Barbarossa halted after Kiev: Opinions?

After the reduction of the Kiev pocket, AG South cmdr Von Rundstedt favoured halting for the winter to rebuild instead of pushing on with the attempt to capture Moscow. The line was straight at this point, and the German units were not nearly as worn down as they would become by the following January.

By aborting Operation Typhoon a fairly large reserve could be created, losses restricted to manageable proportions, the front fortified in reasonable time and most supply problems (the root of the Germans' problems with the winter weather) avoided. Particularly notable would be reduced wear and tear on the limited supplies of wheeled transportation (much of which was abandoned in the flight from Moscow in OTL), meaning the Motorized divisions in AG Center and AG North would retain operational mobility.

A minor offensive in the south (with nothing in front of it to oppose it) could still be carried out to secure the Donbass and create a salient in the Kharkov region as a springboard for resumed offensive operations in 1942, and operations to capture the Crimea and isolate Leningrad carried out more or less as occurred historically. There wouldn't be any need for a botched rushed attempt to seize Leningrad with tanks either.

The flip side is that the Soviets could do the exact same -- take time to train their new units adequately instead of continuously rushing their counter-offensives. OTOH, Stalin didn't decide to give up micro-management until after the Kharkov disaster a year later.

How would 1942 go in these circumstances? Assuming an isolated Sevastopol is ignored as being more trouble to the Soviets than it's worth, offensive operations might be resumed as early as late April.

There is a good chance that Stalin would have ordered his surviving Army fronts and his newly established Reserves and elements of the Siberian Divisions to launch counterattacks among the entire Front to try to push the Germans back...

Stalin might be quite anxious to drive the Germans off Soviet territory and regain the loss of face & reputation when the Germans Blitz and decimated his Armies all over Russia....

Hitler would still have had to keep massive forces deployed in Russia to head off a counteroffensive that would eventually reach into Germany. The Germans would have prepared heavy defenses all across Russia, and they could be better supplied because their logistics would be a little less stressed. The still-disorganized Red Army would have gained little and lost a lot charging these defenses, and even as the Soviets improved their military, they would not meet crumbling German forces in hastily-prepared defenses. They would have had to fight every inch of the way through strong fortifications prepared for this very moment over time and supplied by a sustainable logistics chain. They could very slowly begin taking back their country, but they would pay a very heavy price doing it.

With the Russian threat not an imminent problem, Hitler could leave the decision-making on the Eastern Front to his generals, and focus his efforts on dealing with the Western allies. The Germans will still be beat in the end, but it will take much more time and with much more casualties for both sides. However, the Russians could well lose millions of men and many tons of equipment while gaining little. After a few months or a year of this, they might judge these losses to be unsustainable over the long term, and realize that they cannot retake Russia at this rate. They might sue for some kind of negotiated peace, which would allow the Germans to transfer all of their massive forces in Russia to the Western Front. Allied victory could take years. But if the Russians take such losses and continue on anyway, they will be hard-pressed to catch up to the United States in the aftermath. They will have thrown away maybe most of their male population of fighting age, and a their industries will be hard-pressed to replace equipment losses.

dduff442 said:

After the reduction of the Kiev pocket, AG South cmdr Von Rundstedt favoured halting for the winter to rebuild instead of pushing on with the attempt to capture Moscow. The line was straight at this point, and the German units were not nearly as worn down as they would become by the following January.

By aborting Operation Typhoon a fairly large reserve could be created, losses restricted to manageable proportions, the front fortified in reasonable time and most supply problems (the root of the Germans' problems with the winter weather) avoided. Particularly notable would be reduced wear and tear on the limited supplies of wheeled transportation (much of which was abandoned in the flight from Moscow in OTL), meaning the Motorized divisions in AG Center and AG North would retain operational mobility.

A minor offensive in the south (with nothing in front of it to oppose it) could still be carried out to secure the Donbass and create a salient in the Kharkov region as a springboard for resumed offensive operations in 1942, and operations to capture the Crimea and isolate Leningrad carried out more or less as occurred historically. There wouldn't be any need for a botched rushed attempt to seize Leningrad with tanks either.

The flip side is that the Soviets could do the exact same -- take time to train their new units adequately instead of continuously rushing their counter-offensives. OTOH, Stalin didn't decide to give up micro-management until after the Kharkov disaster a year later.

