A stronghold in Europe - A von Bethmann Hollweg TL

[DerGreif]

A stronghold in Europe – a von Bethmann Hollweg TL


Foreword


Or “How to use this timeline”

This is my first proper timeline after lurking here for two years, finally registering in 2008, then contributing rather little to the AH section especially after I discovered the political chat section. After reading and reading and forgetting again I decided to just start this timeline before I will never get around to do it.


I just want to send some things ahead. This timeline will be written mostly in excerpts of fictitious academic monographs or essays on history, although exemptions to this rule may occur from time to time. Footnotes are not fictitious but contain references to sources of our timeline, facts of our timeline and so forth. Although I have some rather tangible ideas where this will go until 1920 things from there still look rather blank. So I will surprise myself, since I have the intent to carry this through until we reach the year 2010.



I try to be as plausible as possible. This does not mean that only the most probable events will happen but they have a high percentage compared to events of low probability.


I will take so-called butterflies into account, but only where I find it logical. That is just for the sake of a butterfly I will not change arbitrarily any dates, persons and events. Since a great war will occur this will change significantly afterwards – too many people will die or not die. Things will diverge more thoroughly from there than before.


I appreciate comments on the content as well as on the form and style. English is not my native language, I tend to typos and so on. So feel free to point these things out to me. If you see factual errors or think events should develop different, I appreciate your comments as well. In case of the latter I would welcome a source preferably in English or German to further my knowledge on said subject, my other languages are either too rusty or non-existent to read complex historical topics.


That being said I am really excited and hope you enjoy it, although it first will cover an often discussed period. Sothe first installment is about to follow right now.


Kind regards,
G.

[DerGreif]

Prologue: The Philosopher of Hohenfinow

Excerpt from Gerald Stern, “The Philosopher of Hohenfinow”, 1981


Theobald Theodor Friedrich Alfred von Bethmann Hollweg was born in November, 29th 1856 in Hohenfinow. When he died in June, 3rd 1922,1 at the same place, he died as one of the most important leaders of the German Empire. During his life he was often critised for his political decisions, many of them have never been fully understood. The academic public still tries to get access to this complex character who was torn between a sense of duty, an unprecedented feeling of responsibility for the people he governed and his ethical understandings. Although von Bethmann left a rich correspondence with his two friends, and his contemporaries wrote a great deal about him, so many mysteries still remain and very well will never be unearthed.


What the following work tries to accomplish is an objective assessment of his career, his achievements and failures in a most comprehensive way. And no biograpy with such a goal can neglect those persons and institutions which had influenced the subject of the biography. Looking back to von Bethmann's youth one of the most important persons for him was his grandfather Moritz August von Betmann Hollweg. August was a law professor, a veteran of the Prussian national assembly of 1848 and a Prussian minister for culture. Although he resented democratisation he was outright appalled by the reactionary forces and their repressive behaviour. Together with his friend Dietrich Wilhelm Landfermann he campaigned for a cautious change to a conservative-liberal but constitutional state.2 It were August's ethical insights and his adherence to the law which influenced von Bethmann a great deal. This position of a political centre which his grandfather has maintained during his political career was clearly adopted by von Bethmann as Prussian minister of the interior and later on as chancellor of the German Empire.3

Schulpforta in 1900

Another major influence in von Bethmann's early life was Schulpforta, the school he attended from 1869 to 1875 leaving as best of his class.4 Von Bethmann himself wrote that it was Schulpforta which taught him the ability of an independent judgement and gave him the self-confidence he would need so desperately in his later years as politician.5


Finally from his father von Bethmann learned the sense of duty and responsibility which guided many of his decisions – some of his best and arguably some of his worst. Although von Bethmann disagreed with the political opinions his father held there was never a major fall-out between the two besides one remarkable incident in 1873 after which von Bethmann left to visit his grandfather for two weeks. As von Bethmann wrote in a letter to his friend Wolfgang von Oettingen:


“Today I learned how difficult it is to stand for the principles which I come to believe in and still to show the respect and obedience to my father which I owe him.”6


This conflict should foreshadow the central conflict in von Bethmann's life. His examination of this conflict in many letters and a notable memorandum earned him the moniker philosopher of Hohenfinow,7 often meant in a derogatory way.


Von Bethmann's years studying law in Strasbourg, Leipzig and Berlin were a sign of the impression his grandfather had left on him. Not only was he following the same profession as his grandfather but his resentment of any political form of extremism be it socialist liberal or conservative-reactionary showed the deep rejection of his grandfather had for the same views. When von Bethmann finally entered politics as joined candidate for the Reichstag of the German Conservative Party, the Free Conservative Party and the National Liberal Party in 1890 it was his intention rather to follow the example of his grandfather than his father.8 Although von Bethmann lost the election by a small margin to August Althaus of the German Free-minded Party, his father was pleased that he had tried.9 Since this time von Bethmann was sceptical of the parties. Especially the infighting between the conservative parties appalled him.


