Undoubtedly things would have been better for the Turks if they’d withdrawn from the war in 1917 and the earlier the better. Even with the loss of Bagdad in March 1917, the Ottomans were by no means totally defeated in Mesopotamia and still presented a serious challenge to the British. The Ottomans would have had the strength to offer terms for an armistice to the allies, rather than being so weak that they were forced to accept whatever the allies wished to propose, as happened in October 1918. The Turks could have secretly offered terms to the allies, confident that if the allies rejected their terms and offered an unacceptable counterproposal they could continue fighting.
In 1917 the allies would have jumped at practically any terms the Turks suggested, happy to be generous just to get Turkey out of the war; in February Russian had undergone a revolution, the Russian Tsar had abdicated and been replaced by a provisional government that was struggling to assert control, establish order and continue the war all at the same time. If the Ottoman Empire was to withdraw from the war the British and French could have rushed aid through the Dardanelles to southern Russia to prop up the government, at the same time the Russians would have been able to resume trade through the Black Sea, earning much needed foreign capital. That would have justified being very generous to the Turks. A cease-fire with permanent borders corresponding to the lines of control by the various forces on the ground would have been acceptable. While the Sykes-Picot Agreement had divided most of the Arabian territories of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence and controlbetween Britain and France, the urgency of the situation in Russia would have taken precedence over any agreement on war aims that had been agreed by diplomats in the relaxed atmosphere of a gentleman’s club in less urgent times when anything had seemed possible.
The French would have objected that the British would be gaining most of their objectives with regard to the Sykes-Picot agreement while France would be getting none of theirs, to which Lloyd-George would undoubtedly have replied that it was the British Empire’s forces that had done the bulk of the fighting, the extent of French involvement in the Middle Eastern fighting consisting of sending a single division of colonial infantry to take part in the Gallipoli campaign, what Lloyd-George succinctly described as ‘a handful of nigger troops’. Besides which, with the fighting in the Middle-East over, the bulk of the British Empire forces in the region would be transferred to the Western Front, something the French had been demanding for most of the war.
The problem is that the very reason that a Turkish offer of a cease-fire would have been accepted by the allies is the very reason why such an offer would have been unthinkable. Since the February Revolution the Russian forces in the Caucasus had been haemorrhaging troops as men, hearing word of land reform from home, deserted the army to return to their home towns and ensure that they didn’t miss out; why stay and die from either the bad weather or a Turkish bullet when you could go home and finally have your own farm to work instead? Finally, after three long years of stalemate and defeat, the Turks were seeing some success in the Caucasus. Enver Pasha’s dreams of a new Turkish Empire carved out of the Caucasus and Russian Central Asia, the very reason that Turkey had gone to war in the first place, looked like it could actually be realised. If it could be then the new lands would more than make up for the territories lost in the two Balkans Wars as well as the rebellious Arab territories now siding with the British. To ask for a cease-fire just when all of the plums looked ready to fall? That would have made all of the sacrifices of the war worthless.
Such a thing would have been unthinkable to Enver and Talaat, so any such offer would have been dependant on a change of regime, most likely a coup. And this too would have been difficult, a successful coup in Constantinople would not necessarily guarantee the loyalty of the armies in the provinces; many of the commanding officers on the various fronts were relatives of Enver; hardly men likely to follow orders from men that had killed him in a coup.
If the new government were able to establish control and negotiate an end to Ottoman involvement in the war, it would face a snake in the cradle; the men marching home from the Caucasus Front would tell stories of being about to march to Baku when they were stabbed in the back by traitors in Constantinople. The prospects for peaceful civil government post war under such circumstances would not be good.