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#61
October 3rd, 2011, 09:35 PM
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#62
October 3rd, 2011, 10:24 PM
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Economic dominance. Colonies are not profitable for a state, but quite profitable for its investors, who are those calling the shots anyway. It's not much use throwing money at colonies when every bit of profit from there is gobbled up by American robber bar... uh... industrialists.
Without the profiteering from WWI and the theft of the German patents US economic growth will be quite a bit slower.
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#63
October 3rd, 2011, 10:47 PM
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Since Bethmann was one of the most earliest and prominent advocates of ethnic cleansing in Eastern Europe in preparations for upcoming Germanization schemes(and he invented this idea on his own,despite similar other designs)*, this will be an interesting world indeed...
*Absolute Destruction: Military Culture And the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, Isabel Hull, Cornell University Press, p.223
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#64
October 4th, 2011, 02:38 AM
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#65
October 4th, 2011, 11:22 AM
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And certainly the US wouldn't have gone for India. But Canada? The true gem stone of the empire, impossible to be protected by the Royal Navy...
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#66
October 5th, 2011, 01:41 PM
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So I am still working on Chapter 5, the rough outlines are set but there is still much to be polished.
But I had the chance to read up on British foreign policy and Grey's attitude. So I can add something to this discussion. Was Germany targeted unfairly as a threat to the Empire? How big were the chances for a détente between both nations? The historiams seem somewhat divided - what a surprise. But I think there is kind of a rough consent, too. Charmley, John, Splendid Isolation?, 1999, gives a rather critical account of British foreign policies. Massie in Dreadnought, and others are more balanced in their approach. From what I have gathered Grey was rather sincere when he thought about Germany as a threat to the Empire. I also think that this was not always the product of rational and sober thinking, but so was the German foreign policy more often than not either. I think Grey had an irrational fear of Russia, seeing as a threat in East-Asia, for India and in Persia. Therefore he supported the alliance with Japan, although he feared hat it might wreck relations with Russia. He wanted to stay on the sunny side of Russia and thought that the "way to St Petersburg would go over Paris". Therefore he wanted the entente with France and that on the other hand brought him always in contrast to Germany. That Germany would attack France of their own is a rather ridiculous assumption but there were those pre-emptive strike proponents in the German military, so it is not that off-hand. Much more realistic was his fear that Germany might get dragged into a war with Russia via A-H, which in turn would also bring France into the fold. That in the end any German victory, he feared, would have helped to diminish the Russian threat was, of course, something he did not see. Abd again one has to admit: Although the German fleet was in the end no match for the British fleet, that is not the whole truth. Germany had gained some formidable new ships. And the British fleet was scattered around the world, leaving a rather slim line of defense. It was that and the German naval law of 1912 which in cluded an all-around the clock war preparedness for the German fleet as well as the war scare in July/August 1911 which let the British to sign the agreement with France which would relieve the British fleet of its guard duty in the Mediterannean. That Grey perceived the fleet building as a threat is a rather rational decsion besides the fact that it might not endanger British safety as much as some thought. Germany had made it clear in the end that it was building this fleet against the British fleet. And that is a threat. and then Britain was no longer in any meaningful way obliged to be overly friendly to Germany. And on a last note: It were not the British on a whole, even not the government that feared the Germans that much. It was mostly Grey with some tentative support from Asquith and maybe McKenna. Lloyd George and Churchill "defected" only after the Agadir Crisis and German diplomatic conduct in that regard was rather abysmal. Even then Grey had a hard time. He withheld information from the Cabinet and tried to hide his actions concerning France. But he had many vocal opponents. Gade, Gleichgewichtspolitik oder Bündnispflege?, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1997 seems to be certain that under these circumstances - especially because the British entente with France was not well defined, Britain could not sign a well-defined neutrality agreement with Germany. I think that is not entirely true. Massie gave a rather thorough account of the Haldane mission and the concluding negotiations. Grey was ready support a political formula which came very near a neutrality clause. Although it was limited to neutrality only in cases of a non-provoked defensive war, I think this was genuine promise. There were additional poltical agreements included like support for German colonies and the Baghdad railway. Grey was ready to give much for a real slow down in fleet-building, which would have been a mutual slow-down. I think in this TL he will be even more ready to do that. And he will have much more pressure from his colleagues in the cabinet. In this TL Lloyd George and Churchill (he stays president of the Board of Trade in this TL) will not change sides on this matter but stay firmly pro-German. Therefore I believe a British-German détente on the basis of a slow-down in naval building and a partial neutrality guarantee in case of a defensive war is a probable outcome of sensible negotiations. Quote:
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Of course, he was no angel either, and sometimes his decisions seem rather erratic and/or spineless. Some of these I attribute to his OTL fatalism and often gloomy mood. Others may very well were rather just that: spineless. And others might have been genuinely bad and/or evil. But there is a reason that one of his most thorough biographers called him an enigmatic personality in the preface (Vietsch) and another put that right in the title of his biography (Jarausch, The enigmatic chancellor). Kind regards, G.
