Kalter Krieg - a TL of a three way cold war

[Alex1guy]

As vain and horrible as the USSR and the Reich's building projects were, I must say they would have been breath taking to behold. This is a really epic timeline!

[Zaius]

An excellent read. Like so many others I particularly like the grandiose architecture resulting from the "construction race". I can't wait to see how the various power blocs will approach expansion into space ITTL. If many of them try to compete in this regard, then even the collapse of one needn't remove the impetus for space exploration which is bound to produce interesting results.

[MSZ]

Originally Posted by Zaius

An excellent read. Like so many others I particularly like the grandiose architecture resulting from the "construction race". I can't wait to see how the various power blocs will approach expansion into space ITTL. If many of them try to compete in this regard, then even the collapse of one needn't remove the impetus for space exploration which is bound to produce interesting results.

I have something planned for the space race, just don't want to spoil it. Let's just say that with Germany being part of it, TTL Outer Space Treaty would be different than OTL.

Next part is up

The 50’s were a time of significant changes taking place in both Serbia in Croatia. After a decade of German occupation and extremely tight control from German military authorities, the local fascist leadership started to be tired of it, as well as were the people of these states. In 1953 a joint declaration was signed by the Ustascha and the ZBOR on mutual friendship between the two nations the parties represented, which also expressed regret for the losses both had suffered in the past 11 years, which de facto also meant condemning the German atrocities which had taken place during the Yugoslav Civil War and the years after. The “cult of personality” which was present in both states was criticized by certain elements in the powers structures, particularly by the “old guard” fighters who also took part in the struggle for their countries independence, but after the war were often persecuted due to their anti-German stance. Newly introduced laws which allowed for press to be released by private enterprises (under government supervision and censorship of course – but still an improvement over a full state monopoly) allowed for ideas to spread and a demand for reforms to grow. Most subjects discussed both by politicians as well as the people involved the bureaucracy within the administration, rule of law in the justice system (which interestingly was not declared to be part one of the basics of justice, replaced by the German legal concept of justice being based on the “common sense of the Volk”, allowing judges to sentence defendants for “crimes” not present in codebooks or any other law), independence of foreign policies, waste in economic production and the presence of the Serbian and Croat fascist parties in the international fascist movement.

While the upper classes and the intelligentsia expressed their dislike of the government by means of writing and speech, the veterans and workers did so by factory strikes and street manifestations. Many war-time regulations were still in place by the mid-1950’s, and tight military control led to the life conditions of the majority of the population not only not improving, but also growing worse in some areas. Germany ruthlessly exploited the former Yugoslavia, stripping it bare of resources and goods, going as far as stealing pigs and chickens from farms to provide them to their own farmers. This contradicted governmental propaganda od “friendship with Germany” and “rising racial and national consciousness bringing a rise in development”. With the contact between the leadership and the people being lost, everyday difficulties common folk had to experience were alien to the higher ups, creating a spiral of hatred – the lower downs hating the leaders for their exploitation, submission and wealth, the leader hated the lower downs for them “not understanding the grand scheme of things”, blaming “jews and communists” for all the shortcomings. The societies trust in the leaders began to erode.



Croat Propaganda, depicting the "brotherhood of arms" with Germany


The place where the social conflict would take place in the form of a general strike was Split – a large industrial and transportation hub. Dissent was growing since 1952, due to the workers of Brodosplit Shipyards being forced to pay increased taxes due to their company’s “exceptional performance”, which combined with a general freeze in wages led to them de facto suffering from reduced payments. Attempts at remedying the situation by petitioning the Ministry of Industry and the local party work offices had failed, leaving no or not satisfactory answers. Similar situations were present in various other manufacturing plants as well. In this situation, a joint group of delegates were from 21 factories were chosen in May 1953 to go to Zagreb and present Ante Pavelic with the situation and proposed solutions. The delegation included representatives of both the workers, as well as the company owners, who too were dissatisfied with the situation, and acting in the spirit of corporatism, were willing to cooperate with the staff – the solutions being already an accepted compromise between the groups. Upon arriving in Zagreb, the delegation met with the poglavik who promised to push through the necessary changes for. Returning to Split, the delegates were greeted as heroes, but not for long. Three days after their return Pavelic broke his promises, withdrawing from the agreement. To make matters worse, the day after that, on the 15th of May, the Minister of Agriculture declared the planned prices for basic food products, which were noticeably higher than the former ones. This declaration was already planned to be expressed much earlier, but as a result of non-communication between the ministries was not postponed despite the tense atmosphere. This declaration was the spark that ignited the May General Strike.



The Brodosplit Shipyards, site of first anti-ustasche demonstrations in Croatia


On the 18th of May the workers of the 21 factories who sent their delegates to Zagreb declared a strike and took to the streets, quickly joined by many others, turning it from a workers strike to a great national manifestation. About 50.000 people participated, making it all the way to City Council. Demanding the recognition of the achieved agreement as well as lowering food prices, the demonstrators were still under party control with their members among them – as they themselves, having participated in forming the company compromise and being assured by their superiors of its immediate implementation felt cheated. Demands for either King Tomislav or Ante Pavelic to come to Split to talk to the protestors were made as well.

After 5 hours, when it began to be obvious that the demonstrators would not let go, the City Council requested that the police forcefully remove them from before the City Council, as they began to fear their building might be stormed. Police units were brought before it, but the demonstrators refused to leave, on the basis of their presence there being legal according to former Yugoslav laws, and that present regulations forbidding them from doing so were war-time ones – no longer in force. The police did not break up the strike, having insufficient force and the requested the capital for reinforcements. Word of what was happening made it to both Ante Pavelic, as well as Alexander Löhr, the Commander of German Armed Forces in Croatia. Who exactly made the decision remains uncertain, but nevertheless, the central government decided for the use of the Croat Army to take down the demonstrators. A special “pacification” group was established with the goal of “restoring order” in the city. In the afternoon, tanks began to roll in into Split, and a crackdown on the demonstrators began.



Demonstration in Split, seen from air


The demonstrators learned from a local policeman of the approaching army units as well as on the fact that their families began to be arrested, as well as the original delegates to Zagreb. The huge crowd thus abandoned the City Council and made their way to the local prison where the arrested were being brought. The building was stormed the prison guard giving up all information about the newly arrived, as well as the keys to the prison gates and armory. About 200 people were thus released, not one of them being arrested for criminal activity (common criminals remained in their cells and policeman were allowed to carry out their normal work as usual, although they were disarmed). The large group spread, taking control of the adjacent court and prosecution buildings, stealing and burning files. A number of people were injured, but no fatalities. The disorder went on until around 15:30, when the military arrived – the local area was locked down and shots were fired, the demonstrators being shot at on sight. Fire was exchanged, leading to 3 soldiers being killed, as well as 254 civilians. On midnight, martial law was introduced in the whole city, with mass arrests taking place.

The events that took place in Split echoed across the fascist bloc as well as the world, though not much in Croatia itself – state propaganda purposely refusing to inform about it. It led to large changes among both the populations who no longer trusted the fascists, as well as the leaders, who realized that them remaining in power was not certain. Many among non-Croats fascist parties took this as a “wakeup call”, looking for ways to avoid such things taking place at home. Some economic and social reforms took place as their result, with the results varying from country to country – sometimes leading to social moods being bettered, sometimes leading to greater dissent and other demonstrations and strikes – which were also broken by force.

The situation was also growing tense in Czechia. Following the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1940, the rump State of Czechia was gradually forced into accepting more and more German sponsored legislation, eventually turning it into another fascist state in German orbit. Emil Hácha was not in a position nor the type of person to resist the changes, the general Czech population also being content with accepting German domination in central Europe, not seeing the possibility of fascism failing in the expected future. A new constitution was introduced in 1945, shortly after Hácha’s death, in line with fascist doctrine. A one party system was established, allowing only the official National Unity (Národní souručenství) party to operate (except for the German minority party), the position of the Head of State being granted to Josef Nebesky as the “Vůdce” – combining the positions of Prime Minister and State President, granting it dictatorial powers. However, despite these changes, Czechia remained the most liberal and free of the fascist regimes. The fascist in the country were very weak and ineffective before 1940, and even with German support they were unable to take full control of the country. The National Unity allowed anybody to join, including members of all former parties, which would then form different “wings” within the party, creating a sort of “multi wing system” within the single party. It in fact became a custom for a person coming of age to sign up – not as a sign of support, but rather of resistance as it made the theoretically “fascist” be made up mostly of non-fascist. Terminating membership without any reason was hardly an option nor was demanding any special requirements – being a “mass movement” based on ethnicity it was meant to allow anybody Czech to join, and in the few occasions when requirements were demanded, local party groups (also being non-fascist) would simply ignore them. Most of the top leadership wasn’t even willing to change the situation – with the population remaining more less content there was no need to change the status quo. Anti-state agitation was forbidden, but again almost all of those arrested were quickly released. Even anti-jewish legislation wasn’t enforced, most complaints on that coming from the German minority which however did not really have any authorities to turn to – state offices and administration would routinely hear them out and ignore them. Incredibly most of the people did not even seem to understand that they lived under a “fascist regime”, and were rather seeking to preserve a “live and let live” situation between them and the rulership, the rulership doing mostly the same. Like blades of grass, the people of Czechia bent under the fascist hurricane, but thank to that – the wind didn’t break them.



Josef Nebesky, first Vudce of Czechia


The situation began to change in the 50’s, with a new generation, one being raised in the environment beginning their lives in the adult world and seeing the difficulties their parents in Czechoslovakia, or even their grandparents in Austro-Hungary did not have to live with. Thinking that now that they had a state of their own, they realised the ridiculousness of the situation they were in and demanded changes to be made. Demonstrations were more common in Czechia than other fascist states and mostly regarded unpopular fascist reforms or decisions which were also often recalled after them – leading too few major changes being done (the constitution being one of them), the free market economic system also being mostly untouched, allowing the country to develop at a faster pace than its neighbours, despite losing most its industry in 1938. This did create a certain anger in Germany, but wasn’t considered a major problem – with the Reich having little direct order to the Czech government and it being very compliant with requests (accepting to join the OMEWZE as Berlin Pact with no protest) there was no need for taking action. After 1950, things started to take for the worse though, with the various administrative orders and Berlin-originating directives becoming unbearable, as well as a major drain on Czechia’s limited finances. The students of Czech universities were among the most “rebellious” groups in the country, young age and a large degree of freedom the universities granted being the reason they were willing to act. The first major demonstration took place in July 1955 after the governments declaration of raising tuition fees as well as terminating any “tuition-free places” together with a large degree of the scholarships granted. The new law was made partly for financial reasons – as the country needed money from anywhere tit could get it – as well as had German backing, believing that this could reduce the quality and popularity of Czech universities, which even many reichsdeutsche attended. Like many times before, the legislation was withdrawn, but unexpectedly the students found out it was reintroduced in August. This caused a second demonstration, this time much larger. No longer were only students involved, but also workers, farmers, veterans and all other social groups as part of a National Unity rally – as all of them were members after all, thus bypassing any possible refusal on the governments side to ban it.




The "National Unity rally" on the Weneclaus Square in Prague


On 1st of September 1955 the rally of over 200.000 people took place in Prague, demanding the governments and Nebesky’s dismissal as well as new elections to the Czech parliament to take place – with the hope that the democratic elements within the party could emerge victorious. The rally was peaceful and quickly found support among many who were in the Party’s service – including the Czech radio, whose directors even invited the rally leaders to their studios, interrupting regular broadcasts with various other auditions, including interviews with them, their official and non-official demands and declarations, tales of the wars given by veterans as a “heart-warming” part meant to increase morale, as well as stories ridiculing the Germans in many ways. Those producing the broadcast did not identify themselves but often used the pseudonym “Jaroslav Hašek” instead – in memory of the author who made fun of the former German regime as well. The broadcast was transmitted beyond Czechia and could be well heard all over Europe, informing everyone of the ongoing situation.

The government didn’t take action. When on 3rd of September von Moyland arrived to Prague, officially to “assess” the situation he met with Nebesky who assured him everything was in order and that the demonstration would be ended shortly. Returning to Berlin the next day, von Moyland delivered the assurance to Goring – their conversation taking place at the same time when Nebesky would accept the demands, dismissing himself and his cabinet from their positions and offering his office to Jan Šrámek, a former member of the Czechoslovak People’s Party. Šrámek, despite his age, took the office and was sworn in by the Czech parliament on the same day. He appointed the ministerial offices to the various leaders of the rally and promised that free elections would take place as soon as possible – allowing the new government to make the necessary preparations and not interfering in its work. One of the first actions taken by the new government was declaring Czechia’s neutrality and withdrawal from most of the fascist blocs international organizations. The Czech secret state police was declared disbanded, in an effort to get popularity its members were offered the possibility to join the road police “so that they can catch real criminals”, as said by Šrámek. The situation grew more bizarre with each passing day, the remaining fascist countries being very amused by what was going on. Czech embassies were crowded with people expressing their support abroad, with goods being brought there in a sign of friendship.



Jan Sramek, prime minister of the "emergency government" of Czechia (he never claymed the title of Vudce)


Germany was not laughing however. The events taking place undermined its power and prestige and it sought to bring a friendly regime back to power in Prague. Intensive talks were quickly held between Berlin and the Czechs which gave no result – threats, such as refusing it credits, blocking of Czechia’s borders, “starving it to death” etc. were laid on deaf ears, as the new people in charge, as well as the general population were quite confident about their ability to live through those hardships. One such conversation with the German Gauleiter of the Sudetenland was even recorded and later transmitted on radio – the government living up to its promise of being “crystal clean”. Germany would realize that without the presence of actual enforcers of its will present somewhere, they really did not have much influence over others. Punitive actions against the Czechs in Germany took place, their assets seized and bank accounts frozen, despite the protests of other fascist states, most loudly by Italy, Poland and Hungary. Though Slovakia complied with the German demand on closing the border, Poland did not – and trucks and trains of freely given goods would come through the narrow border. The events taking place in Czechia were no longer a “local misbehaviour” – but a large problem, a sign of Germany’s inability to control its region without force and inviting the non-occupied states to follow Czechia’s example. In order to prevent that, Goring finally decided to put an end to the “local misbehaviour” – a term Goring used to refer to the events early on – by force.

The Wehrmacht entered the State of Czechia on 16th of September and occupied the country within a day. Officialy this was the answer to alleged atrocities being commited against the volksdeutsche in the country and the reforms breaching the German-Czech Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation from 1940. The Czech Army did not resist, nor did the civilian population. The new regime took no steps to forestall a potential invasion, despite the ominous troop movements by the German Army it knew about. The Czech leadership believed that any invasion would be too costly, both because of domestic support for the reforms and because the international political outcry would be too significant even for Germany. Upon the Heer arrival to Prague, Šrámek and his cabinet were found in his office and arrested by the German Military Police and flown to Berlin. A new “emergency government” was set up, one composed almost in half from the members of the only group fully loyal to the Reich – the remaining Germans living in Czechia. Hans Krebs, who was among the leaders of the Moravian Germans, became the new “Vůdce”, remaining in office for five years, during which Czechia was “fascified”. Central governmental authorities were temporarily moved to Jilgava. Other changes involved complete suppression of opposition groups, the full reinstatement of censorship, the dismissal of specific reformist officials, the dissolution of the National Unity party and its replacement with the Czech National Socialist Party. Repressions against the population was rampant, with the German Army serving as the new enforcers of state policy.




Hans Krebs, second Vudce of Czechia


Although Germany promised to withdraw its forces from Czechia immediately, this didn’t happen. The intervention also did not create any of the fallout Czechs expected to occur despite that it was de facto a breach of the Munich Agreement the West participated in forming as well. Germany denied accusations of breaching that agreement as they did not annex the country or officially turn it into a Reichsgaue like Bosnia or some other form of protectorate – rather, Czechia officially remained an independent state, just one happening to be headed by a German. Sanctions against the Reich were not introduced, vetoed in the League of Nations by Germany itself. The intervention in Czechia was a double-edged sword for Germany however. Until then, it could realistically rely on diplomacy, economy and ideology to preserve its interest in the region, forming partnerships of sorts with other countries, which while beneficial for both sides, aided Germany more than others. These ties were also what in fact allowed it reach its position, the countries of Central Europe believing that compromises with the Reich, once reached, would be abided by. While none of them dismissed the threat of a German intervention, it was not used as a threat to force Berlin’s agenda through. After 1955, this changed. It allowed the Reich to strengthen its grasp over its sphere of influence on one hand, losing credibility on the other. Germany, which for the past years tried to create the image of an honest partner, willing to protect others from the looming threat of communism with varied results, once more became a menace, another entity to be feared rather than to be relied on. Brute force would be what Germany had to start depending on more and more, which in turn strengthened the “resistance” among other fascist bloc states – particularly Italy, Poland and Hungary which felt threatened the most by the Reich and would cooperate more strongly to prevent a second such intervention to take place in either of them.