How would 1942 go in these circumstances? Assuming an isolated Sevastopol is ignored as being more trouble to the Soviets than it's worth, offensive operations might be resumed as early as late April.

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Yes, the Germans would have been vastly better off as far as losses, but so would the Soviets. They lost a lot of men trying to hold Moscow and through Typhoon, even during the Winter fighting too. But the Germans could not afford these losses the same as the Soviets. As it was the loss in equipment was terrible for the Germans, not to mention the loss of experienced men. It is better for the Germans to fight with the more secure supply lines under your scenario, as it would preserve vital equipment and give the Germans better shelter and allow for their winter gear to be brought up.

I'm of the mindset that the Soviets, who at this point would have vast numbers of untrained recruits, would launch massive counter offensives. That is not necessarily good for the Germans though, if the Soviets can focus enough firepower on the Germans before they can build up enough of a defensive line. On the balance though IMHO its better for the Germans to go on the defensive and focus on minor offensives in Ukraine.
It forces the Soviets to come to the Germans over their own bad roads, which hurts them, especially if the Germans use the Luftwaffe to interdict the limited rail lines open to the Soviets after Kiev.

The problem won't really kick in until 1942, as it makes it more obvious that the South is the likely. Still overall its much more likely that the Germans hold on longer, the Soviets are hurt worse, and the war lasts longer with more damage to the Soviets in the postwar.

Doesn't really matter, unless..

...the Germans do a 180 from OTL and treat the population of the occupied Soviet territories as partners instead of slaves. Remember, the Ukraine suffered terribly under Stalin's rule. If the Germans reverse collectivized agriculture and treat the people decently, their food supplies increase (the Germans planned to feed their invasion force from the occupied territories), their partisan problems shrink, and they can get a lot of recruits to fight Stalin. With luck, the Germans could hold the areas they've taken for rather longer.

Not really possible unless the Germans can show more restraint about starting the "kill all the slavs" plan. The certainly didn't OTL. It was why they were at war in the first place after all.

Deckhand said:

Not really possible unless the Germans can show more restraint about starting the "kill all the slavs" plan. The certainly didn't OTL. It was why they were at war in the first place after all.

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The POD is far too late to change Hitler's mind about the Slavs.

@OP:
What is the extent of the German advance after Kiev ITTL? You mention minor offensives in Ukraine, but what exactly? Do the Germans take Orel, Bryansk, and Kursk? Do they try and hold Rostov? What about Belgorod and Kharkov?
I would think these would be a minimum even if Typhoon is not launched. Well, maybe not Rostov.

Classic What if Hitler was not Hitler

The experience of WWI mentally conditioned Hitler to expect victory vs France but not necessarily in a single campaign season.

Thus no Sea Lion planning... etc... etc

In June 1941 Hitler expected and demanded 1941 victory over the USSR.

For the German Armed forces NOT to push for a win in late 41 requires a POD removing Hitler during Barbarossa.

Hitler had already being told Typhoon operating at the end of the Wehrmacht's supply rope.

The German staff wargames 17-20 December 1940 led von Paulus to recommend a strategic "pause" after winning the Dvina / Dnepr River lines. Otherwise, von Paulus concluded that any drive on the deeper Soviet centers of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov would fail due to logistical shortfalls.

Hitler was not going to order a strategic "pause" or halt in the campaign.

Hitler did not want to settle back into a militarily rational / sane defensive line even after the Soviet counter offensive. Instead, Hitler dismissed Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, the C-in-C Army, and personally assumed the command of all land forces. Field-Marshal von Bock, C-in-C Army Group Center.

Hell, most of the general staff also believed that Russia was on the verge of collapse and the best plan would be to seize Moscow before winter and cripple it.

Julian said:

Hell, most of the general staff also believed that Russia was on the verge of collapse and the best plan would be to seize Moscow before winter and cripple it.

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The USA G-2 thought Moscow would fall too, and that the USSR might be knocked out of the war.

BlondieBC said:

The USA G-2 thought Moscow would fall too, and that the USSR might be knocked out of the war.

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Yup. The Soviet Union's "Allies" purposefully restricted Lend Lease because they thought it would just end up falling into German hands.

wiking said:

The POD is far too late to change Hitler's mind about the Slavs.