The following years saw von Bethmann rising further in the hierarchy of civil servants. In 1899 he headed the most important Prussian province of Brandenburg, six years later in March 1905 he was appointed Prussian minister of the interior.10 Again von Bethmann showed the political views he had inherited from his grandfather. Pleased to have reached a position which allowed him to influence politics on a greater scale he tried to be a middleman between the conservatives, liberals and socialists. This earned him much scepticism from every site. While he argued for a reform of the Prussian three-class franchise the conservatives thought it to be too radical, the left-wing liberals not radical enough. These conflicts continued as von Bethmann was appointed secretary of the interior11 and vice-chancellor of the German Empire by the then chancellor von Bülow. With Bülow's dismissal by Wilhelm II. during the infamous Daily Telegraph affair von Bethmann gained the most important position in the German Empire after the emperor: Wilhelm II. appointed him to chancellor in July 1909. Von Bethmann stood at the beginning of the most difficult period of his whole life.12


Writing to his friend and soon to be secretary of foreign affairs Karl von Eisendecher he said:


“Difficult times might lie ahead. But I am convinced it is not a coincidence this important duty has fallen upon me. I will fulfil this duty as best as I can and perhaps I will succeed in moving this government beyond petty partisan squabbles which destroy any chance of progress.”13


____________________________________________



1 He died in January 1st, 1921 from a cold which developed into an acute pneumonia OTL.

2 Everything as in OTL.

3 This happened in OTL, but in this TL the influence is even stronger.

4 As in OTL.

5 The self-confidence part is added in this TL. It actually is kind of the POD, having von Bethmann developing a much stronger self-confidence based on his closer relationship with his grandfather and his experience in school.

6 This anecdote is invented by me. It shows the stronger self-confidence von Bethmann has acquired in this TL.

7 He earned this moniker also in OTL.

8 In OTL his father pushed him to do this.

9 In OTL von Bethmann won the election with a margin of one vote. After some of his opponents claimed irregularities during the election he resigned. Some butterflies are leaving the first result already with a victory for von Bethmann's successor in the reelection in OTL.

10 As in OTL. His predecessor died in March 1905. No need for a butterfly here.

11 Due to the fact that the German Empire did not formally had a ministries but only departments their heads were called state secretaries.

12 As in OTL. Von Bethmann could hardly influence any of the circumstances leading to his appointment besides being more eager to accept it.

13 In OTL von Bethmann was rather unsure of his assignment and accepted it only very reluctantly in obedience to the order of the emperor.

[wiking]

I'll subscribe. Eager to see where you take this.

[Koenig von Poposia]

I'll be following this as well. Looks interesting.

[Ordinary joe]

Interesting, looking forward to more.

[abc123]

Intresting. Subscribed.

[DerGreif]

Thank you all for your interest! I will give an update tonight.

Kind regards,
G.

[machine3589]

I`ll keep an eye on this.

[TheLordProtector]

This seems quite interesting, but should't it be in pre-1900?

[abc123]

Originally Posted by DerGreif

A stronghold in Europe – a von Bethmann Hollweg TL

Bump. Bump.

[DerGreif]

Part 1: Walking on razor's edge


Chapter 1: A personal decision1

Excerpt from Gerald Stern, “The Philosopher of Hohenfinow”, 1981


[…] After Bethmann2 had been appointed to chancellor he also had to supervise the imperial cabinet, encompassing the secretary of foreign affairs, of the interior, of justice, of the colonial office, of the treasury, of the navy office, of the postal services and of the train office as well as the minister for Alsace-Lorraine. There was no minister or state secretary for defence on the imperial level, since all federal states had their own military. So the Prussian minister of defence functioned as minister of defence for the empire.


Confronted with his new task Bethmann looking back on the reshuffle of the Prussian cabinet3 had to consider some changes in the imperial cabinet too. One of the most urgent was the change of the secretary of justice. Rudolf Arnold Nieberding who held that office wished to retire. Bethmann decided quickly on a successor and in October 1909 Hermann Lisco was appointed to secretary of justice.


Although not that pressing at the time another important change was on the horizon, the secretary of foreign affairs. Bethmann had his personal difficulties with the incumbent von Schoen. Schoen was also ailing. And Bethmann was in dire need of a reliable advisor in foreign affairs since his personal experiences with diplomacy was practically nil. Furthermore the growing tensions between Germany and the United Kingdom, lately fuelled through German politics in the Bosnian Crisis in 1909, had to be smoothed. It was Bethmann's declared aim to secure positive relations with the British Empire. After careful consideration Bethmann decided to contact his friend Karl von Eisendecher.