[Shaby]

So, Germans find themselves in the same situation as Soviet Union of OTL. Except that they do not control their allies as closely as Soviets did. How diverse are fascist block armies are in terms of equipment? I'd guess Italians have their own equipment, but does Poland have such capacity?

[MSZ]

Sorry for the late update. Easter used up most of my time. Here is the next part.



Hungary would also see its own share of domestic problems. Since 1920, the Kingdom had been ruled by the regent Miklos Horthy and supporting him was the Party of Hungarian Life. His popularity rose greatly after regaining much of the territories lost after the Great War, those gains coming unfortunately at a great cost in lives and wealth. German pressures led to the introduction of a number of reforms, moving the Szeged-fascist system to a more National-Socialist one. The Arrow Cross Party was officially guaranteed a minimal participation in the power structures of the state, including a minimum of 20% of seats in the parliament regardless of election results (which since 1944 had always been higher than that) as well as positions within the government, including Ferenc Szalasi becoming the deputy Prime Minister. The German Minority Party under Franz Anton Basch was also granted minimum participation rights. This however was not satisfactory for the Hungarian national socialists who perpetually tried to upset the system seeking more power. Various actions, including arrests, racist legislations, forceful seizure of property were conducted, with Horthy and the Hungarian Life Party immediately belaying or preventing them. Retaliatory actions against the Arrow Cross Party however would always lead to Germany stepping in for it, preventing repercussions. This sort of a “dynamic equilibrium” was maintained for almost two decades, with Horthy’s main role being preserving the balance of power, preventing a Nazi takeover without destroying the Nazis or upsetting Germany – as the threat of possible revision of borders was permanently looming, the Romanian Iron Guard being very pro-German specifically for that reason. Universally hailed as a national hero even during his lifetime, his great charisma allowed him to rally the Hungarians behind him, despite economic difficulties and Hungary’s role in the region diminishing under his reign. His death in 1957 was the end of an era, with a three-month long period of national mourning taking place. Istvan Horthy, his elder son, prepared for being his successor took over the position of Regent, his political skills, charisma and prestige however not even coming close to that of his father. Being prepared for the role of leader of Hungary for over a decade, his role in the state steadily grew despite not wielding any actual power.





Funeral of Miklos Horthy, Regent of Hungary


Istvan Horthy was a representative of a new generation of fascist leaders, the ones who did not live or serve through the time of the Great War. Educated in the west, and having worked in the industry business for a large part of his life, his military and political experience was limited, despite spending the last ten years of his father’s life under his tutelage. Not having fought any wars himself, and being somewhat shunned by the military due to many officers knowing his rank (that of eventually a colonel) was granted to him solely because of his father, he in turn diminished the importance of the military in state affairs, “Hungary not needing a Bonaparte” being his words. A friend of large business, he saw fascism as a means of bettering the livelihood of the people and increasing their wealth by directing the efforts and resources of the state to the construction of an infrastructure useful to the public rather than the military – such as hospitals and schools, “butter before guns”. He also realized that modern wars, more than anything required money rather than bullets, hence the welfare of the people was to come first – and the fascist state was to guarantee that by granting free or cheap access to what was normally a costly part of everyday life – food, water, electricity as well as other things, such as railway tickets, health service, higher education and such. These were to be achieved by the cooperation between state enterprise and big businesses – over which the “small Regent” had watched over during his work with his father. He also supported a certain liberalization in the Hungarian Life Party – with other parties being officially banned, many of their members joined the official one, which thus became more diversified harbouring people of varied views, from real Szeged and Italian Fascists to simple monarchists and conservatives.

Hungary’s economy hardly grew through the decade after the Vienna Compromise and the Yugoslav Civil War, the loss of most of the country’s financial assets, large debts having to be paid to Germany, buyouts of Hungarian factories by German conglomerates and the various administrational practices of the OMEWZE strongly hampering development. By 1950 about 80% of Hungarian trade was conducted with Germany, like most countries east of Germany involving the export of foodstuffs and pre-manufactured goods in return for capital goods, machines and hard currency. This made Hungary very dependent on the Reich, as despite the OMEWZE provisions, it could withhold Hungarian exports and make up for the differences by importing from other central European states, placing them at a permanent disadvantage. The “little regent” tried to remedy the situation in a very fascist way – by combining small and large businesses of the same or similar branches into “alliances” under state protection. Combined, private and state owned enterprises would resist German attempts at taking over control. The arms and motor industries would be the first to do so, followed by railways, rolling stock, metallurgical and chemical industries. Hungarian buses, coaches and trams would be particularly popular among the fascist bloc countries, exported overseas as well and easily competing with both German and western competition. Hungarian agriculture only began to recover in the early 50’s, after the terrible losses suffered after the expulsion of Romanians from Transylvania and uplifting large numbers of the population and their resettlement in the east. Only after a few years did the massive population movements stop and the population which remained on newly obtained lands managed to begin producing foodstuffs, returning production to previous levels. Hungarian wine and palinka production would remain in private hands of small businesses, not monopolised by state spirit industries like elsewhere and also becoming known for its superb quality across the world.



Ikarus buses and trolleybuses were export hits worldwide.


Hungary would be among those countries which would be the most disturbed by German domination in the fascist bloc, despite being heavily influenced by the Reich and susceptible to its demands. Having obtained territories from its neighbours in the past with German aid, those states would quickly turn their allegiance to Germany, hoping that by coming closer to it, border revision could once again be done. Hungary would do the same, thus remaining faithful to the Reich, but did not display the same submission to it, hoping to find different guarantees to its borders. Those came from Italy and Poland, which too did not wish to see further border revisions being conducted in central Europe, nor were they willing to accept total German domination. These three would thus form an unofficial alliance to both jointly cooperate with the themselves for mutual benefit, as well as to prevent German power rising too much. Hungary would remain the weakest of the three, due to its size, population and already present German influences, but it would nevertheless seek and often obtain Italian and Polish support in political and economic matters. The three states would hold annual unofficial summits in Visegard to discuss their situation, their results being more than just words. One result of this cooperation was the construction of an express railway on the Venice-Zagreb-Budapest-Lwow line, considered to be one of the most beautiful tourist lines in Europe. It also strongly benefited Hungary’s position, the railway being capable of moving high numbers of goods both to the Italian seaports in and near Venice, as well as establishing a direct connection through Transcarpathia to Poland, thus also giving Hungary the possibility of completely bypassing any possible German obstructions in Croatia.

The Hungarian military displayed sub-par performance during their participation in the invasion of Yugoslavia, modernization since the Great War going slow. By 1950, the standard issue rifle of the Hungarian infantry was still a FÉG 35M bolt-action rifle modified to use the 7.92 x 57mm Mauser ammunition. The demand on using German weaponry, ammunition and spare parts was one of the many ways Germany maintained its domination in the Berlin Pact and Hungary was one of its victims. It was only in the 50’s when the Honvédség began to introduce the German Stg-44 into its ranks, also producing its own variant at Lámpagyár factories, the A-55. Most of the Hungarian military equipment remained German produced however, or produced on a German license, such as the Turán tank or the 7.5 cm KGL 42 infantry artillery gun. The Hungarian motor industry did however secure a monopoly on providing trucks for the slowly motorizing army, RABA vehicles becoming gradually more common. Its air force was also almost completely German-made – in fact, Germany would routinely sell its older aircraft to its allies in the east, replacing them with newer versions for their own use.





A Hungarian Turan II tank


Hungary remained a highly stratified society with great social and economic inequality. Through the forties and fifties most of the benefits of economic development were awarded to the higher classes, while the general population hardly experienced any betterment, their real wealth even being reduced due to inflation. Industrialization allowed for Hungary to transform itself from an agrarian-industrial economy to an industrial-agrarian one, but despite the rise of the percentage of the population being employed in industry, real income remained mostly the same. Industrialization did not lead to social advancement as workers rights were limited and trade unions were banned. Most of the former nobility was pleased by it, but many of the fascists and nationalists were not, there aims being the activation of the potential the people represented. The concept of a “social function of property” had thus grown in popularity, the idea being a certain compromise between the property owners who sought to preserve their wealth, the nationalists who sought to distribute it and the fascists who sought to both use it, and gain social support. Propaganda became intense in workplaces and education facilities, the lack of rising wages being compensated with social events carried out at the companies expanses. This allowed for tone down dissent, but did not eliminate it – that the private wealth of individual workers did not grow could not be overlooked, despite them being granted other types of benefits the fascist state provided.

The elections in 1959, two years after Istvan Horthy’s rise to power, led to a significant change in the Hungarian Parliament. For the first time since 1943, the national-socialist Arrow Cross Party obtained less than 20% of the popular vote – a significant drop compared to the 35% it held just 4 years earlier. Although theoretically it would not change much, as agreements between the party and the regency guaranteed it at least 25% of the 199 seats in the parliament as well as the position of the deputy prime minister (held by Gábor Kemény), the Hungarian Nazis became agitated. The reasons for such as significant drop was not the result of the population changing their minds about them, rather the result of the new regent not turning a blind eye on the massive electoral fraud the ACP would routinely conduct every election for the last one and a half decade. Disliking them, young Horthy sought to gradually limit their presence in politics, starting by denying them the electoral advantages they had – following those elections, he would tell his co-workers that he intended to terminate their guarantees in the next elections. Further, together with Prime Minister Pál Maléter they would hold government meetings with only the non-ACP members at the regents personal hideout, excluding the Hungarian national socialists from participation in power. These actions were not unknown by them and their relations with the regency steadily eroded through 1957 to 1959, Istvan being considered by them one of the greatest opponents of the national-socialist movement in Hungary.





Istvan Horthy, second Regent of Hungary


The Arrow Cross was not willing to simply wait for what they expected would be their termination, one way or other. Neither were the Germans, who supported the ACP and shared their concerns. Istvan’s attitude of distancing himself from Germany and seeking closer ties (and possible protection) with Italy and Poland was very gentle though, toned down by his father while he lived, and by the events in Czechia after 1955. Realizing that fast changes would cause an immediate German reaction (something that was not certain before, when Germany stuck to its border treaties) he went with what he considered “small steps” – but which appeared much larger in Berlin. After the “lost” elections in 1959, Germany unofficially promised “full support” to the Arrow Cross Party leadership should its position in Hungary become threatened. This promise was however not handed from the government, but rather from the NSDAP chancellery making it of dubious quality. It was however good enough for Szalasi and his followers who took it as a promised bailout, emboldening them enough to start planning a takeover.

Istvan Horthy was not as charismatic as his father, nor did he manage to gather as much support. The generals were aware of his attitude towards the military, the Gendarmerie was not quite fond of him as well. The young regent was an exception in the fascist states having obtained power through inheritance rather than internal conflict between power groups, thus not possessing any stable support. The party of Hungarian Life, which he himself saw as his main source of power was in fact weakened by his actions – by liberalising it and allowing greater diversity within it, it became disunited and many of its members were opposed to the regent as well. The party did not have its own paramilitary wing either. The ACP however not only maintained a strong discipline but also an organized militia as well. Their contacts with the military would also lead them to believe that they could count on their support at best, or non-interference at the most likely – which was in fact all they needed for their planned coup d’état. Their plan involved mobilising their followers in Budapest and marching to take over the city while the regent was still in it, forcing him thus to “abdicate” – ending the “Kingdom of Hungary” and replacing it with the “State of Hungary” with Szalasi as “Nemzetvezető”. While that took place, reinforcements from the country were to be prevented from arrival by taking over railways leading to the capital. The ACP managed to obtain the support of the local police as well, guaranteeing them an almost full monopoly on “law enforcement groups” within the range of the capital.

Unfortunately for them, conspiracy was not what their followers specialized in. Information about the planned coup managed to reach the regent through a number of sources, mostly from various MPs whose support the ACP sought to obtain before going through with their plan. He was thus able to prepare for a possible, but to him not yet a certain putsch. Among the moves made was replacing Károly Beregfy, the Chief of Staff and commander of the land forces, associated with the ACP (though not a member) with the younger Béla Király, considered more loyal to the regency and holding a dislike for the national socialists. This big small move was the spark that began the 1958 Hungarian Coup, as the Szalasi followers came to believe that their plot was being uncovered, and steps would have to be taken sooner rather than later to remain in power.





Ferenc Szalasi entering his party headqurters at Andrassy Avenue 60, one day before the beginning of the coup


On 19 November 1958, the local Arrow Crossist militias in Budapest, reinforced with their compatriots from the rest of the country gathered on Andrássy Avenue for the purpose of holding their march. A parliamentary session took place on that, day and the plan involved taking control of the building while the delegates were still in it. Other groups involved at the time took control over the railways and roads leading to the city, removing tracks and establishing makeshift barricades. The Arrow Cross Party declared a “work-free day” keeping those capable of managing the rail and locomotives from even using them. Those insisting on going to work or already present were kept under guard. This way the Regent was denied the aid of the military as it simply couldn’t arrive. Upon learning of the ACP gathering on the streets, the Regent moved to the Castle Hill under guard. Béla Király gave out a general order in the country forbidding any units to leave their barracks without his direct order, simultaneously requesting the regiments located in the direct vicinity of the capital to arrive immediately. With the Arrow Crossists on the move, the troops considered loyal secured the bridges on the Danube and the Margaret Island, as well as the parliament building. By noon, the first fire fights began – the ACP did not expect any significant military presence in the city and attempted to take the bridges by force, leading to them being suppressed with machine gun fire. The Parliament building was surrounded and taken as a sort of “hostage” – the soldiers protecting it resisted a takeover attempt as well, but did not have enough ammunition to keep it going. Martial law was declared by both sides, the military controlling Buda and the ACP controlling Pest with 1800 soldiers on the governmental side and about 4000 on the side of the ACP – the loyalists holding however an advantage in firepower. Random artillery shots were exchanged, falling on Castle Hill, as well as Kossuth Square. A temporary stalemate occurred, both sides incapable of launching an assault on the other. To break it, both sides needed support from the country. On 14:00, Ferenc Szalasi, declared in his radio message countrywide the formation of the “Government of National Salvation” with him as Prime Minister calling for all those “loyal to the country and the Hungarian people” to join the fight against the regent – who had been accused of attempting a military takeover and dismissing the Parliament, as well as being responsible for the blood spill, which in fact had been true – the governmental side shot first. He thus requested his supporters, as well as those parts of the military and the Gendarmerie to support him, belaying the chief of staff’s order. The first regiments began arriving at Keleti by 17:00, bolstering his forces to over 8000. The Regent realized the grave situation he was facing and demanded additional forces to arrive at the city as well. In a small fight, the Army stormed the blockade preventing them from arriving at Kelenfold. The railway was taken back, allowing for reinforcements to make it to the city, about 4000 strong. The coup turned into a preparation for a Civil War, with soldiers in the countryside choosing whom to support and arresting, or outright killing their opposition. About 90 casualties took place on the day countrywide as a result of the attempted coup.

On the next day, on 10:00 am. the first meeting between Istvan Horthy and Ferenc Szalasi took place on the Arpad Bridge, attempting to defuse the critical situation. This attempt failed of course, as neither side could at that point talk with the other in good faith, knowing well that folding to the other’s demands would most likely result in them being placed before a firing squad. Szalasi demanded the Regents abdication and Pál Maléter’s dismissal, giving up their powers to him. This would effectively make him the dictator of the country, as it would make Gábor Kemény Prime Minister, granting the Arrow Cross Party full control of the executive branch. Horthy demanded that Szalasi and the ACP stand down and give up their arms, offering amnesty for their crimes. Nothing came out of the discussion, and three hours later at about 13:00 the rebels offensive began. The parliament had been taken and the defences on the Arpad and Margaret bridges had been breached, thanks to the arrival of tanks to the capital. Their offensive was however stopped soon after, as the loyalists already had anti-tank weaponry at their disposal, destroying a number of those arriving directly at the bridges, blocking them. A counter-offensive was held in the south with the ACP being pushed out of the XXI district. Occasional skirmishes continued well into the night, though most of the fighting ceased at dusk. With reinforcements arriving into the city for both sides, and communicational chaos, the military situation was uncertain for both sides. The failure of the rebel offensive meant however that the ACP lost the decisive military advantage it planned to obtain and in fact held for a short time. Having more resources at their disposal, the government was capable of bringing more support than the national socialists, placing the latter at a worse position.





