The Rise of Johnston

Techically this is my first proper attempt at a timeline. I apprieciate any feedback.

The following is an alternate version of the Peninsula Campaign and, possibly, the Civil War in which General Joseph E. Johnston is not wounded at Seven Pines and keeps command. The timeline will be told in battles. Politics may be touched on later but I'm not that well versed in Civil War Politics. The timeline with begin at the start of the Peninsula Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign

Battle of Williamsburg

Prelude

In April 1862 General Joseph E. Johnston had received directions from General Robert E. Lee – the Confederate General-in-Chief in all but name – to move the last of his army save Ewell and Jackson’s divisions and Field’s Brigade to Yorktown to reinforce the Yorktown Lines. After leaving instruction to Jackson, Ewell and Field to use their initiative in his absence as he would be too far away to control event in Northern Virginia Johnston sent his forces moving to the Capitol and travelled ahead of it to Richmond himself. There he learnt that neither President Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee or Secretary of War George W. Randolph had visited the front themselves or sent any of their subordinates to view it personally and report back so therefore he made it perfectly clear that he was not prepared to commit to any plans until he had visited the front himself.

Taking W.H.C. Whiting with him Johnston set off to tour the Confederate defences at Yorktown, Williamsburg and Norfolk. Arriving at Yorktown however he found the defences half finished and haphazardly placed, lacking usable artillery, easily outflanked by naval vessels and overlooked by several positions to the east from which fire could be poured into the lines with ease. This combined with the testimony of Generals D.H. Hill and John B. Magruder as to the weakness of the position and the increase of illness amongst the troops left Johnston in no doubt that the position would be easily overwhelmed.

With this in mind he cut his tour short and headed straight to the capitol without delay. There he conferred with Davis, Lee, Randolph and Generals James Longstreet and Gustavus W. Smith on the plans for the campaign. Longstreet and Smith were present because Johnston had asked for them to be but both proved to be unhelpful to his cause.

Smith’s unhelpfulness was a particular blow to Johnston as Smith was one of his closest confidents, had been promoted on his recommendations and he had had to beg for Smith to be present in the first place. Only a short while into the conference Smith pleaded illness and asked to be excused, with the permission given Smith retired to the next room and fell asleep on a sofa. Johnston complained bitterly to Whiting afterwards that Smith had left him isolated and outnumbered.

With Longstreet Johnston was more forgiving as he had never held him in close confidence before and the South Carolinian had recently lost three children to scarlet fever in a week and almost lost another to the same illness shortly thereafter. Following his personal tragedies Longstreet had become withdrawn and taciturn and Johnston had not expected a great input from him but had brought him in the hope of presenting a stronger front for his cause.

Johnston would have preferred to have brought Whiting but Whiting had angered Davis over the winter months and was not welcome in the same city as the President so there was no way he could have been brought to the meeting.

Johnston argued for a withdrawal to Richmond itself. He argued that the Carolina’s and Georgia should be weakened to support his army and that the Peninsula was untenable due to the Federal Naval dominance and the haphazard, partly finished defences of Yorktown. He wanted to combine forces into a major army around Richmond so he could face McClellan on near parity, neutralize him then turn to clear Northern Virginia.

Lee argued that weakening the Carolina’s and Georgia at that time would be hazardous as there were powerful Federal forces deployed in those states threatening them and the poor state of Southern Railroad, combined with their unreliability in the hands of civilians, meant that if they were moved then they would be in transit as battles in each of those states began and be of no use. He called for a stage by stage defence of the Peninsula itself to buy time for more troops to be trained so they could replace the more experienced troops in the Carolina’s and Georgia, the experienced troops from those state massed around Richmond and more war material could be bought or manufactured and distributed.

Davis was swayed by Lee’s arguments and ordered Johnston to head to Yorktown and fight a stage by stage withdrawal.

Johnston reorganized his forces at Yorktown by moving Magruder to command the right flank, keeping D.H. Hill in command of the left flank, putting G.W. Smith in the centre and putting Longstreet at the rear. Had Johnston not been so annoyed and discontent with Smith he would have place him to the rear to command what Johnston believed would be the most important section of his lines - the one designed to move quickly to the rear to protect his line of retreat should the Federals move via the rivers.

