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#21
January 5th, 2012, 10:35 AM
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Its nice that my post is being ignored and that the discussion is carrying on as if I didn't say anything
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#22
January 5th, 2012, 10:47 AM
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However, I do not see this happening, as it is not within the capabilities of Wehrmacht at the time. I believe that British would manage to extract at least some of the men that could form a skeleton of new army. Furthermore, it is clear that Churchill's government cannot be blamed for such a disaster and if they had time to think coolly and rationally about it, they could only come to the conclusion that Germany cannot win the war. They would certainly get some breathing time as Germany turns to finish France off. I admit British decision could sway either way, depending on many factors, of which most important one would certainly be the scale of disaster at Dunkirk/France. Without BEF in the long term, I guess Allies would not go beyond Sicily in Mediterranean, thus releasing more troops for Overlord eventually.
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#23
January 5th, 2012, 11:15 AM
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no sealion
but i'm in the british sue for peace camp losing that effectively leaves them with no nucleus to expand their army; basically its a super worse version on mons british strategic options would suck losing their entire army india and other places could get ideas that britain is finished with all sorts of rippled effects
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#24
January 5th, 2012, 11:56 AM
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On the invasion fears:
Why should Germany even attempt it? Hitler was not keen on it, neither the German navy. so, if a glorious peace could be arranged, and with BEF gone, generals, equipments, etc etc, well, just maybe. Could they have encircled the entire BEF and made them surrender? Yes, I believe so, based on Deighton's books and also on Brooke's comments. It is, however, amazing to see what the consequences would have been if Sea Lion is not attempted: Option 1: Go for the rest of the British empire. That is Middle East and Iraq with the oil, leading to Iran and to the Caspian Sea and Russian oil. Option 2: Go for Russia full force in early 1940. Option 1 will leave Russia to get into a better shape, option 2 will leave the Med as the next war theatre. Both would not have been possible? So, would Germany have lost "by defauilt" anyway?
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#25
January 5th, 2012, 01:12 PM
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1. Churchill almost certainly still survives in power, and that means no peace agreement.
The great debate over whether to send out peace feelers in the British cabinet - first the war cabinet, and then the full cabinet - lasted from May 24-28. The evacuation of Dynamo lasted from May 28-June 3. Note two things: When the debate happened, it was expected that very few - perhaps no more than 50,000 soldiers - would be evacuated, and that would include at least some French soldiers. Secondly, the motion being considered was only whether to send out peace feelers to Italy to ascertain what terms Germany might offer. That doesn't mean that Britain would actually accept them. While Churchill had a fight on his hands as it was, he won that fight with general expectations of the cabinet that most of the BEF would not be saved. It's possible, of course, that once disaster actually happened that debate would have reopened afterward in the cabinet. But that seems unlikely for the time being. The decision had been made; hearts were hardened; Halifax was unlikely to have the zeal to reopen the debate. So the war would almost certainly go on, albeit in a grimmer public mood, with lots more British POWs in German captivity. 2. That doesn't mean there wouldn't be other knock-on effects. The loss of the cream of the British army would force other decisions that would adversely affect the war effort. Consider what was lost (if I have my information correct): Of the 13 divisions sent to France, the 12th and 23rd were disbanded, 51st Highland was destroyed. The other 10 infantry divisions war records were: 1st, Sent to North Africa in 1943, then Italy 2nd, Sent to India in 1942 3rd, Sent to Normandy in 1944 4th, Sent to North Africa in 1943 as a mixed division, then Italy 5th, Sent to India in 1942, then North Africa, Italy then France in 1945 42nd, became an armoured division in 1942, disbanded in 1943 44th, Sent to to Middle East in 1942, disbanded in 1943. 