The Sherman wasn't designed for tank v. tank combat, instead idiotic Army doctrine put the M4s theoretically in an infantry-support role and the tank destroyers in anti-armor operations. In practice, the reverse was true just as often.
Still, the Sherman was decent in 1944, and fantastic in 1942. I can't think of much that would help. Perhaps a more powerful gun with a longer barrel, though I don't know how feasible that is.
Wider tracks would certainly be a bonus.
Wrong, the Sherman was designed for the Exploitation after breakthrough phase. It was considered the 'modern-day' cavalry. US Army doctrine had infantry break the enemy line and then the Shermans/Armored Divisions would race deep into the rear of the enemy and destroy his command, guns, and supplies.
This worked to perfection in the encirclement of Nancy and the Cobra Breakout.
An infantry support tank wouldn't need the high top speed and mechanical reliability designed into the Sherman.
Re 4th Armored's CCA at Nancy, excerpts:
Day 1
The head of the CCA column reached high ground west of Chateau-Salins at 1700 and established a 360-degree defensive perimeter. Combat elements closed on the bivouac throughout the night. The combat command trains, which had bivouacked separately, arrived the next morning (14 September) and replen- ished the fighting forces. CCA’s thrust to Chateau-Salins repre- sented a penetration of twenty miles and had so far yielded 354 prisoners taken and 12 German tanks, 35 vehicles, and 5 guns destroyed. CCA’s losses on 13 September were twelve dead and sixteen wounded.
Day 2
The day’s advance netted a further 400 prisoners and cost the Germans 26 armored vehicles, 136 other vehicles, and 10 88-mm guns. CCA sustained a total of thirty-three casualties and lost two medium tanks.
Day 3
WA’s raids and ambushes around Arracourt resulted in the capture of another 1,000 German troops and the destruction or capture of 8 tanks, 16 large-caliber guns, and 232 vehicles. CCA lost only three killed, fifteen wounded, and four tanks destroyed. More important, CCA’s raid across the 553d Vdksgrenadier Divi- sion’s rear prompted the 553d to withdraw from Nancy, allowing the 35th Division to occupy the city on 15 September against little opposition.
Finally, after the German counterattacks petered out:
In the defensive actions fought around Arracourt, the 4th Armored Division claimed 281 German tanks destroyed, 3,000 Germans killed, and another 3,000 taken prisoner. The 4th sustained only 626 casualties in all,
Well yes, but I was talking about a better tank in 1942. In OTL the sane thing would be for the US Army to adopt the Firefly in 1944. But the 17pdr certainly could not have been fitted into Shermans before then.
In 1944, the US had the 76mm M4s and 90mm M36s in production. By the end of August the Germans had just 184 AFVs on the entire Western Front. 184! One US Armored division had about that many medium tanks.
M4 (76mm) Notes
US Army Ordnance began working on the 76mm gun in early 42 on its own initiative. While there were several 76mm guns already in service, the most likely weapon was the M7 Heavy Tank gun, this gun was too large to fit into a Sherman sized turret. The T1 gun was developed to use the same projectiles, but a smaller case. To avoid confusion, the M7 gun was labeled ’3-inch’ and the new T1 as ‘76mm’. At first the T1 had a barrel 57 calibers long, but this was too long and it was cut back to 52 calibers.
Unfortunately, though the new gun could penetrate almost 1 inch more then the 75mm weapon, it did not offer the same anti-tank performance as other comparable guns. The new gun only had a 3.6lb propellant charge, the Brit 17lbr had almost 9lbs, the 7.5cm German gun had 8.1lbs.
Several concerns were raised with the gun in other areas- Large muzzle blast and dust cloud, smaller explosive charge in the HE shells, no smoke shells. The Tank Destroyer Battalions were supposed to be the primary offensive anti-tank arm in the US army, and the M4 medium tanks were to fight infantry, artillery, and exploit breakthroughs into the enemy rear. Since the TDs already had the 76mm gun, objections were raised about the unsuitability of the 76mm gun to infantry support missions. During the war, 70% of all tank ammunition fired was HE, 20% AT, and 10% smoke. It was recommended that 1 tank in 3 be armed with the 76mm gun, either one company per battalion, or one platoon per company.
The Brits decided to arm 1 or 2 tanks per troop with a 17lbr. They also offered to ship 200/month 17lbr guns to the US for installation on US tanks in Aug 43. Trials between the 17 and the new 90mm gun in March 44 showed that the 17 had better penetration performance then even the new 90mm gun. However by the time these trials took place, 76 and 90mm ammunition was already in production and any new tanks would not be available until after Normandy. Ordnance was also developing new HV ammo for the 90mm gun at that time.
By Normandy, there were 200 76mm armed Shermans in Depots in Britain, but there was no plan to distribute them to the units involved in the invasion. Most of the commanders were reluctant to see the 76mm gun replace the 75mm gun in any significant quantities. While the 75mm could not penetrate the Panthers glacis or mantlet at any range, the 76mm also could not penetrate the glacis at any range, but could pierce the mantlet of the Panther at 200yds. US intelligence did not expect the Panther to be deployed as a Medium tank with the PzIV, but as a heavy tank like the Tiger. The numbers of Panthers encountered in France was a significant shock to the combat arms.