When McClellan began to bombard the position in early May, Johnston began his withdrawal. Longstreet hastened to Barhamsville to oppose any attempt to land a Federal force to the rear; with him he took Magruder’s division, the first Virginia Cavalry and some of the reserve artillery. Smith withdrew in front of Hill and took up position at Williamsburg; Hill withdrew a day before the federals overran the position at Yorktown.

The Federals pursued and to oppose this Johnston ordered a rear guard action to be fought.

Battle

May 5

G.W. Smith had placed all his forces in Fort Magruder bar one brigade – A.P. Hill’s – which he kept to the rear. His only task was to delay the Federal advance long enough for D.H. Hill to pull his own forces further towards Richmond at which time he was to extricate himself.

Smith was convinced any attack was to come from the north. He believed this because he thought J.E.B. Stuart was guarding his southern flank. In truth Stuart had been almost cut off from the rest of the army by the rapid advance of General Hooker’s division and was forced to ride far around his flank to rejoin the Confederate army. As a result Smith spent the morning and the early afternoon waiting for an attack from the north.

Smith was caught totally by surprise therefore to find Joseph Hooker’s division emerging to his rear where his flank was almost completely overrun before A.P. Hill, acting on his own initiative, moved his brigade forward and blunted the federal attack. Smith panicked at having his expectations proven completely wrong and failed to issue any further clear orders during the day, leaving his brigade commanders to command themselves.

Smith’s brigades began to deploy against Hooker and at first Hooker held but John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade struck his flank hard and he was driven back and almost overwhelmed but he managed to withdraw and strengthen his line. At this point a federal victory could have been achieved if an attack had come from the north but Winfield Scott Hancock had eventually been forced to halt by Edwin Vose Sumner after Sumner – in defacto command of the battle – became overly worried about Hooker and sent all forces he could to reinforce his southern flank in a static defensive position.

J.E.B Stuart stumbled across D.H. Hill’s division on the march and warned them that the Federals were nearby, shortly after Fitzhugh Lee arrived at Hill’s HQ with news that Smith was hard pressed and an attack from the north could destroy Smith’s entire division.

D.H. Hill wasted no time in turning his division around and marching to the battle. His brigades immediately took up position to defend the northern flank of Smith’s line but Hill was annoyed to find Smith in a panic in his HQ with no idea of what was happening and worrying that he was about to be overrun.

Hill became the defacto commander of the Confederate forces and sent Johnston a dispatch - informing him of the immediate situation, his plans and Smith’s breakdown – while settling in to defend the position until sunset at which time he would extricate the two division and march as quickly as possible to link up with the rest of the Army further west.

Jubal Early was convinced that the federals in front of him were weak and exposed and convinced Hill that a chance existed for him to attack and capture several artillery pieces with little trouble. Johnston, who had spurred his horse to the battle as soon as he found Hill had become engaged, arrived in time to hear this proposal and deferred to Hill and Smith. Smith and Hill both agreed to the attack. Early's judgement was wrong however as his brigade ran into W.S. Hancock’s division with artillery and was badly mauled before pulling back to his own line. It was his own fault for not doing any reconaissence.

Nothing more of note happened before night fall and Hill managed to extricate the forces without hassle. Sumner had convinced himself that the whole Confederate Army opposed him and that he would soon be overrun himself so did nothing but dig in, allowing Hill to escape.

Aftermath

Hill and Smith’s divisions linked up with the rest of the Confederate army three days later at Baltimore Crossroads. There Smith submitted a heavily edited version of what happened at Williamsburg that painted himself in a better light while D.H. Hill found himself so busy with his duties that he wouldn’t be able to submit his version until a year later.

In his edited version Smith claimed that he had ordered A. P. Hill to counter-attack, that he had put all his force in the South and reinforced A.P. Hill’s success, that he had sent Fitzhugh Lee specifically to find D.H. Hill and get him back to the battle and that he had made all the command decisions once D.H. Hill arrived. This version was opposed by all involved but many of their versions would not appear until much later.

Johnston had received several dispatches from his subordinates which painted Smith in a poor light and lessened his worth in Johnston’s eyes even further yet Johnston was not prepared to condemn him outright. Smith could have been having an off day and Johnston, having been the man to get Smith promoted to high office in the first place, felt that he had to show some loyalty.

