WI: No Suez

Since as early as the Napoleonic Era there had been talk of 'piercing' the Suez Isthmus in order to create a canal linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas, however it was only after the de-facto sovereignty of Egypt that serious discussion began on the subject. Specifically, under Sa'id Pasha; previous Egyptian rulers had been opposed to the idea, instead opting for plans either for a canal linking Alexandria to Cairo to the Red Sea via the Nile, or for railways across the Istmus; either of which would allow for Egyptian tolls and taxes on goods and people). Even then, though Sa'id supported the direct canal idea he would only agree to the plan if he had the backing of one of the Western powers (i.e., Britain or France). The British were staunchly against the canal idea, believing that such a waterway would threaten British control of the seas, her communications with India and the East, lay Egypt (and the Turks) open to attack by a foreign power (France), and was in any case against the laws of nature; even Lord Palmerston went so so far as to state that the Suez canal idea was "one of the many bubble schemes that from time to time have been palmed upon gullible capitalists." Thus the opportunity fell to the French. Louis-Napoléon was an enthusiastic 'canalist,' who had even written a pamphlet encouraging a canal across Nicaragua to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans while he was under sentence of 'emprisonnement perpétuel' in Ham, long before his rise to power and proclamation of the Second Empire. He saw the idea of a canalized Suez, with a French-dominated Egypt, as a way to a) expand upon his personal power and the Napoleonic Legend in France, and b) to further extend France's geopolitical influence. It was only after the canal had been largely completed that the British became involved, and even then that was largely to deny the sole control of the canal to the French.

So, WI either a different Egypt with someone instead of Sa'id (perhaps a surviving Abbas), or a different France with someone instead of Louis-Napoléon, the direct Suez canal project would appear to fall apart. So what happens throughout the rest of the 19th century and into the 20th? Does a Central American canal at either Panama or Nicaragua go forward without the example of the Suez? How does this affect colonialism and patterns of European colonial claim and settlement? What is the effect on the Great Power balance? What are the results on Egypt's development vis-à-vis the Turks without the canal (and, presumably, either French or British intervention and conquest)?

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Almost a hundred views and no replies?

wolf_brother said:

Almost a hundred views and no replies?

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wolf_brother

I think sooner or later, probably sooner, it would be built because it's just so practical. A railway helps a lot but still lacks the capacity of a canal and requires trans-shipping. Also, unlike the Panama there is not the same problem with rough terrain and serious disease factors.

Steve

Agreed; sometime before the end of the (19th) century someone - French, British, American, among others - is going to build the "Suez" Canal.

Hmm. I've continued to do more work on this and it seems like my initial assessment was correct. Without either the French or the British backing the move it seems like it wouldn't happen. The Turks were, at best, apethetic about the project and Egypt itself simply didn't have the funds necessary to undertake it on its own - especially since she was still in debt up to her neck. If the French don't back the project, and the British won't (and they wouldn't; they did everything they could to stop the Suez Canal even IOTL), then who would the Egyptians, or even the Turks, turn to? Certainly not the traditional opponents in Austria or Russia. The Italians are a maybe, but I'm not sure Italy had the funds available to throw into such a project as a canal crossing the Suez - or even would be willing to.

No one else seems that they would be in a position to use the canal, or would have the power, and will, to back such a project, or would even care one way or another. Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, the US, Germany? None of the Western states seemed like they fit the criteria to back the creation of a canal.

So... back to the OP; what are the effects on no Suez?

wolf_brother said:

...If the French don't back the project, and the British won't (and they wouldn't; they did everything they could to stop the Suez Canal even IOTL)...

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Before I can even wrap my head around the idea of a world without that Canal, I hope you can enlighten my ignorance further about just why the British, of all people, opposed it so staunchly until it was a fait accompli?

I'm not doubting you've found that this was the case! But it's pretty astonishing to me.

I can sort of see an argument against the Canal--the British already controlled the established sea routes, and opening up a faster, more direct route might tend to strand a lot of their prior investment. That seems like a rather weak argument to stand against the ongoing profitability of taking advantage of more direct routes themselves though.

