Italy first strategy
- Thread starter Sapiento
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There's really no reason for an Italy-first strategy. This was the Italian Army that had been routed by natives a few years earlier, more or less the joke of Europe. France and the BEF (and even Russia, at least at first) are orders of magnitude greater threats than Italy.
For argument's sake though, I think an Italy-first strategy would've resulted in a combined German-Austro-Hungarian sweep down through the Alps to Rome or until the Italians threw in the towel. As far as territorial changes, not sure, likely territory to AH and Italian East Africa to Germany.
For argument's sake though, I think an Italy-first strategy would've resulted in a combined German-Austro-Hungarian sweep down through the Alps to Rome or until the Italians threw in the towel. As far as territorial changes, not sure, likely territory to AH and Italian East Africa to Germany.
It was actually the lower quality of the Italian army that had inspired me to this question. Would not the weakest link of the chain break first? Would not this be the reason to go for the Italians first?
I'm no expert in WW1 military history, but with Italy defeated the CP could squeeze out the Italian economy and agriculture and thus improving their own situation. As the Italians had 'betrayed' their allies I cannot see any reason why the Germans and especially AH would treat a defeated Italy gentle.
Of course, if an Italian defeat seems possible the Entente would surely either shift troops to the southern front or start a relief offensive in the west. I don't think a new south-west front would have made the French general staff very happy.
The main problem here IMHO is that an Italy first strategy wouldn't help the Central Powers to achieve their war goals. Even if Italy was defeated and offered an armistice, the western powers would fight on. If France or Britain were defeated and forced to an armistice, however, the war will end.
A good argument. But as I mentioned before I think control over the Italian industry and Italy's agricultural production would improve the economic position of the CP. More equipment for the army, more food, also for the civilian population.
There's also the question what happens to the Regia Marina? It's ships are part of the Otranto Barrage.
I think a defeated Italy opens some interesting possibilities for the CP.
Industry and Agricultural production are a plus, granted. As could be trade through now "neutral" Italy. The western Allies however would likely blockade Italy as a whole to limit the usefulness of the occupied regions and its industries. And considering food I'm not sure how much surplusses Northern Italy had - starving the local population isn't a good idea in an industrial region you want to use.
Considering the ability to blockade I think Britain could still blockade the Adria on it's own - although with a surprise element the Austrians might try for a sea battle. Or the Allies could try to blockade the whole Med at the Suez channel and Gibraltar. With most Mediterranean countries in the Allied camp this would still be quite effective.
Additionally, I doubt that the CP would occupy that much of Italy. A frequent argument for Italy not joining the CP is its exposure to the Royal Navy. The argument applies even more for large parts of Italy occupied by the CP hence I believe only the Po valley would be occupied (providing the majority of the industry), probably including Genua.
An insteresting question is whether a second front in France would come to life. I'd say yes, either on the Italian side of the Alps or in the Alps. That implies exchanging the Italian front with a weak enemy against another Italian front against a strong enemy. It's difficult to say which side would be weakened more from a second western frontline.
Finally, to take up your image: I wouldn't consider Italy the weakest link of the chain but rather a second chain. IOTL, the Russians were defeated by the CP, but this didn't help them much. I think France is the link that holds all pieces together, hence the main effort should be put into France.
Well as the Zulu and the Afghan or the Mahdi can attest, the italians are not the only one who had some debacle with the native population.
But to enter on the specific, Italy entered the war in the middle of the 1915 so A-H was already fully engaged with Russia and Serbia so divert more resource here can hamper his wa effort on the other fronts.
This is not Kaiserreich, the possibility of the A-H to swamp trough the alps and take Rome is almost ASB, you can consider the italian armed forces a joke, but this is WWI and the italian soldier was a respected fighter who was praised for his stubborn capacity of endure almost anything, who was commanded by the evil brother of Neville and even when a Caporetto the A-H put anything to take them out, they faltered yes but in they recovered and create a stable front, with minimal revolt and there were never discussed the possibility to ask an armistice.