Tanks in the streets of Budapest


The escalation was not reserved to the city. In the rest of the country, after numerous clashes among the troops in garrisons and barracks, the situation began to clear out. The ACP could count on more support among the military than other social groups, the regents dislike for the military being well known. Also, the fact was that most of the grunts came from the lower parts of the society, “exploited” by the regime and being one of the groups on which’s support it usually counted . Most of them thus usually complied with the orders given to them by their direct superiors, rather than the higher-ups even if they knew about them, which often wasn’t the case. When requested, the pro-rebel units went to great lengths to reach the capital to support the coup or attempted to take over other towns or cities in their direct vicinity, being mostly successful – as governmental units were restricted to staying in their quarters. Another 300 people died on that day in clashes between the two sides.

International reaction to the ongoing violence was mixed, as what was happening was often perceived as essentially a civil war between what was thought to be two cooperating fascist parties – not competitors. In the west, knowledge of Hungarian language was extremely limited, as was the information about what went on in the country – for many leaders both in the west and the east, the Arrow Cross Party and the Hungarian Life Party were the same, or two different names for the same, the differences between them being unknown. Thus when violence erupted, it was automatically branded as a “Civil War” rather than an attempted coup – as coups could not be conducted by those already in power, as was thought to be the case with the ACP. The League of Nations initially restricted itself to a general declaration urging for violence to be stopped. The second declaration made by the USSR condemning the Hungarian government for using violence was automatically vetoed by Germany, Italy and Poland. In general, nobody in either the west or east was prepared for what went on, nor had any plan on how to react to it – preferring to wait until more information was available.

The fascist states were much more knowledgeable about the internal situation of Hungary and knew about the brewing conflict between the ACP and the HLP, despite official statements and propaganda declaring “unity” of all political forces in the country. Germany had held a general pro-ACP stance for some time already, its “national socialist” philosophy and the Germanophilia of its leaders being considered better than the more ideologically independent “Szeged Fascist” – who drew more inspiration from Italian Fascism. The situation developed in an unwanted direction in German eyes, with Horthy stalwartly protecting his country’s “independence” despite it becoming more and more dependent on Germany – or perhaps because of it. In the numerous situations when the ACP took very dangerous actions against the ruling regime, the Reich kept bailing it out, preventing its collapse. Even despite that, Szalasi was forced to giving up his position as Deputy Prime Minister to Gábor Kemény, his second in command, he himself becoming a sort of “spiritual leader” of the Hungarian National Socialist movement. With Miklos Horthy’s death, Goring was vary about his son and his policies – and with good reason. His liberalization of the HLP was a source of great concern for the other fascist states, as it was seen as a “left-right deviation of fascism” – although the regent himself justified it by pointing out that the other fascist states allowed non-fascists to participate in the works of their parliaments – such as the former DNVP members residing in the Reichstag. With the Italy-Poland-Hungary “alliance” becoming more clear, ensuring it does not succeed in challenging Germany was a point of importance. Hungary was an obvious weak link, one Germany sought to exploit.

Already at 03:00 am. on 20 November Slovakia raised the alert level of its army, as an answer to the events in Budapest. Romania followed suit on the same day. Both countries held a silent hope that they could use the crisis to their own ends – which meant a revision of their border with Hungary. Both of their leaders also held a strong pro-German stance overall, in fact that “Hungarian vanity” would eventually result in an internal conflict in their country was something the Romanian leadership believed in and used as a reason for their apparent “non-action” towards regaining northern Transylvania, promising to take steps when the time was right. This seemed to happen just at that moment. Concentration of troops along the Hungarian border began, and a promise of supporting Berlin in an intervention against Hungary was made by both Bucharest and Banská Bystrica – before any such decision was made by the German government.






Slovak soldiers near the Hungarian border


Germany had thus been somewhat “absent” during the first day of the coup, it in fact preferring for the rebels to win, considering Szalasi a better alternative to the regent. When it became apparent that the ACP lost its chance of taking power by either surprise on the first day, or with military strength on the second, it found the need to react. It was hard to believe that after a direct attack on the government, a victorious HLP would allow the ACP to continue to exist – coup’s being almost always punished by death. The termination of the national socialist movement in Hungary thus became a very possible result, the execution of its leadership being almost certain. To prevent that, the ACP would have to succeed in taking power, which at that point it could only do with the aid of a German military intervention, like the one in Czechia 4 years earlier. While Romania, Slovakia and Serbia as well as many in the NSDAP showed interest in such a resolution, the sentiment wasn’t universal. An intervention would mean having to supress a nation of 10 million, which in the past had proven to not be of the ones who go down without a fight. While an intervention in Czechia was ultimately accepted by the rest of central Europe, on the basis of fascism being threatened there, this was not the case in Hungary, were the conflict was between two fascist groups – many believed that it had the right to choose its own path, the conflict in the streets being the result of a lack of conflict for succession on top. Even among the radical Nazis in Germany, the view that “National Socialism is not for export” was present, and that the Reich could benefit more by allowing the Szeged fascist and national socialists to fight it out between themselves – their conflict being a tool Germany used in the past to manipulate them. But should any side win, the internal conflict would be gone, as would that means of control – after all, there was no guarantee from the Arrow Crossists that they would remain subservient to Germany once they got rid of opposition. Thus it wasn’t certain to all that the loyalists victory would be an overall bad thing – though the collapse of the ACP wasn’t seen as good either.

In the night between the 20th and 21st of November, an emergency cabinet meeting was held in the Reich chancellery to debate over the Hungarian problem. Already after it was called, but before it assembled, a new message arrived – a request from the ACP and the German Minority Party in Hungary (through which it arrived) for Germany to intervene and save the failed putsch – though not in those exact words. The message meant that the ACP lost faith in the possibility of their victory at that point, which wasn’t surprising seeing that its relative power was shrinking at a rapid pace. It was thus another plea for a “bailout” from the situation it got itself into. Attached to it was the promise of aid provided to it by the NSDAP before the coup – one about which Goring had no knowledge of. Infuriated that such a declaration had been made in “in the name of Germany” – as that was how it started – he attacked the Party leader Achim Gercke for granting such a promise. Goring did not wish for another military adventure, understanding more than others how much “political capital” they cost. He nevertheless also understood the potential results of abandoning the ACP – and more importantly the German minority. Before the night ended, the Wehrmacht had been ordered to concentrate near the Hungarian border, while the German emissaries in Slovakia, Serbia and Romania joined up with the staffs of their host countries to prepare for a Berlin-Pact operation. Poland refused to participate, while Croatia’s preparations were stopped by an Italian veto. While a final order was not yet given, a message was sent back to the ACP, informing them that they are to remain in position and wait for further instructions – aid being on its way. This message was intercepted by the Hungarian loyalists and brought to the attention of the Regent – who was also made aware in the morning of troop movements along almost all Hungarian borders.





German Leopard tanks could be seen directly next to the border


The Hungarian government thus faced a difficult situation. Cracking down on the rebels was certainly within the range of its capabilities. By the 23rd the ACP had been reduced to just a few strongholds, (including Pest) mostly in the east, as martial law was declared in the entire country – those areas which had not already fallen under ACP control were thus prevented from doing so. Only in a few cases did the regiments side with the rebels, as most of those suspected of sympathizing with them were arrested beforehand. Martial law was unofficially justified by the necessity of preventing a foreign invasion – despite no such order being yet given. Should those few points of resistance be terminated, the country would face Berlin Pact sanctioned actions, including a possible partition. This could be prevented by giving in to the not yet defeated rebels – but would sacrifice the entire country to its national socialist regime. Horthy thus went looking for a third option, which firstly involved not taking action against remaining resistance (in order not to provoke the Germans). He needed to both bring the ACP to a negotiations table as well as seek a way to delay a foreign attack. To do that, a second meeting on the Arpad bridge took place. This time, Horthy suggested another deal – he would promise to abdicate after the crisis was resolved, as well as demand to be allowed to enter the Parliament building (where MP’s were still held and which was occupied by the rebels) with his token guard, and for it to be cleared of rebel troops. This would de facto mean him surrendering himself to the ACP, as the entire east bank of the river was controlled by them, even with the building cleared, re-taking it would be a matter of minutes. Szalasi agreed to it, hoping that doing so would bring him closer to forcing the regent to abdicate, not knowing that Horthy already surrendered all his powers to the Prime Minister – in case he was killed. Him leaving Buda would thus not disrupt the workings of the government. After removing the rebels from the parliament, Horthy entered it with his escort of 20 men, in order to address the MPs there and look for a resolution of the conflict.

Istvan Horthy presented the situation the country faced to the information-devoid MPs, telling them that terminating the rebellion would likely result in a Czechia-like resolution. He appealed to the ACP members still there to abandon their way for the good of the country, promising to forgive them for whatever actions were done – offering to even not give amnesty, as giving it would imply a crime having been committed, not doing so meaning leaving all rebels with a clear record. He declared his intent to abdicate and form a new constitution, offering to end the Regency and return the crown to the rightful heir – Otto von Habsburg. This surprised those gathered there immensely, as his father personally took action to prevent the Austrian royal family from returning to the throne. The sincerity of this declaration was very doubtful – for Horthy, this was just a tactical move to buy time. His entire venture to Pest was not part of some brilliant plan or the sign of his personal genius – it was mostly an act of desperation, as he well realized that the conflict could not be resolved by force of arms or him doing diplomacy from Buda. With the top-ranking ACP leaders being so power hungry to be willing to accept German occupation and partition just to obtain full control, he sought to come in contact with the younger arrowcrossist, those “more rational” ones. The idea was that the rebel movement may be divided internally, or at best experience a coup within their own ranks. It also was meant as a way to further delay the Germans. While the Nazi movement in Germany was generally anti-monarchist, it still held certain members of the old aristocracy as well as other pro-monarchists, especially among the Austrians. Despite the Habsburgs not being involved in the fascist movement at all, unlike other central European monarchies, the possibility of installing an ethnic German was by itself something not to be ignored. The Hungarian minority in Germany was quick to pick up the idea, and since contact between those in the Parliament and those outside was still possible with telephones and radios, the contents of the regents proposals quickly passed to headquarters of the German Minority Party and further to Berlin – as well as unofficially to Otto himself, who at the time lived in Spain.



Horthy speaking before the Hungarian parliament


Horthy’s mission was at least a partial success, very surprisingly for him. Monarchist sentiment wasn’t very strong in Hungary at the time, the new generation not remembering the Habsburgs, but with the country itself still being a kingdom and royal regalia being part of constant state propaganda it wasn’t non-existent either. More importantly, it wasn’t opposed – many conservatives and fascist were quite willing to accept a Habsburg return to the throne, if it was to mean terminating royal power (like in Italy), making the Prime Minister responsible before the Parliament (rather than the throne) and was to prevent the worst possible outcome – German invasion. Many of the Arrow Cross Party would too realize the threat such an intervention would be dangerous, despite their party propaganda which was extremely germanophiliac and officially stated that Hungarian border security was based on German approval and thus the threat of revision would come only if Hungary distanced itself from Germany – just what the Regent was doing. In their eyes, staying closer to the Reich than its neighbours was the best possible guarantee. The possibility of a return to status quo ante with the regent removed from power could still be called a success of the coup, even if it didn’t bring the ACP to power. With many of its members still feeling mostly loyal to their country, rather than their leader, Szalasi’s grasp over his own followers loosened a bit. But most importantly, with Berlin being brought to attention over the developments there, and the possibility of the disliked regent being removed from power peacefully, the order to do so by force was further delayed.

Italy had been closely monitoring the situation in Budapest, its conviction to keep the Fascist Bloc as an alliance of at least formally equal partners being strong. It was strongly opposed to the German intervention in Czechia and had very good reasons to prevent the expansion of German military presence beyond the Reich’s borders – with South Tirol remaining an ethnically German area, it did not want to risk a situation where Germany would even have the possibility of annexing further territories – the shortly existing idea of incorporating Czechia to the Reich on the basis if it being a former member of the Holy Roman Empire being a sign of the Nazis not abandoning their ambitions of expansion. Italy was also strongly opposed to the Nazis strongly republican stance – it itself being a kingdom, it did not see it necessary to abolish monarchies. Preventing Hungary from falling to the national socialists and/or the Germans was thus seen as important.

Umberto II urged Benito Mussolini to take part in resolving the crisis, in part to prevent anti-monarchism from rising, in part for seeing Hungary as a crucial part of the non-Nazi fascist bloc of which Italy was an unofficial leader. Mussolini, despite being 75 years old was still quite lively and highly respected abroad. He too realised the importance of keeping Germany at bay, the disparity of power between Italy and Germany growing larger with time. Still, in his meetings with Goring he talked with the Chancellor as with an equal, making up for his country’s relative weakness with his charisma and the mythology of the “founding father of fascism” behind him. Initially however he did not seek to interfere in Hungarian affairs, preferring the regent to the arrowcrossists, but staying true to his view of “fascism not being for export” and it being a sacred right of every country to follow their own path of development – except if they were part of the Italian Empire of course. It was only after preparations for the intervention began that he decided to take action – firstly by belaying the order of using the Croatian Army, demanding that Pavelic stops his troops from gathering despite Berlin-given orders. After informing the local German commander Alfred Müller of this, Müller contacted Berlin looking for orders. The German Staff ordered him to stop preparations, both of the Croatian and the local German troops. Sensing that Goring was very convinced about having to move into Hungary, Mussolini decided to take advantage of German uncertainty. On the 25th of November he arrived to Hungary, seeking to end the crisis before Germany got the upper hand.


Benito Mussolini in Budapest



His visit was prepared ad hoc. For safety reasons, his plane landed on a military airfield outside Budapest. His arrival was announced to Szalasi, who vowed not to disturb him – Mussolini’s reputation being just that powerful. Il Duce requested a summit to be held between the ACP and the regency, with him as a mediator. It was meant to take place in the Parliament building as a sort of “neutral ground”. The purpose of it was to form a “common response” to German actions, as well as forming a new government – one which would be more representable than the two separate ones already in existence. It was also a rather sneaky way to further delay the Germans – Goring could hardly accept a situation where such a summit would be held without a German representative – doing otherwise would undermine its position. Ignoring it wasn’t possible either – it would be hard to imagine German tanks rolling into the Carpathian Basin while such a Mussolini-held summit was taking place. Goring’s reaction was thus an immediate, almost impulsive demand for Germany to participate – which was also exactly what both Mussolini and Horthy sought from the start.

Von Moyland came to Budapest on the 26th, his guidelines being that of demanding Horthy to step down, the Arrow Cross Party and the rebels not to be harmed, guaranteeing their participation in the government and parliament, protecting the interest of the German minority and the economic ones of the Reich. This meant that from the very beginning the Arrow Cross Party was at a losing position – as the German foreign minister was not authorized to demand a full disbandment of the opposition to the ACP – that they were to “participate” implied they were also to share power. The summit went on for two days, despite the city being technically in a stage of siege. While many were looking nervously at Budapest and awaiting the results of the meeting, wondering what would come of it and if it would be a success, the situation was much calmer in Berlin, Rome and even Budapest itself. Since the summit was already taking place, it would mean that a “diplomatic solution” would have to be found – anything else would be a failure for all sides. The results of the summit would be given out on the 28th. In his last speech as regent, Miklos Horthy spoke before the Parliament building to a gathered crowd. He officially stepped down from the position of Regent, offering the crown to the legitimate ruler. He also apologized for his own actions during the last two days, blaming himself for what happened – leaving the rebels guiltless. Such was the price for preventing a Czech-like resolution. The agreement reached would also amend the division of seats in the Parliament, guaranteeing 100 (out of 199) to the Hungarian Life Party, 80 to the Arrow Cross Party and 19 to the “Minorities Bloc” – a “to be formed” party representing all the minorities still living in Hungary. It would of course be German dominated, but by officially representing all of them, it was meant to justify it having almost 10% of all the seats. The ministries would also be divided along party lines, and a general rule of any political office headed by a member of one party having a deputy from the other. This was meant to “ensure cooperation” – but would mostly just “ensure control” of one over the other.