46th, Sent to North Africa in 1942, then Italy 48th, lower establishment in 1941, reserve in 1943 50th, Sent to North Africa in 1941, then Italy, then Normandy then to UK where reduced to reserve status. Two other divisions already in Britain were also deployed abroad in 1941-1943, the 9th (51st) to the Middle East in 1942, and the 18th to Malaya in 1941-42. With the loss of virtually all of the BEF, the home defence situation would be much more dire and salient. And that means it would be much more problematic to send forces to the Middle East or the Far East in the ensuring 12-18 months. Most of what Churchill deployed to those theaters came from former (reequipped) BEF divisions. Given Churchill's priorities, one has to think he would still try to reinforce Egypt, at least once Rommel swept through Cyrenaica. But instead of the six divisions ultimately sent to the Middle East in 1941-42, he might be only able to manage one or two...perhaps a bit more if he can cajole more troops from the Dominions. I think that makes it an open question whether the Eighth Army can resist Rommel's offensive in 1942. And would Roosevelt agree to ship all those tanks and guns to Egypt if Britain proved so unable to reinforce it itself? [I have not mentioned the Greek operation. I think Churchill still goes through with that. He was a gambler, willing to play for the long odds.] It means grimmer things for the Far East, however. Malaya and Singapore likely fall more quickly, even if that also means that an extra division is not destroyed in the process. And as much as Churchill prioritized Egypt, he could not afford to lose India. Something would have to be sent there to bolster the defanse and tamp down any Indian resistance to the war effort (and keep Canberra and Wellington mollified). And he'd have to rob his Egyptian Peter to pay his Indian Paul. There would be too many things to do, and far too few troops to do it with. 3. Then there is the effect on the French war effort in June 1940. Just shy of 140,000 of the troops saved at Dunkirk were French, and virtually all were quickly repatriated to France in short order. About half of them actually re-entered the French order of battle. The loss of those troops likely means that the French resistance collapses a little more quickly. On the other hand, it might also spur Churchill to evacuate the 51st Highland before Rommel captures it at St. Valery - he'd need every man he could get. 4. The other question, already mentioned by others, is whether this improves the prospects for Operation Sea Lion. I think it certainly improves the prospects that the Germans would give it a more serious effort, given how much weaker the British land defences would be. But I tend to agree with others that this really doesn't change the challenge of beating the RAF and the Royal Navy. If anything, it makes it more difficult, since the RAF might have kept most of the 177 fighter losses that happened in pulling off Operation Dynamo. In short, I think all this means a Britain that stays in the war, albeit with grimmer morale; a France that falls a little more quickly; but more serious consequences likely in the Middle East and the Far East, with all the resulting tensions with the Dominions. It almost certainly means a longer war: if Rommel is able to reach the Suez Canal and beyond, Torch becomes a dicier proposition, and that means Allied control of the Mediterranean by 1943 much less likely.
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___ best regards, Athelstane
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#26
January 5th, 2012, 07:37 PM
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Psychologically, it would be hugely significant in London - less so for the French who would be more accustomed to military reverses. In the aftermath of a disaster at Dunkirk, the onus would be on Hitler to sound ultra-reasonable. The deal would be neutralisation in exchange for repatriation. The British would recognise German hegemony on the Continent but the non-aggression Pact would guarantee British independence and the survival of the Empire (perhaps even with Berlin pressing Tokyo not to attack British possessions). In exchange, Hitler gets a free hand against the USSR.
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#27
January 5th, 2012, 09:40 PM
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Hello Stodge,
It happened about 21 months later, but the surrender of Singapore might be just as apt, being that it was the largest surrender in British military history - at least in OTL (80,000 captured). Obviously, a surrender of the BEF would dwarf that.
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___ best regards, Athelstane
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#28
January 5th, 2012, 09:50 PM
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Would things have been very bad for Britain if the BEF was lost? Yes. There would be no one to train a new army and fight the war at the same time for starters, while morale would be pretty dire even with a victory in the Battle of Britain. Would it have meant an invasion? No, not unless an ASB number of improbable things happened as well. Have a nice day teg
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Cornwallis gets away in Slipping the Net - What if Yorktown had not been a decisive American victory
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#29
January 6th, 2012, 02:55 AM
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Agreed that losing the BEF doesn't mean the RAF and RN are going anywhere. Still, nothing anyone has written has convinced me that Dunkirk wasn't Germany's most realistic chance of knocking Britain out of the war.