Italy performance in WWI was in line with the other power, no more and no less.
lukedalton said:
Indeed, OTL WWII showed that the Apennine Mountains are quite suitable for defense.
And even if that advance would go smoothly the Central Powers would just add an extra front to fight on (exchanging the Isonzo versus one in the french alps and one somewhere down the italian boot)
World War 1 showed almost throughout it's entirety that it often didn't matter where you concentrated your forces or how many lives you were willing to sacrifice - the odds were so heavily stacked in favour of the defender that concentrating on an industrialised nation with a large mountain range lining it's border and another mountain range running down the middle of it - making defence of that country at that time so much easier than attacking it, it would have been madness for the CPs, even if Italy is the 'weak link'.
All that probably would have happened is we'd have another famous WW1 battle to go aloneside the Somme and Verdun.
All that probably would have happened is we'd have another famous WW1 battle to go aloneside the Somme and Verdun.
Whereas you're right that the odds were heavily stacked in favour of the defender, OTL WWI in Italy showed that the CP could have broken through thus possibly ending trench warfare in between the mountain ranges you cite and thus occupying the majority of Italian industrial capacity, which in turn could lead to Italy asking for an armistice.
Overall, hence, I think it would have been possible for the CP to take out Italy if they concentrated their effort there. But I doubt that this would have changed very much.
Surely the best way for the CP would have an occupation of just northern Italy, which is the most valuable part of the country in economical aspects.
I think we can agree that a breakthrough in Italy was possible. Just the consequences are open to debate.
The moral side should not be ignored. To defeat a member of the Entente would boost the CP's moral. This could be used by the politicians there in many ways.
The shifting of most of the AH forces from the southern front would have the most immediate consequences at the eastern front IMO.
I think we can agree that a breakthrough in Italy was possible. Just the consequences are open to debate.
The moral side should not be ignored. To defeat a member of the Entente would boost the CP's moral. This could be used by the politicians there in many ways.
The shifting of most of the AH forces from the southern front would have the most immediate consequences at the eastern front IMO.
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I think there is no option to go after Italy earlier than 1917/18. Beforehands, the much more massive threat of Russia stands in the way of redeploying enough forces to a front which held quite well against Isonzo-Offensive 1,2,3...
Also, I absolutely agree that pushing Italy out of the war is no essential war winner. Only making France asking for an armistice can do that.
Thus, the only plausible path towards such an offensive (not to Rome, which is ASB, probably not even to Milan) is to have a decision to shelve the Great Western Offensives of 1918 in favour of a defensive posture and instead trying to make an impression by pushing a manageable enemy over the brink of defeat.
I.e. we need a CP-strategy which tries to get out of the war by proving it is still going strong instead of trying to win total victory.
At this point of time, having Italy out of the war say in summer of 1918 would only create benefit if it would be a puzzle-peace of a political strategy to find compromise-peaces with the Western Powers.
If Italy is only offered dictated conditions, there is the danger of remaining in the war whatever the cost, until the USA fix the situation for good. Thus, Germany and Austria can only push for very little...acknowledging the 1914-border plus the occupation of Venetia for the rest of the war, giving the Austrians a short and river/lake/mountain-based defensive line.
For the time being, it would mean a lot of relief for the battered Austro-Hungarians. It could allow the monarchy to stay in the war with little more than a token effort for the time being, i.e. occupation duty in Venetia, Serbia and the East, but also still stabilizing the Balkan Front. Austria still had 32 divisions on this front in late 1918, some of these could have been redeployed, some demobilized.
So even if no agreement is reached in 1918, pushing Italy out of the war could carry both Germany as well as Austria-Hungary into 1919.
Also, I absolutely agree that pushing Italy out of the war is no essential war winner. Only making France asking for an armistice can do that.
Thus, the only plausible path towards such an offensive (not to Rome, which is ASB, probably not even to Milan) is to have a decision to shelve the Great Western Offensives of 1918 in favour of a defensive posture and instead trying to make an impression by pushing a manageable enemy over the brink of defeat.