I guess the more serious argument would be that while a Canal guaranteed to be open to British traffic no matter what, or even one completely neutral given British general dominance of the seas, would be a fine enough thing, another power gaining control of the Canal and selectively closing it against British and allied shipping while favoring themselves and their allies with access to it would be a terrible setback, perhaps disastrous. That really seems more like an argument for securing control of the Canal for themselves though.

Apparently from what you say, it wasn't a matter of Britain having mixed feelings and sometimes the naysayers prevailed; you say it was a fixed and steadfast policy to oppose the Suez canal. Was that just because it seemed likely to be a French-controlled project, or what?

Perhaps their reasoning would shed more light on the question of how and why the canal might never be attempted.

Because without this startling revelation of this British opposition, I'd have assumed that everyone would see such a canal as a sign of clear progress and that as the technology to dig it improved, the project would go from possible to inevitable.

If you can clarify just why the British were against it, perhaps then we can better see how the world might have gone if they got their way. Right now, such a world seems like a Bizzarro World to me!

Shevek23 said:

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Essentially as I outlined in the OP the British were opposed to the project in general as they felt that it would threaten their control of the waves, and more directly because Britain was diametrically opposed to the idea of another state having the power to challenge her on the water, especially re: communications with India and the Far East. I think the quoted sentiment from Palmerston I gave in the OP encapsulates the British position fairly well.

As well, Frederick Bruce, the British Consul-General in Alexandria, tried to talk Sa'id Pasha out of the protect, telling him that "a direct Canal between Suez and the Mediterranean would give Egypt the go-by, would have a constant tendency to escape from the jurisdiction of the Egyptian government, and would in no way enrich it except in so far as it might create a demand for supplies." This was even before he had received instructions from London, as of course communications were rather slow than and foreign ambassadors had quite a bit of lee-way. However his official instructions were basically along the same lines; he was to represent to the Pasha, 'in a friendly manner,' that the British government found the scheme a) impracticable, and b) too expensive for debt-ridden Egypt (many of those debts to Britain). As well there was the implication that Britain, though nominally allied to France (against Russia in the Crimean at the time), was against French interest in the project; "Whatever tends to facilitate intercourse between the British dominions in Europe and in Asia must necessarily be agreeable to Her Majesty's Government."

Also, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was opposed to the plan; he was much more in favor of both a) a railway across the Suez, and b) a waterway route via the Euphrates in order to facilitate trade across the region to India and beyond. As well he mistrusted the French, both personally and politically, and believed that they were attempting to break Egypt away from the Turkish Empire; a position that both he and his government steadfastly refused to be apart of. Like Bruce he acted before he had received instructions from London and urged Reshid Pasha, the Ottoman's Grand Vizier who was sent to Egypt to put forward the Porte's authority over the matter, to 'discountenance the plan,' which resulted in a letter from Reshid to Sa'id advising the latter to complete the Suez railway (which was nearly complete at the time) and to temporize the canal idea until Istanbul had further information.

Ferdinand de Lesseps, the man behind the entire canal idea who had convinced Sa'id of it in the first place, argued in Istanbul against Redcliffe's position stating, without authorization, that French emperor Napoleon III would back both Egypt and Turkey in the canal venture. IOTL Napoleon went along with this as he was, as I stated in the OP, an avid 'canalist' and saw an opportunity to expand both his personal power and that of France's. However, suppose ITTL he publicly renounces the idea for fear of losing British support in the Crimean; or instead perhaps the 1855, and the 1858, assassination attempt is successful. So without French backing, and with the British staunchly opposed, the entire venture could, and IMHO would, fall apart at this critical stage.

I'm mostly working off of Between Two Seas: The Creation of the Suez Canal by Patrick Balfour, 3rd Baron Kinross right now, but this also aligns with what I've found in other publications such as Eugenie and Napoleon III by David Buff and Victoria R.I. by Elizabet Longford, as well as sources I have found online.

Eventualy a Business will seriesly look into the idea.

wolf_brother

Like Shevek23 I find it hard to believe that Britain would oppose the basic idea provided they had control, or at least a veto on the use of the canal? It could be sheer stupidity and also the government of the period was very opposed to government intervention. I.e. that their not willing to fund a canal themselves so the main aim is to stop anyone else doing it. Since Britain already had important interests in the Med and dominating it's waters then a British controlled canal seems so obviously a powerful tool that it seems amazing that there would be an automatic opposition to the idea.