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#30
January 6th, 2012, 04:02 AM
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Total defeat at Dunkirk is ASB, losing a somewhat larger number of troops is not. The RAF did a good job overhead. The British Navy performed the evacuation with its usually professionalism, and the troops on the ground were provided during the retreat with exceptionally good leadership from Alan Brooke and Alexander. Two out of three of these factors could not be changed without an earlier POD that might have butterflied Dunkirk away. I supposed you could have Brookie and Alex killed off, so less troops get out. But the most serious loss (in terms of defending Britain against a Sea Lion) was of the expeditionary forces' tanks and artillery. But this IOT outcome didn't affect the Nazi decision not to invade. They really didn't know how bereft of heavy equipment and weaponry the British army at home was. MI-5 had rounded up all the Nazi spies in Britain and was using them to send false messages back to their masters in Berlin. The Nazis thought the British home forces were really quite powerful, and they KNEW how powerful the RN was. It was the RAF that they underrated.
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#31
January 6th, 2012, 07:56 AM
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No, I don't think Sealion was in any way possible with the forces available. What I meant (and didn't make myself clear) was that the Germans would THINK that Sealion was possible, and therefore try it. Much of OKH thought it would be merely a scaled-up river crossing. Now, with the BEF in the cage the British have perhaps 2 divisions of regulars (I'm assuming 51st Highland is evacuated in time, and 1st Armoured is either not sent or evacuated), and I think 2 divisions of territorials. The rest of the defences are old men with shotguns and hunting rifles. How long would these (in the mind of OKH) last against a corps or two of the Wehrmacht? Surely all we have to do is take the boat to England, have a couple of days fight against what's left of the British Army, march to London and win. The RAF and RN? Surely Goering has assured us that the Luftwaffe can handle them. If OKH/OKW get a really bad case of victory disease (possible, given they've just destroyed the BEF), they might even try Sealion without full air superiority. The Unmentionable Sea Mammal will fail in this TL as it would in OTL. The difference here is that the German high command may think it will work, and therefore give it a try. The question then is: what happens when the Wehrmacht has to write off several divisions, and suffer a reverse of this magnitude?
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#32
January 6th, 2012, 08:15 AM
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Edit: this is the one I think I was thinking of. Last edited by Gunnarnz; January 6th, 2012 at 08:19 AM.. Reason: Added link.
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#33
January 6th, 2012, 08:15 AM
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Okay sorry for misunderstanding you. An attempted Sealion however would probably offset the negative morale effects from a failed Dunkirk, possibly even more so. It would have only made the problem of how to train a new army worse (due to combat losses) but it would have probably kept Britain in the war.
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Cornwallis gets away in Slipping the Net - What if Yorktown had not been a decisive American victory
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#34
January 6th, 2012, 08:56 AM
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If we assume (and it is an assumption) that a much less successful evacuation results in some kind of British neutrality, then the more interesting question is what effect it has on Barbarossa.
I'm inclined to think that any extra materiel freed up will have a minimal impact. But there are two competing questions 1. Will the Russians be as surprised? With Britain out the war, Germany will not be as able to run the decoy operations indicating Britain as a target. With only one front, will Stalin still ignore the intelligence? 2. Can the start date be brought forward, and will that make any difference? If the Germans are as successful as OTL, but start a month earlier, then Operation Typhoon isn't slowed by mud (potentially)
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#35
January 6th, 2012, 09:04 AM
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Probably best to let the experts decide this one.
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"The role of the Cavalry is to add colour, dash and daring, to what would otherwise be a mindless shitfight amongst grunts".
