With a POD dating back to the abdication of Reza Shah could Mohammad, the next shah, stop the Iranian revolution and keep the monarchy in a position ofpower, ifso how does this impact the world, specifically Iran-Iraq relations and the cold war.
Jordan's monarch is the absolute ruler of the country.He could attempt to reign in Mossadegh's more confrontational methods in dealing with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, up to and including sacking him as prime minister. If Mossadegh had slowed down and bargained with the British, American support for the 1953 coup would not have been forthcoming. At the same time, a slower process of nationalization (possibly partial nationalization, or foreign control with significantly higher taxes on foreign oil companies' revenue) would have still provided plenty of revenue to build a more modern economy in Iran through public investment in infrastructure, education and healthcare for the populace.
The Shahs would probably lose most of their power over time, while remaining popular as long as they acted as the "adult in the room", similarly to Thailand or Jordan's monarchy. This could actually lead to a stable, prosperous, democratic Iran, allied with the West in the Cold War but acting as a good example for moderate Third World nationalism.
Jordan's monarch is the absolute ruler of the country.
Jordan's monarch is the absolute ruler of the country.
I guess that"s true, but still not the best exampleI know, but Jordan's king is generally loved by the population, which sees him as a moderating force and a symbol of national unity. As well, Jordan is a generally non-repressive nation, and is rapidly modernizing and democratizing.
You'd also have to find a way to eliminate Khomeni or at least keep him shut up for a while. One of the hostages at the Embassy had done a tour in Iran as a military advisor in 1962-63, and he said that Khomeni came out against the Status of Forces agreement with the U.S. (not just for the advisors, but SAC personnel in-country as well). The Shah threw Khomeni in the slammer, and was going to have him shot, when several other imprisoned clerics made Khomeni an Ayatollah. An unwritten rule was this: "Don't shoot Ayatollahs." The Shah instead kicked him out of the country. If the Shah had the guts to make Khomeni pose for a firing squad, maybe the '79 Revolution wouldn't have happened.
If he's still exiled, maybe SAVAK (Shah's secret police and intelligence service), sends a hit team to liquidate Khomeni once he starts causing serious trouble.
He could attempt to reign in Mossadegh's more confrontational methods in dealing with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, up to and including sacking him as prime minister. If Mossadegh had slowed down and bargained with the British, American support for the 1953 coup would not have been forthcoming. At the same time, a slower process of nationalization (possibly partial nationalization, or foreign control with significantly higher taxes on foreign oil companies' revenue) would have still provided plenty of revenue to build a more modern economy in Iran through public investment in infrastructure, education and healthcare for the populace.
The Shahs would probably lose most of their power over time, while remaining popular as long as they acted as the "adult in the room", similarly to Thailand or Jordan's monarchy. This could actually lead to a stable, prosperous, democratic Iran, allied with the West in the Cold War but acting as a good example for moderate Third World nationalism.
Even in a more democratic Iran, Khomeni would still be viewed as an "Enemy of the State." Why? Because he'd still be advocating for an Islamic theocracy in Iran. Remember that there were quite a few liberals and reformers who supported the '79 Revolution-until Khomeni destroyed them and forced the survivors to flee the country along with those who supported the monarchy.
The whole Iran debacle was basically caused by the fact that AIOC wasn't going to cut any deals with Iran that gave them anything less than a blank check and complete control over Iranian oil. Partial nationalization, or something like the 50/50 deal like the Arab-American Oil Company had with Saudi Arabia was something that was specifically proposed to, and rejected, by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. AIOC at this time, simply will not back down, Mossadegh is considered an absolute threat to their hegemony.
Yes, he is, but as the Suez Crisis showed, even middle powers like the UK could no longer act without American approval. If Mossadegh had been more restrained, American support for a coup would have been unlikely. This would have forced the British either to cut a deal or try a coup on their own. If this had failed (which without American support would be likely), Mossadegh would have been able to push his agenda through with little opposition, foreign or domestic. In either case, Iran gets its oil money AND keeps both American acceptance (if not support), while remaining a democracy.
BTW, check out the book "All The Shah's Men", its fantastic.
Very true about Khomeni using the more Western-oriented opposition to take the brunt, but still, those who remained had a choice: pose for rifle fire in Khomeni's firing squads, or flee. The lucky ones got away with the clothes on their backs, maybe a suitcase or two in addition, and that's it. The unlucky ones got unmarked graves.
Remember that the Shah was also on good terms with the Israelis. Asking Mossad to take care of Khomeni is not out of the question.
Yeah, this is true, and I agree, it's not unreasonable to say that Operation Ajax would have been guaranteed to fail without American support. The problem was the British were excellent spin doctors on the matter, they played to Ike's fears of the Tudehs, which were known to receive support from the Soviet Union. And with Mossadegh pushing for nationalization of any sort, let alone just partial, the AIOC would have shot it down, and then they could've appealed to the Americans with the "give them an inch and they'll take a mile" thought path. I'm also not entirely of the persuasion that Mossadegh DIDN'T have sympathies towards the Soviet Union himself, and that's the point where he runs into the more intractable era in US Cold War policy, this was the time where we had no tolerance for Third Wayers, you had to be with us and if you weren't 100% of the way you weren't going to get our support.
The Shah cutting a deal with the protesters with significant American pressure (this requires multiple PoDs, including a healthier Shah) to limit himself somewhat is probably better for Iran in general. It helps Iran keep a big, big buddy in the Middle East, it tones down some of the Shah's excesses, and it keeps Iran prospering on the right path to good relations with the West and developing as a nation. And it's certainly better for them than Khomeini and his devils.