I.e. we need a CP-strategy which tries to get out of the war by proving it is still going strong instead of trying to win total victory.
At this point of time, having Italy out of the war say in summer of 1918 would only create benefit if it would be a puzzle-peace of a political strategy to find compromise-peaces with the Western Powers.
If Italy is only offered dictated conditions, there is the danger of remaining in the war whatever the cost, until the USA fix the situation for good. Thus, Germany and Austria can only push for very little...acknowledging the 1914-border plus the occupation of Venetia for the rest of the war, giving the Austrians a short and river/lake/mountain-based defensive line.
For the time being, it would mean a lot of relief for the battered Austro-Hungarians. It could allow the monarchy to stay in the war with little more than a token effort for the time being, i.e. occupation duty in Venetia, Serbia and the East, but also still stabilizing the Balkan Front. Austria still had 32 divisions on this front in late 1918, some of these could have been redeployed, some demobilized.
So even if no agreement is reached in 1918, pushing Italy out of the war could carry both Germany as well as Austria-Hungary into 1919.
The problem is that by the time of the German spring offensive the Italian army has largely rebuild itself thank to Armando Diaz (basically the italian equivalent of Petain) and in June 1918 A-H tried to capitalize is gain launching an offensive to knock out Italy from the war only to end in a bloody defeat so Italy has been hit hard but there is still will and capacity to fight, expecially if A-h and Germany push for an equivalent of the russian treaty. So the C-P using all their capacity to beat Italy is doable, the problem is the cost alone of this can push them to the bargain table.
But doesn't this require an unusual amount of prescience on the CPs part? They have to figure out that offensive warfare is generally useless--so its OK to stand on the defensive East and West--but that attacking Italy will be an exception.
Grey Wolf
Donor
Precisely when logically the opposite would be most sensible - knock Russia out and relieve the pressure, knock France out and win the war, knock Italy out and ....er knock Italy out
Best Regards
Grey Wolf
There's a big problem with Italy's coal supply. IOTL, this was solved by Britain supplying what was required.
If Italy is overrun in 1916 (let's say Falkenhayn is listening to Wetzell and shifts forces south instead of sending them to die at Verdun), Germany would have to supply the coal - at least the amount required to loot the Italian industry and keep Italian agriculture going.
That could work - if a sufficient number of Italian workers was sent north to reinforce the German working pool.
This would, however, require some thorough strategic understanding in the German leadership, something not really observed in WW1.
If Italy is overrun in 1916 (let's say Falkenhayn is listening to Wetzell and shifts forces south instead of sending them to die at Verdun), Germany would have to supply the coal - at least the amount required to loot the Italian industry and keep Italian agriculture going.
That could work - if a sufficient number of Italian workers was sent north to reinforce the German working pool.
This would, however, require some thorough strategic understanding in the German leadership, something not really observed in WW1.
Leaving aside the fact that the decisive theatre for WWI was always in France, Austria tried in May 1916 to take Italy out of the war (battle of Asiago). It did not result in any major gain, and the offensive was called off when Brusiloff attacked in Galicia at the beginning of June.
The Germans refused to send troops to support this offensive (IIRC Italy and Germany were not in a state of war in 1916), since they (correctly) believed that the breakthrough had to happen in France: in any case there was not a lot of maneuvring space in the Asiago theatre, and even if German troops were transferred there were limits to their number.
Before May 1916, the serbian front was still very active (the serbian collapse came in November 1915), so there was no chance to mount an early offensive.
I also doubt that the Strafexpedition might be decisive in taking Italy out of the war: in late 1917 Caporetto was a success above any expectation for the CPs, but still it was stopped on the Piave river (and even if the Piave line had fallen, new defense were already in place on the Adige). This is WW1, there is no blitzkrieg and defense is much stronger than offense.
