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#61
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The Axis in OTL did gain air superiority over the RAF and the fight in the air was basically lost around March 1941. If they would have taken malta and increased the German air power there wouldn't be much difference from OTL in terms of losses and superiority. it where the surface vessels who where most effective at countering the Axis supply's, not the RAF. Land based planes are less effective at naval interdiction and convoy raiding anyway. Quote:
German naval leadership wan't much better then the Italian one. Raeder and Saalwachter wheren't that much of tacticians and not very modern in their ways. Dönitz would be the only one capable of helping the Italians. But he was busy with his U-boats. Quote:
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That last part you mentioned Sealion could work. No, just no. read all the other 500 threads about sealion. Never without ASB. |
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#62
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I am not going to bother reading 500 threads by British fratboys. I have already explained how Sea Lion could work. Why don't you present your own counter arguments. |
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#63
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#64
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Even if you would say that the Germans would build more planes then OTL. These planes would be build in factories in Germany and occupied territory, which are fully open too allied bombings as there are no Axis planes above those territories. They would have a hard time keeping the luftwaffe at strength. What i meant to say was that the luftwaffe did gain air superiority at some point in the battle over malta. Even then, they wheren't able to take the upper hand and cnoquer malta, nor stop the allies from supplying all over the meds. Air superiority isn't everything. Quote:
The Italians had full air superiority over Greece yet they couldn't beat them. The SU had full air superiority over Finland yet they couldn't beat them. Quote:
The other thing, about Italy handling the Middle-East by themselves. Crap. Italy had never the Industrial capacity nor the manpower to build enough war equipment to defeat the Allies in the middle-East. Never. They had lost an entire army too the British in Egypt already. Where are they going to get the manpower? Also Italy had horrible leadership and weak organization. They wouldn't last 2 months against the Allies so far away from home in the middle of the desert. Like OTL. Quote:
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Just installing more AA isn't going to do the trick. you need airpower and they didn't have that if more planes would be send too the Middle-East and they can't build more. Quote:
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Quite frankly i'm not in the mood either. Just try and read a few, maybe you see your ideas come by. |
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#65
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Hi Lionhead,
Apparently you didn't read that the Illustrious, which was supposed to protect a convoy took six 500 kg bombs and was saved only because its planes refueled in Malta, because the deck was useless and they returned to shoot down Stukas and it made it to Malta. Now suppose Malta had been in axis hands at the time. Planes from Sardinia and Sicily attack it first, the Squas cannot refuel in Malta and have to ditch and the Stukas keep pounding the Illustrious and the rest of the ships in the convoy, so that none of them make it to Alexandria. There is absolutely no point in capturing Gibraltar at a high cost, the Brits did have to go around the cape for quite a while to supply Egypt, using Malta only to sink Italian ships supplying Rommel. With Malta in axis hands the Brits ar basically out of the Med. While their carriers were very well built, they made the incredible mistake of providing those excellent ships with lousy planes, rendering them quite useless against large numbers of faster, lighter, land based planes. They only succeeded in destroying the Italian ships with their obsolete swordfish because they had Malta and because the Italians did not patrol the limited waters around their base well enough (land planes, boats, etc,). |
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#66
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The Kammhuber Line did quite well considering how complete the air superiority the Allies had OTL. In OTL, both the British and Americans were able to bomb Germany day and night with only minor damage to German industry to show for it while taking damage themselves. In this TL, the Germans would be stronger (because they would not be taking on Russia yet) and leaving behind a Luftwaffe contingent and anti-aircrafft artillery. The British also would not have American planes helping them. Quote:
). So, they would not have done it in this TL. If they did, they would have been wasted by German defences like Dieppe OTL showed.Quote:
The Nazis were just as relentless and bold like the Japanese, something that the timid Italians lacked. You're telling me that with British forces even weaker in Africa and Middle East than they were in Asia, that the Nazis backed by air superiority could not take over these regions in a cakewalk? Who knows, maybe some of the relentlessness and boldness could rub off on the Italians, who after finally having Italian military production coming to bear in late 1940 early 1941, could handle Afica and the Middle East by themselves. |
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#67
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I am just going to comment on your assertion that American air superiority over Japan wasn't important. It was vital. Every American engagment (whether offensive or defensive) against Japan including the crucial Battle of Midway had American air superiority helping to make the difference. As for the rest of your post, we are going around in circles. I have already addressed all of this elsewhere. Let's agree to disagree |
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#68
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1) This is a summary of the air war in the East that shows no familiarity whatsoever with what did or did not happen there. The Germans gained a near-total air superiority on that front and it took the Soviets until 1943 to start gaining parity and their air force was not a significant factor until 1944-5. The Germans had superiority in a sense total enough that they were able to use obsolescent aircraft and to enjoy one of the most lopsided aerial theaters of the war for years. And in the grand scheme of things this, simply put, did not and could not break the Soviets in a land battle.
