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#5901
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Quote:
You only need carriers if you don't have enough land based air. |
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#5902
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Quote:
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#5903
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Quote:
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#5904
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I don't know, the movie was considered insultingly inaccurate, especially in regards to the senior officer Philip Toosey. If you want an idea of what actually went on read One Fourteenth Of An Elephant by Ian Deny Peek. Basically, if the prisoners could have found a way to build the bridge even slower and make it even more rickety they would have done.
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#5905
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From what's in the damage analysis in Friedman's cruiser book & the histories of the ships in question, a US 10k-ton treaty cruiser should be able to survive a single Long Lance hit, assuming she doesn't suffer any other damage or run into really bad weather on the way to the yard, though it'll be 4-6 months in the yard repairing the damage; it's when one gets hit by 2 or more that survival becomes problematic.
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#5906
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Quote:
Remember his remit is first to protect Singapore and Ceylon. Not the Dutch. He wants more intelligence before he does something risky.
__________________
The Whale Has Wings, a shiny new Fleet Air Arm in WW2. Timelines go better with Whales... http://www.astrodragon.co.uk/Books/TheWhaleHasWings.htm |
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#5907
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#5908
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Quote:
HMAS Hobart after taking a Japanese submarine torpedo. ![]() |
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#5909
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Probably done by a Type 95 which was a cut-down version of the long lance with shorter range and 80% of the warhead.
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#5910
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supplying burma
I think the tonnage requirements quoted are misleading.
Operation Thursday supplied 10,000 men and 1000 mules with 3 batteries each of field and light AA on 125 tons per day with an initial stock of 250 tons. That’s on a mix of British and Indian army scales. IJA formations are bigger but I think something on the order of 200 - 250 tons per division day is reasonable for that sort of operational tempo. It would certainly cover food requirement. The problem will be ammo. A US infantry division ammo requirement per day went from 83 tons per day in pursuit up to around 350 - 450 tons in attack and 470-770 in defence. a 155mm battalion uses 15 tons in pursuit to ~100+ tons in defence or attack. Compared with OTL the IJA are moving from a largely pursuit type operation to one with more Attack/Defence rates which is going to blow their logs situation much faster than OTL. 1 day in attack = 30 days in pursuit. Apparently the IJA planning numbers were more or less the same as the USA planning numbers for supply. The above quoted is I think actual expenditure rates which may be very different but the principle remains valid. They will also have been favouring ammo rather than food/fodder and POL supply for some days now just to maintain their level of activity. In this context Stilleto has turned a dodgy ammunition situation into a near catastrophic one. The final problem is The IJA have no WW1 experience to fall back on so their logs planning will be booklearning rather than real world and higher HQs will I think not believe Yamashita when he says he has problems. |
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#5911
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Might the figures for Port Arthur and Mukden have been a fairly reasonable substitute for WW1 values?
__________________
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#5912
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Possibly from Mukden, but not much from Port Arthur due to the extra 10 years difference (even the most junior officers from Port Arthur are now in their mid 50s)
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#5913
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Still a pretty hefty hitter. Lovely dent though. Give a few Aussies a couple of hammers and a crate of beer and they'll have that knocked out in a jiffy. Bonzer!
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#5914
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Possibly but my general understanding is that while the 1904/5 figures were a shock compared to pre war planning, WW1 was a shock compared to that and WW2 again.
But its possible. The real points though are these. The supply requirement depends on what you are doing. Active attack or defense makes ammo supply the biggest portion. (the 'delay' line is a higher but on the same order as 'pursuit' I would read either as general daily consumption with low tempo operations) Vs OTL expeditures I think there has been a massive increase because of the intensity of the fighting, so the crunch will come much much sooner. If the IJA switches to a defensive posture their consumption increases if the UK/CW attack. Any delay or request to pause is likely to cause questions at higher HQ over Yamashita's aggressiveness much like OTL with Homma with a high probability of him being replaced by a guy under orders to use use his men as Human Bullets and conquer Malaya right now. Tenaru river/Edsons ridge on a corps scale? |
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#5915
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correction possibly
the IJA planning number was 1/2 - 1/3 lower that the US equivalent, and based on Russo Japanese/China experience.
To give another idea - the Brits calculated that using 25lbers a morale attack (suppress the enemy fire during and for some time after the barrage) which reads like a barrage immediately prior to an infantry attack, would require 1,500 rounds delivered in 1 hour on a 100x100 yd target area. assume a 500 yd frontage that gives 7,500 rounds in an hour. Thats arguably a UK/Ger or Russian Battalion attack frontage but you could get numbers that show 1000 yd as a battalion attack frontage. an IJA division artillery component (not battalion and rgt guns) was allocated 48,000 rounds. Thats supposed to last 25 days fighting. You could use 1/3 of it in an hour to have an effect on a UK/CW company frontage in defence. OK there are others ways with less ammo expenditure but I am making a point. |
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#5916
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#5917
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#5918
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Quote:
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#5919
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Quote:
However, I do not know about what TTL may have produced in British codebreaking efforts. |
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#5920
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