Finally Italy was committed to the war, and the commitment did not waver even after Caporetto (when in December 1917 the Germans offered to Italy - through Swiss channels - an armistice based on the status-quo-ante the government refused to give it any consideration).
I would confidently say that the idea of an Austro-German occupation of Northern Italy (much less getting to Rome, as someone has suggested
) is clearly ASBish
The Germans refused to send troops to support this offensive (IIRC Italy and Germany were not in a state of war in 1916), since they (correctly) believed that the breakthrough had to happen in France: in any case there was not a lot of maneuvring space in the Asiago theatre, and even if German troops were transferred there were limits to their number.
Before May 1916, the serbian front was still very active (the serbian collapse came in November 1915), so there was no chance to mount an early offensive.
I also doubt that the Strafexpedition might be decisive in taking Italy out of the war: in late 1917 Caporetto was a success above any expectation for the CPs, but still it was stopped on the Piave river (and even if the Piave line had fallen, new defense were already in place on the Adige). This is WW1, there is no blitzkrieg and defense is much stronger than offense.
Finally Italy was committed to the war, and the commitment did not waver even after Caporetto (when in December 1917 the Germans offered to Italy - through Swiss channels - an armistice based on the status-quo-ante the government refused to give it any consideration).
I would confidently say that the idea of an Austro-German occupation of Northern Italy (much less getting to Rome, as someone has suggested
) is clearly ASBishFinally Italy was committed to the war, and the commitment did not waver even after Caporetto (when in December 1917 the Germans offered to Italy - through Swiss channels - an armistice based on the status-quo-ante the government refused to give it any consideration).
I would confidently say that the idea of an Austro-German occupation of Northern Italy (much less getting to Rome, as someone has suggested
I clearly agree that the most the CP can expect realistically is to get the frontline to the Adige/Lake Garda.
And I am sure that anything worse than a status-quo-ante offer will be refused by Rome unless France falls (which won't happen in this scenario either). If Italy suffers a harsh defeat in 1918 comparable to Caporetto, things might change a bit (unless Germany shows that it is losing the war on the Western Front simultaneously, which is open to debate with a defensive stance there).
If the Austrians are smart, they offer plebiscites on their own conditions.
On Austria-Hungary's 1918 offensives: AFAIK, these were botched by not having a clear strategy as much as by the re-organization of the Italian side. A maximal (measured by the limits of supply via Innsbruck) German presence might change things here a lot. If they shift their focus from the Western Front to Italy and you measure what they achieved vs the French and British and put that on an Italian map, then you have a good chance for Caporetto Part II.
How could Italy be the first priority for the CP when it was nominally an ally of Germany and AH until after the outbreak of WW1 and didn't enter until 1915? CP mobilization plans involved France and Russia. You'd have to create a sufficiently early PoD that Italy was formally an Entente power well before 1914.
Also, wouldn't terrain be a problem? Given Allied experience in the 1940's, a CP offensive down the Italian peninsula might be much slower and take far more men than might be expected based only on the size of the Italian army.
Also, assuming the CP did knock Italy out of the war, so what? The effort to do this would draw reqources away from France and Russia, where the real enemies that mattered were.
Also, wouldn't terrain be a problem? Given Allied experience in the 1940's, a CP offensive down the Italian peninsula might be much slower and take far more men than might be expected based only on the size of the Italian army.
Also, assuming the CP did knock Italy out of the war, so what? The effort to do this would draw reqources away from France and Russia, where the real enemies that mattered were.
A-H our ehm ally probably always had some plan for attack Italy, due to a long period of unpleasentness between the two nation called 'Risorgimento Italiano'. During the terrible Messina Earthquake of 1908 some Austrian generals and politicians suggested an invasion of Italy now that she was occupied with the natural disaster and during the Italian-Turkish war of 1911-12 A-H basically vetoed any Regia Marina operations in the Adriatic Sea, and all this when Italy and A-H were both members of the Central Powers and supposed allies. So when Italy signed with the Entente Vienna simply dust off his plan (not really they probably were fairly updated) and go on.