AHC: Modern Kingdom of Iran

With a POD dating back to the abdication of Reza Shah could Mohammad, the next shah, stop the Iranian revolution and keep the monarchy in a position ofpower, ifso how does this impact the world, specifically Iran-Iraq relations and the cold war.
 
With a POD dating back to the abdication of Reza Shah could Mohammad, the next shah, stop the Iranian revolution and keep the monarchy in a position ofpower, ifso how does this impact the world, specifically Iran-Iraq relations and the cold war.

He could attempt to reign in Mossadegh's more confrontational methods in dealing with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, up to and including sacking him as prime minister. If Mossadegh had slowed down and bargained with the British, American support for the 1953 coup would not have been forthcoming. At the same time, a slower process of nationalization (possibly partial nationalization, or foreign control with significantly higher taxes on foreign oil companies' revenue) would have still provided plenty of revenue to build a more modern economy in Iran through public investment in infrastructure, education and healthcare for the populace.

The Shahs would probably lose most of their power over time, while remaining popular as long as they acted as the "adult in the room", similarly to Thailand or Jordan's monarchy. This could actually lead to a stable, prosperous, democratic Iran, allied with the West in the Cold War but acting as a good example for moderate Third World nationalism.
 
He could attempt to reign in Mossadegh's more confrontational methods in dealing with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, up to and including sacking him as prime minister. If Mossadegh had slowed down and bargained with the British, American support for the 1953 coup would not have been forthcoming. At the same time, a slower process of nationalization (possibly partial nationalization, or foreign control with significantly higher taxes on foreign oil companies' revenue) would have still provided plenty of revenue to build a more modern economy in Iran through public investment in infrastructure, education and healthcare for the populace.

The Shahs would probably lose most of their power over time, while remaining popular as long as they acted as the "adult in the room", similarly to Thailand or Jordan's monarchy. This could actually lead to a stable, prosperous, democratic Iran, allied with the West in the Cold War but acting as a good example for moderate Third World nationalism.
Jordan's monarch is the absolute ruler of the country.
 
Jordan's monarch is the absolute ruler of the country.

I know, but Jordan's king is generally loved by the population, which sees him as a moderating force and a symbol of national unity. As well, Jordan is a generally non-repressive nation, and is rapidly modernizing and democratizing.
 
I know, but Jordan's king is generally loved by the population, which sees him as a moderating force and a symbol of national unity. As well, Jordan is a generally non-repressive nation, and is rapidly modernizing and democratizing.
I guess that"s true, but still not the best example
So if Iran is able to become a functioning democracy like you say will sad dams ambition still cause the war?
 
You'd also have to find a way to eliminate Khomeni or at least keep him shut up for a while. One of the hostages at the Embassy had done a tour in Iran as a military advisor in 1962-63, and he said that Khomeni came out against the Status of Forces agreement with the U.S. (not just for the advisors, but SAC personnel in-country as well). The Shah threw Khomeni in the slammer, and was going to have him shot, when several other imprisoned clerics made Khomeni an Ayatollah. An unwritten rule was this: "Don't shoot Ayatollahs." The Shah instead kicked him out of the country. If the Shah had the guts to make Khomeni pose for a firing squad, maybe the '79 Revolution wouldn't have happened.

If he's still exiled, maybe SAVAK (Shah's secret police and intelligence service), sends a hit team to liquidate Khomeni once he starts causing serious trouble.
 
You'd also have to find a way to eliminate Khomeni or at least keep him shut up for a while. One of the hostages at the Embassy had done a tour in Iran as a military advisor in 1962-63, and he said that Khomeni came out against the Status of Forces agreement with the U.S. (not just for the advisors, but SAC personnel in-country as well). The Shah threw Khomeni in the slammer, and was going to have him shot, when several other imprisoned clerics made Khomeni an Ayatollah. An unwritten rule was this: "Don't shoot Ayatollahs." The Shah instead kicked him out of the country. If the Shah had the guts to make Khomeni pose for a firing squad, maybe the '79 Revolution wouldn't have happened.

If he's still exiled, maybe SAVAK (Shah's secret police and intelligence service), sends a hit team to liquidate Khomeni once he starts causing serious trouble.

But would Khomeni be able to find an audience willing to listen to his extreme views in a functioning democracy? It was Mohammed Reza Shah's extremely oppressive policies that caused such a shift in the opposition towards radical leftism or Islamism.
 
Even in a more democratic Iran, Khomeni would still be viewed as an "Enemy of the State." Why? Because he'd still be advocating for an Islamic theocracy in Iran. Remember that there were quite a few liberals and reformers who supported the '79 Revolution-until Khomeni destroyed them and forced the survivors to flee the country along with those who supported the monarchy.
 
He could attempt to reign in Mossadegh's more confrontational methods in dealing with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, up to and including sacking him as prime minister. If Mossadegh had slowed down and bargained with the British, American support for the 1953 coup would not have been forthcoming. At the same time, a slower process of nationalization (possibly partial nationalization, or foreign control with significantly higher taxes on foreign oil companies' revenue) would have still provided plenty of revenue to build a more modern economy in Iran through public investment in infrastructure, education and healthcare for the populace.