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#36
January 15th, 2012, 01:39 PM
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The German Panzer divisions were halted unnecessarily on three separate following their breakout from the Meuse River crossings. The first was on May 17th when Hitler ordered them to halt until reinforcements could be brought up; he feared an attack by the French from the South that could sever the line of the advance behind the spearhead of the Panzer Divisions. His fears were baseless; General Halder knew, based on signals intelligence from ‘Foreign Armies West’ the German Army’s department for radio intelligence gathering, that the French did not have the forces nearby with which to attack in any strength and this was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance. While gaps were forming between the Panzer and motorised spearhead of the offensive and the following infantry divisions with the men on foot and artillery drawn by horses, these presented no opportunity to the French, who lacked the troops in the area and whose forces, subjected to continuous air attack, could not move even as fast as the slow moving German infantry. At this time the Germans had just reached the line of the Sambre – Oise Canal. The Germans lost almost an entire day here, as well as the momentum that their attacks had developed up until that point. Had this halt order not been given the German advance would have been able to make huge strides; the allies were still only just beginning to grasp the seriousness of the threat that the German breakthrough presented and had barely started to react to it, there was virtually nothing between the Panzer Divisions and the coast at that time. The second halt was caused by the German’s own unprecedented success; when they reached the English Channel on the 20th of May they had literally moved faster than they’d done planned for. Consequently the 21st was lost while the Panzer Divisions waited for orders. From Guderian’s campaign dairy: ‘So the 21st of May was wasted while we waited for orders. I spent the day visiting Abbeville and our crossings and bridgeheads over the Somme. On the way I asked my men how they had enjoyed the operations up to date. ‘Not bad,’ said an Austrian of the 2nd Panzer Division, ‘but we wasted two whole days.’ Unfortunately he was right.’ Had the Germans anticipated their success and during the months leading up to 10 May 1940 done the preliminary staff work necessary to reinforce any success in their coming offensive this would not have happened. Amazingly, the Germans had done no real planning for what was to happen after they’d crossed the Meuse, let alone what happened once they’d reached the Channel coast. If Manstein had remained as Rundstedt’s Chief of Staff there is little possibility that this would have occurred. Likewise, had Guderian been in command of the Panzer Group instead of Kleist, decisions would have been made faster to keep the momentum of the Panzers flowing. The third halt was Hitler’s infamous ‘Fuhrer Halt Order’ of the 24th of May. Hitler, alarmed by high number of German tanks reported out of action, ordered the Panzer Divisions halted and for the Luftwaffe to destroy the B.E.F. and French 1st Army. This was a major mistake, most of the tanks reported out of action were from mechanical problems that could be repaired in hours or at most a couple of days, they had not been destroyed in combat. It has also been claimed that the approaches to Dunkirk were not suitable for Panzers, this too is false; Guderian, who had experienced the terrain there first hand in the First World War, was fully confident that his Panzers would have no difficulties. From Guderian: ‘Hitler ordered the left wing to stop on the Aa. It was forbidden to cross the stream. We were not informed of the reasons for this. The order contained the words: ‘Dunkirk is to be left to the Luftwaffe.’ We were utterly speechless.’ When the order to halt came on the 24th, the Panzers had just secured crossings of the Aa Canal; the last physical obstacle of any sort between them and Dunkirk, only 15km (less than 10 miles) from the harbour. Without the halts of the 17th and 21st they’d have been crossing the Aa sometime on the 21st or 22nd of May, when there was little in the way of British and French Forces in position to stop, or even reasonably slow them. Instead of being able to withdraw to the coast from ‘the thumb’ projecting down to Lille with the Aa as their right flank, the British would have found themselves trying to fight their way to the coast against the Panzers near Burgues, Wormhoudt and Noorshote. They’d have been heavily engaged in front against the Panzer Divisions while still fighting a desperate rear guard action against the German Sixth Army. Even if the first two halts took place and the Germans didn’t reach the Aa Canal until the 24th of May, without the Fuhrer’s halt order the right flank of the allied pocket would not have gone static allowing the B.E.F. and French 1st Armies to withdraw in anywhere near as good order to the coast as they did, there is every possibility that the German Army Groups could have met north Ypres sometime before the 28th of May, trapping more than half the forces that were subsequently evacuated. With much of their forces trapped in a pocket to the south, forming a secure