Karl von Eisendecher as naval officer, 1868

Karl von Eisendecher was born in June 23rd 1841 in Oldenburg. Already in his early years Eisendecher joined the Prussian navy. He was attached to an East-Asia-expedition under the command of Friedrich Albrecht zu Eulenburg. This was his first contact with Japan officials. The mission ended rather successfully for Eulenburg with a treaty favouring Prussia. After his return Eisendecher attended the naval school and earned his officer rank. His following career led him first into the admiralty and in 1871 to Washington as part of the German diplomatic mission there. In 1873 Eisendecher was promoted to naval attaché. Only one year later he was ordered to Tokyo as the new consul general, which was the highest ranking German diplomatic position in Japan at this time. In April 1880 Eisendecher received another promotion to minister plenipotentiary when the German residency in Tokyo was awarded the status of a proper legation. Finally he returned to Washington in 1882, this time as minister plenipotentiary, although he stayed only for two years. Back in Germany Eisendecher would gain the influential position of the Prussian ambassador to Baden, one of the southern states of the German Empire which were still seen as a danger to the integrity of the empire.4


As Bethmann knew quiet well Eisendecher had extensive experience in diplomatic affairs. Furthermore he was an expert in naval technology. And last but not least he maintained close ties to the British Empire.5 Still Bethmann was not overly enthusiastic to ask his friend to become the secretary of foreign affairs on his side. Eisendecher had a history of criticising von Bülow, Bethmanns predecessor and superior, as well as the Emperor while simultaneously praising Bismarck. Bethmann had some arguments over these issues with Eisendecher and this had led to serious tensions between the two.


Bethmann's alternative would have been Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, a man who was at the time minister to Romania but had helped the foreign office on some critical issues the latest being the Bosnian Crisis which was mostly solved through his work. The possibility of a personal meeting had already passed since Kiderlen-Wächter was already on his way back to his position in Bucharest. Bethmann knew Kiderlen-Wächter was no expert on the British. His expertise was lying in Balkan politics and Russian expansionism. Finally Kiderlen-Wächter was despised by the emperor so there was no great difference to Eisendecher who was also not liked well by the monarch. Taking the more efficient option, though with some reluctance, Bethmann arranged a meeting with Eisendecher to talk about his problems. They met in Karlsruhe on September 17th 1909 where Eisendecher was eventually left with the task of writing a memorandum on the subject of a possible British-German détente based on a reduction in naval production on the German side and a guarantee of neutrality on the British.6

Karl von Eisendecher in 1909

This was everything else than easy. Eisendecher knew the British too well as to assume that they would come forth with an unambiguous guarantee of neutrality. Such a commitment would not only violate their tentative alliance with France but also their principle of balance of powers. His result were rather disappointing. First of all Eisendecher noted that Germany had no chance to achieve or even maintain a ratio of 3:4 to the British fleet. He concluded the naval armament was unnecessary, since it could not reach its goal. Simultaneously it was damaging the relationship between both states and eating up precious resources which could be used elsewhere. For a man of the navy this was an accurate and astonishingly honest assessment. Therefore Eisendecher suggested giving up the 3:4 standard and agreeing to a more favourable one for the British. The further build up should be slowed down dramatically in accordance with the British pace. Germany on the other hand should not expect an outright commitment. Any yet so weak political concession by the British should be considered satisfactory for now.7 Anything else would just drive the UK even deeper into the arms of France. As Eisendecher put it:


“If Britain commits itself to neutrality it will lose the support of France and Russia. Therefore Britain needs security from us. Britain fears our fleet first and foremost. It is perceived as a threat to their empire which depends on its fleet, and a threat to their island, which can only be attacked by a fleet. Hence we have to remove this threat, even if it is only a perceived one. And this means anything from stopping ship construction to limits on sea lanes for warships to colonial concessions. Only such a convincing move can give Britain the security it needs.”


Eisendecher finished the paper in late October 1909. When von Bethmann read it, he was rather pleased, since it went in the direction he and Metternich8 wanted to go. Both saw a solution to the naval arms race as urgent and the only possible way to come to an agreement with the UK. Eisendecher found additional potential in a joint colonial approach of the two powers. But this should be rather complementary to the negotiations, the primary focus should lie with the naval discussion. When von Bethmann discussed the paper with Schoen, the latter was irritated by the suggestions made by Eisendecher. It was clear that Schoen thought them to be too yielding. Furthermore he feared the inevitable confrontation with Tirpitz over the naval law. Since Schoen wanted to quit for some time preferring the position of an ambassador, Bethmann sought the approval of the emperor for Eisendecher. Although the emperor was not pleased with the memorandum as well as Eisendecher as a person, the necessity of a change got ever more pressing, since Schoen's health was deteriorating further. With negotiations with Britain being on halt due to the upcoming election there,9 Bethmann considered the moment opportune for a change in the position. Finally the emperor gave in to Bethmann's insistence. It would not be the last time.