@OP:
What is the extent of the German advance after Kiev ITTL? You mention minor offensives in Ukraine, but what exactly? Do the Germans take Orel, Bryansk, and Kursk? Do they try and hold Rostov? What about Belgorod and Kharkov?
I would think these would be a minimum even if Typhoon is not launched. Well, maybe not Rostov.

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Pretty minimal -- they don't go near Rostov, just poke out a modest salient of 100-200kms. It's handy for launching offensives even if the actual blow comes elsewhere as it will naturally suck in Soviet defenders.

Julian said:

Hell, most of the general staff also believed that Russia was on the verge of collapse and the best plan would be to seize Moscow before winter and cripple it.

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Whatever about Oct 1, by mid November disquiet about progress was obviously very widespread. The people best positioned to judge how well things were going were maybe the divisional and regimental commanders. Their forces were strung out in "company" groups of maybe 50-80 men which where too far apart to keep in sight of each other even in open country. During the winter, holes between such "strongpoints" stretched literally tens of miles in some places. That's not a front line.

Obviously the situation in the rear zones was even more chaotic, and the Soviets infiltrated forces through the German "lines" sometimes in entire divisional formation.

Of course the Soviets were desperately weak as well, but they weren't tasked with garrisoning a hostile country and moving supplies over hundreds of miles without rail transport.

Typhoon was a tactical success in its initial weeks, but the madness of "advancing into a vacuum" was widely noted. Leeb for one got into a furious row with OKW about it.

KG "Cagey" said:

For the German Armed forces NOT to push for a win in late 41 requires a POD removing Hitler during Barbarossa.

Hitler had already being told Typhoon operating at the end of the Wehrmacht's supply rope.

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This is probably true, although the whole point of these things is to examine the implications of decisions and he was so random he could do anything. Plus many of the experts backed him up, so the blame can't all be laid at his door for once. If someone managed to paint an inspiring picture in his mind of another rapid drive in 1942 instead of an autumn/winter slog through the forests of the central front who knows what he might have decided?

KG "Cagey" said:

Hitler did not want to settle back into a militarily rational / sane defensive line even after the Soviet counter offensive. Instead, Hitler dismissed Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, the C-in-C Army, and personally assumed the command of all land forces. Field-Marshal von Bock, C-in-C Army Group Center.

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Yes, and there was a subtle subtext to this. The Nazi party started national collections of warm winter clothing and played newsreels of the events incessantly. There was a devious genius to actually playing up the invasions' failings in this instance: the message was that the Nazi party was on the ball and paying attention to what mattered and that the supply disaster was the fault of the professional military (the last part wasn't entirely untrue).

Of course the problem wasn't lack of warm clothing, it was exactly the problem Napoleon faced in the winter of 1812: all the supplies in the world were available, just piled up in Polish warehouses.

I think this might work in the short term on the one hand, but proves a two-edged sword on the other hand: the USSR has room to push the Nazis from Leningrad and thereby enhance its war production, drive the Finns away from risking complete encirclement of the city, and winds up in an ultimately better strategic position.

Strategically Germany has the major problem that can't be solved short of ASB PODs that it has no reason to expect the kind of war it fights, but as that's the war it gets it has to improvise. No incidental change in this regard alters this fundamental fact.

KG "Cagey" said:

The experience of WWI mentally conditioned Hitler to expect victory vs France but not necessarily in a single campaign season.

Thus no Sea Lion planning... etc... etc

In June 1941 Hitler expected and demanded 1941 victory over the USSR.

For the German Armed forces NOT to push for a win in late 41 requires a POD removing Hitler during Barbarossa.

Hitler had already being told Typhoon operating at the end of the Wehrmacht's supply rope.

The German staff wargames 17-20 December 1940 led von Paulus to recommend a strategic "pause" after winning the Dvina / Dnepr River lines. Otherwise, von Paulus concluded that any drive on the deeper Soviet centers of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov would fail due to logistical shortfalls.

Hitler was not going to order a strategic "pause" or halt in the campaign.

Hitler did not want to settle back into a militarily rational / sane defensive line even after the Soviet counter offensive. Instead, Hitler dismissed Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, the C-in-C Army, and personally assumed the command of all land forces. Field-Marshal von Bock, C-in-C Army Group Center.

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That's the Neues Dolchstosslegende of Axis history, namely that the German generals again preferred to attribute to their politicians their own defeats. Hitler understood the war would last into 1942, which is why he wanted to halt instead of launching Typhoon. Halder and company were the ones that wanted Typhoon and reaped what they sowed for neglecting the spreading logistical rot in the German army.