perimeter near the coast would have been all but impossible. On the allied side there are a string of decisions that had they been made differently would have spelt disaster. When General Weygand replaced Gamelin as allied supreme Commander he ordered the trapped northern armies to attack south and link up with the main French forces south of the Somme River and severing the German offensive in the process. In his orders Weygand called for eight divisions to attack south, far more forces than the B.E.F. and French 1st Army could ever hope to free up. He also promised that the French armies south of the Somme would attack as well, thereby aiding the chances of a successful link up, but there were no forces available for such an offensive. And his plan did not account for the German control of the air except to demand more fighter squadrons to be sent to France by the R.A.F. However when he briefed Reynaud and Churchill on this scheme they were won over by his confidence as well as their own desperation that something must be done. Weygand’s presentation painted an entirely fictitious picture of the situation in the north to the two allied Premiers as well as to Ironside, the British Chief of the General Staff and, working under these false beliefs pressed General Gort to do everything he could to comply with Weygand’s orders for an attack south. So Gort had the allied supreme Commander but also his the British Army’s commanding general and the British Prime Minister all telling him that he had to attack south; Weygand was giving orders to his subordinate while Churchill, regardless of any doubts he may have had, was pressing Gort to comply in order to keep faith with their ally, while for Ironside it was a combination of both. Gort was a carrier officer of the British army and in every sense the very definition of orthodox, for him to go against these orders and the pressure from above must have been truly staggering. That he came to the decision early enough to save the B.E.F from destruction, while Weygand’s plan was still in favour in senior political and army circles on both sides of the Channel, is absolutely miraculous. Had he tried to comply with his orders the B.E.F. and would have been trapped and destroyed in a large pocket somewhere near Lille along with the French 1st Army. The direction that the British withdrew in provides another opportunity for disaster. The B.E.F. had been supplied from the ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre. Normally a retreating army will withdraw along its lines of communication, picking up supplies and reinforcements as they meet them coming the other way. For the B.E.F. to have withdrawn in this manor would have meant moving back towards the ports of Calais and Boulogne and evacuating from there. Had they done so they’d have been trapped when those ports were cut off by the Panzer Divisions wheeling north. General Brooke’s proposal that the B.E.F. use the Belgian ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge to evacuate from would have been equally disastrous when the Belgian Army capitulated. Had any of these scenarios eventuated the allies would have been lucky to evacuate the 20,000 to 40,000 that was all that most feared they could evacuate, instead of the 338,226 that they actually managed to evacuate. If that had been the case, those evacuated would have consisted almost entirely of rear echelon personnel, supply and logistics staff, not combat personnel. Likewise, if the Germans had pushed harder and reached Dunkirk and the evacuation beaches only a few days earlier than they finally did, say on the 1st of June instead of the 4th, only 194,000 would have been evacuated. So it is entirely possible, in fact it was probable, for the B.E.F. to be entirely destroyed, or for only a small portion of it to be evacuated consisting of none of the fighting soldiers, which brings us to the next question: What would Britain do next? There is a popular perception that Britain would fight on alone regardless of the severity of the losses at Dunkirk. It is romantic to believe that Britain would have fought on no matter the odds, but it doesn’t reflect the historical facts. In fact this belief is the result of some very deliberate myth making by none other than Winston Churchill himself. All of his writing and every speech he gave after the war emphasised that Britain stood united in their darkest hour. This is manipulation of perception by a master of the art; where other lesser men might emphasise their personal role during the moment of crisis, especially after years being ridiculed in the wilderness, Churchill chose to emphasise British unity and resolve. It was his final gift to the British nation, that every English schoolboy would grow up believing that when faced with insurmountable odds, his countrymen didn’t waver, that every one of them stood resolutely determined to fight on to final victory. It is a beautiful and a masterful legacy and Churchill at his most magnanimous best, but it does not reflect historical truth. If the B.E.F. had been lost, General Ironside’s assessment for the cabinet would have been extremely bleak. Prior to the evacuation, when he estimated that they would be lucky to get more than 40,000 men back to England, Ironside privately recorded that with the loss of the B.E.F. would spell the loss of all hope of