2) Yes, it did very well against an Allied air force that kept clinging to the idea that heavily armed bombers alone were all that were needed, to the point that the Strategic Bombing Campaign was a near-loss for the Allies. It took the P-38 to win it, without it the Kammhuber Line would have actually *won* the aerial Battle of Germany. 3) Again, the Soviets were able to wreck German logistics and capture entire German armies when the air superiority was in every degree in favor of the Germans. How could they have done this by this rationale? 4) Again, air superiority had nothing to do with it, the Japanese Army outflanking a British Army that was not prepared for their avenue of advance. The Japanese air arm didn't do a thing here. British incompetence and Yamashita's skill had everything to do with it. You can keep claiming this with no evidence and it will be no truer the thousand and first time that the claim is made than it was on the thousandth. The Allies did not win the war through air power alone, their own analyses during WWII itself told them as such. |
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#69
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The rest is all speculation anyway.I also never said that American Air superiority wasn't important, just not the most important. The actions of the US Marine corps and fleets where more important. |
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#70
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I'm a bit late admittedly, but may I recommend my "Hitler's Mediterranean Strategy"?
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Finished: Chaos TL - Genghis Khan dies in 1200 Timeline, Scenario, Stories! Hitler's Med Strategy Jaredia: A tilted Earth (NOW: 4000 BCE) |
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#71
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Wrong. The Germans had air superiority and pushed far into Russia until Stalingrad in which they no more had sir superiority. The Battle of Stalingrad was indicative of how important air power was. At the start of the battle, the Germans had air superiority and was able to capture 90% of the city. Then winter set in which reduced the Luftwaffe's effectiveness and so the Soviets got a breather. The Soviets land soldiers, better euipped to fighting in winter than the Germans, were then able to capture and destroy the German airfields, reducing even further the Luftwaffe's effectiveness. The tide had turned. By the end of the battle, the Soviets had air superiority. The Germans had lost air superiority and therefore the advantage after the battle and had to fight the rest of the war on the defensive. The Nazis should never have bothered to take the city, wasting time to to kill Soviets hiding behind rubble. They should have bombed the hell out of the city and advanced past it to destroy the Soviet production in the east. Any Soviet counter-attack operating from the bombed-out city would then have to be carried out in the open and therefore be easy prey to the Germans. Quote:
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"The Japanese 25th Army was resisted in northern Malaya by III Corps of the Indian Army. Although the 25th Army was outnumbered by Allied forces in Malaya and Singapore, Japanese commanders concentrated their forces. The Japanese were superior in close air support, armour, coordination, tactics and experience. Moreover, the British forces repeatedly allowed themselves to be outflanked, believing—despite repeated flanking attacks by the Japanese—that the Malayan jungle was impassable. The Imperial Japanese Army Air Force was more numerous, and better trained than the second-hand assortment of untrained pilots and inferior allied equipment remaining in Malaya, Borneo and Singapore. Their superior fighters—especially the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero—helped the Japanese to gain air supremacy. The Allies had no tanks and few armoured vehicles, which put them at a severe disadvantage." "The battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers (Force Z) reached Malaya before the Japanese began their air assaults. This force was thought to be a deterrent to the Japanese. Japanese aircraft, however, sank the capital ships, leaving the east coast of the Malayan peninsula exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their amphibious landings. Japanese forces quickly isolated, surrounded, and forced the surrender of Indian units defending the coast. They advanced down the Malayan peninsula overwhelming the defences, despite numerical inferiority. The Japanese forces also used bicycle infantry and light tanks allowing swift movement through the jungle." "By the morning of 15 February, the Japanese had broken through the last line of defence and the Allies were running out of food and ammunition. The anti-aircraft guns had also run out of ammunition and were unable to repel any further Japanese air attacks which threatened to cause heavy casualties in the city centre. Looting and desertion by Allied troops further added to the chaos in the city centre.[29] At 09:30, Percival held a conference at Fort Canning with his senior commanders. Percival proposed two options: either launch an immediate counter-attack to regain the reservoirs and the military food depots in the Bukit Timah region and drive the enemy's artillery off its commanding heights outside the town; or capitulate. All present agreed that no counterattack was possible. Percival opted for surrender." I am waiting for to ignore all this and claim again that Japanese air power had nothing to do with it. |
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#72
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I'll look it up. Thanks.
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#73
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Mike, I disagree with your examples, which seem to have little to do with Africa and the Middle East in any case. Yes, air power was of great importance in WWII. The German invasion of France was successful in large part due to the effects of Stuka dive bombers replacing the need for slow moving artillery pieces. And aircraft carriers did indeed replace battleships as the main capital ship.