The other thought was how much of this opposition, from Bruce and de Redcliffe came after they knew that the French were planning a canal. I.e. their opposition was less to the idea per-say than to it being done by their arch rivals, with the potential diplomatic, economic and military problems that could pose?

Steve

wolf_brother said:

Essentially as I outlined in the OP the British were opposed to the project in general as they felt that it would threaten their control of the waves, and more directly because Britain was diametrically opposed to the idea of another state having the power to challenge her on the water, especially re: communications with India and the Far East. I think the quoted sentiment from Palmerston I gave in the OP encapsulates the British position fairly well.

As well, Frederick Bruce, the British Consul-General in Alexandria, tried to talk Sa'id Pasha out of the protect, telling him that "a direct Canal between Suez and the Mediterranean would give Egypt the go-by, would have a constant tendency to escape from the jurisdiction of the Egyptian government, and would in no way enrich it except in so far as it might create a demand for supplies." This was even before he had received instructions from London, as of course communications were rather slow than and foreign ambassadors had quite a bit of lee-way. However his official instructions were basically along the same lines; he was to represent to the Pasha, 'in a friendly manner,' that the British government found the scheme a) impracticable, and b) too expensive for debt-ridden Egypt (many of those debts to Britain). As well there was the implication that Britain, though nominally allied to France (against Russia in the Crimean at the time), was against French interest in the project; "Whatever tends to facilitate intercourse between the British dominions in Europe and in Asia must necessarily be agreeable to Her Majesty's Government."

Also, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was opposed to the plan; he was much more in favor of both a) a railway across the Suez, and b) a waterway route via the Euphrates in order to facilitate trade across the region to India and beyond. As well he mistrusted the French, both personally and politically, and believed that they were attempting to break Egypt away from the Turkish Empire; a position that both he and his government steadfastly refused to be apart of. Like Bruce he acted before he had received instructions from London and urged Reshid Pasha, the Ottoman's Grand Vizier who was sent to Egypt to put forward the Porte's authority over the matter, to 'discountenance the plan,' which resulted in a letter from Reshid to Sa'id advising the latter to complete the Suez railway (which was nearly complete at the time) and to temporize the canal idea until Istanbul had further information.

Ferdinand de Lesseps, the man behind the entire canal idea who had convinced Sa'id of it in the first place, argued in Istanbul against Redcliffe's position stating, without authorization, that French emperor Napoleon III would back both Egypt and Turkey in the canal venture. IOTL Napoleon went along with this as he was, as I stated in the OP, an avid 'canalist' and saw an opportunity to expand both his personal power and that of France's. However, suppose ITTL he publicly renounces the idea for fear of losing British support in the Crimean; or instead perhaps the 1855, and the 1858, assassination attempt is successful. So without French backing, and with the British staunchly opposed, the entire venture could, and IMHO would, fall apart at this critical stage.

I'm mostly working off of Between Two Seas: The Creation of the Suez Canal by Patrick Balfour, 3rd Baron Kinross right now, but this also aligns with what I've found in other publications such as Eugenie and Napoleon III by David Buff and Victoria R.I. by Elizabet Longford, as well as sources I have found online.

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Part of the reason why there was something of a knee-jerk reaction against the idea was that it did not seem necessary. The British had over the prior few decades established steam ship services from European poets TO Egypt, and from Red Sea ports TO India (and obviously vice-versa) and the replacement of the coaches with rail travel was just about complete.

One aspect of this of course was that the steamship companies had established routes and schedules, and a canal would mean changing all that, buying new ships that could make the longer journey, changing their infrastructure etc.

When you have something that works well, being offered something that works even better but which comes with some obvious drawbacks is not so obviously a good idea

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

I think that it would be far more likely that a Nicaragua Canal be built rather than the early attempt at a Panama Canal, since the latter revolved around de Lesseps reputation from the building of the Suez Canal. Of course, there would still be the US's "Nicaragua stamp" blackening of the route (by suggesting it went through the lavafields of live volcanoes or some such) but if the technology to build Panama does not SEEM to be there, then the idea for the Nicaragua Canal is going to have a much larger impetus.