continuing the war. Ironside was not someone noted for exaggeration or for hysteria; if that was his professional opinion then it is likely to have been very close to the mark. Churchill’s grip on power remained tenuous from May to August 1940. Many members of parliament, including Churchill himself, believed that his premiership would be short lived. There were many in parliament that were waiting for him to falter before they would make a move against him while others were actively conspiring to see him replaced. Churchill inherited Chamberlains cabinet and when he expanded it with the inclusion of some Labour Party members, merely expanded the cabinet rather than dispensing with the services of some of the less steadfast members. He was still heavily dependent on Chamberlain, who remained leader of the Conservative Party with strong support even after Churchill had replaced him as Prime Minister. Nor was he able to do without Halifax as foreign minister. Halifax and Chamberlain were only the most prominent members of parliament willing to explore peace negotiations, there were considerably more even after the B.E.F. had been successfully evacuated. Had the B.E.F. been lost and the CIGS assessment of the war situation been as bleak as Ironside’s would undoubtedly have been, those looking for a negotiated way out of the crisis for Britain would have been seen as the only sane way to save Britain from invasion. And Churchill is unlikely to have been able to avoid such peace feelers being approved by cabinet by inviting other, more reliable members into cabinet; aside from his lukewarm support in cabinet, he was also unable to judge who his real friends were in the wider parliament. During 1940 Churchill repeatedly asked David Lloyd-George, British Prime Minister during the First World War, to join his war cabinet. Lloyd-George repeated refused because of the presence of Chamberlain in cabinet; the pair mutually detested each other and refused to work together. It was until late in 1940 that Churchill found out that Lloyd-George had been conspiring to replace Churchill as Prime Minister with the intention of entering into peace negotiations with Hitler. This does not mean that Britain would have surrendered; there would not have been columns of jackbooted soldiers marching through London. None of those looking to negotiate were talking of capitulation; the terms they were looking for were for an end in the fighting, preferably after some small British victory to improve her standing at the negotiations table. Britain would have come out of the war largely intact, but those who had opposed fascism would have been thoroughly discredited. Just what parts of the Empire Britain lost would depend on when they entered negotiations, they lost British Somaliland shortly after Italy entered the war and this would probably have been demanded as part of any Italian terms. Just what else would be lost would depend heavily on the negotiators, and on what other sharks would have gathered once the scent of blood entered the water; Spain had become a pro-Axis non-belligerent on the day Paris fell and occupied the neutral city of Tangier and considered annexing it. With France defeated and Britain impotent and seeking an end to the fighting, Franco may have looked for other real estate to acquire while there was the opportunity. With a much weaker Great Britain, America’s aid to the UK cannot be expected to have increased and would most likely have been a lot less. American support was based on the belief that Britain was strong enough to fight on alone and that anything sent to Britain would not end up in Nazi hands with the fall of the U.K.The term ‘aid’ is amusing in this context; American aid to Britain in 1940 consisted of allowing the British to buy arms and equipment from the United States, provided that the British pay for everything before if left the wharf. Pay in full, in gold. The first significant aid to Britain from America was the ‘Destroyers for Bases Agreement’ which wasn’t made until 2 September 1940, well after the timeframe of any British peace negotiations would probably have commenced and only took place because of the U.S. president’s assessment that Britain was still a credible combatant power; something that would not have been the case with almost the entire regular British Army languishing in German P.O.W. camps. In June 1940 the US army’s War Plans Division drafted what came to be known as the ‘Strong Memorandum’ . The memorandum predicted the imminent defeat of Britain and France and called for immediate American mobilisation for hemispheric defence, termination of military aid to the allies and an entirely defensive American posture. Roosevelt was only willing to disregard the memorandum and continue support to the allies when his personal envoy Harry Hopkins had reported back to him that Britain could continue the fight. If Hopkins’ report had matched that of Ambassador Kennedy’s, that Britain was on the ropes, the American Strategic policy would have been to build up the defences of the Western Hemisphere exclusively. With Britain withdrawing from the war the status of the Free Governments in Exile would have been extremely difficult if not impossible. A lot would depend upon the government that replaced Churchill’s, but certainly no peace agreement would be possible with Germany if