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Wer kämpft, kann verlieren. Wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren. (Bert Brecht) A simple translation: Never ever give up.
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#67
October 5th, 2011, 02:22 PM
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Germany was a limited threat to France - that was about all the capacity she had. But even if she succeeded in annihilating the French army, that wouldn't make her hegemon of Europe (it hadn't made her in 1871), as a Russia acting sanely was unbeatable for the German army. The coal driven German fleet was pegged to the German Bight. This was understood very well in Britain. There was no capacity in Tirpitz' fleet to threaten the sea lanes of the British Empire.
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#68
October 10th, 2011, 06:24 PM
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And finally Chapter 5: I left the election of 1912 out of it - since that would have prolonged the installment unnecessarily. It contains specific research on th Grey's foreign policy, especially pre-1913. I hope you enjoy it. If someone has a good idea for a picture for this chapter, please feel free to post it.
Chapter 5: Turning the tides Excerpt from Anthony Nelson, “Sir Edward Grey and British Foreign Policy”, Cambridge 1988 […] In essence Grey's policy was driven by one goal: to hold Russia and France back from attacking British interests in the empire.1 Russia stood on the border in East-Asia, in India and in Persia. France was engaged in Africa and especially in the Mediterranean. And it owned ports on the Channel. So he wanted to bind both nations to Britain, and along many minor and major agreements in the end he achieved that through the entente with France which in turn brought Russia into the fold.2 Since he saw no alternative to this alliance and had therefore to fight for it, anything which would damage this alliance would have to be avoided.3 And this finally led to Grey's “Germanophobia” as it was perceived by the Germans, some of his own colleagues and other spectators on the world stage. Yet Grey did not fear the Germans per se. But whenever a crisis had arisen they were in opposition to Russia and France and Grey had to support Germany's opponents, which in turn left him in opposition to Germany. But Grey went even further than that. He also wanted to avoid any détente with Germany (or any engagement with other nations in the sphere of influence of either Russia or France) because he precipitated that his allies would see this as a weakening of the coalition and would leave it.4 That despite these facts a naval agreement and a political understanding was achieved5 prior to the Great War was the result of a general change in German foreign policies under Bethmann and Eisendecher on the one hand and a lack of support for his policies in the cabinet on the other hand. Combined with German willingness to give a lot for gaining less this led to a détente which at least helped to hold the peace until 1914. [...] Excerpt from Thomas Fitzgerald, “Era Eisendecher - German Diplomacy 1910 - 1918”, Dublin 1994 […] During the crucial months of the Fez Crisis, May to August 1911, talks with Britain on the issue of a naval détente had ceased almost completely. But Eisendecher had made sure that Metternich would hold contact with the British foreign office on this matter. Germany's conduct in the Fez Crisis left a good impression with many British cabinet members. Churchill, who was a supporter of closer Anglo-German relations6 as well as Haldane pointed to Eisendecher's open policy and Bethmann's fair guidelines revealed in his speech before the Reichstag on June 12th 1911. It was then that Lloyd George suggested to renew the talks on a naval agreement considering the strained budget he had to administrate. Grey was not that optimistic that there would be any new impulses since the last round of talks. Germany's position on a political understanding as a precondition and its naval armament plans would not have changed, he mused. Therefore negotiations stayed on hiatus. Nevertheless British-German rapprochement continued. In the end of July the British and German fleet participated in a joint manoeuvre before the Norwegian coast.7 And with the Final Settlement on Morroco signed on August 15th Eisendecher had managed to bring the Fez Crisis to a peaceful but favourable conclusion. Grey acknowledged this as diplomacy of the highest art, but remained weary of the fact that France had almost given too much. His colleagues in the cabinet, on the other hand, were rather enthusiastic about the new chances of growing British-German relations. Eisendecher received positive reports from Metternich and Rheinbaben which signalled that negotiations had never such a high chance for success than now. Therefore Eisendecher went only on a short holiday, knowing that he would need his energy to fight Tirpitz and the Kaiser first if he wanted to accomplish anything. While Bethmann's War Council had established that Germany had to avoid British enmity at all costs, Tirpitz and the Kaiser were still fond of their High Seas Fleet, which was the main obstacle