: Americans could liken it to the M14. It was a bruiser. Myself, I've fired the Canadian version of the FAL: it'll shoot through trees, tires, car doors, just about anything. Their light machine gun was the FN-MAG, a weapon that had many traits with the BAR and the MG42.
The Rhodesian Air Force used the Alouette as well, in much the same way the Portuguese did. But they also put an important spin on it, developing the use of helicopters teamed with air assault troops into a counterinsurgency strategy termed Fireforce. If there is ONE STRATEGY that defined counterinsurgency in either Africa or Southeast Asia in the Cold War,
it is Fireforce.
The concept was to employ ground based units in a patrol role: they would "move to contact," patroling with an intent to find and fix enemy combatants in a single localized area at which time they would call for back up. This backup would be prepositioned nearby at a scratch airfield in light helicopters (the Alouette IIIs could only carry 4 passengers along with the pilot and gunner) as well as in prop-driven transports (C-47s in the case of Rhodesia and South Africa) holding paratroops.
They would be vectored into the contact location by a command helicopter, then the troops would use the concept of "vertical envelopment": there would be no attempt to drop the troops in a single group and then have them fan out. They would instead be dropped exactly where they would need to be to surround the enemy, then set up ambushes or advance into the contact from the flanks.
So...what can we take from this cursory look? The weaponry involved (and the tactics) have almost nothing at all to do with the Soviet model: in a world where the USSR was defeated, the Soviet model would be discredited. Also, the AK-47 became popular because it was able to be fielded by poorly trained guerillas with a minimal support and training base. The German military is the opposite of that: they will have extensive logistical lines, as well as comprehensive basic and advanced infantry training. Thus the Wehrmacht can be trusted to use a technically advanced battle rifle like the G3 or FAL, not an assault rifle in an intermediate caliber like the M-16 or AK-47.
They will also be using tactics similar to the French in Algeria, the Rhodesians in the Bush War, or perhaps the French in Indochina. They would probably not, however, be using tactics like the British in Malaya, Borneo (the Confrontation), or Northern Ireland.
The difference here is clear: in Algeria, Rhodesia, and Indochina (and Vietnam later), the counterinsurgency effort was largely a military one. It was seen as a problem that could be solved through the use of force as a pacification tool.
In Malaya, Northern Ireland, and the Confrontation, a Hearts-and-Minds approach (the term was actually coined by an SAS officer during the Confronation) was used to attempt to interface with the local population.
As far as reading material on the nuts and bolts of this subject, I'd like to throw some titles out that are on my bookshelf, along with a reason why I'm recommending them:
The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962 by Charles L. Shrader. This book is an amazing work that focuses not on the war itself, but on how the French military developed tactics and support services for the helicopters that came of age in the Algerian War.
Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya by Caroline Elkins. During the Mau Mau Uprising in the early 50s, the British military sent a fair amount of Kikuyu tribespeople to their early graves through torture and squalid camps where they were imprisoned. If you read this book, it would be best to read something else on the Mau Mau Uprising first, so you can get a good idea of when Elkins is correct and where she is completely going over the deep end of sensationalism.
Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall. Fall is the best and most informed historian on any aspect of any post-WWII combat in what would become Vietnam. But
Street is about the French involvement in Indochina from just after the end of WWII to the final separation of their colony. It's an amazing work, helped a lot because Fall was present for many of the events, from airdropping supplies in the Red River Valley to drinking in Hanoi with a Vietnamese golddigger who jumped from commander to commander.
An Unpopular War by J.H. Thompson. An oral history of the South African Border War, as told by Citizen Force troopers. The CF was composed of men taken from all walks of life for 2 years of service before they were allowed back into the civilian world. They performed all duties: from cooks to the Recces (South African special forces), and came home to be successful businessmen and politicians as well as scarred drunks. This is a very honest depiction of what a state of constant war does to population, and probably the closest you could get to an actual account of post-WWII German colonialism.
) will be adopted as standard issue by the German Armed Forces.