As a result Smith retained command of the division but his worth had greatly decreased in the eyes of the army and of Johnston who had not been happy with him since the conference in April.

McClellan believed Sumner had made a complete mess of the battle and cost him the chance of a great victory. He criticised Sumner in private for over-caution and for mishandling the battle but in public felt he could not say or do anything as Sumner had been appointed by Lincoln.
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Very nice. I look forward to more.

You may be interested in the current threads at http://cwbn.blogspot.com/

67th Tigers said:

Very nice. I look forward to more.

You may be interested in the current threads at http://cwbn.blogspot.com/

Click to expand...

Was interesting to read about what G.W. Smith's illness might have been. I got the impression from Steven Newton's Book that Smith lacked stamina and was easilly exhausted and from the articles I read on the link you provided it appears that he suffered from bouts of paralysis that made him incapable of moving and thus completely unsuited to any field command.

Nytram01 said:

Was interesting to read about what G.W. Smith's illness might have been. I got the impression from Steven Newton's Book that Smith lacked stamina and was easilly exhausted and from the articles I read on the link you provided it appears that he suffered from bouts of paralysis that made him incapable of moving and thus completely unsuited to any field command.

Click to expand...

Aye. I was also always under the impression that when Lee assumed command on the ANV that was it. It now seems that Lee on assuming formal command did not assume operational command until after Seven Pines when Smith was paralysed the day after the battle ended. Fascinating stuff as usual from Rotov.

Battle of Barhamsville

Prelude

The Commander of the Federal Army of the Potomac, General George B. McClellan, was greatly disappointed with the battle of Williamsburg. He had believed that there had existed a chance for a crushing Union victory to be achieved but that this chance had been squandered by Sumner’s poor handling of the battle and over-caution. His discontent with Sumner increased his reluctance to name a second in command as Sumner was the only real option available.

However McClellan had recognized the other opportunity he had. With Yorktown in Federal hands the York River was open to the Federal Naval Squadrons and, if the move could be made quickly enough, he could place a powerful force behind Johnston via a landing at Eltham’s Landing or West Point, capture the key intersection of Barhamsville and trap a large portion of the Confederate Army on the Peninsula itself.

To do this he wanted to send four divisions – those of William B. Franklin, Fitz John Porter, John Sedgwick and Isreal B. Richardson – via the river at once to occupy the afore mentioned position but when it came to conducting this move he discovered that the naval transports were simply not available to him to do so. Instead McClellan had to make do with sending his divisions brigade by brigade up the York River, he was forced to chose which division to send first and chose Franklin’s division.

It took two days to load Franklin’s division onto the federal ships and transport it to its destination and so the division was of no help whatsoever for the Battle of Williamsburg but should the plan work then their absence from that battle would not be for naught.

General McClellan thus had high hopes for his turning movement.

However unbeknownst to the Federal commander General Johnston had anticipated such a move and sent Longstreet’s division ahead of the rest of the army to protect the line of retreat and hold the enemy at which ever position they attempted to land.

As such Longstreet had stationed most his division at Barhamsville and in the day and a half he had before the Federals arrived he had attempted to fortify the position as best he could. This attempt had included hastily digging a series of trenches facing the direction of the York River but only held by three of his brigades - those of Cadmus M. Wilcox, George Pickett and Roger A. Pryor - while stationing another Brigade under Richard Henry Anderson further north and somewhat isolated so as to react quickly to any attempted landing at West Point and keeping Raleigh Colston’s brigade in reserve.

So when Franklin landed at Eltham’s Landing he found no immediate opposition but as a naturally cautious man he was not prepared to move forward until he knew what the strength of his enemy was and where it was deployed. He was preparing to dig in a wait for reinforcement when news reached him from one of the Federal ships that the Confederates were in force at West Point. Encouraged at what he believed to be faulty deployment but the Confederates he decided to attack Barhamsville as soon as possible to take advantage of the opportunity.

So Franklin left the protection Eltham’s Landing in the hands of the Federal Navy and marched forward.

He never suspected for one moment that the information had been wrong and that what the federal navy had spotted was not Longstreet’s division but only Anderson’s Brigade.

