Hindenburg Line

In my recent readings, I've finally started to peruse my copy of "If Germany Attacks", which ironically is all about the German defensive efforts in WW1. In goes into glorious detail about the evolution of German defensive doctrine during the war, covering several major campaigns, including the Somme, 3rd Ypres, and one of the battles of the Champagne.
http://www.amazon.com/If-Germany-Attacks-Military-Library/dp/0837150299
During the section about the theory behind the Hindenburg line and the internal conflicts over doctrine, the author mentions that the line was never truly assaulted in a way to test whether it was a valid concept. OTL the Hindenburg line was broken after the German army had already been defeated in the field and their reserves used up. As a result the line was never tested as the creators had intended.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindenburg_Line
So I'd like to start a discussion to satisfy a musing of mine:
What if in 1918 the Germans didn't launch their offensives and held behind the Hindenburg line?
The scenario would have to be a bit different than OTL for a number of reasons to make things more 'interesting'. Let's say the US is not involved and cuts loans to the Entente, which would lessen their material advantage over the Germans.
Furthermore lets say the Germans never tried the Hindenburg Program (http://books.google.com/books?id=2Y...EwDTgK#v=onepage&q=hindenburg program&f=false), which means the population, though hungry, isn't starving and coersion of labor doesn't cause large strikes. Therefore Germany has about 10% more material and about 150,000 more men of the 20-40 age group for the army.
How would the battles turn out once the Brits and French tried to have a go at the German positions? Let's say they are about 40% weaker materially to be generous, but have not lost the manpower in the OTL German offensives.

I have my opinions, but I'd like to hear yours first.

Edit:http://www.diggerhistory.info/images/asstd/trenches.jpg

The concept of defense in depth had been seriously put in question in the 1917 Flanders battle, so, the Germans - if they didn't switch to the offensive in 1918 - would have to come up with something new.

At the same time, the Cambrai battle had introduced Allied surprise attacks; another tombstone for the defensive concept.
It is hard to see how the Germans could have remained at the defensive; the defensive battles had cost them as dearly as offensives.

rast said:

At the same time, the Cambrai battle had introduced Allied surprise attacks; another tombstone for the defensive concept.
It is hard to see how the Germans could have remained at the defensive; the defensive battles had cost them as dearly as offensives.

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Only because the Germans launched desperate counterattacks to regain lost (And often useless) ground, which in nearly every case made for the majority of their losses (Save for a few battles, such as at Vimy and parts of Cambrai). It was rare that the Allies would ever reach the main German defensive line, as they would usually be counterattacked well before then.

If the Germans follow the anti-tank lessons learned at Cambrai, and continue to practice multi line defense in depth, than they should inflict heavy losses for little ground, then due to their standard counterattack doctrine (If they keep their reserves close enough to attack quickly, but not so close that they are flattened by the enemy barrage) they'll take equally or slightly less heavy losses attacking an enemy who has had at least a day to dig in along the new frontline and get artillery into position. Then the front stagnates and we're back to square one.

Of course, this ignores the fact that at Cambrai the German counterattack actually overran the British for fewer losses and even gained some ground on them. I could see this working in some cases, provided that the enemy tanks are taken down and that he has already committed his reserves.

rast said:

The concept of defense in depth had been seriously put in question in the 1917 Flanders battle, so, the Germans - if they didn't switch to the offensive in 1918 - would have to come up with something new.

At the same time, the Cambrai battle had introduced Allied surprise attacks; another tombstone for the defensive concept.
It is hard to see how the Germans could have remained at the defensive; the defensive battles had cost them as dearly as offensives.

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Captain Wynne, author of "If Germany Attacks" states at the end of his Passchendaele chapter that the Germans altered doctrine based on their experiences during the battle and went back to the solution that Fritz von Lossberg arrived at during/after the Somme: prepared counterattacks with Eingreif division. Ludendorff was apparently so satisfied by the solution that in November of 1917 he ordered all German forces on the Western Front to adopt this solution. Obviously the solution was modified as 1918 rolled around and new experiences with Allied techniques forced said alterations.

There was no solution: At the beginnig of the British Flanders offensive, defense in depth had worked well.
But after the British artillery (with the active help of their German opponents) had turned the terrain into a quagmire, all those theories broke down.

The British, instead of advancing some four to five kilometres as their generals envisaged, had to be contend with wading through the mire for some two to five hundred metres.
But the Germans, trained to execute swift and decisive counter attacks, also had to wade through the quagmire, shelled by close-by British artillery, which still had connections to the infantry (which hardly hadn't advanced at all - and thus could communicate with the gunners, who were still in their starting positions, and hadn't moved at all.)

The final result was that slow nibbling away of terrain couldn't be stopped by defensive in depth.
In the final account, it was back to who could afford more losses. And here, the Germans knew they were the losers.

Didn't the Canadians brake the Hindenburg Line at Vimy?

wiking said:

to the solution that Fritz von Lossberg arrived at during/after the Somme: prepared counterattacks with Eingreif division.

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There were two elements: Immediate Gegenstoß bei local reserves; and if this didn't work, Gegenangriff by Eingreifdivisionen after preparation.

Beedok said:

Didn't the Canadians brake the Hindenburg Line at Vimy?

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No, Vimy was in 1917. They broke it in October of 1918 at Cambrai. And it got broken in a whole bunch of places right after too. This is about the point where the Germans clued in that, yes, the war really was lost. It is also the point where the Allies realized that, yes, they were going to win the war before Christmas. The Allies had been planning for the war to continue into 1919. Their build up was aimed at a 'war-winning' offensive sometime in the spring of 1919. The German collapse nixed those in favour of an immediate series of offensives that Canadian history students know as the "Hundred Days". (8 August to 11 November 1918. In actuality just 95 days.)