No Manstein

jeffking

Banned
We all know the father of modern Panzer Blizkreig warfare was Gen. Manstein but even as late as March 1940 there was major disagreement in Nazi HQ about the battle plans for France. The top generals wanted a replay of WWI with an approach into Belgium and invasion on a broad front. The Allies could easily anticipate such a move and shifted practically all their forces to meet them there. That is when Manstein lay the trap of conceiling his main forces in the Ardennes forests to strike at the undefended Allies rear. Now what if Manstein hadn't been so adamant that this was the correct path? or if Hitler had overruled him and sided with his Superiors? How would the war have developed? Could the Allies have held off the Nazis in a replay of WW1 trench lines, this time on the Muese and Rhine instead of the Somme and Marne? and if a protracted stalemate had occured would Stalin have taken the opportunity to launch an offensive to destroy Fascism once and for all?
 

Cook

Banned
We all know the father of modern Panzer Blizkreig warfare was Gen. Manstein...
We don’t all know that because he wasn’t; Heinz Guderian is rightly accredited as the father of armoured warfare. Manstein, an infantry general, was the principal developer of the German Sickelschnitt Plan but he was not alone. The German 1940 plan prior to the adoption of Sickelschnitt was not a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan by the way.
 
No Mastein-wonders in WWII mean no Blairwitch-ATLs on this board 70 years later. This would mean a disaster!
 
The German 1940 plan prior to the adoption of Sickelschnitt was not a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan by the way.

If anything it was less ambitious.

Anyway, Manstein not being there would create butterflies far before this.
 
Erich von Manstein has benefited from some pretty massive embellishment of his actual record. He failed utterly and completely to capture Sevastopol in 1941, and his record at Leningrad is so undistinguished it tends to be passed over altogether. He failed at Stalingrad in relieving the siege of the army (even his fanboys concede that), he had no comprehension of when to call it quits at Kursk, and he again failed to keep the Soviets from reaching the Dniepr. Adding to this he was an over-zealous enforcer of Hitler's Commissar Order and someone who blamed all his mistakes on Hitler, in the case of Kursk in particular in a self-contradictory fashion. The Nazis would not have necessarily missed much had he had a bullet kill him in WWI.
 

John Farson

Banned
Erich von Manstein has benefited from some pretty massive embellishment of his actual record. He failed utterly and completely to capture Sevastopol in 1941, and his record at Leningrad is so undistinguished it tends to be passed over altogether. He failed at Stalingrad in relieving the siege of the army (even his fanboys concede that), he had no comprehension of when to call it quits at Kursk, and he again failed to keep the Soviets from reaching the Dniepr. Adding to this he was an over-zealous enforcer of Hitler's Commissar Order and someone who blamed all his mistakes on Hitler, in the case of Kursk in particular in a self-contradictory fashion. The Nazis would not have necessarily missed much had he had a bullet kill him in WWI.

Yes, and thanks to him (or rather, his fanboys) we have so many Manstein TLs/fanfics here that they're coming out of our asses. Him getting a bullet in WWI would be worth it just to avoid that.:p But yes, your points are good.

Why don't other WWII German generals get some love, like Model, or Rundstedt?
 
Yes, and thanks to him (or rather, his fanboys) we have so many Manstein TLs/fanfics here that they're coming out of our asses. Him getting a bullet in WWI would be worth it just to avoid that.:p But yes, your points are good.

Why don't other WWII German generals get some love, like Model, or Rundstedt?

Primarily because Model shot himself and Rundstedt fought in the West. Most of the Nazi generals admired were the most violent and treacherous pro-Nazi fanatics, whose self-serving memoirs obscured how treacherous those men actually were. The tragedy is that generals who really do deserve better treatment like Model get overlooked and von Manstein and Rommel tend to be treated as Marty Tzus Great White Hopes, not generals serving a side handicapped by bitter factionalism and intrigue often resolved by shooting or ensuring the sacking of their rivals.

He was judged by his peers as being the best general in the German army. All you’ve managed to state is that he couldn’t do the impossible.