Battle

May 7

Franklin’s division approached Barhamsville and were surprised to find entrenched forces at their front. Reports soon arrived at Franklin’s HQ that the Confederates were in strength at their front and entrenched. Franklin however had been convinced by reports that the main body of his enemy was further west and north at West Point and refused to believe that he had been wrong. He sent orders stating that the main body of the enemy was not present and an attack had to be launched.

Henry W. Slocum’s Brigade was the first to attack, striking to the right of Longstreet’s line, and achieved early success in driving Pryor’s Brigade from its entrenchments. It seemed as if the line would be rolled up before Colston’s Brigade came up in support and drove Slocum back to secure the position.

At the same time Philip Kearny’s brigade attempted to attack the centre of the line where Pickett’s Brigade was positioned but its attempted attacks were driven back four times without success. However the danger his attacks represented forced Longstreet to switch some of Cadmus Wilcox’s Brigade to support Pickett and this weakened his left flank.

This weakening of the Confederate left almost proved fatal as John Newton’s brigade began to attack in support of Kearny. Wilcox was overwhelmed and forced to pull back, losing almost a quarter of his brigade – half of what had not been transferred to support Pickett - in a rout and left the situation on that flank precarious.

Longstreet quickly rerouted two regiments from Colston to Wilcox but while they strengthened Wilcox they did not relieve the pressure on the left and the rest of Longstreet’s forces were too badly pressed to bring in support.

But suddenly Anderson’s Brigade appeared on Newton’s flank and struck, driving it back and away. Anderson had acted on his own initiative when he heard the sound of the fighting and marched south as quickly as he could and had arrived at the crucial moment.

As the fighting drew to a close the lines were static. Portions of it had changed hands during the day but neither side was able to make any ground. With the news that more Confederates were approaching from Williamsburg and Baltimore Crossroads – where Magruder was settling in - and with no reinforcements within close supporting distance, Franklin decided to withdraw to Eltham’s Landing and finish securing a position there.

Aftermath

Longstreet claimed the battle as a victory as he had held the Federal attack, held the field at the end of the day and had kept the road open. Johnston agreed with Longstreet’s assessment and celebrated the victory that night at Baltimore Crossroads with his senior command – of which G.W. Smith was notably absent but for health reason more than an omission.

The truth was though that Longstreet hadn’t been in complete control of the battle and at times the battle had been fought under the direction of the individual brigade and regiment commanders. He had made some important decisions but overall he had not performed well and had been saved by the arrival of Anderson at the vital moment.

Franklin received some criticism for his performance from McClellan and his subordinates but retained command. Much like Johnston had with Smith, McClellan was reluctant to persecute him when he had been a supporter of Franklin in the first place.

McClellan was somewhat happy that Fanklin had managed to keep hold of Eltham’s Landing and decided to move the rest of his army up to that point in preparation of a move toward Richmond, believing it would be quicker and safer to move his army via the York River than over the Peninsula, but he was bitterly disappointed that the chance to trap the Confederates had been lost.

Subtle changes to what happened in OTL so far but the big changes are to come after this installment.

Battle of Drewry’s Bluff

Prelude

General Johnston’s army was now stationed at Baltimore Crossroads between the Chickahominey and Pamunkey rivers where he was prepared to dig in a fight but only so long as his flank and rear was protected. His main fear at this time was that a Federal force would land behind the Chickahominey via the James River and make his position untenable.

The key to preventing a landing via the James was the position at Drewry’s Bluff but despite its importance it had been neglected by the powers in Richmond. Davis, Lee, Randolph and Naval Secretary Stephan Mallory had failed to give it any priority for troops or artillery and had given the commanders at the scene no assistance in fortifying the position.

Now that the threat had increased however all of the men in Richmond were trying to improve the position and reinforce it. Drewry’s Bluff became a hive of activity in the early days of May but in doing so no one in high command had thought to assign a clear commander to the position.

So when Johnston sent some of his own staff officers to examine the position they found the works well manned but lacking artillery and disorganized without any clear leadership.

With the recent loss of the C.S.S. Virginia when its captain was forced to scuttle it following the approach of Federal ironclads the Federal captains had become over-confident and believed their ships indestructible. As such the commanders of the Federal Ironclads on the James River resolved themselves to advance and attack the position.

The Confederates had anticipated an attack by the Federal Ironclads and had scuttled a ship in the river to block the approaches but the Federals were certain they could remove the obstacle with no trouble.