The abdication of the Regent


On the 1st of December the new government led by Géza Teleki was formed, Gábor Kemény remaining in the position of deputy Prime Minister. All former members of both the Regency and ACP governments were dismissed and replaced with office holders. The MPs, released from their involuntary “prison” would not gather again, as new elections were to be held in January, with the new provisions in use. Through December, Hungarian delegates would try to convince the heir apparent to claim the Hungarian throne promised to him – Otto being initially hesitant to be the Apostolic King of a fascist country – especially since it was demanded that doing so would require him to give up any claims to Austrian throne and other “non-Hungarain” titles (King of Croatia, Grand Duke of Tuscany, etc.) as well as recognize the Nazi “Habsburg Laws”, banning him from reclaiming his family wealth. It was expected by most of the political parties, as well as by the Germans that he would refuse, thus leaving the position empty, its symbolic powers thus given to the Primate of Hungary József Mindszenty. This would not be the case, as Otto von Habsburg would arrive to Budapest just before Christmas, spending the celebrations walking the streets – as a sort of test, to see if he would be accepted by the common folk, who were able to recognize him from newspaper photos. After New Years Eve he would officially accept the throne, thus becoming Otto I of Hungary. His coronation would be a great event, with the presidents, prime ministers and royals from the entire world attending – including those from such far-away places like the Emperor of Japan and the President of the United States. Him agreeing to take the throne also finally allowed the new constitution to be introduced, one cementing the provisions from the summit from November. The attempted coup would thus overall end up being a net gain for the Arrow Cross. With the regent out of the picture, their presence in governmental and legislation increased beyond the earlier level, and the HLP strength reduced to just one vote majority, it was quite confident in its power – despite most of state power residing in the hands of the Prime Minister. Géza Teleki would not last in his position for long, internal fighting quickly leading to the very typical for fascist states clashes of various interest groups – of which the ACP was one of strongest.

[MSZ]

With the victory of Mao in the civil war in China, the neighbours of the middle kingdom had to accept having to deal with bordering a communist country along their borders. Mao’s victory had a bitter under taste for China though, as both Tanu Tuva and northern Uyghuria were lost, incorporated into the RFSSR, as well as the fate of Manchuria, Mongolia and Korea were undecided, as they were still occupied by the Red Army, which showed no willingness to withdraw. Stalin sought a permanent dual alliance be formed between the two countries, insisting on Mao making concessions to the USSR – such as allowing it to build and use military installations in China, like air/naval bases and listening posts. Mao would have none of it. Determined to rid China of foreign presence, he refused on allowing Soviet troops on Chinese soil, stating that “all armies ought to stay at home”. He would not be intimidated by Stalin, insisting the two talk on equal footing, blatantly ignoring Soviet military superiority – having just won two wars, he was confident in the strength and endurance of the Chinese people. He did not consider the Red Army as a threat – rather as an obstacle. Mao refused to recognize the new regime in Manchuria, sticking to his line of both Taiwan and Manchuria being “rebel provinces”. To prove to Stalin his non-reliance on him, he would begin his own campaign of expansion to both undermine the position of the “Man of Steel” in Asia, and establish his own. While he was not threatened by anyone in his company, he sought to be seen as the legitimate “Hero of the Asian Revolution” and “Great Leader of the Proletariat”, titles which Stalin would use, as he was the one to end Japanese imperialism. Committees would form in Manchuria supporting the idea of “reunification” who would be responsible before Mao, not Moscow. Agitation would take place as well. Stalin would not forbid this, remaining confident in his ability to maintain control, as well as knowing that any overly brutal action could terminate the possibility of a strategic alliance between the two giants. He would honestly see it as not only a ‘possibility’ but in fact an important step in the inevitable victory of communism, giving up territorial gains being completely possible for him – provided he got what he wanted first. The Soviet resources and technological expertise, combined with the Chinese numbers and survival skills would create an alliance capable of overthrowing the western colonial empires, firstly in Asia, later in Europe. Mao in turned would want to prove that China itself could serve as such a force, being non-reliant on the USSR. He didn’t forget Stalin lukewarm attitude towards him and his general support for Chiang during the Civil War. Intense negotiations on the Moscow-Beijing line would take place through the fifties, and although the two would remain seen as firm allies, underneath tension would remain.





Mao and Stakin in Moscow, 1950


The diplomatic competition on the Sino-Russian front would turn violent much further south than where the source of that completion lied. With the communist victory in China, the situation in French Colonial Empire grew from bad to worse. Unlike Britain, France did not begin experimenting with granting self-determination rights to the people of its empire. This was not due to some kind of arrogance of the French, rather because of what was seen as a necessity. Its empire being not as profitable as the British, France needed all the revenue it could get from to pay of its debts and finance its army – reforms limiting income, or even requiring investments would have to abandoned, if they even were suggested. Thus, when the Arabs in the middle east were forming their own countries out of the British mandates, the ones living in Syria and Lebanon were still stuck with a French colonial administration. They were not isolated from the changes happening around them and demanded the same. In the same manner, the peoples of Indochina knew about the changes in India and China – the time of empires was coming to an end, and the demand for greater autonomy, self-rule or even independence grew.

It was quite surprising that France, having in the past spent a lot of resources on creating a Cordon Sanitaire around the communist USSR to protect not only itself, but the rest of Europe as well, would so lightly treat the matter of communist expansion in China, despite the neighbourhood of its Indochinese possessions. This was the result of not so much ignorance, but a different perception – having spent quite some time with “self-proclaimed” Marxists in charge, and coming closer to Russia, many French politicians had come to the conclusion that it wasn’t so much the communist ideology that was threatening, but the “vessel” which carried it. Hence while Communist Russia had to be approached with cautiousness, Communism in China, a second grade power was much less of a threat. Communism in Vietnam was seen as even less of a bother, believed to be either no different than the one in metropolitan France, and in the worst case – possible to deal with using simple police force. For many, it was in fact the possibility of a united China ruled by the nationalists that was the worst result of the Civil War in China. Chiang’s authoritarian regime based on a strong sentiment of national sentiment, combined with his own rhetoric on how democracy was impossible to be introduced in China at that point of its development, strongly reminded Paris of Mussolini and his “Doctrine of Fascism” which too opposed democratic traditions, claiming fascism to be “a step in development” of a more perfect, future system. Drawing from its European experiences, many concluded that a border with a communist state would be favourable than with a fascist one, which traditionally considered Indochina its “sphere of influence”. These calculations were completely wrong of course. In Europe, France faced what were established countries with centuries of statehood traditions, whose leadership was driven by the pursuit of national interest. In Indochina, the people never had a state in the modern sense, communism being viewed as a way to establish a new system from scratch – but requiring the destruction of the present oppressive one first. This would make Indochina susceptible to communist agitation, no longer coming from far away France – but from just over the northern border.

The Vietnamese population remained politically mostly non-active through the decades of French domination. Their culture, placing a great amount of respect on the elderly, had most of the young population be devoid of a “national sentiment” in the traditional European sense. Obedience to the elders prevented the young from looking for a future beyond their simple villages and cities, the rest of the world rarely coming to see them as well. Nevertheless, anti-colonial sentiment was present, though smaller compared to other parts of the world. Rebellions against the French weren’t completely unheard of. Sporadic revolts and uprisings began almost from the outset of French domination but effective opposition only arrived when Ho Chi Minh recognized the potential of Communism to unify the people and provide a strategy to defeat the occupying forces. From the 1920’s to 1949, Ho Chi Minh patiently brought together the disparate resistance groups to build a single organization - the League for the Independence of Vietnam, better known as the Vietminh.





Ho Chi Minh, the founder of the Viet Minh


With the Chinese communists coming to power, the potential of the Vietnamese resistance would grow. Infiltrations of Indochina by Chinese would begin to take place since 1950, albeit on a very small scale. Chinese emissaries would arrive in Vietnamese villages, encouraging them to take up the fight against their oppressors, being promised a better future. Those who would choose to answer the call, would form militias, trained by Chinese veterans and be armed with their weapons in the “safe haven” of China. They would later return and wreak havoc in northern Indochina. The colonial authorities, which usually restricted themselves to operating only in the urban areas, avoided the jungle allowing these rebels to get a large degree of freedom. Poor administration would often lead to officials ignoring such events in their reports to superiors or attributing them to simple bandits, not armed rebels. This would further delay a response, and make Paris unaware of the developments occurring. Mao on the other hand would know of it perfectly, being behind it in the first place. With the Vietnamese resistance movement being still in its infant stages, he sought to form one under his control. For Mao, causing a storm in Indochina would serve both his internal policy, maintaining the population in a state of vigilance, as well as his international position, potentially forcing the west to begin talks with him (as the People’s Republic of China was still mostly untecognized) and proving to Stalin he was capable of acting independently. Mao believed that this would strengthen him politically in Manchuria as well. On at least one occasion, he would say that he was ready for another War of Liberation, this time of Manchuria – implying his readiness to support an armed struggle against the Russians. In fact, he perceived the USSR as potentially the greatest threat to Chinese independence, his capability of igniting a war in Indochina being meant as a show of strength – if they could do it in Vietnam, they could do it elsewhere (Manchuria) as well.

The west, and the Axis powers would not recognize the new regime in China. Mao was not discouraged by it, knowing well that it took a lot of time for them to recognize the USSR as well. Stalin’s reaction to Mao’s adventures in Indochina was caution. He realized well that a potential success in Indochina would weaken his position in Asia, as at the time negotiations with the west regarding an anti-axis alliance were still going on. He would thus only take those actions which granted him deniability, providing China and Vietnamese with material aid in form of guns, ammunition, vehicles, medicine – but would not send any personnel to Indochina. This way he could still reap the fruits of being at least a “co-worker” in spreading the revolution in Asia, while at the same time denying any participation to the French, declaring USSR-made goods to come from the Chinese. Mao would take the opportunity to strengthen himself, seizing a lot of equipment meant for Indochina.






Chinese "volunteer" in Vietnam, wielding a Soviet AK-47 rifle


The French War in Indochina would begin in 1951 in the Bac Son district, where the Viet Minh would proclaim the abolition of the Vietnamese monarchy and the introduction of a socialist republic. This was de facto a declaration of war, though one not taken seriously in Paris at first. The French authorities would initially just ignore it, content with the little success they had in arresting communist propagandist in some cities. However with attacks on colonial garrisons, police stations, officers and other governmental authorities intensifying, France had to take action. Cities were reinforced with additional police forces for their protection, while the colonial army units were sent out to the Vietnamese jungle to defeat the insurgents. This would bring France into a frustrating partisan war for which it was ill-prepared. Having spent most of its military resources on modernizing and expanding its metropolitan army, meant for conventional warfare in the European temperate climate, the colonial forces were left with little recruits and equipment, both of which were either untrained or impractical for a tropical environment. The lack of experience became apparent when casualties would quickly rise – when faced against Chinese veterans with over a decade of practice, French rookies were woefully unprepared.



Ho Chi Minh speaking out his declaration of Vietnamese independence


In conventional warfare, fighting is done over territory, and firepower is a decisive means of victory. In a partisan warfare, it’s the contrary – there are no fixed positions, hostiles mix together with the people preventing their identification and the entire war is fought over granting the civilian population a sense of safety. Since partisans don’t care what territory they defend, they have the freedom to choose it, attacking when and where they want, deciding what loses will be experienced by both sides. A 51% success in a conventional battle guarantees a victory; in a partisan it is synonymous with a failure. Protecting 100% of the population on half the territory is better than controlling all the territory in just 50%. If 100% security can’t be obtained by the anti-partisans on at least part of the land the war is fought over, the partisans will eventually win. Thus, all they have to do is not suffer a defeat, which they can do by avoiding combat. This was what the French Army, not used to this kind of combat, couldn’t get their heads round – the concept of a “sanctuary”. The Viet Minh had managed to establish a network of ‘safe havens’, both in northern Vietnam and southern China, which would be connected by jungle roads unknown to the non-locals – hence, not destroyable. French units, carrying more equipment would be much slower than the rebels, allowing the Vietnamese not only to hastily withdraw if they thought the odds were against them, quickly relocating their ‘sanctuary’ elsewhere and reestablish it once the army was gone, but also to call for reinforcements and engage the enemy with numerical superiority – despite altogether their numbers being smaller than the French. This speed would be not only tactical, but strategic as well. When the French Army concentrated on defending cities, the communists would attack rural areas. When rural areas and villages would be reinforced, attacks would be carried out on urban areas and French strongholds and forts.





French colonial troops with tank support


Stalemates are rare in this type of conflict, and most often mistaken for one side regrouping and preparing for another strike, the other making similar preparations to either defend themselves, or counter-strike. Any country deciding to fight such a war by force of arms must accept a long and costly conflict – or a terrible bloodbath. The British, having fought these type of wars in the past, and won, knew their victory were a result of advanced technology like machine guns and repeating rifles. With these technologies being more and more cheap, and thus popular, fighting such wars was becoming more and more risky – a chance of winning it being the result of denying the opponent resources. While doable in the deserts of the middle east or in far-away Africa, India was not such a case, the overall northern border being impossible to fully control. For these reasons Britain preferred to keep at least some influence in India by winning over some “hearts and minds’ before a conflict there would get violent, exposing the Empire’s potential weakness. The French did not follow suit – not because of arrogance or stupidity, but because of their budget. For them, Vietnam had to be returned to a state of profitability to pay off debts. It was a simple economic matter, symbolism and prestige of holding a protectorate in Asia being an important, but still – second matter. France thus did not solve the problem it faced, neither by force or diplomacy and reforms. It kept doing what it was prepared, both materially and psychologically to do, that was a classical war with well-defined front lines – only this time, the ‘lines’ in Indochina would grow more and more ‘round’, with circles around urban settlements being considered ‘safe’ and the rest of the vast jungle being painted in different colors from ‘green’ – representing a safe area – to ‘red’ signifying danger.





French soldiers on patrol in Vietnam


France had made just about every possible mistake a participator in a colonial war could have made. The war in Indochina had become a very political topic, both between French political parties and France and Britain. In the 40’s, right wing sentiment was rising, partly due to the failures of the leftist, socialists cabinets, partly because of the apparent successes the ‘right-wingers’ in central Europe had. In 1948, the elections led to an awkward situation with the relative majority of the Popular Front being insufficient for a stable parliament, even with the communists support, who also grew in popularity. The centrists and conservatives potentially could take power, but a coalition between them failed to form, leading to a break-up of the Popular Front and the formation of a center-left + center right, communists, conservatives and others being left out. This parliamentary majority would only be slight and highly unstable, threats of withdrawing from it by members being constant, and eventually leading to its collapse in early 1951, a minority parliament existing until the elections of 1952, which were won by the conservative-centrist coalition. It was a bad timing for it however. The new government aimed at saving the French economy, which internally meant freezing the rise in wages, stopping certain investments and introducing numerous one-time taxes – reforms which were highly controversial. It further withdrew the delegalisation of the radical right wing and fascist parties, in a move to better relations with Germany as well as weakening the left – particularly the communists. Allowed to operate legally, it was thought they could be better controlled as well. It did not introduce any war-time limitations or censorship of press, hoping that an ‘ongoing war’ would allow them to rally the population behind them. This turned against the government however – the war got extensive press coverage with overall a few hundred war correspondents making a tour to Indochina – their works mostly reporting on the failures of the French Army, terrible conditions and a constant sense of fear experienced by just about everyone. These materials further demoralized the French population. The Vietnamese on the other hand used it as a means of psychological warfare – a general order was given out to all units that any journalists found were to be left alive, and brought to safety. Many stories were made of these journalists even deciding to remain with the Vietnamese people, staying with them in their huts, describing what the war was for the ‘other side’ – a fight for freedom. Upon their return to France, these journalists would then speak fondly of the Viet Minh, their written stories further fueling anti-colonial sentiment. When censorship was eventually introduced in 1957, after another victory of the center-right, it didn’t better the situation – rather, accusations of attacking ‘free press’ limiting ‘freedom of speech’ were made against them.