He failed to capture Sebastopol in the fall of 1941 around the time of the fall of Smolensk, and his campaigning in Leningrad is as pathetic as everyone else, Nazi and Stalinist, in the fighting in the siege lines there. A Manstein that deserved his claims of being a Marty Tzu should have taken Sebastopol in 1941, not served to give the Soviets a chance to inflict a continually bleeding ulcer in the south. His failures at Leningrad equally implode his myth, just as Operation Mars shows why service under Georgi Zhukov could occasionally be a mixed blessing in the best way of putting it.

To put it bluntly he really is one of the greatest generals of the losing side of the war, he's not the Marty Tzu certain TLs on this community wish him to be.
 
Yes, and thanks to him (or rather, his fanboys) we have so many Manstein TLs/fanfics here that they're coming out of our asses. Him getting a bullet in WWI would be worth it just to avoid that.:p But yes, your points are good.

Why don't other WWII German generals get some love, like Model, or Rundstedt?

Runstedt gets overlooked because he was an old professional quietly doing his job. People don't like to read about level headed professionals going about their business. Rommel charging around the desert and losing his army first in Egypt and then in Tunisia sounds much more interesting.
 
Runstedt gets overlooked because he was an old professional quietly doing his job. People don't like to read about level headed professionals going about their business. Rommel charging around the desert and losing his army first in Egypt and then in Tunisia sounds much more interesting.

Not just in those two places, I might note. His failure in terms of contributing to German strategic paralysis in 1944 was a really big one.
 
Primarily because Model shot himself and Rundstedt fought in the West. Most of the Nazi generals admired were the most violent and treacherous pro-Nazi fanatics, whose self-serving memoirs obscured how treacherous those men actually were. The tragedy is that generals who really do deserve better treatment like Model get overlooked and von Manstein and Rommel tend to be treated as Marty Tzus Great White Hopes, not generals serving a side handicapped by bitter factionalism and intrigue often resolved by shooting or ensuring the sacking of their rivals.



He failed to capture Sebastopol in the fall of 1941 around the time of the fall of Smolensk, and his campaigning in Leningrad is as pathetic as everyone else, Nazi and Stalinist, in the fighting in the siege lines there. A Manstein that deserved his claims of being a Marty Tzu should have taken Sebastopol in 1941, not served to give the Soviets a chance to inflict a continually bleeding ulcer in the south. His failures at Leningrad equally implode his myth, just as Operation Mars shows why service under Georgi Zhukov could occasionally be a mixed blessing in the best way of putting it.

To put it bluntly he really is one of the greatest generals of the losing side of the war, he's not the Marty Tzu certain TLs on this community wish him to be.

I have no problem labeling Walter Model as the most skilled commander in the Heer (certainly in the top 3)

His failure to capture Sevastopol in the initial rush during operation buzzard could hardly be labeled a command failure... he had no panzer divisions at all, and half of his infantry divisions where Romanian with shitty weapons and poor doctrine vis a vis his German divisions; the lack of mobility which he had no control over stopped them from taking the city in a coup de main... he still captured a lot of troops and territory relative to the forces he had on hand and decisively won the campaign

Which Leningrad operations are you speaking of 41 or 42? His drive in 41 is still mandatory study at Ft Knox armored school; his small corps of 1 panzer, 1 motorized infantry and 1 line infantry division advanced 250 miles in 5 days and facilitated the capture of 65,000 Russians; his advance only stopped due to the incompetence of Leeb and the numerical weakness of army group north/panzer group 4; plus he was transferred out before the really stupid decisions and general assaults where taken at Leningrad so he is not responsible for them

Leningrad 42? His army walked off their trains into a titanic meeting battle; which they won despite losing him to command army group don just a couple weeks later and being stuck with a logistical and tactical nightmare before the battle even started; the Sinyavino battle (which is the only one Manstein was there for) did force the Germans (along with Uranus and Mars) to cancel their proposed renewed offensive against Leningrad, however Manstein's troops inflicted a body count of 5 to 1; and yielded little ground and left the Leningrad military district's forces comprehensively bloodied.... how is a battle where you hold your ground and inflict 5 to 1 losses (with no tank divisions no less) "pathetic"