As the Federal Squadron approached Drewry’s Bluff the Confederate defenders acquired more observers as President Davis and General Lee arrived on the scene. There they were met by the Naval Commander of the area Sydney Smith Lee – General Lee’s brother. General Lee and the President had been unable to keep themselves away from the front now that the action was so close to the capital but both made it clear that they were just observers and would not take command themselves.

The Federal Squadron consisted of two Ironclad gunboats – the Galena and the Monitor – a screw gunship – the Aroostook – a side-wheeler – the Port Royal – and a twin-screw Ironclad – the Naugatuck.

Battle

May 15

The Federal Squadron approached and automatically came under fire from the Confederate defenders.

The Galena managed to reach the scuttled ship that blocked the river but the fierce fire from the Confederates prevented any attempts to remove the blockade. In getting within 600 yards of the Bluff the Galena came under extremely heavy fire and did not escape undamaged and its hull was pierced before it could even contemplate opening fire. It remained static for the rest of the battle.

The Monitor was a frequent target for the Confederate guns but its heavy armour prevented it taking too much damage. However the Monitor too could not return fire as its guns couldn’t be elevated to a level which would hit the Confederate defenders and thus it too became nothing more than a sitting target.

The Naugatuck could return fire but only until its gun exploded at which time it was forced to withdraw.

The Confederates were somewhat panicky and fired on the Federal ships without any cohesion. It was the sheer amount of fire they poured onto their enemy that kept the Federals at bay.

Aftermath

The battle lasted slightly over three hours and ended with a Federal withdrawal. The Galena suffered the most and the damage it had suffered damaged the idea of the invincibility of the Ironclads.

The battle had been little more than target practice for the Confederates but without clear leadership there had been no organized defence and the aftermath of the battle left the situation of command structure and organization at the scene completely unresolved.

Johnston’s staff officers at the scene during the battle had been completely unimpressed with the performance of the defenders and that very same day Major Jasper Whiting wrote to his commander:

"It won't do to trust these people in any way. We can't get anything done....If not too late, a good brigade under an energetic officer might perhaps save the city. A few more vessels sunk; a gun or two well placed, with bomb-proofs; some sharpshooters intelligently located - all with strong field artillery and infantry supports, and some one in charge - might give us, or somebody else, time to do something above. Everything now is at odds and ends; everybody frightened; and everybody looking out for his own affairs. I have never been so much ashamed of our people before."

And Walter Taylor, one of Lee’s staff officers, reported to Johnston that: "The report given to me by Captain Zimmerman, who is connected with the Ordnance Department, and who was present is to the effect that the fire of the enemy was very bad."

While General Lee was a bit more positive about things even he could not ignore the danger of the situation at Drewry’s Bluff. While he wrote to Johnston to explain that “only the two iron boats engaged. No one exposed and no chance for sharpshooters. No signs of landing." He admitted more candidly to Benjamin Huger that he expected McClellan to "avail himself of the river as far up as possible. He may come beyond City Point."

All this convinced Johnston that his flank was not secure and immediately he attempted to get things done to secure it but when Lee told him that there was no force in Richmond that could be sent to reinforce the position Johnston was left in no doubt whatsoever that he would have to withdraw behind the Chickahominey.

Battle of 1st Mechanicsville

Prelude

In withdrawing behind the Chickahmoney River Johnston immediately sent G.W. Smith to the far right to take command of the Drewry’s Bluff position. Smith was ordered to secure and fortify the position as best he could and this Smith did with little trouble.

Longstreet meanwhile was placed next to the Chickahominey on the opposite side of the river to the town of Mechanicville. His job was to watch for any federal movement towards the capital or Fredericksburg and to oppose such a move when possible.

D.H. Hill was placed on the Williamsburg road with orders to fortify a position there but also to watch for any federal attempt to march towards the James. Magruder’s division was placed in quick supporting distance to the other divisions.

Johnston’s next course of action all depended on what McClellan decided to do. From what Johnston had determined McClellan had two possible options. The first was that he could attempt to cross the Peninsula – and thus cross the Chickahominey - to link up with the Federal forces on the James and have an untouchable supply line while the second was that he would advance towards Richmond along the northern bank of the river so as to link up with McDowell’s Corps and bypass the river altogether.