However, even your chosen wiki entries on the fall of Singapore suggest that there were factors involved apart from aircraft in the Japanese victory. Percival and the British Army being largely untrained in jungle warfare were also of great importance. Air support, in a heavily contested urban battle such as Stalingrad (completely different to most desert battles with all the cover the defenders could hide behind), could only achieve so much. You have completely ignored the logistical aspects of how the Germans and Italians are going to supply their mighty Afrika Korps all the way to Alexandria and beyond. This is the most important problem. All the Messerschmidts in the world aren't going to give Rommel enough fuel. Perhaps you could kill a few more Tommies with bombing, delay the fall of Africa a bit longer (even if the Axis does manage to capture Malta as well-which is not neccessarily possible), but it won't make that much difference. Beating the British in battle was something the Axis were able to do already, give or take a Wavell and First Alamein here and there. RAF reinforcements, and others, will eventually get to Egypt. Britain and the Commonwealth was outproducing Germany in terms of aircraft. They would ultimately regain air superiority-even more quickly without German bombing disrupting production. Monty will ultimately come, and Operation Torch will ultimately grind into action. The Axis loses in Africa anyway, it just may take a bit longer.
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#74
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1) No. Again this analysis of the role of air power displays a fundamental incomprehension of its strengths and weaknesses alike at this point in time. Germany knocked out the Soviet air force in short order in 1941. This did not give it an immediate, smashing victory as you would seem to argue as in the seven months the Soviets lost 10 million people that air supremacy was total. How, then, did the Soviets possibly survive? Your claim that the Germans should have simply bombed Stalingrad also indicates fundamental knowledge of first the campaign and then what WWII-era air power studies themselves indicated about the utility and effectiveness of carpet bombing at the time.
2) No, one does not. 3) Japanese air power *did* have nothing to do with it. They made multiple landings and advanced through a jungle the British assumed and wrongfully so (and appeared to have learned nothing from 1940 France about the danger of assuming) was impassable. Perhaps you missed this but air power does not win jungle wars, if it did the USA would have won Vietnam by 1966. |
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#75
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This is your opinion against professional military historians. Many people say that the Germans should not even have bothered with Stalingrad since it had little military value unlike Moscow and the oil fields. They say the Germans should have gone straight and seized either Moscow or the oil fields while the Soviets were still on their heels. I don't understand. What are you referring to? Quote:
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#76
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1) Except that the USSR (not Russia) was indeed big, big, big, and all that air superiority got the Germans was a bunch of meaningless victories. It did not win them the war, when your argument would lead to the same conclusion Hitler's generals had that the war should have been over in two weeks. The Germans tore the Red Air Force apart, but the actual course of battles was shaped not by the Luftwaffe (which was solely tactical and incapable of achieving strategic air aims in the first place) so much as simple facts of logistics: such as that while air and panzers might be able to ride like Hell, infantry and artillery moved at the pace of humans and horses. This gave the USSR in several cases breathing room a more mechanized army would not have given it, and this factor and I want to emphasis this for you my airpower-obsessed friend would not change no matter what the Germans did with the Luftwaffe.
2) The Luftwaffe under Richtoften bombed Stalingrad heavily in the precursor of the battle in the city, and all that did was create shelter for the Soviets. Operation Blue was an over-ambitious plan that committed the Germans to do too much with too little. Its early successes were due to local quantitative and qualitative superiority, but with the Soviets successfully trading space for time and reinforcing what made it work earlier no longer applied. To alter this requires changes at a strategic as opposed to operational level. 3) One does not have a chance to win a war with brilliant air power and a crappy army alone. War doesn't work that way, it never has and it never will. This is the kind of logic that would lead one to conclude the Second Gulf War of 1991 should have been a matter of marching for Saddam, what with the Iraqi Air Force being the single most effective armed service in Iraq. 4) No, you provide links that do not indicate what you think they do and assume that simply saying over and over distorted and inaccurate and oversimplified accounts of things makes it so. Air power never has and never will win wars by itself. Modern wars are won with *combined arms*, the word "combined" meaning of course more than one. Focusing on one arm alone is the kind of dysfunctional and imbalanced analysis that led to problems in the actual WWII itself. |
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#77
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Second gulf war was in 2003.
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#78
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As for the Gulf War; first of all, anti-aircraft capabilities were much more advanced in 1991 than at the time of WW2. Second of all, neither Saddam nor Kuwait had air superiority. The Coalition against Saddam did have absolute air superiority and they easily drove Saddam off. Quote:
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#79
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Nope, 1991. That eight-year technologically upgraded version of WWII in the 1980s was the First Gulf War. 2003 was the Third.
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#80
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1) No, you said that air power does all things. There can be in this analysis no role for the humble-ground pounder. This is like having a debate with a WWII-era advocate of air power who believed air forces rendered armies and navies obsolete.
2) No, you did not say that. You in fact did not acknowledge a role for the LW in Stalingrad at all. 3) The only advantages the Germans had were surprise and superior organization, the LW had nothing to do with it. I suggest you read about the Great Scud Hunt and this illustrates what an Iraq willing to do more than sit there with its thumb up its ass would have done. 4) No, they don't. |
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