With their initial colonial forces having suffered heavy losses, another unpopular move was made - the decision to send conscripts drafted from metropolitan France. Their training inadequate, they would mostly serve as “cannon fodder” used to “overwhelm the enemy with superior numbers” – terms used by the French Governor General in Indochina Jean Decoux. Reminding people of the Great War, and how countless lives were casually thrown away then, anti-war sentiment grew, especially on the left – with members of the communist party going so far as strikes and acts of sabotage in arms factories. On the far-right however, the sentiment was radically different, with calls for further escalating the conflict and further sacrifices being made – all in the name of victory. This sentiment would be quite common among officer veterans of the Great War, who said that France had lost faith in her destiny, and preserving the empire was necessary to maintain its status of a great power. The war would thus strongly divide the society, the general poor population being gradually more opposed to it, the bourgeois and higher classes supporting it.





Jean Decoux, Governor General of French Indochina


With the war going badly, France would eventually turn to Britain for aid – with relations with the USSR not improving and the cold war going into full swing, depicting it as an “anti-communist war” became a popular figure of speech. While the British did closely watch the conflict, they were not willing to participate in a “colonial conflict on hostile ground” – as how Prime Minister Anthony Eden said it, “Indochina is no more French than Mexico”. Britain was uncertain on what to with the conflict in Indochina, on one hand fearing that it might lose if it would continue support “archaic French colonial rules”, on the other – that a complete French withdrawal would seriously threaten the rest of Asia. In 1956, the French President René Coty wrote to Prime Minister Eden:

Originally Posted by René Coty

“If we were to abandon our cause and allow for Indochina to fall to the communists hands, this would lead to a tragic shift in the balance of power in all of Asia and the Pacific, and ultimately affect both ours and yours global strategic position to a degree none of us can accept. It will be difficult to prevent a future takeover of Thailand, Burma and Indonesia. This we cannot allow. The Malaya, Australia and New Zealand will be facing a direct threat.”

Eden wasn’t convinced by this. He perceived Indochina as more of a threat, a swamp in which Britain might be caught, than a potential benefit and did not believe the “domino effect” hypothesis France displayed before him, that the fall one place to communism would necessary mean the fall of its neighbours and the fall of one colony would inevitably bring about a global cataclysm. For him, the best place for defense would be the Malaya, under British protection, where reforms of the same kind like in India could be done, preventing communism from being an attractive ideology. Britain realized that while in Europe it faced the Russian colossi, in Asia it faced China, which was very suspicious of the USSR, and Vietnam, which in turn was very suspicious of China. The communist monolith was much less united, as the conflict over Manchuria exemplified. Granting the people an alternative to communism in their desire for state building was the best way to prevent its spread. Eden’s answers to French requests for assistance were thus murky and evasive, trying to somehow break to France its refusal. After meeting with Admiral Radford of the Royal Navy, he would put it straightly that he “opposed a conflict in a far-away place where the Russians are strong an can manipulate the sentiments of the indigenous populations” and that there was “no real possibility of seeking a truce with an opponent which wasn’t yet defeated” – a silent acceptance of allowing Indochina to fall.

The culmination of the war would come in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, in the north-western part of the country, near the border with Laos. The lack of decisive victories for the French emboldened the people beyond Vietnam, in Laos and Cambodia, where communist militias would form as well. The region was considered to be strategically important, as it was through where supplies from China went to Vietnam and Laos. The French Staff decided to fortify the area and man it with elite soldiers from the French Foreign Legion, granting it also paratrooper and bomber aircraft support if necessary. It was believed that this could bring the Viet Minh into an open battle where they could be halted, and once routed – pursued into the jungle by the well trained elite units, eventually destroyed with a combination of training and aerial support. However what the French did, was placing themselves into a situation they couldn’t win in. The Viet Minh could simply ignore this troop concentration, thus preventing the best French soldiers from being present where real combat took place. If they decided to attack, it would be because they felt they had a good chance of winning. The Viet Minh bided their time and was thus allowed to prepare an offensive in a professional manner, with the aid of Soviet and Chinese advisors. On March 13 1957 a grand Vietnamese offensive took place, almost immediately taking two outer forts which were meant to cover the highland. They were taken with the use of Chinese artillery brought specifically for that purpose – something the French had no idea about. Subsequent attacks of varied strength would take place over time from different directions, tiring the defenders. Paratrooper reinforcements were called in, but due to bad weather fell at a bad position, right onto an attacking Vietnamese force – many soldiers were killed before they reached the ground.





Battle of Dien Bien Phu

This loss shook the French spirit among the soldiers. Having lost such a battle, morale fell, as fresh soldiers did not see the point fighting battles with an enemy which was capable of defeating professionals. The French government was also seeing less and less of a point in continuing the fighting, especially with the British pleading them to withdraw and concentrate their efforts somewhere else. A general withdrawal was organized in 1959, completely abandoning north Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In 1960, after elections were held, the new government would quickly negotiate the terms of withdrawal with the Viet Minh. Although neutral Geneva was suggested as the place where talks were to take place, that didn’t happened – instead Ho Chi Minh demanded that the talks were to take place in Versailles. Having been present there during the conference ending the Great War, he was refused his requests for granting Vietnam independence. Coming back, he sought to remedy that, humiliating the French and granting his country the same recognition other countries in the world had. The Versailles Summit would officially declare and accept the independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, all of which became socialist republics, strongly associated with China.






The Summit in Versailles


The end of the war also led to further deterioration of West-Soviet relations, as with time it became very obvious to the French and British that the USSR was not staying out of the conflict as it declared. With Indochina lost, Britain did in fact strengthen its ties with France, not by aiding it in its colonies, but by tightening cooperation in Europe – joint manoeuvres and General Staff gatherings being held on a regular basis. It was important to the UK to ensure that it did not wish to abandon France sending its advisors there as part of the MAAG (Military Assistance and Advisory Group) which was the beginning of British permanent troop presence in France.

[Strategos' Risk]

Stalin seems to be biting off more than he can chew with Manchuria. A Sino-Soviet split seems to be in the making already.

The British seem very prescient about the dangers of getting sucked into an Indochinese conflict. I wonder if the French are angry at them for their inaction. But while Vietnam is blow to the Gallic psyche, what about Algeria?

Great, comprehensive installments. Rest assured your readers are reading even when comments are low.

[Bergil]

And the proxy wars begin...

[Zaius]

Another fine installment. And another! Congratulations on the level of detail.

Now, a minor nitpick. I’m hardly an expert on economy, but I’m surprised that Hungary did so well in disentangling itself from the German economy in such a short period of time.

(At the risk of going slightly offtopic, while considering a timeline of my own I have been wondering to what extent channelling their trade through railways which circumvent Germany can help small east European states in a WWII-less scenario. IMO the example I had considered (a Czechoslovakia retaining its borderlands and redirecting more of its trade through Gdynia and some Yugoslav ports) might have been viable, but what of less industrialized states after a prolonged period of ‘integration’ with Germany? What are their chances of finding more distant trade partners capable of replacing it?)

I also wonder how the USSR is going to react to Germany’s problems with its unruly allies.

[MSZ]

Originally Posted by Strategos' Risk

The British seem very prescient about the dangers of getting sucked into an Indochinese conflict. I wonder if the French are angry at them for their inaction. But while Vietnam is blow to the Gallic psyche, what about Algeria?

Surprisingly, they actually were that - one of the reasons they didn't get involved OTL. I attribute it to their experiences with fighting the Boer's and keeping India. They also had experience in handling these situations in the Far East as well, like with the Malayan Emergencies.

I will cover Algeria, as well as Syria and Lebanon later. Decolonization is slower in this timeline, the lack of WW2 making the western empires more willing to use force, but essentially the popular sentiment among the colonial populations is the same as OTL - but less combat experience.

Originally Posted by Zaius

Now, a minor nitpick. I’m hardly an expert on economy, but I’m surprised that Hungary did so well in disentangling itself from the German economy in such a short period of time.

(At the risk of going slightly offtopic, while considering a timeline of my own I have been wondering to what extent channelling their trade through railways which circumvent Germany can help small east European states in a WWII-less scenario. IMO the example I had considered (a Czechoslovakia retaining its borderlands might manage to redirect more of its trade outside the region through Gdynia and some Yugoslav port) might have been viable, but what of less industrialized states after a prolonged period of ‘integration’ with Germany? What are their chances of finding more distant trade partners capable of replacing it?)

Hungary didn't. Germany remains its most important trade partner and will do so for the forseeable future. However, there is a major difference between the OTL situation and TTL - the USSR purposely made it's client states dependent on it in many aspects, whether natural resources or rolling stock. ITTL, fascist economics emphasise self-sufficency, so despite trading more, those states outside direct German control can develop a much greater degree of infrastructure and industry meant for their own need - whether it's producing the food they want (producing palinka was banned under communist rule, leading to less fruits being planted) or machines they need. And while trade wasn't the number one means of exercising control by the USSR, its turnout with either Hungary after '56 of Czechoslovakia after '68 still didn't drop. So while economic difficulties might plague Hungary for some time, its not like Germany will embargo it. They tried that tactic with Poland in the 20s and lost, ending up with Gdynia being built. To maintain control they still have to keep trade going - just with less profitable terms.

As for the second question: I can hardly imagine a situation were the east-central european states are able NOT to trade with Germany. Too profitable - the Germans simply have too much cash and goods on their hands not to trade with. Sure, France, Britain and the USA may have that as well, but they are simply too far away and realistically - they never were intersted in penetrating the east economically. The last 20 years shows very well how in a "free market situation" trade ties form - trade between the former COMECON states and Germany rose something like ten times in that time, and keeps rising still, while trade with Russia was reduced significantly. France's and Britain's interst in that region being reduced to the financial sector and in France's case, energy. IIRC, the recent crisis in fact led to Poland overtaking Russia in trade turnouth with Germany - and seeing that before the war German-Polish trade turnout was three times as large as German-Soviet, it tells you just how attractive Germany is. In 1939, almost no country in central Europe conducted less than half its trade with the Reich.

As for how to bypass it - to do so, Germany would have to lose its attractivness. At present, most of the economies of former COMECON states is agricultural/pre-manufactured goods meant for export to the west (mostly Germany of course) and a service sector to keep it going. Final goods are rare - I can't come up with any known brands apart from Ikarus and Solaris really, and even those aren't exactly universally recognized. Since they also lack R&D, or are brain-drained to the west, that's unlikely too change in the near future.

Assuming a no WW2 scenario, those countries would be in a significantly better situation, but still not as good as the west. Prevent the war, and they will develop their own "final goods" industries which could compete with the western ones. So what they produced for the Germans, they can keep producing for the companies at home which in turn can sell those final goods were Germany normally would. But few of them are large enough to form a truly diversified economy like Germany or France. Poland, Hungary, Romania maybe, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia if they survived - but say, Lithuania with 2 million people wouldn't have the manpower to have an economy providing as much diverse goods like the UK - even in small quantities. They would be limited to a few industries, the rest of the country economy being linked to it one way or other - something like Finland, and Nokia being its "economic engine", pulling the rest of the country. On the bright side - industrialization wouldn't require a Stalinist effort causing genocide, until the Green Revolution food prices worldwide were high enough to actually sustain a steady industrialization effort of almost the entire region. So even with a German big brother watching, raising the capital for buiding factories by agricultural states tied with Germany would be quite possible - more than it was with a Soviet occupation.

Apart from more domestic developed and diverse industries, the only countries capable of replacing Germany as a market to sell stuff to would obviously be France and the UK - provided they decolonize, since with their colonies they would not have the incentive to buy things from central Europe. So first question to anwser would be - does abandoning Germany really help? Trade with it is simply lucrative, to give it up would have to happen for political reasons. Unless of course Germany doesn't modernize its industry, doesn't become/maintain itself as the export superpower it is presently keeping its eastern neighbours going by buying those cheap parts it needs but can't outsource to China/Asia due to their poor quality control. In that case, it's any country that first realizes that trade with central Europe is overall more profitable than with their colonies, as colonies cost a lot to keep them in line. Again, France and Britain are my first and best bet. Neither Italy nor Scandinavia have enough purchasing power. The USA is to far away and economically seculded. The Benelux countries may be "gateway states", which would start the process, but couldn't take it very far.

Overall - without WW2, most countries in central Europe would be something akin to present day Spain (minus the current crisis there) - objectively speaking developed, but still slightly behind Britain or France. With developed sectors of industry and known brands like SEAT, but still not quite as many as Germany. Capable of going on without having to export lots of cheap stuff and workers abroad, but still doing better whe they do it. Something of this sort.

As for Czechoslovakia - remember, SKODA was a bigshot company before the war, a Krupp or IG Farben grade industrial works. It could realistically provide lots of machines, weapons, capital goods to all its neighbours, if it had better relations with them. If it was to direct its goods overseas, then Gdynia does seem very viable (connection between it and Polish Upper Silesia existing already before the war,and the Poles having built a railway from there to the Baltic in the 20s). Yugoslavia is good to, but it would require transfer through at least one extra country (either Austria or Hungary) in which case comes the question if Italy wouldn't be preferable (I think there was a Vienna-Venice connection, and I'm absolutely certain there was and is a Prague-Vienna one). After that, the destination could be Scandinavia or the UK. France does seem to be possible to reach through Austria and Switzerland, so naval connection wouldn't be necessary. But still, why would the Czechs and Slovaks not want to do their business with Germany?

[MarshalBraginsky]

I've got a question: judging by the fact that there is no WWII, would Soviet demographics be a bit better than OTL? Since the Soviets didn't have to spend so much money on making a huge military that bled them dry in the OTL Cold War. On the other hand, is Turkey a part of the German-led bloc as well?

[Constantinople]

Originally Posted by Sibirskaya

I've got a question: judging by the fact that there is no WWII, would Soviet demographics be a bit better than OTL??

More than likely. 27 million people (many of whom were young men) will deeply alter the USSRs demographics compared to OTL.

[MSZ]

Originally Posted by Sibirskaya

I've got a question: judging by the fact that there is no WWII, would Soviet demographics be a bit better than OTL? Since the Soviets didn't have to spend so much money on making a huge military that bled them dry in the OTL Cold War. On the other hand, is Turkey a part of the German-led bloc as well?

Originally Posted by Constantinople

More than likely. 27 million people (many of whom were young men) will deeply alter the USSRs demographics compared to OTL.

Indeed; without the war, millions of Soviet citizens would not die. Even without the Baltic States, Karelia, East Poland, Bessarabia - the USSR has a net gain in population by the lack of war. Additionally, taking into account that the USSR had a very high population growth OTL, and those compound perentages that are in effect in population growth, it is likely that the USSR would exceed 300 million somewhere in the 80s - making it the third most populous country in the world.

As for Turkey: it's in a peculiar position, stuck between all three blocks - Fascist inthe west, Communist in the east and capitalist in the south. OTL Turkey was something of a flawed, but nevertheless a democracy, with the Army making sure it stays that way. ITTL fascism might lead the army to introducing it's own rule after one of it's coups, but it is not a given: neither the USSR nor Britain would like Germany to have such foothold in the middle east. Turkey is,likely to be a combat ground between the various powers: the military turning to fascism, making Kemalism its Turkish version; the civilian government prefering western democracy (plus having an interest in staying close to Britain to get Cyprus); the poverty and non-Turkish minorities looking towards communism as an anwser to their problems. Britain's position in Turkey may not be as strong as USA's was OTL. If Turkey got nationalistic enough to start wholesale persecution of say, Armenians, another Russo-Turkish war would not be out of the question, without Pershing missiles in Asia Minor.

[Strategos' Risk]

I have a few tangential questions:

1. Is there quite an ideological division between Italy and Germany within the fascist bloc? And if so, is something similar to the Sino-Soviet Split inevitable?

2. Have the fascist states done any sort of recruiting or influence over Latin America's populist regimes?

[MSZ]

Originally Posted by Strategos' Risk

1. Is there quite an ideological division between Italy and Germany within the fascist bloc? And if so, is something similar to the Sino-Soviet Split inevitable?