However, by September, the ‘Panther Problem’ appeared to be much less urgent, the US believed that most of the Panthers had been knocked out. A few days later 4 newly formed Panther brigades were crushed conducting a local offensive by 75mm armed tanks due to superior tactics and training on the part of the US forces.
An additional problem was that units were short of tanks across Europe, 335 tanks short of ToE by the end of September. Ordnance was reluctant to switch to a new tank line and worsen the tank shortage.
In August 1944, a new HV round was issued to the existing 76mm units. This round could pierce a Panthers mantlet at 1000yds, but still bounced off the glacis. Production of the tungsten cored ammunition was never able to meet demand and distribution was hardly more then one round per tank per month on average. By February, each 76mm tank had received only 5 rounds of HV on average.
After Ardennes however, there was a marked change in opinion about the 76mm tanks. In January, the 12th Army Group formally requested that no more 75mm Shermans be sent to the ETO and in February stopped bringing 75mm tanks up from repair depots. By April 600 75mm Shermans had accumulated in rear depots. Some of these were sent to Britain to be converted to 17lbrs but never reached the front before the surrender.
2095 76mm armed Shermans were sent to Russia. The M4E2 was a popular tank, called the ‘emcha’, a contraction of M-Chetire (M4 in Russian). The M4 equipped the 1st, 8th, and 9th Guards Mechanized Corps.
Development of the US 90mm Tank Gun
In 1942 Ordnance (Ord) began the study of more powerful tank guns even though there was no user requirement from the Army. The potential use of 90mm anti-aircraft guns was spurred by the reported use of German 88mm guns in the anti-tank role. The first attempt, the 90mm GMC T53 mated a 90mm turret to a M4 tank chassis.
At an August 1942 conference, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and Ord agreed to begin production of 500 T53s and planned a further 3,500. However, the T53 proved to be a poor design and Ord realized that the 90mm gun had to be redesigned to be an effective tank gun. In October, 1942 Ord began work on a new T7 90mm gun and its mounting system. One of the 2 pilot guns was mounted on a M10 late in 42. Due to the greater volume of the 90mm cartridge, the standard M10 turret had to be changed, to include power traverse and other improvements.
Gen. Bruce of Tank Destroyer Command (TDC) objected to the design. He felt that the M10 based chassis were too slow, and that the existing 3” gun was sufficient. He was ignored by both Ord and AGF, and TDC continued to be marginalized in future Army decisions due to a history of poor decisions.
Ford took over the design of the new T71 90mm turret, and the first prototype was delivered in Sept 1943. AGF approval for production was won in Oct 1943. The designated hull was the M10A1, which in turn was based on the M4A3. Almost 1200 M10A1s had been built by then, and had been retained in the US for training (4,993 M10s were built for overseas deployment). An additional 520 M10A1 chassis were built Nov 43-Jan 44, the last 300 without turrets.
AGF recommended that the M10 production be terminated and 10 battalions be equipped with T71s. Slight changes were made through January 1944. Conversions of the 300 turretless M10A1s began in Apr 1944 and were completed in July. The requested number of T71s was increased to 600 in May. Also in May, AGF asked ETO US Army command if they wanted any of the new T71s, and were told that there was no need as the M10s were adequate.
The 90mm Tank destroyer was designated M36 on June 1.
On July 6, ETOUSA cabled AGF and asked for every M36 they had, and for all M10 Battalions be converted to M36s as soon as possible. On July 29, the total number of M36s ordered reached 1,400 after the tank fighting in Normandy. Resistance to the M36s evaporated at both the TDC and ETOUSA. 12th Army group requested that of the 52 TD battalions committed to the ETO, 20 become M36, 20 retain M10 or M18, and 12 remain equipped with 3” towed guns.
M36s arrived in France in September 1944, and entered combat in early October. The 90mm gun was a definite improvement, able to penetrate the Panther glacis at up to 500yd, in addition, the powerful 90mm shell could cause the glacis to collapse if struck with multiple non-penetrating shells, and still score a kill. One of the first Panther kills occurred at 1,500 yds, a M36 from the 776th TD Battalion scored 2 hits, one broke the track, and the second entered the turret, blew the breechblock off the 75mm cannon, and blew the top off the turret.
There were 6 M36 battalions in service by January 1945. The Ardennes fighting renewed pressure to field the M36, and convert all towed 3” battalions. In addition, the HVAP 90mm projectile was becoming available.
While the total numbers of German vehicles encountered was going down, the individual vehicles were becoming more heavily armored. A M36 from the 776th encountered an attacking German column including a captured Sherman and two JagdTigers on January 5 1945. The M36 flanked the German vehicles and put a 90mm round into one of the JagdTigers, destroying it. The M36 then destroyed the captured Sherman, and fired HE shells at the accompanying Panzer Grenadiers, driving off the attackers.
From Osprey’s M10 and M36 Tank Destroyers, 1942-53; New Vanguard Series #53
Lastly, something that really irritates me is that in 1939-41, the Germans used inferior tanks with superior tactics and training to run all over Eastern and Western Europe, and everyone went "OMG Blitzkrieg!" In 1944-45 the US used "inferior" tanks, and superior tactics and training to crush the German armor, and everyone goes "OMG Tiger!"