Of course, you could say that no Suez Canal could affect the whole argument in a knock-on fashion, since by the time they came to build a canal across the Central American isthmus there was an established railway, with steamship routes to and from it, just like in Egypt.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

Well, oddly enough, it seems that the conservatism of the British position in the mid-19th century was actually more in Egypt's interest than Britain's! OTL, once the Canal was a done deal, the British moved to secure their interests in it, and by the decades surrounding WWI the Canal passage became central to both British commercial and military operations. They certainly changed their tune in the matter of Turkish sovereignty, didn't they!

Vice versa, the Canal has been de facto closed quite a lot since conflicts between Egypt and Israel have so often made the Canal region a war zone; repeatedly the battles have resulted in ships being sunk in the Canal by the Israelis (who have often been denied the use of the Canal by the Egyptian government anyway). And of course the Canal can only take ships of a certain size, larger ones having to go around Africa anyway.

From an Egyptian point of view, if a certain volume of trade in cargo and passengers could be taken as a given regardless of whether it is ships passing through a canal or Mediterranean ships offloading both passengers and cargo to take a railroad to a Red Sea port and other ships there, the latter would seem more certain to bring more revenue to the Egyptians, and to make Egyptian sovereignty more clear; the canal option eventually subjected Egypt to multi-power treaties that at least in theory forced Egypt to abide by the theory that the Canal was in some sense international waters and should be open to all comers. The economic question for Egypt would be, would the greater benefit to Egypt of more revenue per passenger or ton of cargo being transhipped there by rail be offset by the possibility that some of this volume would be deterred by the inconvenience? Economically speaking that's an incentive for Egypt to make the transfer as convenient and attractive as possible.

Politically speaking, no matter how peaceful commerce normally goes from the Med to the Red Sea, the British were going to be concerned to keep the route open to themselves, and so one way or another drawn into the politics of the region. A Canal offered them the option of being able to quickly transfer their Naval capital ships (at least those small enough to make the passage) from the East to the European theatre of operations and vice versa, which had to be appealing to the Admiralty and budget-conscious Parliament.

So on one hand, to some extent we do live in a world without the Canal since we've so often had to do without it when it was blocked in Arab-Israeli wars; on the other there's no denying that with the Canal existing, the politics of controlling it did become a major centerpiece of British policy, and I think if they had succeeded in discouraging DeLessep's project, their deeper interests in getting smooth, reliable, economical passage of commerce through the region would have added to naval interests in getting passage for the actual hulls, thus changing their tune on the matter of the canal--and a delay of a generation or so would bring with it improved construction methods (but also the ambition to make a bigger canal for the bigger ships of the day).

Now, as far as some kind of Central American canal goes, I think the US Navy's interest in being able to quickly transfer their fleet elements from the Atlantic to the Pacific was pretty crucial in the US interest in the matter. And so a canal in either Panama or Nicaragua would be contingent on US confidence they could dominate the canal region in the long run; given that they'd want the canal; without that they'd take a position similar to the one you've indicated the British held on Suez.

So it comes down to the question of how likely the consolidation of respective British and American de facto imperialism would be; given the general trends of the age I'd think that sooner or later both powers would be both confident of their control of the respective sites and feel compelled by the economics of military budgets and the imperatives of the increasingly fast pace of steamship warfare to want the passages for their warships.

Of course in both cases, having decided they need the canals for warlike purposes, both powers would be sure to put a benign face on the matter by emphasizing the boons to peaceful commerce, though actually I think that economically speaking it wouldn't really matter that much whether the passage is direct for ships or involves transfers between ships overland; the latter is probably better for the host country but the former was more attractive for prospective passengers and it might be that a canal encourages more traffic and thus offsets the tendency for the cargoes and passengers to stay aboard and thus bypass the host country as customers. It all depends on what the host country charges for canal passage.

Grey Wolf said:

I think that it would be far more likely that a Nicaragua Canal be built rather than the early attempt at a Panama Canal, since the latter revolved around de Lesseps reputation from the building of the Suez Canal.