That isn't to say Manstein didn't have some horribly managed battles; you just chose the wrong ones :).... Mius was by far and away his dumbest move; sure the 3rd panzer corps crushed the divisions who crossed, but he completely ignored his left flank which Zhukov then visited with 1.4 million men in 18 armies backed by 1700 tanks and 4000 aircraft and 7800 cannons... the defeat there was more epic and impressive than Bagration or Sickle cut
 
Not just in those two places, I might note. His failure in terms of contributing to German strategic paralysis in 1944 was a really big one.

I know the nazi generals like to overly blame hitler for their mistakes; but strategic paralysis in France 44 does go to him... Hitler put two field marshals in the same place who had different strategies for how to handle the battle; on top of that the top panzer man had his own ideas; instead of setting a real strategy or establishing an honest chain of command; Hitler used this to put all the panzer formations in OKW reserve so he would have final say in their allocation plus he ordered them spread out everywhere which neither Rommel or Guderian/Rundstedt/Schweppenburg wanted.
 
I have no problem labeling Walter Model as the most skilled commander in the Heer (certainly in the top 3)

His failure to capture Sevastopol in the initial rush during operation buzzard could hardly be labeled a command failure... he had no panzer divisions at all, and half of his infantry divisions where Romanian with shitty weapons and poor doctrine vis a vis his German divisions; the lack of mobility which he had no control over stopped them from taking the city in a coup de main... he still captured a lot of troops and territory relative to the forces he had on hand and decisively won the campaign

Which Leningrad operations are you speaking of 41 or 42? His drive in 41 is still mandatory study at Ft Knox armored school; his small corps of 1 panzer, 1 motorized infantry and 1 line infantry division advanced 250 miles in 5 days and facilitated the capture of 65,000 Russians; his advance only stopped due to the incompetence of Leeb and the numerical weakness of army group north/panzer group 4; plus he was transferred out before the really stupid decisions and general assaults where taken at Leningrad so he is not responsible for them

Leningrad 42? His army walked off their trains into a titanic meeting battle; which they won despite losing him to command army group don just a couple weeks later and being stuck with a logistical and tactical nightmare before the battle even started; the Sinyavino battle (which is the only one Manstein was there for) did force the Germans (along with Uranus and Mars) to cancel their proposed renewed offensive against Leningrad, however Manstein's troops inflicted a body count of 5 to 1; and yielded little ground and left the Leningrad military district's forces comprehensively bloodied.... how is a battle where you hold your ground and inflict 5 to 1 losses (with no tank divisions no less) "pathetic"

That isn't to say Manstein didn't have some horribly managed battles; you just chose the wrong ones :).... Mius was by far and away his dumbest move; sure the 3rd panzer corps crushed the divisions who crossed, but he completely ignored his left flank which Zhukov then visited with 1.4 million men in 18 armies backed by 1700 tanks and 4000 aircraft and 7800 cannons... the defeat there was more epic and impressive than Bagration or Sickle cut

Somehow these factors didn't prevent him from actually capturing Sevastopol almost a calendar year later. Nor did they impair his brilliance at Third Kharkov. Mind, I don't disagree that von Manstein was good, I just think his mistakes tend to be minimized.

The problem with saying he's not responsible for the failure of the Leningrad offensive is that if his problems were really the fault of everyone else, that didn't exactly imperil advances much more dramatic on paper than his. The fall of Leningrad never happened in no small part due to decisions he made, just as the siege of the city was a result of poor Soviet planning running into Ritter von Leeb's well-equipped army that strategically wrong-footed it.

Simple: the Soviet failures in the Siniavo battles were due to continual, never-resolved-during-the-siege failures of co-ordination. Manstein's actions did nothing there, Soviet mistakes he managed to exploit did everything. It's an example of victory due to enemy fuckups ala Chancellorsville, not direct action ala Overlord or Vicksburg.