to any agreement with Britain. When Eisendecher returned to Berlin, he would meet an already prepared battleground. Bethmann had struck a bargain with Moltke – something which would lead later on to the semi-formalised chancellery-talks between both men – and he had secured the support of quiet a number of other high ranking officials, including the secretary of the treasury Wehrmut, the Prussian secretary of war Heeringen, the Chief of the Military Cabinet Lyncker and the Chief of the Naval Cabinet Müller, the last one perhaps the most important on this subject. During the last months of 1911 Eisendecher sent three memorandums to the Emperor, not only describing in detail how Germany would never be able to win the naval race but also giving a thorough account of what a British-German understanding could achieve in ways of colonial expansion and economic advantages. When the Emperor gave in, the Great Army Law of 1912 was already on its way to a solid majority in the Reichstag. Only the discussion of the financial side caused greater disruptions. The suggestion to cut naval expenditures was not met well with the nationalists. For Eisendecher this was a great argument in further negotiations with Britain, since the Reichstag held no competence for foreign policy. Any reduction in naval armament achieved that way could thus be used to argue for a cut in naval expenditure. But it needed the Emperor's final decision that Eisendecher should receive a free hand to negotiate a naval agreement until talks could resume in any meaningful manner. The question how to proceed was decided by Bethmann and Eisendecher. Metternich should contact Haldane known as to be one of the most vocal Germanophiles on Asquith's cabinet. Haldane received the preliminary proposal for continuation of naval talks with great pleasure. The liberal government was in a dire situation since it had been voted in on accounts of reducing armament spendings and new social programs. The naval arms race had made it rather difficult for the treasury to fulfil those promises. When Haldane presented Metternich's note to a cabinet meeting in February 1912 the response was great relief by most of the participants. Especially Lloyd George and again Churchill, both part of the economists in the cabinet, supported immediate negotiations with Germany.8 McKenna was not so eager since he remembered the naval scare of 1909 rather vividly.9 And Grey feared that any conciliatory agreement with Germany might endanger the entente. But he conceded that negotiations should take place since the chances of an agreement seemed much better than before. So Asquith suggested that Grey should meet with Eisendecher, since McKenna seemed not to support negotiations.10 Eisendecher was invited to London and he accepted gladly, saying that direct talks would be most appropriate. It was the first time that Eisendecher and Grey met directly. The public reason given was quiet different, of course. Grey feared that a direct meeting between him and Eisendecher might leave France and Russia with distrust on the content of the meeting. Therefore it was published that Eisendecher was to meet his old acquaintances and the King while on an week-long visit to Britain. During his stay Eisendecher visited Grey in his London home on February 20th. Eisendecher made it clear from the beginning, that he was given a free hand and wide authorisation. Grey was pleasantly surprised by this development and asked for a general delay in the naval building program. Since the German Army Law and its discussion were not unknown to Grey he rightly assumed that the possibility of a slow-down of the building speed must have risen. Eisendecher acknowledged that and explained the difficulties within German politics he and Bethmann had to face. But if Germany was to reduce its naval building tempo, he asked, could the British finally accept a political understanding which would guarantee British neutrality in case Germany would be engulfed in a war? Grey was ready for once to cease this one time opportunity and drew up a political formula together with Haldane the next day:11 “England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and will pursue no aggressive policy towards her. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.”12 Eisendecher telegraphed the proposal back to Bethmann in Berlin with some notes of his own. At first sight this seemed far less than Eisendecher and Bethmann had hoped for. Since both men were still eager to once and for all quiet the supporters of Tirpitz' naval policy they thought they needed a wider agreement, one which guaranteed British neutrality in case of a war. Eisendecher suggested a further sentence: “England will therefore observe neutrality in case Germany had to fight in a war which she did not provoke. Germany will commit to the same obligations.”13 Eisendecher included a significant slow-down of the naval construction speed from the prescribed two dreadnoughts a year beginning in 1912 to only one dreadnought every year spread over twelve years and a promise of no further naval laws without consulting Britain first. Any agreement on these lines would have cut British naval expenditures in half and given reasonable