The Shahs would probably lose most of their power over time, while remaining popular as long as they acted as the "adult in the room", similarly to Thailand or Jordan's monarchy. This could actually lead to a stable, prosperous, democratic Iran, allied with the West in the Cold War but acting as a good example for moderate Third World nationalism.

The whole Iran debacle was basically caused by the fact that AIOC wasn't going to cut any deals with Iran that gave them anything less than a blank check and complete control over Iranian oil. Partial nationalization, or something like the 50/50 deal like the Arab-American Oil Company had with Saudi Arabia was something that was specifically proposed to, and rejected, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. AIOC at this time, simply will not back down, Mossadegh is considered an absolute threat to their hegemony.

So if Iran is able to become a functioning democracy like you say will sad dams ambition still cause the war?

That entirely depends on the America factor, entirely. If Iran becomes a democratic state but the US perceives that Iran is no longer an ally worth cultivating and stops giving them the preferential treatment for military aid, then that will make them a target for Hussein. If the Americans keep right on trucking and equipping the Iranian military with American weaponry than Saddam is not going to play that game.

The initiation of the Iran-Iraq War rested on two assumptions: that the Americans were going to be neutral or at least not go against Iraq (he turned out to be wrong in a good way for him... they supported Iraq overwhelmingly), and that the Iranians were going to be weak because of the American arms and spare parts embargo, combined with the fact that Iran had purged a good deal of the Imperial Iranian military that had been trained and advised by the Americans, this killed a good deal of their officer corps. Unfortunately he underestimated that the Iranian air force would still be able to go off what little it had left and be a decisive factor in stopping the first big Iraqi offensives into Khuzestan, an area that happened to produce EIGHTY PERCENT of all of Iran's oil, Iran having the third largest reserves of any nation on the face of the earth.

So basically, unless a democratic Iran is also a weak, militarily-crippled nation like OTL Revolutionary Iran, Saddam, ever the opportunist, would avoid such a suicidal notion as attacking them.

Also Matt, it's more likely that the Shah would quietly get the CIA to arrange for Khomeini to get hit by a car while he was crossing the street in Paris, that is an offense that the Shah REALLY cannot afford to deal with.
 
Even in a more democratic Iran, Khomeni would still be viewed as an "Enemy of the State." Why? Because he'd still be advocating for an Islamic theocracy in Iran. Remember that there were quite a few liberals and reformers who supported the '79 Revolution-until Khomeni destroyed them and forced the survivors to flee the country along with those who supported the monarchy.

It wasn't so much that Khomeini destroyed them it was that he got them to do the brunt of the fighting, and take the brunt of the losses against the Shah, strengthening his own faction composed of lower-class bazaar Iranians and the religious while educated, Western-oriented liberals and reformers took the full force of any counterattack.

After that, Khomeini swept in.
 
The whole Iran debacle was basically caused by the fact that AIOC wasn't going to cut any deals with Iran that gave them anything less than a blank check and complete control over Iranian oil. Partial nationalization, or something like the 50/50 deal like the Arab-American Oil Company had with Saudi Arabia was something that was specifically proposed to, and rejected, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. AIOC at this time, simply will not back down, Mossadegh is considered an absolute threat to their hegemony.

Yes, he is, but as the Suez Crisis showed, even middle powers like the UK could no longer act without American approval. If Mossadegh had been more restrained, American support for a coup would have been unlikely. This would have forced the British either to cut a deal or try a coup on their own. If this had failed (which without American support would be likely), Mossadegh would have been able to push his agenda through with little opposition, foreign or domestic. In either case, Iran gets its oil money AND keeps both American acceptance (if not support), while remaining a democracy.

BTW, check out the book "All The Shah's Men", its fantastic.
 
Yes, he is, but as the Suez Crisis showed, even middle powers like the UK could no longer act without American approval. If Mossadegh had been more restrained, American support for a coup would have been unlikely. This would have forced the British either to cut a deal or try a coup on their own. If this had failed (which without American support would be likely), Mossadegh would have been able to push his agenda through with little opposition, foreign or domestic. In either case, Iran gets its oil money AND keeps both American acceptance (if not support), while remaining a democracy.

BTW, check out the book "All The Shah's Men", its fantastic.

Yeah, this is true, and I agree, it's not unreasonable to say that Operation Ajax would have been guaranteed to fail without American support. The problem was the British were excellent spin doctors on the matter, they played to Ike's fears of the Tudehs, which were known to receive support from the Soviet Union. And with Mossadegh pushing for nationalization of any sort, let alone just partial, the AIOC would have shot it down, and then they could've appealed to the Americans with the "give them an inch and they'll take a mile" thought path. I'm also not entirely of the persuasion that Mossadegh DIDN'T have sympathies towards the Soviet Union himself, and that's the point where he runs into the more intractable era in US Cold War policy, this was the time where we had no tolerance for Third Wayers, you had to be with us and if you weren't 100% of the way you weren't going to get our support.