Hitler deposed his generals because they'd spent 1941 disobeying his orders in just the precise pattern to lead the Corporal to increase his distrust of his generals. Hitler had every military reason in the world to sack the people he did. The Wehrmacht handled 1941 very poorly, and in their memoirs blamed Hitler for their mistakes.

Remember Hitler was a psychotic evil sonofabitch bastard, but he was not stupid.

Snake Featherston said:

That's the Neues Dolchstosslegende of Axis history, namely that the German generals again preferred to attribute to their politicians their own defeats. Hitler understood the war would last into 1942, which is why he wanted to halt instead of launching Typhoon. Halder and company were the ones that wanted Typhoon and reaped what they sowed for neglecting the spreading logistical rot in the German army.

Hitler deposed his generals because they'd spent 1941 disobeying his orders in just the precise pattern to lead the Corporal to increase his distrust of his generals. Hitler had every military reason in the world to sack the people he did. The Wehrmacht handled 1941 very poorly, and in their memoirs blamed Hitler for their mistakes.

Remember Hitler was a psychotic evil sonofabitch bastard, but he was not stupid.

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Hitler, IQ-wise, was not stupid, but he was ignorant, uneducated, impulsive, irrational, and insecure. I can believe that some of the generals around him did make some of the mistakes that he is attributed with, I also have no problem accepting that Hitler did make ridiculous mistakes all the time, militarily, politically, and economically. He often refused to make decisions until too late, pawned off responsibility for things on people like Goering, who had no ability to actually carry out their responsibilities , and then got angry about their failures before forgiving them and giving them more chances to screw up.

Hitler was a terrible leader who refused to listen to the advice of his professional advisors and made numerous bad decisions. The meme that the German generals were actually to blame for Hitler's mistakes is played out. Hitler screwed up regularly, though so did his advisors. However the general staff was handpicked by Hitler for being yes-men, rather than independent thinkers who would stand up to his bad decisions. Remember the stand fast was Hitler's idea and cost the Germans badly at places like Demyansk.

@Snake Featherston

This point cuts both ways as well though. When the Soviets seized the initiative, the Germans always imagined they were facing an enemy enjoying 3 to 4-1 strategic superiority and 8 to 16-1 tactical superiority wherever the Soviets decided to launch their next attack.

It's kind of hard to imagine what the OSS saw in intelligence head Reinhard Gehlen -- his figures were so wildly wrong the man must have been amazed he ever worked again. The 16-1 superiority was simply a projection of Nazi dogma. Soviet strategic superiority was in reality only 1.5-2.5 to 1 and operational superiority seldom more than 4-1 at best.

... the point being that (partial) defeat of the USSR ought to have been imaginable. It wasn't beyond the bounds of possibility for Germany to hamstring the Soviets so badly they could reduce their commitment in the East to 80-odd mostly infantry divisions. Cutting the Persian lend-lease corridor would have been a giant step in that direction.

dduff442 said:

@Snake Featherston

This point cuts both ways as well though. When the Soviets seized the initiative, the Germans always imagined they were facing an enemy enjoying 3 to 4-1 strategic superiority and 8 to 16-1 tactical superiority wherever the Soviets decided to launch their next attack.

It's kind of hard to imagine what the OSS saw in intelligence head Reinhard Gehlen -- his figures were so wildly wrong the man must have been amazed he ever worked again. The 16-1 superiority was simply a projection of Nazi dogma. Soviet strategic superiority was in reality only 1.5-2.5 to 1 and operational superiority seldom more than 4-1 at best.

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Gehlen played the OSS and they had no idea what was actually going on in the Soviet Union, only knowing that the Germans were highly effective in killing Soviets, so when they were handed what they thought was a left-behind resistance network, they jumped at it. The Germans did hand them some excellent intelligence on high level Soviet telex communications, the FISH decoder ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fish_(cryptography) ), so probably thought if the Germans were doing that well, then they were telling the truth about other things....

Anyway, Gehlen was giving a supremely difficult task of assessing the capabilities of a police state that no one in the world had up-to-date about. Yes his organization screwed up, but they were at best guestimates about what was going on behind the iron curtain. It didn't help that the various intelligence services around the world, MI5/6 included, were riddled with Soviet agents.