On January 18th 1909 Eisendecher was appointed secretary of foreign affairs for the German Empire. The era Eisendecher had begun.


______________________________________________
1Pun intended.

2I decided to leave the German „von“ out of the name. I will have to change this in the first installment, too.

3As in OTL, see Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler 1909 - 1914, pp. 9.

4Everything as in OTL, see Pantzer/Saaler, Japanische Impressionen eines kaiserlichen Gesandten. Karl von Eisendecher im Japan der Meiji-Zeit, pp. 19 ff.

5As in OTL, see Pantzer/Saaler, Japanische Impressionen eines kaiserlichen Gesandten. Karl von Eisendecher im Japan der Meiji-Zeit, p. 22.

6In OTL Bethmann deemed Eisendecher not suitable to develop a concept for a policy towards Britain, primarily because he did not like Eisendecher's criticism of Bülow, although he conversed with Eisendecher on this topic, he knew of Eisendecher's knowledge on the subject and Eisendecher was his friend. See Forsbach, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, Vol. 1, p. 322. In this TL Bethmann can cope with the criticism due to his stronger self-confidence.

7This was consensus between Bethmann, Metternich and Kiderlen-Wächter in OTL, see Forsbach, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, Vol. 1., pp. 325, 329, 332, 339, 341.

8As in OTL, the German ambassador to Britain was Paul Graf Wolff Metternich zur Gracht, a strong opponent of the naval building programs in Germany.

9As in OTL, see Forsbach, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, Vol. 1., p. 346.




OTL cited sources:
Forsbach, Ralf, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter (1852 – 1912) – Ein Diplomatenleben im Kaiserreich, Vol. 1., Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1997.
Pantzer, Peter, Saaler, Sven, Japanische Impressionen eines kaiserlichen Gesandten. Karl von Eisendecher im Japan der Meiji-Zeit, IUDICIUM-Verlag, München and Tokyo, 2007.
Zmarzlik, Hans-Günter, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler 1909 – 1914, Studien zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen seiner innerpolitischen Machtstellung, Droste-Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1957.


Further sources:
Jarausch, Konrad, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the hubris of imperial Germany, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. 1973.
von Vietsch, Eberhard, Bethmann Hollweg. Staatsmann zwischen Macht und Ethos, Boldt-Verlag, Boppard 1969

[DerGreif]

Originally Posted by TheLordProtector

This seems quite interesting, but should't it be in pre-1900?

Technically you are right since the PoD is way before 1900. But the first real consequences are felt mainly in 1909 and afterwards. Any differencies before are rather minor and mostly not noticeable in a historical context. But with the appointment of Eosendecher instead of kiderlen-Wächter as secretary of foreign affairs things will really change. Therefore I thought "after 1990" would be more appropriate.

Thanks again for your interest, I really appreciate it.

Kind regards,
G.

[Josephus]

BUMP!

subscribed... zis is very interesting

[DerGreif]

I have to apologise for a long hiatus. Here is finally another update. But personal problems, a new job, my marriage and the fight with the German aliens department so that my wife can stay with me, took much of my spare time.

Nonetheless, I will not abandon this timeline although installments may come rather sporadic than regularly until these problems are fully solved. But now - without further ado - I present Chapter 2:

Chapter 2: First round

Excerpt from Thomas Fitzgerald, “Era Eisendecher - German Diplomacy 1910 - 1918”, 1994


[…] After Eisendecher was appointed to secretary of foreign affairs negotiations with the British on naval armament were still on a hiatus due to elections held in the UK and the change in the ministry. That gave Eisendecher some time to read up on the notes taken by Bethmann and Schoen in the previous talks based on his own memorandum. The reactions of the British foreign ministry were cautious at best but as Eisendecher had foreseen a commitment by the UK has not been on the table yet. Furthermore there were still lingering problems caused by the Moroccan crisis and the Baghdad railway, the latter been seen as a threat to the British position on the Persian Gulf.1


Eisendecher started another of three extensive rounds of talks in March 1910 focussing on British conditions for a naval agreement and colonial spheres.2 As expected discussions moved slowly. It seemed impossible to get the British side to agree to a neutrality clause whereas Eisendecher had to face Tirpitz and Bethmann on his own side. Tirpitz opposed any notion of a slow down in naval armament vehemently. It was clear from the beginning that Tirpitz would be the main obstacle to overcome. Bethmann supported the basic ideas of Eisendecher, but was a strong adherent to the written law which would have to be ignored or amended to make changes in the naval building policies.


For the British side it was rather difficult to concede a political commitment as Eisendecher and Bethmann had envisioned. Grey feared that France and Russia, the British allies, would interpret this as a loosening of their relations. This was something the British Empire could not allow, since Germany might try to exploit this fact and try to dissolve the entente.3 This constant fear of Germany endangering the British alliances on the one hand and German fear of being surrounded by enemies in case of a war brought the negotiations to regular halts.