Britain were harbouring enemies of the Reich. Depending on the time frame of negotiations, and the government, some would possibly be able to relocate to Washington, but once there they’d be unlikely to have any more influence than the members of the former Tsar’s administration had. Exiled governments such as the Dutch, with extensive colonial empires still loyal to them would probably move to the capital cities of the colonies. The position of de Gaulle and the Free French would be possibly the most difficult; they would not be able to flee to the United States because the U.S. still had diplomatic ties with the Vichy regime, and no significant French colony recognised them as a government. For Hitler, a peace that left British power on the continent destroyed but still undefeated at home would be entirely acceptable; he would be secure in his realm and would have achieved everything he had set out to do in the west and could be confident that the British would reconcile themselves to the new order in Europe and any muttering s about wars of revenge would be isolated to the lunatic, warmongering fringe, who would not have a voice in the new government in London. He could then consider a readjustment of his relationship with Stalin at his leisure, planning for war against the Soviet Union some time in 1942 and undistracted by difficulties elsewhere. So in conclusion, the defeat of the British Expeditionary Force by the Germans was a possibility and would have in all probability resulted in Britain making peace with Germany. The summery of Major General Julian Thompson, in his book ‘Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory’ puts it best: Gort’s decision to evacuate his army from Dunkirk saved the BEF. He may not have been a brilliant army commander – his faults have been discussed already and need no repeating. But he was able to see with absolute clarity that the French high command were utterly bankrupt of realistic ideas and that consequently Allied plans would lead nowhere, and he had the moral courage and unwavering willpower to act in the face of censure and criticism, thus ensuring that the BEF was saved. There are few occasions when the actions of one man can be said to be instrumental in winning a war. This was one of those. Had the BEF been surrounded, cut off and forced to surrender, it is inconceivable that Britain could have continued to fight without an army. That is not to say that Britain would necessarily have been occupied, but a humiliating accommodation with Hitler would surely have followed. Without continuing British resistance, weak at first but daily growing stronger, Hitler would have won the war. For the reasons already given, the United States was incapable of intervening to limit Hitler’s hold on Europe. Sources: Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory by Major General Julian Thompson. To Lose a Battle: France 1940 by Alistair Horne. Blood, Tears and Folly by Len Deighton. Fateful Choices by Ian Kershaw. Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord by Max Hastings. Eagle Against the Sun: The American war with Japan by Ronald H. Spector. England’s Last War Against France: Fighting Vichy 1940 – 1942 by Colin Smith.
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#37
January 15th, 2012, 03:37 PM
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The main reason the Germans didn't use their armour more aggressively at Dunkirk is they wanted to preserve it for the invasion of France; this was probably sensible of them. Putting the BEF ahead of France would have been an inversion of sensible priorities. Last edited by amphibulous; January 15th, 2012 at 03:51 PM..
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#38
January 15th, 2012, 03:41 PM
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I think people tend to forget about the blockade because the Germans don't - can't - fight any battles to break it, and without the exciting stuff it doesn't make the History Channel. But it's the most significant fact of WW2: the Germans have conquered an area that can't feed itself or supply its own factories. Without food and raw materials inputs, the Germans have conquered a useless liability. Last edited by amphibulous; January 15th, 2012 at 03:52 PM..
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#39
January 15th, 2012, 03:46 PM
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#40
January 15th, 2012, 06:08 PM
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Stalin had more than enough warning, but the UK actually at peace with Hitler is probably enough to prevent surprise. The German excuse for all the troops in Poland was the need to train outside of British bomber range. This is plausible enough for someone who wants to trust Hitler to believe in, but with the UK at peace, what is the excuse for the Germans? Assuming the same surprise, the biggest thing is not the date, but better supplies. Germany will eventually use most of the divisions in Western Europe in the East. Germany will be able to import needed material from overseas. Also, I doubt FDR comes to the USSR aid if Britain has already made peace.
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Prince Henry of Prussia: The Rise of the U-Boat http://www.alternatehistory.com/disc...d.php?t=225455
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