assurance that it would stay that way in the coming years. Grey did not like Eisendecher's additional sentence. The danger that sentence might pose to the entente appeared too great to him. He declared that as much as he liked the suggestions for a naval agreement the political formula could not contain the word neutrality.14 In a last ditch effort Eisendecher leaked his proposal to Cassel, who in turn leaked it to Lloyd George, which brought Grey the harshest criticism of his foreign policy during his tenure. The storm of anger that washed over Grey in the cabinet meeting of the same evening was severe. Even McKenna supported an extensive political understanding now. But Grey threatened with resignation if the political formula was to be adopted the way Eisendecher had proposed it. Asquith did not want his government break up and managed a last time to bring Radicals and Grey back together. And so during another excruciating day of negotiations Grey convinced Eisendecher that the clause supported by Grey already contained such a neutrality in case of war.15 But he considered to give in on the colonial issues especially the fate of the Portuguese colonies.16 That left Eisendecher at least with something to please the nationalists although these arrangements had to stay secret for the time being and were kind of a bird in the sky not caught yet. When Eisendecher returned to Germany on February 25th 1912 his luggage hold a preliminary draft of an extensive treaty between Germany and Britain, including a political formula, an agreement on German colonies and the Baghdad railway and a huge reduction in naval armament. Of course, this also had to pass the German public and although not necessary parliamentary consent would have to be ensured to fight the sea lions off. The elections to the Reichstag of March 1912 made sure that Bethmann would have a sufficient majority. In the end of April the treaty was signed and a supplement to the Great Army Law passed which led to a reduction in the naval building pace. Eisendecher and Bethmann stood at the zenith of their career. [...] OTL cited sources: Charmley, John, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War, Hodder & Stoughton London 1999. Gade, Christel, Gleichgewichtspolitik oder Bündnispflege?, Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, Göttingen, Zürich 1997. Lowe, C. J. /Dockrill, M. L., The Mirage of Power, Vol. 1, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston 1972. Massie, Robert K., Dreadnought. Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War, Random House New York 1991. Neilson, Keith, 'Control the Whirlwind': Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary, 1906-16, in: Otte (Edit.), The Makers of British Foreign Policy – From Pitt to Thatcher, pp. 129 ff., Palgrave, Hampshire 2002. Stevenson, David, Armaments and the Coming of War in Europe, Clarendon Press Oxford 1996. Wilson, Keith, Grey, in: Wilson (Edit.), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War, pp. 172 ff., Croom Helm, London, Sydney, Wolfeboro (New Hampshire) 1987. ________________________________________________ 1 As in OTL. I believe this is the best explanation of Grey's policy before the war. See Wilson, Grey, in: British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War, pp. 172 ff., especially pp. 178 ff.; Neilson, 'Control the Whirlwind': Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary, 1906-16, in: Otte (Edit.), The Makers of British Foreign Policy – From Pitt to Thatcher, pp. 129 ff.; another explanation is offered by Lowe/Dockrill, The Mirage of Power, Vol. 1, pp. 18 f.; Charmley, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 338 ff. They see Grey's policy directed towards containing Germany. 2 For this theory on the “way to St. Petersburg over Paris”, see Wilson, ibid., p. 180; Gade, Gleichgewichtspolitik oder Bündnispflege?, pp. 146 ff., especially p. 152. 3 One has to admit that Grey avoided a formal alliance with both France and Russia as well in OTL. He may have considered the entente a way of staying still neutral without doing so, see Neilson, ibid., pp. 128 ff., especially pp. 134, 136 f.; Lowe/Dockrill, ibid., pp. 52 ff.; for a different take on this subject see Charmley, ibid., pp. 332 ff. 4 As in OTL, see Wilson, ibid., p. 184; Lowe/Dockrill, ibid., pp. 50 f., 74; Charmley, ibid., p. 341, 5 How such a détente may have been possible even in 1912 of OTL see the footnotes for the next fictitious excerpt which details these events. 6 Massie, Dreadnought, pp. 818 f. According to Massie it was Agadir, which changed Churchill's attitude towards Germany, Massie, ibid., p. 819. 7 This was planned in OTL, but was abandoned by both sides because of the growing tensions, see Massie, ibid., pp. 735 f. (footnote). Since in this TL cordial relations between both countries are maintained, the joined exercise will happen, especially since Eisendecher will push for the manoeuvre to go on as planned to promote positive relations. 