Therefore Eisendecher concentrated on not so controversial topics where an agreement seemed to be achieved more easily. Especially the Baghdad Railway was an upcoming topic in these negotiations. Whereas the Germans wanted to expand the line near the Persian Gulf the British wanted the end terminals of the German controlled railway as far away from their sphere of influence as possible. As the Turkish government tried to raise custom tariffs to gain more revenue for the railway Britain and France objected. Although minor advances were made there was no real progress seen during theses negotiations.4 So Eisendecher turned back to the naval question.


In June 1910 Eisendecher achieved a first success. The British accepted a proposal for an information exchange regarding their respective naval armaments as a preliminary agreement.5 Although Bethmann was not enthusiastic about moving first, Eisendecher made it clear, that Germany had to give something to earn the trust necessary for further negotiations. The Kaiser was even less enthusiastic than Bethmann but after some discussions with his chancellor was willing to give it a try, if a serious political agreement could be expected within the next year. With the naval information exchange agreement signed Grey was ready to consider a slowing down of the fleet building program as opposed to a straight stop. Eisendecher was eager to assure that this was a “great offer” because it would leave enough leeway to outmanoeuvre the German Naval Laws – something that was essential for Bethmann who saw no chance to get these laws amended.


But the following negotiations reverted to a near halt since the implementation of the information exchange was riddled with difficulties on both sides. Especially the German naval attaché Wilhelm Widenmann who tried to torpedo any rapprochement,6 was responsible for most of the diplomatic discord concerning this agreement. His exaggerating demands for insight into the British naval armament plans7 and his slander of the German ambassador Wolff-Metternich before the emperor and lies about the real situation in the UK8 put a constant strain on the British-German relations. Furthermore the German admiralty showed its disdain for the agreement on every opportunity and remained uncooperative towards the British emissaries. With another British election in January 1911 the negotiations were slowed down even further although German industrialist and shipowner Albert Ballin together with Sir Ernest Cassel9 and (to a much lesser extent) Haldane10 on the British side gave their best to get the talks going again.

Naval attaché Werner von Rheinbaben 1911 – 1914

But at least this break gave Eisendecher, Bethmann and Wolff-Metternich the opportunity to get rid of one of the obstacles to a British-German détente: the ever disturbing Widenmann. First Wolff-Metternich received serious reports of diplomatic misbehaviour by his naval attaché and sent them back to the Emperor as a file collected over several months. This gave an impressive record of misconduct Wolff-Metternich could only describe as “wilfully ignorant of current politics, dishonourable and unworthy of a naval officer”. Immediately afterwards Eisendecher and Bethmann both talked to the Kaiser about an ersatz for Widenmann. Both made clear that Widenmann would be unacceptable for the foreign office to work with any longer. They suggested the former adjutant to Tirpitz and designated successor to Widenmann, Werner von Rheinbaben, who was a moderate naval officer as replacement.11 The serious infringements of Widenmann's behaviour could no longer be ignored by the emperor and with both the secretary of foreign affairs and the chancellor backing the ambassador the emperor caved in. Although Widenmann tried to put Erich von Müller in his position as his successor12 the combined resistance of the troika stopped the radical from taking the position instead of Rheinbaben. With Rheinbaben as naval attaché the emperor would receive more accurate though less pleasant reports from the UK in the following years. But this was one important step towards the emperor's acceptance of the naval agreement in 1911. [...]

_________________________________________________
1As in OTL – Sweet, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 216 ff.

2As in OTL – Sweet, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, p. 233.

3As in OTL – Sweet, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 229 ff. Massie, Die Schalen des Zorns, pp. 584 f.

4Mostly as in OTL.

5In OTL this was offered by the British in August 1910 – Massie, Die Schalen des Zorns, p. 586. In this TL Bethmann Hollweg can be convinced by Eisendecher that Germany has to move first.

6As in OTL – Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, pp. 213, 216 f., 223, 232 ff. 236, 238; Cecil, Wilhelm II, Vol. 2, p. 124.

7Something he most certainly would have done in OTL if there had been an agreement like that in effect.

8As in OTL – Holborn, Deutsche Geschichte in der Neuzeit, Vol. 3, p. 112.

9Both tried to get negotiations going in OTL – Sweet, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, p. 229.

10He was described as a Germanophil in OTL – ie Sweet, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, p. 221.

11As in OTL Rheinbaben was adjutant to Tirpitz and designated successor of Widenmann.

12In OTL Widenmann succeeded with this scheme when he left the office in 1912.