Again, this is not to say that he's good, it's just that he had his own problems as a general.

I know the nazi generals like to overly blame hitler for their mistakes; but strategic paralysis in France 44 does go to him... Hitler put two field marshals in the same place who had different strategies for how to handle the battle; on top of that the top panzer man had his own ideas; instead of setting a real strategy or establishing an honest chain of command; Hitler used this to put all the panzer formations in OKW reserve so he would have final say in their allocation plus he ordered them spread out everywhere which neither Rommel or Guderian/Rundstedt/Schweppenburg wanted.

I agree, but military logic meant the generals needed to pick one idea and carry it out, the perpetuation of that feud ensured nothing *but* the worst of all possible worlds by furthering Hitler's indecision + micromanagement (the combination is where Hitler went badly wrong, from a strictly military POV, more often than not).
 
Somehow these factors didn't prevent him from actually capturing Sevastopol almost a calendar year later. Nor did they impair his brilliance at Third Kharkov. Mind, I don't disagree that von Manstein was good, I just think his mistakes tend to be minimized.

The problem with saying he's not responsible for the failure of the Leningrad offensive is that if his problems were really the fault of everyone else, that didn't exactly imperil advances much more dramatic on paper than his. The fall of Leningrad never happened in no small part due to decisions he made, just as the siege of the city was a result of poor Soviet planning running into Ritter von Leeb's well-equipped army that strategically wrong-footed it.

Simple: the Soviet failures in the Siniavo battles were due to continual, never-resolved-during-the-siege failures of co-ordination. Manstein's actions did nothing there, Soviet mistakes he managed to exploit did everything. It's an example of victory due to enemy fuckups ala Chancellorsville, not direct action ala Overlord or Vicksburg.

Again, this is not to say that he's good, it's just that he had his own problems as a general.



I agree, but military logic meant the generals needed to pick one idea and carry it out, the perpetuation of that feud ensured nothing *but* the worst of all possible worlds by furthering Hitler's indecision + micromanagement (the combination is where Hitler went badly wrong, from a strictly military POV, more often than not).


Those factors didn't exist in 42 Sevasopol; Hitler had the entire Heer siege train sent to the 11th army giving him 170 weapons bigger than 155mm; plus he gave Manstein the 22nd panzer division and the VIII fleigerkorps which had a shit load of highly experienced stuka and JU-88 pilots who quickly bombed the russians into submission to make up for Manstein's lack of premier divisions to actually conduct the assault... both the Russians and the Germans regarded Manstein's conduct and capture of the Crimea as decisive and effective (the Russians firing and gulaging various commanders who opposed him and the Germans promoting him to army group command and naming him field marshal)

Manstein was only a corps commander in 1941 not army or army group... when his tanks reached the Dvina Leeb via Hoeppner told him to stop and wait for the infantry to catch up and at that point in spite of the brilliance he displayed to that date, the campaign was lost and could never be recovered

I wasn't saying that Leningrad 42 was a decisive Manstein success... but the Germans won the battle regardless of how or why; and it wasn't "pathetic" handling as you described it given that they won

The only way to resolve the impasse in France was to have Rommel get axed
 
Actually they did exist in 1942 Sebastopol, all German operations in the South were carried out on a logistical shoestring. A competent Soviet leader in command of the Kerch forces would have made von Manstein's work very painful indeed. His success was due more to how idiotic Lev Mekhlis was than anything he did. Even then the Soviets evacuated the entire garrison, he failed to capture it.

I'm agreeing that the tactical results of Siniavo were German victories, I'm noting that it was more Soviet military weaknesses in co-ordination and leadership than German action that made the Leningrad Siege last as long as it did. These problems never really went away for that force during the war and helped save Finland in 1944, as the Soviet generals around Leningrad never really mastered fighting at the tactical level. Even a merely competent but otherwise undistinguished commander could produce Siniavo 1942-scale debacles against such an enemy.
 
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