There is. I tried to slip through that fact by pointing out that the various countries had their own versions of fascism: National Socialism in Germany; Italian Fascism in Italy; Szeged Fascism in Hungary. Fascism wasn’t meant as an international ideology applicable in the same way everywhere – nations would have to figure out their own versions of it. And that Italy being the “fascism birthplace”, “Italian Fascism being the new Roman Empire meant to distribute culture” would make it culturally and ideologically more attractive than National Socialism. Whether fascism can (or rather – is it ideologically justified) be exported at all would be a point of ideological conflict between Italy and Germany. Italy, less interested in war and having South Tirol in memory would be more opposed to it; Germany, to keep control of central Europe would be more for it. Ideology would most likely be dependent on geopolitical necessity, but in certain points they would differ for scholaristic reasons. For example:

Citizenship and race. The Nazis were very clear that only Aryan could be citizens. Germanization was not looked towards – even in Mein Kampf Hitler opposed it, as “lesser bloods can’t be made to use german language since they can’t comprehend its complexity” or something like this. The concept of “naturalized citizens” was an abominations to the Nazis.
On the other hand the Italian fascist were much more willing to extend citizenship to non-Italians and sought to Italianize them – “race being a state of the mind”, non-Italians being potentially able to “act Italian”. It could be a big point of controversy – an Italian citizen of Ethiopian descent tries to marry a German citizen. Would the child be full Aryan to the Germans, or a mix-breed? If the second, Italy would have reasons to disagree on that regard with Germany.

Civil Law. Italian fascist were BIG on “roman law is best law ever”. They made the roman legal maxims de facto sources of law, changed the civil code to suit their needs in 1942. They even tried to purge the Italian legal system of “Germanic influences” like restrictions on dividing land (whether through contract or succession). The Nazis on the other hand hated Roman Law, removing most of its study from universities, wanting to replace it with Germanic Law. They even wanted to terminate the BGB in favor of the Volksgesetzbuch, introducing a lot of restrictions on contracts and succession rights, as well as legal capacity. In general, Italian law emphasized freedom of contract; Germanic emphasized the “social function” of laws and rights. Personal freedoms vs. “good of the Volk”

Economics. Wise man said “Capitalism seeks to exploit wealth; communism seeks to seize it; fascism seeks to control it”. So while both and Italy and Germany allowed for private property and enterprise to exist and introduced ways to control, the degree of control over it was different. Germany nationalized entire branches of economy, particularly the soil and natural resources. Italy did not have a program of similar magnitude, for them the State was meant to ensure that wealth “trickles down” and that is used for public good. Nazi Germany wanted to seize and redistribute directly. Also the matter of freedom of trade between the fascist states would be an issue – Fascism sought to make every country self-sufficient to make the “free” – independent from the fluctuations of market prices, independent from foreign embargos and disruptions of trade. But does that mean every country was meant to be as much self-reliant as possible, or are the fascist states meant to be self-sufficient together? Should free trade between them be emphasized, while regulated in a fascist way, or treated as a “necessary evil”, trade with other fascist states as much an obstacle to true freedom as trade with others? Since Germany is the one to import resources, it would most likely want to force through a “we are all in it together” approach to have easy access to others resources and markets. Italy would be more resistant to “sharing our wealth” as long as it has seriously impoverished areas, especially in the south, and even more once they discover oil in Libya.

These are just some points. Thing is that the conflict would be more like an academic and legal dispute than an actual conflict over geopolitics. Geostrategically Italy and Germany have a lot to benefit from each other and very little conflict. So it would require very different fascist to take power in one of those states for them to split, as they would have to have very different objectives than the regular ones.

Originally Posted by Strategos' Risk

2. Have the fascist states done any sort of recruiting or influence over Latin America's populist regimes?

I haven’t touched the subject since I feel still uncertain here. It is kind of a bad cliché that the South American states all want to wallow in fascism and are crawling with fascist militias just waiting for those German guns to arrive so they can take power while the people cheer and the democrats and communists all go into hiding without resistance. They did have flawed and non-democratic regimes, many nationalist and militaristic – but fascist would be a big word, unless of course we would consider, say, Pinochet’s rule to be “Chilean Fascism”. I don’t want to screw up by overestimating what the fascist could realistically achieve in this scenario, nor do I want to ignore it, especially with the USA being isolationist (note that the Guatemala coup would not happen, since there is no CIA in 1954 for example). Supporting right-wingers in the region will likely happen in the same manner the USSR supported the left-wingers, but the success rate of such Guerilla’s is undecided.

[MarshalBraginsky]

Originally Posted by MSZ

Indeed; without the war, millions of Soviet citizens would not die. Even without the Baltic States, Karelia, East Poland, Bessarabia - the USSR has a net gain in population by the lack of war. Additionally, taking into account that the USSR had a very high population growth OTL, and those compound perentages that are in effect in population growth, it is likely that the USSR would exceed 300 million somewhere in the 80s - making it the third most populous country in the world.

As for Turkey: it's in a peculiar position, stuck between all three blocks - Fascist inthe west, Communist in the east and capitalist in the south. OTL Turkey was something of a flawed, but nevertheless a democracy, with the Army making sure it stays that way. ITTL fascism might lead the army to introducing it's own rule after one of it's coups, but it is not a given: neither the USSR nor Britain would like Germany to have such foothold in the middle east. Turkey is,likely to be a combat ground between the various powers: the military turning to fascism, making Kemalism its Turkish version; the civilian government prefering western democracy (plus having an interest in staying close to Britain to get Cyprus); the poverty and non-Turkish minorities looking towards communism as an anwser to their problems. Britain's position in Turkey may not be as strong as USA's was OTL. If Turkey got nationalistic enough to start wholesale persecution of say, Armenians, another Russo-Turkish war would not be out of the question, without Pershing missiles in Asia Minor.

With the Soviet Union's net gain population wise, would they be in a position to become decently prosperous without any problems they faced in OTL? I'm not sure if Kosygin would still rise to power in this regard, although he would be marginalized since the Soviet Union conducts trade with the US and other nations within its sphere of influence. As for the Philippines, I know that you had it in the American sphere, but there was a communist movement there and they had a split in the 60s. Would that kind of split happen ITTL, only Mao could be a bit more aggressive?

Speaking of which, did the Netherlands already give independence to Indonesia, or did it just allow *Indonesia to split into several new nations? If it did give independence, could the Konfrontasi be butterflied away? What of the territorial disputes in SE Asia without WWII? I also suspect that Iran could have been pro-German since it was sandwiched between pro-Western India and the Soviet Union itself, as well as Afghanistan, although I wonder if the Nazis would have called for volunteers if the Soviets did invade Afghanistan, or would the quagmire in Afghanistan be butterflied?

[red1]

MSZ, do the /French ever improve their military in the 1950's? I personally believe with the problems with French Indochina in the '50's they would get their act together and modernize.

[MSZ]

Originally Posted by Sibirskaya

With the Soviet Union's net gain population wise, would they be in a position to become decently prosperous without any problems they faced in OTL?

No. The Soviet-style central planned economy is effectively incapable of producing prosperity – it is only capable of bettering the lives of those living under it in the degree it produces “public goods” and grants them to the population and only those consumer goods which the Gosplan planned to produce – which never was much as most funds and resources were placed for military production. Population had little relevance in creating prosperity. It might sound awful, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the general living standard of Soviet citizens would in fact be a little lower than OTL, due to the USSR having more mouths to feed and less food to give – figuratively and unfortunately literally speaking. I don’t want to dwell on this, it is controversial – but fact stands that the USSR would not be economically better off without WW2. Communism not only prevents, it actively fights what is necessary for prosperity to emerge. It denies people incentive to work by fixing wages and rewarding according to time, rather than result (people being paid by the hour rather for a job done). It doesn’t promote raising work efficiency and productivity either for the same reasons. By nationalizing all businesses it concentrates all large capital in the hand of governmental agencies, preventing them from being used for research and modernization. There is not only no capital for brilliant people to start their own companies to employ people, there is also no incentive for them to create new stuff and ideas, as they are denied the right to profit from them. As a result there is no “middle class” with a decent purchasing power necessary for a developed economy to form – as anyone becoming relatively rich would instantly be branded an “enemy of the people”, “Kulak” or something like this.

Originally Posted by Sibirskaya

I'm not sure if Kosygin would still rise to power in this regard, although he would be marginalized since the Soviet Union conducts trade with the US and other nations within its sphere of influence.

Kosygin was an ally of Khrushchev, their careers being tied to each other. I’m currently writing about this, so please wait a day or two

Originally Posted by Sibirskaya

As for the Philippines, I know that you had it in the American sphere, but there was a communist movement there and they had a split in the 60s. Would that kind of split happen ITTL, only Mao could be a bit more aggressive?
Speaking of which, did the Netherlands already give independence to Indonesia, or did it just allow *Indonesia to split into several new nations? If it did give independence, could the Konfrontasi be butterflied away?

The Philippines and Indonesia will certainly have their own communist movements which will be active during decolonization. As for Mao – while he had an aggressive rhetoric he was very careful in his actions, so I don’t know how much more aggressive he could be ITTL. Indonesia is still under Dutch control, I still don’t know if it will become OTL Indonesia or split into several different states – I want to do some research into it, I’m just having problems with finding the necessary time for this, being busy at work and with my studies. It is an interesting idea, one I don’t recall seeing in other timelines, but I want TTL to be at least plausible, so I will have to find out how strong such movements were OTL and why they failed.

Originally Posted by Sibirskaya

What of the territorial disputes in SE Asia without WWII?

Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are all Socialist Republics and thus have no territorial issues with each other. Thailand remains a monarchy and knows it is a target for further communist expansion – whether it will want to seek protection at the West’s or Fascists side is still up for debate, though I recall there being a serious issue on some temple at the Thai-Cambodian border with actual military clashes taking place there (I failed an exam once by not remembering its name and I still don’t….). and the relation between the two being overall difficult. I have an idea here, but it will have to wait before it goes anywhere.

Originally Posted by Sibirskaya

I also suspect that Iran could have been pro-German since it was sandwiched between pro-Western India and the Soviet Union itself, as well as Afghanistan, although I wonder if the Nazis would have called for volunteers if the Soviets did invade Afghanistan, or would the quagmire in Afghanistan be butterflied?

Let’s not get ahead of ourselves – Afghanistan is still decades away, IF it was to happen. And just because Persia is between the pro-west India and the USSR doesn’t make it have to choose a side to oppose both – when it can try to collaborate with one against the other. Besides, I already covered Persia in a past installment – did you miss it?

Originally Posted by red1

MSZ, do the /French ever improve their military in the 1950's? I personally believe with the problems with French Indochina in the '50's they would get their act together and modernize.

Ah. I thought I made it clear that the French military is not “bad and obsolete” – just underprepared for this type of conflict and making bad political decisions. France sees Germany as the greatest threat it faces, and prepares it’s army adequately – for a conventional war in a temperate climate with clearly known front lines and uniformed enemies. And should it face such a war it would do decently – but colonial wars of attrition don’t need powerful artillery and tank support. So they are in no need to “get their act together and modernize”, they would just have to better organize and avoid mistakes as they already have a capable Army by objective standards – one that is not enough to survive a German onslaught, but one capable of rolling somewhere into Africa, defeating some local warlord and occupy the country – it’s the occupation that is difficult, but not just for the French, it is a problem every country with a colonial empire will have to face.

[MSZ]

Although the Chinese Civil War had ended in 1949, with the remains of the republican government led by Chiang Kai Shek and his supporters fleeing to the island of Taiwan and the proclamation of the formation of the People’s Republic of China, technically, no peace treaty was actually signed ending the conflict. Both sides in fact would officially claim that war was in fact ongoing – the communists officially claiming Taiwan to be a “rebel province” and part of China, the nationalists claiming legitimacy of ruling all of China as well, expecting that communist rule would soon be toppled by popular dissent and that they would return to the mainland. However, both sides had limited their conflict, mostly due to the lack on equipment necessary to keep it going. With the Republic of China controlling Taiwan and a number of small islands of the Chinese coast, they were in a defensible position. The communists lacked the equipment to strike against them, limiting themselves to artillery attacks being occasionally conducted on some targets – sometimes military, sometimes just for the purpose of spreading terror.

Despite his former promises of democratizing China, Chiang did not give up his de facto dictatorial powers. Claiming “war emergency”, he introduced martial law in the entire country, beginning a period of “White Terror” against communism. It would be quite effective in fact – the island being previously Japanese possession, it’s inhabitants were not supportive of communism. Nevertheless, thousands of Taiwanese and evacuees were imprisoned for “sympathising with communism”, many of them intellectuals and democratic leaders. The country, having been abandoned almost completely by the world, was in a state of paranoid fear, the military leaders of the KMT using that to keep the population in check.





Executions of political dissidents in Taiwan


The expected collapse of the PRC did not come. Neither was the KMT in a state where it could realistically strike against mainland China. This resulted in a temporary stalemate which at first ended in 1952. With Japan still being forced to pay war indemnities, its industry would often be requested to produce particular goods for both the USSR and the PRC. In 1951, the demand for 20 landing craft capable of operating on seas, as well as 30 barges was made by China. Despite initial hesitation, the Japanese being extremely vary about giving, or even selling vessels to what they perceived were hostile states potentially planning a full invasion, it would eventually comply with the order. The boats, while rather poor quality due to the time they were constructed in and factorial obstruction were nevertheless completed and given to the Soviet Union, which in turn turned them over to China. With these, the People’s Liberation Army mounted its first professional amphibious assault on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Despite heavy losses and fierce nationalist resistance (both sides having tens of thousands troops present on the battlefield), the PLA emerged victorious. For Mao, it was a great success, both militarily and politically. With China having lost significant territories as a result of the Far Eastern War, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tuva and Uighuria being under Soviet control, he needed to regain as much of what was lost as possible, so as not to be seen as another “Emperor” signing ”unequal treaties” as well as proving to Stalin that he was capable of independent action. With Tibet being annexed in 1950, Taiwan seemed to be next – and Chiang knew it.





Generalissimo Chiang kai-Shek

However despite his pleas, aid would not come. The USA was too isolationist to interfere in the affairs on the other side of the Pacific – despite military presence in the Philippines. Seeing China as just an extension of Moscow’s will, it thought that protecting its interest in Asia was best done through the USSR, which it did - the PRC would not be recognized by Washington. France, fighting its own war with communism in Taiwan was eager, but unable to help – escalating the conflict into a full blown war with China was far beyond its abilities. Even Britain, despite certain fears over Hong Kong, was not going to take action – fearing that doing so might result in a war with China and at least upset the USSR, with which it was still at the time thought to be possible to find a modus vivendi against the fascists. Germany was the only country willing to provide aid, but with Taiwan having problems with actually paying its debts, and the Reich not being quite as willing to act as a gift sender, it was limited. Nevertheless, without much choice, the Republic of China did in fact join the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1954 – hoping on at least being granted intelligence on future communist actions.





Signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by the Republic of China

Mao’s greatest challenge in his post-war career as revolutionary leader of China was answering the Manchurian question. Following the war, the former monarchy of Manchukuo was replaced with the “Democratic People’s Republic of Manchuria”, a puppet state of the USSR, occupied by the Red Army – like Mongolia and Korea. While Mao did recognize the independence of Mongolia and Korea (under heavy Soviet pressure), he did not do that in regard to Manchuria – which was seen as “Japanese stolen territory” and rightfully belonging to China – just like Taiwan. Manchuria thus became a bargaining tool between Stalin and Mao – the former, truly being a revolutionary to the core being willing to give up what Russia had lost to the Japanese in 1905 in return for a permanent and strong dual alliance. Intense talks were conducted between the PRC and the USSR on the matter of Manchuria, as well as Indochina, Korea and Japan – Stalin wishing to assure Mao he was willing to accept him as a partner in Asia and lead the Revolution in Asia together. Mao however saw through the old Bolshevik, and despite official propaganda on both sides declaring brotherhood and unity, Mao considered Russia to be an actual threat, Soviet military presence so much wanted by Moscow being denied in all ways – including the right of Soviet submarines being allowed in Chinese ports. With no military cooperation, Stalin attempted to threaten Mao by pointing out he would not be able to protect China in face of a KMT or western-sponsored counter-revolution. The Chinese leader would remain stalwart, going so far as accusing Stalin of nefarious motives due to his negotiations with the west, as well as proving to him through the war in Indochina and taking Taiwan Strait islands, Soviet military assistance wasn’t necessary for him.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Manchuria itself was a curious place. Mostly unrecognized, not even by those countries which recognized the former Manchukuo, it was a peculiar place where Soviet and Chinese influences clashed. Although sometimes called the “state of the Manchus”, it was still mostly populated by Han Chinese, who too considered themselves to belong more with China than Russia. Apart from the local Manchurian Workers Party, it was the only communist state where other parties were in fact allowed to operate – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. This “freedom” was introduced as a way of both being a sign of goodwill to China, as well as keeping tight control over them. The members of the CPSU in Manchuria were mostly local stationed soldiers or those sent there to keep watch and control – as the three parties were forced to cooperation. This led to rather awkward situations, with the military administration reporting directly to Moscow, as did the CPSU, the MWP being nominally the state party, but its members having often very different loyalist, while the CPU would be mostly loyal to China – Bejing being in constant contact with the Chinese communists in Manchuria. Despite proclaimed unity, theses splits would result in separate, both official and “unofficial” administrations being formed, party and state ones being sometimes united and sometimes separated, forming a huge bureaucratic mess. Produced goods and foods meant for the USSR produced by CPC controlled factories would find themselves go south, rather than north in “unknown ways”. Border controls would find unplanned transports, even mule-dragged caravans going both way across the border with contrabands. Attempts at tightening the border or administrative controls would mostly fail, with the army needing to intervene. Even border clashes would occur – with unmanned places having the Chinese Communists literally digging up poles representing the border and moving them north over night before the Russian patrols arrived. At one point it went as far as the poles being moved 100 kilometres – at which point the Red Army would have to intervene, restoring the border to its original place.