OTL cited sources:
Cecil, Lamar, Wilhelm II. – Vol. 2 – Emperor and exile, 1900 – 1941, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 1996.
Sweet, D. W., Great Britain and Germany 1905 – 1911, in: Hinsley, F. H. (Editor), British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press 1977, pp. 216 ff.
Holborn, Hajo, Deutsche Geschichte in der Neuzeit, Vol. 3 – Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1871 bis 1945), R. Oldenbourg München und Wien 1971.
Massie, Robert K., Die Schalen des Zorns – Großbritannien, Deutschland und das Heraufziehen des Ersten Weltkrieges, S. Fischer Verlag GmbH Frankfurt am Main 1993; translated by Walter Brumm from the original Dreadnought. Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War, Random House New York 1991.
Ritter, Gerhard, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk – Die Hauptmächte Europas und das wilhelminische Reich (1890 – 1914), R. Oldenbourg Verlag München 1973.


Further sources:
Forsbach, Ralf, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter (1852 – 1912) – Ein Diplomatenleben im Kaiserreich, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1997.
Jarausch, Konrad, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the hubris of imperial Germany, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. 1973.
von Vietsch, Eberhard, Bethmann Hollweg. Staatsmann zwischen Macht und Ethos, Boldt-Verlag, Boppard 1969.
Zmarzlik, Hans-Günter, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler 1909 – 1914, Studien zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen seiner innerpolitischen Machtstellung, Droste-Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1957.

[DerGreif]

No pictures in this. I would have liked to add a caricature or some other symbolic picture to represent the honourable merchant, but I found non - although I have that feeling I saw a picture just like that somewhere some time ago. Meh. I would also like to add a nice map 1910 style to this but I am an incredible bad map maker. I will post a request to the map thread, maybe I get some help. and now the next installment:

Chapter 3: The honourable merchant

Excerpt from Robert K. Cassel, “The honourable merchant - German foreign policy under Bethman Hollweg”, 1997


[…] Whereas other authors already claimed that with the appointment of Eisendecher to the foreign office German policy especially towards Great Britain changed considerably the real turning point came with the Fez Crisis in 1911. As outlined earlier Morocco was a hot bed for frictions between Germany and France. The uneasy truce reached with the Act of Algeciras in 1905 was nothing more than a small band aid on a soaring wound. Although the settlement satisfied both sides for the moment it was only a matter of time before those issues would flare up again. This was the case when German consular officials helped Germans to desert from the French Foreign Legion in 1908.1 The following bilateral agreement signed in February 1909 stopped the tensions of growing into outright war. But it was no final settlement of these issues either. Two years later things went sour again. When in April 1911 Sultan Mulai Hafid – an usurper himself – faced a series of revolts he could no longer control, he allegedly asked the French for help. While the French considered it their right to send troops to Fez according to a clause in the settlement of 1909, the Germans saw these issues rather different.


On April 4th Jules Cambon, French ambassador to Berlin, informed Eisendecher, that Europeans in Fez were no longer safe.2 Eisendecher countered that reports from German officials in the city indicated no danger at all. Therefore French military action would be a violation of the Act of Algeciras as well as of the settlement of 1909. On April 28th Cambon declared finally, that the Sultan had asked for French help to protect the citizens of Fez and that French soldiers were to be dispatched to the capital of Morocco, who should remain there until order was established again.3 Eisendecher was quiet taken aback by this rather cold and scrupulous move by the French government. The question was how to respond to such an affront. In a first meeting of German foreign office officials Baron Langwerth von Simmern was tasked with a memorandum on the situation of Morocco. But an immediate response seemed to be necessary. There were two decisions made. First Eisendecher should contact the Spanish ambassador for Spain had its own stakes in Morocco. Second Eisendecher had to deliver a formal protest note to Paris. So Eisendecher invited Luis Polo de Bernabé Pilón into the Wilhelmstraße for talks on the disturbing developments in Fez. Eisendecher made it clear that he did not believe that the French troops were to leave Fez when order was restored again. It was his firm opinion that those troops were only there to establish a French Morocco in a fait accompli. Bernabé Pilòn acknowledged Eisendecher's assessment as rational and sensible. Finally Eisendecher concluded that if Spain was to protect its own interests in the north it would have to act 'accordingly' hinting at tentative German support if Spain was to take military action. Later that day all great nations received a sharp protest note via the German embassies in which Eisendecher declared the actions of France a breach of the Act of Algeciras seriously injuring German commercial interests which were guaranteed by said treaty.