8 As they did in OTL before Agadir, see footnote 6; Lowe/Dockrill, ibid., p. 36. In this TL they will stay by their opinion, which will be re-enforced through Germany's conduct in the Morocco Crisis. Furthermore the Naval Law of 1911/1912 will be absent in this TL. 9 In this TL McKenna stays First Lord of the Admiralty, since neither the fleet alarm of July nor the CID meeting of August of OTL take place, which both threw a rather bad light on McKenna prompting his replacement by Churchill in October, see Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War in Europe, p. 213. For the naval scare remark, see Massie, ibid., pp. 609 ff. 10 As far as I have gathered McKenna supported an agreement with Germany only after he was transferred to the Home Office, which will not take place in this TL, at least yet. 11 As in OTL Massie, ibid., pp. 790 ff., especially pp. 815 f. 12 As in OTL, cited after Massie, ibid., pp. 815 f. 13 A similar suggestion was made by Metternich in OTL, see Massie, ibid., p. 816. 14 Very similar to OTL, see Massie, ibid., p. 816. 15 Harcourt actually interpreted the British clause that way in OTL, when he tried to convince Grey that he should abide by the German wish: “I tried to prove to him [Grey] that neutrality 'declaration' was no more than we had put into our formula.”, cited after Lowe/Dockrill, ibid., pp. 50 f. 16 He was prepared to do so and actually did so in OTL, see Lowe/Dockrill, ibid., p. 52.
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Wer kämpft, kann verlieren. Wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren. (Bert Brecht) A simple translation: Never ever give up.
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#69
October 10th, 2011, 06:34 PM
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Kind regards, G.
__________________
Wer kämpft, kann verlieren. Wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren. (Bert Brecht) A simple translation: Never ever give up.
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#70
October 11th, 2011, 08:54 AM
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Hi, you are right - germany was a threat to UK, not in military aspects but economically... in 1912 germany had been "stronger" as UK, so they lost their first (in reality second, behind the usa) place... the german merchant fleet was "better" as the british and the distance between the both was closening... in goods and machineries the germans had a huge advantage, the same in technology and chemical industry... so yes, uk wanted to destroy germany, not the politicans, but the big business... for them it wasn´t a problem that UK had to build all the expensive ships (payd by taxes, but they build em and earned money!) in this scenario (if uk and germany come to an understandning) it is quite interesting what happen if the germans switch to oil and long range diesel ships.... not loosing its merchant fleet and - if such event happen - winning the war on the continent - brings germany in a ultra strong situation. Economically even stronger as the brits feared... how will UK react? Keep going, it is very interesting...
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#71
October 11th, 2011, 09:37 AM
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#72
October 11th, 2011, 10:28 AM
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So far so good for Anglo-German détente, but this progress is still rather fragile and further complicating the already murky system of alliances and secret treaties will most likely only increase international tensions.
I still really enjoy your extensive research on the subject.
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#73
October 11th, 2011, 04:01 PM
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I'm a little bit astounded that you quote Massie, who's yellow press niveau.
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#74
October 11th, 2011, 05:52 PM
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First: thanks for all the commentary. It is greatly appreciated.
 I am currently working on Chapter 6 which will focus on domestic policies again, including the election of 1912, assorted other problems, and of course discussions and domestic implications of the army law and the new treaty with Britain.Quote:
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British-German relations are much better now than they were in OTL, which the naval détente was all about. Furthermore the Liberals in general have more freedom to use the money for the social programs as they wanted to. Pro-German sentiments will prevail in the Liberal party and in the British public. Although Grey managed to get away with his entente friendly policy due to secrecy on his part he will have a much harder time in this TL to continue these policies. Besides that I beg to differ on Grey's assessment of the German threat. Grey may have seen Germany as a threat to France, but that was more because France was important to him as an ally to bind Russia - and of course, he did not want another Fashoda. It seems you follow more Lowe/Dockrill's and Charmley's interpretation of Grey's foreign policy, although the former were not critical of it like you. I found Neilson and Wilson more convincing, but I concede that especially Lowe/Dockrill have some good arguments for their case. Charmley is much more critical of Grey, but a bit to polemic for my tastes. Nevertheless I included him in the sources. Quote:
Kind regards, G.