Building of the Central Comitee of the Manchurian Workers Party

Stalin was willing to keep this situation go on almost indefinitely – the Red Army’s presence there ensuring that he always would have the upper hand. In his game with Mao he did not however take into consideration one factor – his own mortality. In 1955, after suffering a stroke caused by his intensive drinking and smoking habits, the General Secretary of the CPSU and leader of the USSR for 33 years, died. His death caused an immediate power struggle between his palatines. As his death came only after another Party purge he organized, the number of competitors was rather limited: Lavrentiy Beria, the head of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police and intelligence service; Georgy Malenkov, Prime Minister of the USSR and the leader of the CPSU Secreteriat; Nikita Khrushchev, the head of the Party in both Moscow and Ukraine, as well as Deputy Prime Minister. With other old Bolsheviks such as Molotov and Kaganovich being stripped of power, some of them being killed in the last Stalinist show trial (Molotov surviving by becoming an ambassador to the League of Nations and Kaganovich “retiring” to controlling rail traffic in Siberia).




A show trial in Moscow

Beria was considered to be the most powerful pretender to seizing power in the USSR. Having cemented his control over the NKVD, he also was in control over the ordinary police and was quick to install Vsevolod Merkulov as the Minister of Justice. Even before Stalin’s death he also managed to secure the position of the head of Soviet military intelligence – which after Stalin’s purge in 1938 was being re-established as part of the Information Comitee in 1948, assigned as “Comitee no. 4” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This had given Beria absolute control over all intelligence and covert operations of the USSR as well give him massive insight into the works of the Molotov-led Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which he used do ensure its chief’s downfall. But with great power also came great enemies. His surveillance of all workings of the state having extended deep into foreign affairs, military matters, science and industry etc. led to him being universally despised and feared.





Lavrenty Beria, the feared Comissar of Internal Affairs

After Stalin’s death a short period of co-leadership occurred, during which all sides sought to get an advantage over the other. Beria, being the most powerful had to experience the bad sides of it – being feared, he could not make many allies, only subject who too followed him out of fear. This led to a shaky alliance being formed by Malenkov, Khrushchev and other against him. Beria’s weakness was that being alone, there would hardly anybody who would miss or want to continue his fight after he would be gone. During a Politbiuro meeting in April 1956 – the institution being re-introduced into actual power a year earlier – Beria was jointly attacked by other members on a number of topics, one of which was his known stance towards Manchuria. Beria was among those who came to believe in the CPC victory in the Civil War early on and was generally a proponent of closely collaborating with China, even at the expanse of returning Manchuria to China’s rule. He was a vocal supporter of this as he was quick to realise that Stalin wanted that as well, and knew well that remaining in his favour was important. He was also accused of mismanaging production and obstructing work of other state institution’s – all of which was true, though the irony was the attackers were guilty of them as well in varied degrees. With the discussion becoming lively and more intense, Beria stood up and in what could have occurred in a movie scene, shouted out that he “deal” with the others (using more foul vocabulary) and turned towards the door to exit the meeting. At that very moment, Rodion Malinovsky, the Minister of Defence and hero of the war with Japan entered the room and together with his adjutant subdued the head of the NKVD in a joint-lock move, bending him over. He then proceeded in walking him out of the Kremlin and into his limousine, held at pistol gunpoint in the car, while being driven to the Lubyanka prison. The NKVD workers present there were shocked to see their boss being Upon descending to the Lubyanka underground, where executions were held, Beria collapsed, having to be dragged there, at this point starting to beg for his life and according to Malinovsky’s word “pissed his own pants”. When in the death chamber, he was shot once by him, his body being immediately cremated and the ashes scattered. A posthumous trial was held convicting him as well as a few of his still living co-workers of the so called “Georgian Mafia” to death and gulag.

With Beria gone, his internal empire became divided among the remaining leaders. The USSR went through a number of administrative reforms meant to remedy the situation Stalin created where power was being held by him directly and various state organs being merely figuratively in power, or even being terminated. As part of it, the existing “People's Commissariats” were replaced with modern “Ministries” and “State Comities” which became directly responsible to the established “Council of Ministers” as the governmental branch – the head of which was Prime Minister Georgy Malenkov. Stalin’s death also led to a de facto revival of the Politbiuro which had continuously been holding less and less meetings with Stalin in charge – his office of “General Secretary” abolished in 1952, the post was restored in 1956 with Khrushchev being becoming the “First Secretary” of the CPSU, due to him being the head of the party in Moscow. This created a dangerous situation for Malenkov – while he still was the head of the party secretariat and could nominally administer it, the political decisions were made by the Politbiuro and his own attempts at controlling the party would easily be bypassed by Khrushchev – his powers as “First Secretary” being unspecified and thus potentially – unlimited. While both Malenkov and Khrushchev were die-hard communists they found themselves working to undermine the other while gathering support themselves by installing their followers into emptied or newly formed positions. This was the result of the paranoid terror totalitarian systems created – even at the highest levels of power the fear that others might act against you motivated people to act against them, creating a destructive system of both cooperation and brutal competition.





Malenkov and Khruschev, leaders of the USSR

Both of the duumvirate held different views on the path their country should follow and how to tackle the challenges before it. Khrushchev was a labelled as a “liberal”, as he was quick to distance himself from Stalin’s original policies and sought reforms “in the true spirit of communism”. As the head of the CPSU he sought to introduce a “Party Priority Principle” according to which it was the Politbiuro that was meant to create political decisions on all matters, the government being reduced to carrying out its will – the slogan being “the government reigns, the Party directs”. He was also more willing to reduce the state centralism and allow the various SSR’s more cultural freedoms – a result of himself being Ukrainian and having support among the Party circles on local levels, such as Nikolai Podgorny, the leader of Soviet Ukraine. He found support also among those involved with the development of agriculture and industry and their administration as well. Without the all-powerful Beria whose secret police was de facto controlling entire branches of the Soviet economy, control over it returned to both state administration and local Party units. Alexei Kosygin was made the head of the Gosplan, under whom the powers of his committee rose as well as the Party’s influences in factories – production and management becoming dependent on political imperatives rather than realistic possibilities.




Khruschev was considered to be the liberal in the west

Georgy Malenkov on the other hand was a “conservative”. His intentions were to establish a system which would be a de facto continuation of Stalin’s rule, the power in the state being held by the Prime Minister which was Stalin’s last position as well as Malenkov’s present. He wanted for the State and Party administration to be connected but also separate, forming two parts of the executive branch of government – nominally equal but with the state administration being superior to Party one at each level, including the central where the Council of Ministers was to be superior to the Politbiuro in state affairs. The Politbiuro was to remain the supreme body of the CPSU and to contribute in the workings of the government and form policies according to communist ideology, but would not be able to actually execute them. Malenkov was an ideologist in reality, and in his vanity considered himself to be the supreme knowledge on communist ideology, dismissing views opposite to his own – another reason why he sought to limit the power of the Politbiuro, to prevent them from “sabotaging” his own true ideals coming into reality. He thus found support among those involved in state administration, such as Nikolai Bulganin, the Prime Minister of the Russian SFSR and those involved with the army, such as Rodion Malinovsky, the Minister of Defense. Malenkov was himself a Russian and opposed de-centralizing the state, preferring to maintain the unity of the “Soviet people” without “dividing them” into various nationalities. This made him called a “Russian nationalist” by some – his view that nationalities were to be “Sovietized” just as during the Tzarist era they were to be Russified bringing him in conflict with many lower level and local officials.

The conflict between the “State Group” of Malenkov and “Party Group” of Khrushchev would come to an end in 1958, the result of a dispute over matters regarding the Ukraine. The Ukrainian SSR was a strategically important part of the Soviet empire, being extremely rich in natural resources and black soils – in fact, it was the Ukraine that produced the great majority of Soviet food products, feeding the country. For doing that, the Ukrainian people were hardly rewarded – the collectivization of the 20’s resulted in a massive organized famine and millions being killed. Following that, despite the introduction of mechanization and new types of agricultural techniques which increased output, the plates of the Ukrainians were not filling with more food – as most of it was still seized by the country and distributed elsewhere. That sacrifice was hardly rewarded, as the living standards did not improve, the Soviet economy incapable of producing enough consumer goods to meet the demand. Resentment to communism grew, kept down only by state propaganda, claiming the Ukrainians and their lives and live hoods were being protected from the imperialistic, fascist west. The Poles were particularly common as the boogeymen for the Ukrainians, their nationalism and suppression of cultural activity as well as the expulsions from turn of the 40’s making them an easy target for propaganda. However, the propaganda claiming those in Galicia were having it worse than those in the “workers paradise”, being only able to eat half a bread loaf a week was backfiring on the authorities with the truth coming out – that despite persecutions those living in Poland did not have it as bad, being able to keep some of their land for themselves and cultivate it; electricity and running water being known (though not common) commodities; famine being unheard of. Many were shocked to hear such stories, expecting that those “liberated from Polish yoke by Stalin” would be grateful, whereas in truth they were devastated, seeking to flee. Arrests and deportations to the “Green Ukraine” in the Far East followed, information trying to be suppressed but not quite being able to prevent tales and gossips from flowing. Despite the Polish-Soviet border being tightly secured, smuggle wasn’t uncommon and was a source of both otherwise unavailable products, as well as a ”reliable” information – smugglers posed as private entrepreneurs/criminals, while many of them were in fact in the service of the Polish intelligence, their tasks being sowing the seeds of dissent by spreading their own propaganda on the good life in Poland, both by word and merchandise – high quality goods sold cheap speaking themselves of what was available across the border.




Polish smugglers in western Ukraine

Soviet propaganda proclaimed that “Ukrainian workers and peasants were being oppressed by the Polish landlords and bankers” – emphasis initially being placed on the ‘workers’, ‘peasants’, ‘landlords’ and ‘bankers’. Communism advocated class warfare, thus it targeted the bourgeois classes as the enemy of the people, nationality being used as a subsidiary when referencing some as “nations of landlords/bankers”. The culture of the nations of the USSR was also controlled, “national heroes” becoming “class heroes” – such a Bohdan Khmelnytsky becoming the organizer of the class struggle of oppressed Ukrainian peasants against Polish exploiters. It was further developed by introducing various other elements of Soviet culture into national ones – traditional culture without them being repressed as well, such as the Ukrainian alphabet becoming heavily modified to suit the Russians. Thus many of the Ukrainian “intelligentsia” felt that the new Soviet regime was just another type of Russian imperialism – aiming for the termination of distinct Ukrainian identity. It called out that those in charge did not even attempt to “liberate” Galicia despite not prolonging the Non-aggression pact in 1942, what was meant as kind of proof that the Russians (not Soviets) were the same occupiers and exploiters as the Poles, partitioning Ukraine – though it was said loudly only by those who managed to emigrate. As the landowning classes in Poland were becoming to be seen as at least not worse than the “Red Boyars” in Ukraine (which mostly meant that the view of the communist grew worse, not that the view of the Poles grew better) a change in approach of propaganda efforts took place. Both in the Ukr. SSR and the Belarusian SSR attention began to move from class to nationality – the “Unity of All the Russians” becoming the theme. National elements were partly re-introduced in the cultural life of the SSR’s. Military autonomy was beginning to be introduced as well, with “Ukrainian Group of Forces” being formed in 1954, as a supreme military district in the Ukraine to those others located there. The concept of increasing the importance of the SSR’s in the top decision making process were suggested, supported by locals and the younger members, who climbed in the hierarchy from the very bottom, without the “career boon” the Revolutionary War was. These moves were taken by the local leaders with a quiet consent of Stalin, in that he would not be informed about them fully, or would just agree to them with a nod, due to his old age. These were nonetheless opposed by many supporters of “democratic centralism”, as with nationalism growing in importance worldwide, especially in the colonial world, allowing it to develop in Ukraine was considered a great threat to the entire USSR. The Ukrainians were already the people with the highest level of “national consciousness” next to the Russians, its growth in intensity and popularity with ‘Ukraineness’ being placed before ‘Sovietness’ being unwanted by many hard-head communists. During high level talks on the possibility of a war with the fascist powers – which due to the cold war took place quite often – it would even be pointed out that such a war could remedy the situation, war effort and victory bringing the Ukrainians closer to the Russians.


The use of Ukrainian language was discouraged by Soviet authorities

Thus in 1958 a governmental session, the Minister of Agriculture Aleksey Kirichenko was dismissed from his position, officially for his failures in increasing production output, though the real reasons were purely political, Malenkov seeking to terminate Khrushchev’s influences in the government. Khrushchev, despite being Deputy Prime Minister did not attend that meeting, which too was a reason why the vote against “his” minister had passed. Upon returning to Moscow he would immediately push through a vote to make Kirichenko a member of the Politbiuro – both to prove to his followers that he would protect them in case of problems, as well as to obtain another vote there. This tipped the balance in his favor, giving him 6 out of 12 votes – but with him being the First Secretary it meant he had the “deciding vote” in case of stalemates. Malenkov accused Khrushchev of abusing power, as though Kirichenko was voted in by the Politbiuro, he did not have the support for that of the Central Comitee nor the Party Congress. While the Central Comitee came to support Kirichenko and was close to ratifying his position, Malenkov used his own powers and influence as the head of the Party Secreteriat to terminate his membership in the CPSU – making him ineligible to join. The crisis was to be resolved at the upcoming Party Congress which took place in Moscow in October 1958. During that Congress Malenkov gave out his speech strongly attacking Khrushchev for his policies in the Ukraine, branding him and others with him as responsible for the situation of agriculture as well as accusing them of “nationalist deviations”. A list of mismanagements was made, altogether pointing out the political changes in the Ukr. SSR and the Belarusian SRR which went contrary to the political line of the Party. Khrushchev defended himself attempting to prove Malenkov being just as guilty of other wrongdoings, being an example of “nationalist deviation” as well. With the subject of Ukraine being on top of the Congress affairs being debated behind locked doors, the “Party group” was being defamed in press for their actions, as well as their liberal tendencies going against the memory and policies of the late Stalin. The end result of the Congress where Khrushchev’s power base was meant to be greatest ended up with his downfall, being accused of anti-state activity carried out under a “false ideology”. Malenkov was backed up I during the Congress with a demonstration of power: Malinovsky strongly supporting him speaking in the name of the Army and the delegates learning during its course of searches being conducted in their homes by police authorities. This resulted in Khrushchev being dismissed from the position of First Secretary of the CPSU, though he was allowed to maintain party membership. His group was greatly weakened as a result of the Politbiuro’s membership being significantly changed, effectively demoting it in status to an advisory body, though one of great significance – the position of First Secretary was to be granted to Malenkov who would thus obtain complete power in the state and the Party.