The following weeks showed a growing uneasiness in European politics. Everybody was quiet aware that another crisis had hit Europe and that again war might be a possible outcome. Especially Britain was not pleased with the actions of its partner in the Entente.4 But Grey saw no possibility to stop them as long as the Entente should be maintained. What Britain feared most was a tripartite division of Morocco without Britain and its vital interests in the region being considered.5 Eisendecher knew that and his knowledge of British attitudes was key to the successful negotiations that followed. When Simmern delivered his memorandum in the end of May he suggested to send a gunboat to Agadir, a port in the south, “to protect the German citizens” endangered by the recent unrest. Eisendecher immediately refuted this course of action as it was seriously flawed. First of all it would give Britain another grievance since any military action by the German fleet would underline the danger the German fleet could become to British interests – in this case the sea-lanes to and around the Cape. Furthermore such an action might give the impression that Germany had interests in southern Morocco which would go beyond commerce and trade. And finally although the French operated on the same pretence there were no Germans who had to be protected in the south. Eisendecher was not willing to lose Germany's strong position to a lie. As Bethmann received both the memorandum and Eisendecher's harsh critic of the same it was clear that any military manoeuvre especially if conducted by a ship would be detrimental to German interests in that matter.6 One day later, on June 1st 1911 Spanish troops occupied important ports in the northern half of Morocco.7


With another military action in this crisis tensions grew hotter. And therefore Bethmann at least wanted to consider all possible options. Inaction was as inadequate in the current situation as military sabre rattling so Bethmann invited leading figures of the military and the foreign office to his home in Berlin. The secret talks of the war council should evaluate the German situation in case the Fez Crisis would escalate. It became imminently clear that as long as Britain and Russia would side with France Germany would be in a dire situation. The ineffectiveness of the German fleet against a British blockade besides other issues made it abundantly clear that German war plans were devised badly and had to be redrawn. One of the most important results of these talks was the insight that Germany could only gain compensation from France via diplomatic means.8


Following these conclusions Eisendecher and Bethmann agreed that Britain should be at least informed of the German intentions in these negotiations. Furthermore Britain could be addressed as arbiter if negotiations were to be stuck. In his famous speech before the Reichstag Bethmann reiterated his earlier statement that German foreign policy would be guided by the principles of an honourable merchant:


“Deutschland hat sich dem Frieden und dem Wohlstand aller europäischer Nationen verpflichtet. Dazu gehören auch die Interessen Deutschlands selbst. Wenn diese – wie unlängst geschehen – von anderen mit Füßen getreten werden, wird Deutschland aber nicht zu Lüge oder Gewalt greifen. Wir haben uns jenen Grundsätzen eines ehrbaren Kaufmanns verpflichtet, denn nur diese werden uns den Frieden erhalten, der für den Wohlstand aller unser Nationen maßgeblich ist. Und in Gedenken dieser Prinzipien werden wir am Verhandlungstisch vor jene treten, die sich an diesen Prinzipien vergangen haben, und sie an ihre Verantwortung für ihre Nation und Europa erinnern.”


Germany has bound itself to peace and prosperity for all European nations. This includes Germany's interests, too. When these interests are stomped on by others – as happened recently, Germany will not descend to lies or force. We have pledged ourselves to the principles of an honourable merchant, because only these principles will give us the peace which is necessary for the prosperity of all of our nations. And in accordance to these principles we will walk to negotiations with those who have violated said principles and will remind them of their responsibility for their nation and Europe.9


In the following sections Bethmann outlined three of the most important principles in this regard:


(1) honesty about the intentions of diplomatic action,
(2) reasonable claims and reasonable prices,
(3) and treaties have to be honoured. In case of a breach an arbiter or judge has to be called upon.


The speech was well received by other nations although the veiled accusations against France – especially since the Sultan later stated that he never asked for French help in the first place10 – registered within diplomatic circles and the press. Only German nationalists were rather snubbed by these proclamations. Britain felt itself more and more in an awkward position. If it was to support France unconditionally there would be strong resentments to be expected from the British public. Pro-German ministers in the cabinet as Lloyd George and Haldane were sincerely concerned with the French conduct in this affair. In a cabinet meeting the ministers agreed on an outline of action in this crisis which was quiet favourable to Germany: As long as British interests were not injured and Germany would refrain from possessions in Morocco the British would not interfere in the negotiations between France and Germany. Even Grey seemed content with German expansion in central Africa.11 In a meeting between Metternich and Grey the German ambassador assured that Germany was not interested in more rights in Morocco than she already possessed. There was no inclination of the German foreign office to occupy a port on the Atlantic he added, as Grey seemed not to be satisfied at first. Grey explained his relief and hinted at the possibility of German compensation elsewhere, for example in French-Congo.