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de Lesseps's underestimation of the difficulty of the Panama Canal project contributed to the original French corporation's failure to complete the Panama Canal. Unlike the flat and sandy Suez, Panama required many locks due to the terrain. Also, the Panama project was plagued with mosquito-borne diseases given the climate and fauna. Perhaps the Americans were best suited to complete the Panama Canal given that the USA was not directly involved with the construction of the Suez Canal. Americans did not bear the same misconceptions as the first French corporation.

So because it happened IOTL it must happen ITTL?

To move the conversation along I'm gonna throw some ideas out there;

Egypt likely remains under Turkish suzerainty, though this will be challenged at every opportunity. The French wanted to break off Egypt even before the canal venture, to which the Brits opposed in order to maintain Ottoman integrity against the Russians. If the British are busy elsewhere however the Egyptians might have their chance to break away and achieve independence. If they do they're likely going to fall under French influence. This will have negative consequences for any Franco-British entente.

During the Scramble for Africa France's basic 'strategy' was a trans-Africa West-East line across the Sahel to link France and her Algerian and West African colonies to her colonies in Indochina. However those Indochinese protectorates were formed due to the direct connection had to the East thanks to the Suez. No Suez likely means no (major) French Asian colonies, so in the larger colonial game France likely focuses closer to home; Libya and the rest of North Africa likely falls to her, perhaps even Egypt, as part of a generalized colonial strategy.

Likewise during the Scramble Britain's goal was to link South Africa across the continent to Egypt to bring it back into the trade loop and direct communications with the islands (Britain -> Egypt -> India). Without Egypt though South Africa remains an integral part of British foreign policy, which will a more direct British approach there. This also has knock-off affects on British colonialism; we might see Britain taking more interest in places like Madagascar, Ethiopia, Persia, Indochina, and Indonesia as part of a 'Indian Ocean rim' strategy.

Without the Suez the US may, or may not, take a more direct role in the Nicaragua Canal. The Canal, even with a partial overland approach via train and stagecoach, was highly profitable. Without the Suez there the US, again may or may not, find the Nicaragua to be much more important to her commercial interests and we might see direct US involvement in the Civil War of 1849-1855, or during William Walker's short regime (OTL 1856-57). Of course this assumes, as Grey Wolf raises, that the technology to successful build an open canal across that point would be available in the 1840s, 50s and/or 60s. Either way a open canal, or even a still-open partial canal, would have some major knock-off effects on American foreign policy, especially when/if the Civil War comes.

Later, IF there is a successful Nicaraguan Canal and IF the Egyptians break away from the Turks and fall under French influence, we might see France take up the Suez project once again. If we're assuming a POD of Napoleon III doesn't commit to the idea than this later canal project would likely replace his adventures in Mexico which without his Empire would remain (at least in appearance) strong, and we might butterfly away or significantly change the Franco-Prussian War. If we're going with a successful 1855 (or 1858) assassination of Louis-Napoléon with the project falling apart during the socialist-vs-republican-vs-Bonapartists-vs-Orléanist-vs-Legitimists chaos in France than a lot will depend on who wins out there. Either of the middle three options might have a chance to survive and thrive, but IMHO either a overtly radical or reactionary French state will collapse under another round of rebellion, revolution and civil war within a generation or two.

Other possible butterflies;
If the Egyptians break away this will weaken the Turks quite a bit; we might see both a Balkan and an Arab uprising, either of which may or may not be successful. We'll also likely see a limited Russian War with gains for the bear in both the Balkans and Caucasus. Hell, Persia might even take a whack at the 'sick man.' Since our 'Egypt Breaks Away' scenario depends on Britain being busy elsewhere than the British either must let the Turks splinter, or they have to withdraw from wherever they are to focus on saving their proxy-check on Russian power. Either way the Turks are fairly weakened and basically fall under both Russian and British influence. Maybe analogous to OTL's Persia during the same period.

In general no Suez means lesser European involvement in Asia thanks to the lack of OTL's much faster route. Even delayed 20-40 years this could give Asian powers such as Japan or even China slightly more time to play catch-up in the region.