Malenkov lacked however the charisma and authority of Stalin and was not able to make the same grand decisions without support – his attempts at using the same brutal Stalinist methods being resisted and with the few years of having to share power having passed making him realise his limitations. He would nevertheless remain the unchallenged ruler of the world’s largest great power. Among his first decisions was the termination of the Manchurian situation – while he supported Stalin in the idea of dual alliance between the USSR and the PRC creating the core of the world’s Anti-capitalism movement, he was much less willing to give up Manchuria, which he viewed as actually rightfully Russian. Relations between him and Mao were tense from the start, his methods of conducting diplomatic talks where he showed an attitude towards Mao treating him not like a Head of State, but a provincial communist prevented talks from being fruitful – Mao being angry at the rudeness with which he was met. Like previously he ignored the threats of terminating Manchu “independence”, but unlike previously he was met with a person who came to power as a civic leader and sought the best for his State, rather than his ideology. Malenkov was thus much more willing to simply annex Manchuria even at the expanse of a pact with China – as he did not see the present, Stalin signed “Treaty of Friendship” as anything more than a paper declaration, China blocking any attempts at developing cooperation further – and look back from Asia back to Europe, where Russian rather than “Communist” interests lied. Mao decided to take action to prove himself to be the true power in Asia the way he did earlier – by going after Taiwan, another propaganda effort of him actually “spreading the revolution”, while the USSR was stagnating in that process. Only this time, the Taiwanese situation would be different.

The Yijiangshan and Dachen Islands would be assaulted in a similar manner like Quemoy a few years earlier, forcing the ROC troops out of them and beginning an occupation. Once again Chiang pleaded to the world for aid in what he called “resistance to global communism”, not expecting to be answered just like he wasn’t earlier. With the French war in Indochina going badly for France, he realized that the west was slowly but surely abandoning Asia. However, to his surprise, his plea would be replied to by Germany, which dispatched a mission to Taipei to hold talks. These involved not just pure declarations of support, but actual willingness to take action and the ROC’s readiness to receive help, as well as its conditions. The German delegation requested the ability to use a naval base on the island of Taiwan with rights to a temporal troop placement as well as numerous trade deals, regarding mostly paying back its war time debts that were late, or on which the Republic of China had partly defaulted. Chiang, desperate to stop an immediate invasion agreed to all conditions.




Attack of the PLA on the ROC forced

Germany was very serious about being seen as the barricade stopping the tide of communism worldwide, as the anti-communist sentiment was one of the things its power and influence was based on. With the west losing the fight, Germany sought to appear as the power capable of winning it, what required more than just words, but actual victories taking place – the cult of militarism being important for National Socialist ideology. Not having taken action in the far east due to the lack of sufficient capabilities, the Reich developed such, by 1958 holding an actual blue-waters navy which it sought to prove to the world was capable of taking action globally. Thus the Ostasiengeschwader naval squadron was hastily formed, made out mostly of various obsolete destroyers and cruisers like the KMS Schleswig-Holstein but also including the modern battleship Bismarck and aircraft carrier Graf von Zeppelin. Meant as a demonstration of power, it didn’t do quite well in Europe – Britain quickly realising that the entire battle group having very limited capacity in engaging British equivalents. The Royal Navy thus remained confident in its superiority, the ‘threatening’ Kriegsmarine seemingly not being as powerful as it was made to look, though the fact that it would be capable of taking action far away from home ports was noted. After crossing the English Channel, the German squadron went south, making a stop in Argentina where the fleets commander Friedrich Kemnade met with the Argentinian President Juan Perón, whom the Reich had been supporting since the coup in 1943 – some years after which he took power, following a domestic version of fascism known as Peronism. Germany provided his regime with support, allowing him to survive a number of coup attempts against him for which Kemnade congratulated him in the name of the Reich during their meeting. After departure, the Ostasiengeschwader went west into the Pacific and eventually reaching Taiwan on 14th April 1959. By the time of its arrival in Zuoying, the base had been already prepared by German personnel arriving there by planes, in preparations for a takeover of the Taiwan Strait islands.




KMS Bismarck, flagship of the Ostasiengeschwader

The entire operation had no real merit. German interests did not lie in the Pacific; nor was its security dependant on the status of China, Taiwan or the small islands in the Taiwan Strait. The strait itself provided no real value despite the calls of some top ranking Nazis that it was a “strategic geopolitical point”, one over which control would be a great boon for Germany’s global position. This was obviously not true, as very little trade flowed through the strait, almost none of which was meant for Europe. By giving this a go ahead, Goring was risking an escalation of the cold war into a real one over something completely outside German interest. Yet the importance or re-establishing the Reich’s position in the world demanded, or at least that was what the German government thought. With decolonization being commonly talked about a communism being an important part of the freedom-fighting movements, anti-communism was one as well – and with the USSR benefiting from communist militias, Germany sought to benefit from those opposed to them in turn. With the west being in a general withdrawal, that itself being a partial proof of their capitalist system being inadequate for the post-colonial world (whether thought to be a result of its overall bankruptcy or its inability to stably exist in impoverished multi-national states plagued by infighting taken to street levels at least), Germany’s “third position” was made to be seen as an alternative to both, it’s ability and willingness to act with force and succeed being crucial.

Since China did not recognize Taiwan as a separate entity but as a “rebel province” German military presence was heavily protested against. It technically did also fulfil one of the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship with the USSR, as from Bejing’s perspective foreign troops in Taiwan were equal to them being in Nanking. Goring knew that, but he also knew more – as the background of the CPSU last Congress was known thanks to the overall effort of the Axis intelligence. Thus, Berlin knew of China’s position and Moscow’s unwillingness to support it further unconditionally – as well as understanding that the conditions placed before China would not be accepted. Thus an operation in the Taiwan Strait did not run as much risks as many would have thought, especially among the western observers. By marking its presence and the Ostasiengeschwader being more powerful the entire Chinese fleet (as it was virtually non-existant) it run little risk of military failure. Chance for that would occur if the USSR was to contribute, which in turn would mean China having to fold to it. That this could happen was pointed out during Goring’s cabinet meetings, but rather than being heard as a reason not to act it was quickly made into the opposite. Should the USSR take control of China, it would become so powerful that the west would not have another choice than to collaborate with the Reich and finally form a general anti-communist alliance against it – a long shot idea suggested by some of the more fanatical Nazis. It would also cause another thing – Germany did realize that unlike India or Vietnam, the Chinese people did not take foreign occupations lightly, the one in Manchuria only being relatively calm due to the past Japanese experience and the vestiges of independence given to it. Communist ideology was not thought to be enough for the Chinese to accept a foreign ruler – thus there was a strong possibility that a Soviet occupation of further parts of China could escalate into bloodshed – another far-fetched scenario, one nevertheless possibly of great benefit to Germany should it come true. There was no reason for Germany to stay in the far east so even if the Soviets were to interfere and collect their prizes in China, Germany could potentially just fall back to Europe and leave the USSR with the mess. This mentality extended even to the possibility of a “Soviet limited response” – as in the USSR taking limited action in China, but in Europe as well. Even in this case, it was not thought that the Soviet Union would be willing to fight a great European War over a pacific island – and would be willing to compromise quickly.

German deduction had proven to be correct. When the fleet was on its way to Taiwan, Mao sent envoy’s to Moscow requesting the USSR to do something – preferably using its Pacific fleet to intercept the Germans. Malenkov’s didn’t receive them in person even, leaving them to Mikhail Pervukhin, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. His response was calm and same as before – to receive help, China was to accept numerous demands, such as accepting the use of its naval bases by the Red Navy, recognize the DPRM, allow for greater Soviet control over the military supplies the USSR provided to it and others. In one such meeting it was even suggested that Russia and China may partition Manchuria between themselves. That the presence of German troops in Taiwan was equivalent to an invasion and called for a common answer, the response was that the USSR would not be going to war every time China is incapable of keeping raiders from its borders – which was taken as an insult. It also came to prove that the USSR did not know that the German fleets purpose was not only securing Taiwan from a naval landing – but also recapturing the lost islands.

With the fleets passing through the oceans, the arrival of German technicians and engineers to Taiwan earlier was not a surprize. It was common for such people to perform inspections of the viability of such installations and nobody in the world really placed much attention to it. What was unknown and what the German Reich was able to keep from the world was that among those arriving groups were the SS special forces of the Viking division – those of the Seebatallione meaning German marines. Additionally, paratroopers of the 1.Fallschirmjägerdivision were brought in as well, the massive transport planes being meant to be used in the operation. The attack on the islands would be the first combat situation test of the marvels of the Wehrmacht – jet fighters, “smart missiles”, paratroopers with selective-fire battle rifles coordinating their actions with both air and sea support – while still nominally small, the German troops to be fielded being counted only about 10.000 strong, it was meant to be a great depiction of German capabilities.



German crew in Zuoying

The initial attack took place on the 28th of April, carried out on all of the targeted islands simultaneously. It was known that the PLA did reinforce their garrisons on them, but not by much – not expecting an actual attack on them. This gave the Germans a partial tactical element of surprize, denying the Chinese also the possibility of reinforcing any of their numbers once the battle begun. Upon realizing that the German ships were heading for the islands, the Chinese Navy ordered their own ships to flee to safety – only bringing them into the line of fire of German cruisers. Those which made it or stayed in ports were bombarded by the planes taking off the Graf von Zeppelin – their smart missiles which flight was aimed manually by targeteers still on the ship causing great damage and proving magnitudes more effective than unguided free-fall bombs used by dive bombers. The Luftwaffe supersonic fighters completely dominated the skies, the Chinese Air Force taking very limited action – after losing 6 planes in dogfights and realizing that the Germans stuck with flying only over the islands and staying out from the mainland, they were raised to patrol only the airspace over the Chinese coast. In the meantime, naval landings took place, the islands beaches being shelled by the large guns of the cruisers and the Bismarck battleship, leaving them open to the SS-marines. It was only within the island that the first difficulties came – the accuracy of battleship guns being too low to be able to destroy the constructed defence points, marines and paratroopers themselves lacking small field artillery or even portable anti-tank weaponry to destroy them. This led them to resort to improvisation and calling the Luftwaffe fighter-bombers to unleash their payload onto fortifications – which had proven effective against those which were not armoured heavily enough. The first field use of paratroopers also took place, though not to secure a strategic point as they were doctrinally designed to do, rather acting as a very mobile but very light infantry, the squads being called in from Taiwan when reinforcements became necessary at some point of the battlefield – the Germans displaying a fantastic level of skill in controlling it, able to respond very quickly. Despite many of the Chinese soldiers they faced being veterans with years of experience, they were still effectively a Great War era force placed against a modern one – giving them no chance of success. After only a day of fighting the battle was won, all of theYijiangshan and Dachen Islands as well as Quemoy and Matsu being in German hands, the artillery points held by the PLA being bombarded out. On the next day, the KMT soldiers would arrive to secure them as well as take the captured prisoners. Only 130 German troops died in the entire operation, a remarkably small number compared to the 2400 Chinese, and many more being taken prisoner.



Me P.1112 fighting against Chinese aircraft

Despite threats, the PRC did not declare war on Germany for this; neither did the USSR. The Reich did not establish diplomatic relations with their adversary leading to the conflict not ending with any signed treaty or declaration, though neither did it not escalate to a full mainland recovery attempt – which was beyond the ability and willingness of Germany to do. With the islands in the Taiwan strait being secured and heavy artillery being granted to the ROC to give it an advantage should another exchange of artillery shots happen, the Germans returned home; their base in Zuoying remaining however. Much to Chiang’s displeasure, the Ostasiengeschwader would not keep their most prized assets, the capital ships Bismarck and Graf von Zeppelin, thus reducing it to just a group of obsolete cruisers and destroyers – but still something of a benefit. The base would also hold an airfield, with German instructors remaining to provide training to the “Chinese Army” and forming Air Force – a grand return to the days of Sino-German cooperation. This allegiance with Germany would isolate Chiang, as he would almost globally be branded a fascist, his past actions thus becoming viewed through his collaboration with the Nazis – unfairly, as it was a result the last option he had, not knowing of the PRC incapability of mounting a full scale invasion of Taiwan at the time. While German presence in the far east would not affect geopolitics of the region – its military there being weaker than what even New Zealand held – the fact that the Reich managed to obtain a permanent foothold there caused a major crisis in Britain and France, as German victory had come to prove that a military victory was possible – contrary what many proponents of hastened decolonization claimed.





SS-mann in Taiwan

Following the crisis, Soviet-Chinese relations turned cold. Mao’s unwillingness to fold to Russian demands cost him a lost confrontation, and though he did not abandon his goals of regaining loses, at that point there was nothing he could do, his loses to severe. With Taiwan-German relations improving, it became apparent that the nationalists would grow stronger with time, another success like in 1952 possibly not being repeatable. The military failure quickly lead to another purge in the Chinese leadership, preventing anyone from using Mao’s supposed weakened position. Malenkov used his failure for his own ends, to push through his plan of annexing Manchuria – believing that Mao would not be able to take action against it, nor would anyone in the world. In June 1960 a referendum was announced in the DPRM and Mongolia on whether the countries would to join the USSR – giving China a timeframe in which it could still attempt to mend its relation with Russia. However, with Mao being as ever an uncompromising fighter, he refused and took a confrontational stance, calling the referendum illegal and ordering the CPC and the MWP to boycott it – knowing well that with Soviet presence he could not possibly win it. This was a wrong move, as it went contrary to his past statements in which he often brought up the “right for self-determination” of the people, and the will of Manchurians to become one with China. By calling for a boycott, he thus lost legitimacy in the eyes of the world. While the world itself was far from glad because of this, protest were weak and mostly regarded the conduct rather than the goal itself. LoN emissaries were allowed to overlook the voting, though their freedom was highly restricted, supposedly for security reasons. In early August 1960 the results were made to know, with 98% of the populations voting for incorporation into the USSR as the Mongolian SSR and the Manchurian SSR. The MWP was incorporated into the CPSU, while the CPC withdrew from it. The annexation of Mongolia and Manchuria de facto ended the flirt between Russia and China for cooperation in the far east, though did not end their mutual relations – rather bringing them down to a normal level without great expectations of strong cooperation. With France having withdrawn from Indochina and India achieving independence, the USSR would not need China anymore in the work of spreading communism, its attention going towards the middle east, Africa and back to Europe.

[Genmotty]

All very interesting.

Not sure I would agree with this timeline on the fallout of Indochina nessically being so 'easy', in much the same way that the Japanese were pushed out of Manchuria far too easliy in my opinion. Keeping millions of troops fed at the end of a very thin railway was a bit of a strech of the imagination....but I think we can argue that tactically if in out timeline the french could fall to Blitzkreig, Japan can fall to Deep Operation.

Key Point:
The first nuclear bomb test is running late even without the Manhatten Project and world war 2 to spur development.

The principle of concept was known back in 1938/39 in Europe and Russia respectively. Both France and Britian immidately had started work on their own projects towards this.

Germany in this TL has still had the loss of German high scientists because the POD wasn't before 1932. This means that Germany itself will in this timeline have found it very difficult to produce a nuclear industry.

Japan was somewhat world leading as well in nuclear industry and without world war 2 to hinder and destroy this industry, Japan like the UK and France are the most likey nations to develop the first bombs.

Given that Britian and France have been in close co-operation any time now they should be rolling out the first test.

America and the Soviets won't be far behind them, indeed since America is isolationist, its only going to have a fraction of the millitery it needs to protect itself, and so the atomic bomb will be a major wakeup call for them.

For the Soviets they will almost be directly behind the UK and France, however Japan might still pip-them-to-the-post unless the Emperor in this timeline stopped work back in the 1940s.

Britian with it's strategic airforce doctrine will have not had the concept of an 'atomic bomb' lost on them, in fact its very overdue in that respect that the British haven't developed the weapon.


Eitherway its going to be a radical powershift.
EDIT: The scary thing is, with Hiroshima and Nagasaki there is going to be very little public awareness of the destruction atomic weapons can bring to people thus there won't be anything like the non-nuclear movements in our timeline, and much in the same way poison gas was one of those 'technological additions to war' it took all the horrors of the Great War before nations started to ban its use.

On the plus side, three nuclear armed nations tactically makes the concept of 'a truel' in a manner, therefore in terms of game theory no nation is ever going to want to fire first....unfortunatly in this timeline, non of the participants in the truel know how badly that gun [nuke] is going to kill them. Hence they aren't going to play the game as if armed with guns, they are going to play as if armed with swords believing they can 'hold back' or 'make decisions' about their fight...

In terms of treating this like a game of strategy it looks to me as if this cold war will end up hot...its too unstable as it has been built up so far.


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I'm supprised Mexico hasn't been included yet in all of this. The Facist bloc would have seen Mexicos one party system (albeit with elections) as a definite world ally, and now its getting some form of global power projection it would be supprising if Mexico-German relations were ignored.

Thus opening up South America for powerplays.

Indeed Cuba has been off the radar as well...