The Shah cutting a deal with the protesters with significant American pressure (this requires multiple PoDs, including a healthier Shah) to limit himself somewhat is probably better for Iran in general. It helps Iran keep a big, big buddy in the Middle East, it tones down some of the Shah's excesses, and it keeps Iran prospering on the right path to good relations with the West and developing as a nation. And it's certainly better for them than Khomeini and his devils.
 
Very true about Khomeni using the more Western-oriented opposition to take the brunt, but still, those who remained had a choice: pose for rifle fire in Khomeni's firing squads, or flee. The lucky ones got away with the clothes on their backs, maybe a suitcase or two in addition, and that's it. The unlucky ones got unmarked graves.

Remember that the Shah was also on good terms with the Israelis. Asking Mossad to take care of Khomeni is not out of the question.
 
Very true about Khomeni using the more Western-oriented opposition to take the brunt, but still, those who remained had a choice: pose for rifle fire in Khomeni's firing squads, or flee. The lucky ones got away with the clothes on their backs, maybe a suitcase or two in addition, and that's it. The unlucky ones got unmarked graves.

Remember that the Shah was also on good terms with the Israelis. Asking Mossad to take care of Khomeni is not out of the question.

Mossad is probably the best idea, it's really obvious if the CIA arranges an "accident" for Khomeini and if there's a hint of their presence, the paper trail gets followed. If Israel knocks off Khomeini, it can just be written off as them being afraid of the possibility his coming to power in Iran.

Offhand I can't quite put a name to it but there is a certain, specific law that the Shah would be violating by killing Khomeini himself, but Shah's a practical man, and tended to focus on Persian Iran rather than on Islamic Iran.

Did you ever hear of that delightfully amusing story about a Star of David on the roof of an Iranian building that nobody noticed for a very long time (a testament to the days of friendly Iran-Israel relations) and when it FINALLY was noticed in recent years the Islamic Republic had a cow and had it removed?
 
Yeah, this is true, and I agree, it's not unreasonable to say that Operation Ajax would have been guaranteed to fail without American support. The problem was the British were excellent spin doctors on the matter, they played to Ike's fears of the Tudehs, which were known to receive support from the Soviet Union. And with Mossadegh pushing for nationalization of any sort, let alone just partial, the AIOC would have shot it down, and then they could've appealed to the Americans with the "give them an inch and they'll take a mile" thought path. I'm also not entirely of the persuasion that Mossadegh DIDN'T have sympathies towards the Soviet Union himself, and that's the point where he runs into the more intractable era in US Cold War policy, this was the time where we had no tolerance for Third Wayers, you had to be with us and if you weren't 100% of the way you weren't going to get our support.

The Shah cutting a deal with the protesters with significant American pressure (this requires multiple PoDs, including a healthier Shah) to limit himself somewhat is probably better for Iran in general. It helps Iran keep a big, big buddy in the Middle East, it tones down some of the Shah's excesses, and it keeps Iran prospering on the right path to good relations with the West and developing as a nation. And it's certainly better for them than Khomeini and his devils.

I mostly agree. Could a possible PoD be Eisenhower refusing to run for office, and therefore a less anti-Communist candidate (Taft or Stevenson) becoming President at the time? Another PoD could be a car crash that kills John Foster Dulles in say 1949, making it impossible that he, as a rabid anti-Communist, be Secretary of State.

Another thing is that up until that point, American policy in relation to Third Wayers was much more ambiguous. Operation Ajax actually established the paradigm and marked the shift towards intolerance of Third Wayers. Before that, the Americans were willing to support some form of moderate socialist or developmentalist economics, as long as politically the nation was aligned with the USA. Examples of that include West Germany under the Social Democrats and Tito's Yugoslavia. Operation Ajax was the first foreign coup, and it set the stage for Guatemala and Cuba. With different people in power, and a less pushy Mossadegh (say he gets some better advice), and I think the President would have basically told the Brits to bugger themselves.
 
Want to bet that was the former Israeli Embassy or maybe their trade mission?

Mossad getting rid of Khomeni is a much better option. And the Israelis would be glad to to it "Imagine, Mr. Prime Minister, the consequences for Israel and the region if this man takes power in Iran." "I see. Do not worry. It will be handled quietly and without any fuss."

A few weeks later, Khomeni is the victim of an automobile "accident"....no paper trail, nothing to connect to any government, and that's that.

Any other clerics who might take his place? Beheshti might be, but he had many other enemies, and OTL he was blown to pieces in a car bomb in Tehran in '81, when the Islamic Republican Party's HQ building was blown sky-high. To this day, the current Iranian regime blames the U.S. for that (revenge for the embassy takeover and all). But since there were factions within factions in Iran then, just as now, there's enough local suspects...
 
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