__________________
Wer kämpft, kann verlieren. Wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren. (Bert Brecht) A simple translation: Never ever give up.
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#75
October 11th, 2011, 06:15 PM
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#76
October 11th, 2011, 06:36 PM
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Thanks for the explanation! Kind regards, G.
__________________
Wer kämpft, kann verlieren. Wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren. (Bert Brecht) A simple translation: Never ever give up.
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#77
October 25th, 2011, 03:16 PM
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Just as any FYI the slow down in naval building you are suggesting requires some very substantial changes to the 1908 naval law for it to work.
The Germans are to build under the 1908 naval laws at the following tempo for 1912-1917. 1 BB, 1 Large Cruiser / BC, 2 Small Cruisers (1912-1916) 1 BB, 1 Large Cruiser / BC, 1 Small Cruiser (1917) From 1918 on German construction rates are governed under the replacement clauses of the Naval Laws. Which specify a replacement age of 20 years for Battleships and Large Cruisers. Kaiser Friedrich Class hits replacement age starting in 1918 and it gets really bad with the Wittelsbach Class in 1922. Kaiser Friedrich III, Commission Date 1898 Kaiser Wilhelm II, Commission Date 1900 Kaiser Wilhelm der Große, Commission Date 1901 Kaiser Barbarossa, Commission Date 1901 Kaiser Karl der Große, Commission Date 1902 Wettin, Commission Date 1902 Wittelsbach, Commission Date 1902 Zähringen, Commission Date 1902 Mecklenburg, Commission Date 1903 Schwaben, Commission Date 1904 So German Building Temp as specified by the Naval Laws would be in 1918 on 1918: 1 1919: 0 1920: 1 1921: 2 1922: 4 1923: 1 1924: 1 It gets worse as Braunschweig class is due for replacement starting in 1924 also. Check Google Books for German Sea-Power: its rise, progress, and economic basis By Sir Archibald Hurd, Henry Castle Its an old book BUT its appendixes have copies of the German Naval Laws. Regards, Michael
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#78
October 25th, 2011, 09:39 PM
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For the time being I am working on Chapter 6 but that turned out to be rather more difficult than expected. I cannot come around to assess what impact the ATL events will have on the 1912 election. I have read two good books on the subject (Bertram, Die Reichstagswahlen 1912) and some guy (name just not remebering right now), The Kaiser's voters. I understand the underlying issues of the election and what the parties aimed for with their respective camapaigns. Economic issues featured prominently, the Imperial financial reform was a hot topic especially for the SPD which saw much inequity their. Protectional tariffs were another important issue and of course the liberal longing for more parliamenterisation. It seems to attributed partially to the Morocco crisis because that turned people off nationalistic propaganda and colonial adventures. In this ATL the Morocco crisis went much more smoothly and with much less nationalistic instigation. So the question rather is: Could that lead to the nationalistic parties to engage more in nationalistic talk during the campaign? And would that have an impact on the election outcome? In OTL the SPD pretty much hit the jackpot, could double their seats and was the big winner. Conservatives lost, as well as liberals wheras the Centre could kind of stagnate and manage to retain a position in the middle between the two camps of "left" and "right". I tend to think that the parties would have been a little bit more willing to engage in nationalistic talks although Bethmann might not want that because of the negotiations with Britain (in OTL he did not want that either but out of entire different reasons eg the Morocco crisis). I think that the election result will not be changed dramatically here. People will still be upset over the economic issues and in foreign policies germany seems to do quiet well so there might be even less an intereset in these subjects. On the other hand people might be more enthusiastic over the treaty with France and will focus more on this topic. I really do not know. Maybe I should check all hotly conteted seats and if it was close enough leave those to the conservatives? I hope I can make up my mind soon. Meanwhile I am working on some pretty interesting RL contracts. Kind regards, G.