After the Spanish occupation and Bethmanns speech before the Reichstag France began to feel the growing pressure. It was clear that even its partner in the Entente was uneasy with the current situation and would like to see a quick and peaceful resolution. So Cambon started a new round of negotiations with Eisendecher. Eisendecher made it rather clear that Germany expected “serious compensations for a serious breach of contract”, although they would not have to be in Morocco. Cambon was somehow relieved but the situation of the French government was not pretty. It lost its three most important ministers to an accident during a flight show and the new figures in the cabinet were inexperienced and rather pro-German in their political stance like the new prime minister Caillaux.12 Since both sides wanted a quick resolution to the conflict, negotiations went smooth. With Eisendecher following the outlines of Bethmanns principles the negotiations ended with a quick settlement in late August 1911. France would guarantee the existing rights of and protection for German businesses in Morocco. Furthermore it would cede parts of French-Congo and French-Equatorial Africa to Germany.13 In exchange Germany would cede some parts of German Cameroon to France. In addition Germany would recognize French protection of Morocco while the Act of Algeciras would be formally replaced by the Berlin agreement, titled the final settlement on Morroco. It was considered an impressive diplomatic victory on the German side, although the nationalists were not pleased with what they considered a fever infested swamp land in exchange for the presumed ore rich areas in southern Morocco.


But both sides – critics and those in favour of the agreement alike – missed the important point: the far reaching influence this affair had on British-German relations. It paved the way for the Naval Agreement in the same year and for the British-German understanding in 1912. [...]

Cameroon after the Berlin agreement in 1911 [map made by Blomma]

____________________________________________

1As in OTL – Massie, Dreadnought, p. 709.

2As in OTL – Massie, Dreadnought, p. 722.

3Almost as in OTL – Massie, Dreadnought, p. 722.

4As in OTL – Dockrill, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 271 f.

5As in OTL – Dockrill, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, p. 272.

6In OTL Kiderlen-Wächter decided to send the gunboat Panther to Agadir, although Bethmann was somehow uneasy with this decision. Interestingly enough the Kaiser objected vehemently to the plan and had to be convinced by Kiderlen and Bethmann before he grudgingly agreed to give the orders, see Massie, Dreadnought, pp. 724 ff. In this TL Bethmann trusts his own feelings much more and will not hesitate to follow Eisendecher's advice. Eisendecher on the other hand had a much better understanding of British attitudes and will see all the problems which Kiderlen simply ignored in OTL. (According to Forsbach, even Kiderlen foresaw problems with the British but just thought that their reactions would not be that hard. Anyway such a failure in judging the British is not likely to occur to Eisendecher who was an expert on British policies.)

7As mostly in OTL – Dockrill, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, p. 272. I changed the date to accelerate this decision a little bit. The original occupation started on June 5th.

8In OTL there was a war council in 1912 which – if considered rationally – came in general terms to the same conclusions. In this TL the war council is initiated by a stronger and more confident Bethmann who wants to get informed of the military plans. In OTL Bethmann expressed a similar assessment after the crisis was over, see Massie, Dreadnought, pp. 742 f. But such a crisis is the perfect situation to ask for information on the defence planning and therefore a war council makes perfect sense. More information on this ATL war council will be given in chapter 4.

9This ATL speech includes veiled accusations against France while at the same time makes clear that Germany will refrain from any military action. It is conceived in the spirit of OTL speech from March 5th 1910, kind of a sequel where Bethmann outlines and enforces his vision of foreign policy conduct.

10As in OTL.

11As in OTL – Dockrill, in: British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, pp. 273, 275.

12As in OTL – Massie, Dreadnought, pp. 723 f.

13In OTL France resented the excessive German claims and their military threat via the gunboat Panther, although they had acknowledged the need for compensation in the first place and were quiet favourable to a French-German rapprochement. (In OTL Caillaux offered essential parts of French-Congo in exchange for small parts of German Cameroon and Togo, even including parts of the coast south of Spanish Guinea including the port Mini up to north of Libreville. He was even willing to make further concessions, like giving up Togo completely. And that was all even after the Panther had arrived before Agadir, see Forsbach, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, Vol. 2, pp. 489 ff.) Furthermore they were bolstered by the British interference – all three things will not happen this TL and therefore the negotiations will end with a more favourable outcome for Germany.









OTL cited sources:
Dockrill, M. L., British policy during the Agadir Crisis of 1911, in: Hinsley, F. H. (Editor), British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press 1977, pp. 271 ff.
Forsbach, Ralf, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter (1852 – 1912) – Ein Diplomatenleben im Kaiserreich, Vol. 2, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1997.
Massie, Robert K., Dreadnought. Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War, Random House New York 1991.


Further sources:
Jarausch, Konrad, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the hubris of imperial Germany, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. 1973.
von Vietsch, Eberhard, Bethmann Hollweg. Staatsmann zwischen Macht und Ethos, Boldt-Verlag, Boppard 1969.
Zmarzlik, Hans-Günter, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler 1909 – 1914, Studien zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen seiner innerpolitischen Machtstellung, Droste-Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1957.

[Uriel]

looks promising

[Josephus]

Great that this is back!

[LordCalner]

Wonderful TL, subscribing....

[Van555]

neat seuff

[DerGreif]

Thank you for your interest and kind words. I am working on Chapter 4 and hope to deliver it tonight using a little break I have in the job right now.

Kind regards,
G.