Also, if the Nicaragua is open but the Suez is not then we'll see much more European (and American) involvement in the Eastern Pacific instead of the Western. However, there's not particularly a lot in the Eastern Pacific; off the top of my head Hawaii is the largest island chain in the region. The small Eastern Pacific ocean islands might be claimed by various European powers and turned into trading posts for goods being sent to and from the Far Eastern markets and protectorates/colonies.

It is too easy to build. It is basically a glorified ditch.

mowque said:

It is too easy to build. It is basically a glorified ditch.

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Alright, seriously. What more do I have to offer? I felt like I've shown more evidence than most threads have showing how, specifically, the British were opposed to the measure and the Egyptians themselves were, at best, apathetic. The fact that there's a canal that directly links the Mediterranean and Red seas through the Suez would be considered ASB if it hadn't happened IOTL. I guess I don't see why everyone is having a hard time moving beyond the POD; I've seen this community discuss, with gusto, far more improbable propositions before.

wolf_brother said:

Alright, seriously. What more do I have to offer? I felt like I've shown more evidence than most threads have showing how, specifically, the British were opposed to the measure and the Egyptians themselves were, at best, apathetic. The fact that there's a canal that directly links the Mediterranean and Red seas through the Suez would be considered ASB if it hadn't happened IOTL. I guess I don't see why everyone is having a hard time moving beyond the POD; I've seen this community discuss, with gusto, far more improbable propositions before.

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All right, let's do this.

The economic value of the Suez is immense. Doubly so for a nation like Britain. Given time, this WILL become a factor. Despite OTL mis-givings, a better, faster and ultimately more secure route (assuming the UK has Gibraltar and Malta) to India is way too much to pass up. A large percentage of the Empire only existed to cement that line of communication to the subcontinent.

To get all of that, you have to dig a ditch. A big one, but really it is highly simplistic mechanically (logistically, not so much). This is no Panama.

Eventually, even if it takes 20-30 more years it'll be built.

mowque said:

Eventually, even if it takes 20-30 more years it'll be built.

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Granted, but even a 20 or 30 year gap will have far reaching consequences on the globe. On Britain in particular, and especially if the Americans' Nicaragua Canal, with its partial over-land route, its the first to be opened and renowned.

Can anyone put a number of it?

The economic value of the canal may be great, but can anyone put a number to it? I mean, how much less would the GDP of the world or any particular country be without the canal?

The other side of the coin is, no canal no British invasions of 1882 or 1956.

The first led to our involvement in the Middle East so no canal, no Gordon of Khartoum, no Lawrence of Arabia and no British Mandate in Palestine. (No homeland for the Jews in 1945 then?)

The second well and truly punctured our delusions of being a world power in the Nuclear Age. If that hadn't happened would reality have caught up with or politicians somewhere else? Vietnam perhaps?

Thoughts...

An interesting idea, of course. I'm tempted to wonder, if Ismal'i Pasha doesn't spend so much on the Canal, he can avoid the indebtness that led to the virtual takeover of Egypt by Britain and France in 1878.

Even without the Canal, Ismali'i faced huge internal problems foillowing the disastrous war with Ethiopia. Whether he could have continued as Khedive or whether he'd have faced an internal revolt leading to either his abdication or execution I'm not sure.

We could envisage Ismal'i and Tewfik being forced into exile and Ahmed Orabi taking over and establishing an independent anti-European Egypt as a kind of proto-Nasser. Orabi lived until 1911 in OTL and would have been an interesting figure in middle eastern politics.

I think he might have gravitated toward Germany as an ally rather than Britain and France and might have sought to re-establish Egyptian control over Syria and Palestine as Muhammad Ali had done.

Had Orabi Pasha prevailed in 1879, Egypt would probably have been a much more powerful state in the 20th Century and a symbol of pan-Arab nationalism. Indeed, I think we could imagine Egypt dominating Arabia and replacing the defunct Ottomans as the "eastern power".

Would this Egypt have allied with Nazi Germany? It's a thought and a nasty one - would it today control the oil resources of Arabia ?

In other words, the Canal weakened Egypt so much that its nationalism was held up for 70 years and this enabled other power structures to develop in the region.