__________________
Wer kämpft, kann verlieren. Wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren. (Bert Brecht) A simple translation: Never ever give up.
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#79
October 26th, 2011, 06:56 PM
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DerGreif,
Check chapter 42 of Dreadnought on the Haldane Mission. Especially the reaction of the British Cabinet to the advanced text of the German Naval Laws (pg 812-13). What freaked the British out wasn't the adding of 3 new ships to the 1908 law that the 1912 law specified it was the increase in the peacetime personal of the navy, the new U Boats and Destroyers. This would allow the German Fleet to act without a general mobilization. The British were worried about the Germans trying in effect to pull a sneak attack. Tirpitz was reading the tea leaves, he knew that support was weakening in the Reichstag for the type of building temp he wanted. 2 BB's + 1 BC a year 1912-18. He allowed himself to be talked down to the 1 DN + 1 BC and every other year a second DN. What I suggest is that Tirpitz has to get SOMETHING. If given a choice between the big ships or the increased number of crews, destroyers, etc he will back the battleships. Churchill is going to be pissed at anything other than status quo but the Admiralty viewed the peace time changes as the deal breaker. So have the extra Battleships go through as the 1912 law dictated BUT back off on peace time personal, additional destroyers and subs. Some of the new subs and DDs are built, pick some number, half, third, whatever but the peace time manning levels are kept the same. Also Limit the terms of the diplomatic agreement to cover 1912-18. This side steps the entire issue of replacement of old ships. Most governments only worry about the next election and 6 years is plenty of time for the British. Trying to do anything about the replacement clause and max size of the fleet would generate a blood bath in the Reichstag. Unless there was some type of massive pay off in exchange it would inflame the nationalists and upset the moderates such that there is no telling what type of bill Tirpitz could then ram through. He would most likely go for his original demand and get it to keep building tempo at 2 DN and 1 BC a year. If you are looking for additional reading material might I suggest 'Luxury' Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 by Holger H. Herwig, chapter V covers the key issues you are dealing with. Michael
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#80
October 26th, 2011, 08:40 PM
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In this TL Tirpitz will see that a new law will have no chance to succeed. The Fez Crisis will be dealt with in a quiet different fashion: no Mansion House speech, no use of nationalistic propaganda, giving right from the beginning Germany's aims being in the Congo not Morocco, no Panther in Agadir. With an even more concerted effort on the side of Bethmann to gather support for the army and resistance against the fleet building there will be no new naval law discussed in late 1911/early 1912. Therefore German negotiations with GB will revolve around a reduction building tempo as they did since Bethmann took over (and some time before). Haldane suggested the 1-ship-speed spread over twelve years in OTL (instead of the 2-ship speed over six years). Maybe we could settle with a 2-1-2-1-etc. over 8 years. I think a limitation until 1918 is a good thing. It would give at least some relief. I actually doubt that a reduction building speed would be out of the question, especially after the elections in 1912, assuming they follow mainly the results of OTL. I am still struggling with a rational assessment of the effect of the ATL Fez Crisis on the election but tend to think that it would not have much of an impact. The economic issues were prevalent and the government has shown to be quiet capable of managing foreign affairs in this TL. In addition to that Bethmann and Moltke will focus on the army and propagate increases there. Also not that easy to do without Agadir but the shift to the army already started in 1908/09 with the Bosnian annexation crisis. With a majority of SPD, left liberals and moderate national liberals and in military spending rather reluctant Centre naval enthusiasts will have hard time to argue against the government line. even more so when the government can produce the treaty with Britain. Treaties did not have to be ratified by the parliament in Germany back then which would further improve the government position. but all this will be dealt with in chapter 6. I try to find the book you mentioned but considering that I have already aplenty material from other sources (some not yet mentioned in the chaters) like Epkenhans, Flottenrüstung, Berghahn, Tirpitz-Plan, an essay by Langhorne and another book by Herwig I doubt it will bring much additional material. Besides Stein is a really good book on the matter at hand and on the conflicting interests of army and navy, as is Brose, the Kaiser's army and Mombaur, moltke. Thanks again for the input! Kind regards, G.
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Wer kämpft, kann verlieren. Wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren. (Bert Brecht) A simple translation: Never ever give up.
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