If McClellan chose the first option then Johnston would strike at McClellan as he crossed the Peninsula. If McClellan chose the second Johnston would move to prevent a link up between the two Federals forces near Mechanicsville.

General Lee and President Davis agreed fully with Johnston’s assessment and all were agreed that they expected McClellan to cross the Peninsula. Johnston however urged caution and determined to wait until McClellan showed his hand before moving.

McClellan would have dearly loved to have a completely secure supply line on the James and the idea of crossing the Peninsula and linking up with federal forces on that river certainly would have been his preferred option but there was another thing on his mind. If he could only have McDowell’s Corps at his disposal then he believed he could defeat Johnston’s army and take Richmond but McDowell’s Corps was denied him.

McDowell’s was the only viable force protecting Washington and with a growing danger from Confederates in Northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley the powers in Washington were not prepared to release McDowell from his task. The only way they would release him to McClellan was if McClellan moved west and link up with McDowell and then drew his supplies from Washington itself.

McClellan was thus as an impasse. He wanted to link up with the James but he wanted McDowell and one way or another he would have to choose between them. McClellan, however, unwisely attempted to do both.

In advancing on Richmond he split his forces. Three Corps stretched out along the Chickahominey so as to link up easily with McDowell when he arrived while two Corps crossed the Chickahominey so as to link up with the James River.

Johnston understood fully the danger of letting McClellan link up with McDowell and considered that the most immediate threat but McClellan had given him the perfect opportunity to prevent this link. The federal commander had split his Corps up and positioned them so that quick support for any of them could not be achieved and this was the perfect opportunity to attack.

With the danger of letting McDowell and McClellan link up fresh in his mind Johnston saw little alternative in striking north of the river.

Johnston had reorganized his force into two wings while stationed near the Chickahominey. These wings were under the command of Longstreet and Smith. Longstreet’s wing consisted of the divisions of Richard H. Anderson (Longstreet’s old division), John B. Magruder, D.R. Jones, and A.P. Hill. Smith’s wing consisted of the divisions of W.H.C. Whiting (Smith’s old division), D.H. Hill and Benjamin Huger.

Johnston plan for the attack was as follows.

Magruder would take up position on the Southern bank of the River and secure it. While this was happening Longstreet would march with the other three divisions across the river further north at Mechanicsville itself and organize this force for a new assault. While Jones and Anderson’s divisions prepared to move forward A.P. Hill’s Division would be sent around the right flank of the Federal position. Anderson and Jones would engage the federals frontally and this would be the signal for Hill to advance against the Federal flank and turn their position.

Johnston explained this in a meeting with his two chief subordinates – Smith and Longstreet - on May 28th and sent a dispatch to Richmond informing General Lee that he expected an attack to be launched on May 29th.

Battle

May 29

When Longstreet attempted to get this plan put into effect he faced trouble from Magruder. Magruder resented his fall from grace. He had once been an Army commander and almost an equal of Johnston but now he had fallen below Longstreet and had not played a central role in anything since Yorktown. Now Magruder outright refused to follow orders from Longstreet as he claimed that Longstreet was a junior officer to him.

This of course created arguments between the two that lasted most of the morning. In the meantime Longstreet sent the rest of his wing moving across the river in preparation for the coming battle.

By 11:00 most of Longstreet’s wing was in position and A.P. Hill had begun his march around the federal flank. They had drawn no attention from the Federals of Fitz John Porter’s Corps. Porter had received no impression that something was amiss at this time and had done nothing.

Longstreet and Magruder finally came to a compromise at around 11:40 and Longstreet rode off to join his wing. There he found A.P. Hill missing and on the march to take up the position Johnston had intended him to but Longstreet interrupted this move and recalled him. This retrograde movement took almost an hour and it took a further thirty to forty minutes for Longstreet to reorganize his line.

So around 14:10 Longstreet finally began his advance but instead of leading with a frontal distraction followed by a knock out flanking blow the Confederates attack was totally frontal.

The initial engagement of the battle went in the Confederates favour and the Federals were driven back but these federals were merely a picket line Porter had extended to await the arrival of McDowell. Now aware of enemy movement on his flank Porter redeployed his Corps to new defensive positions to oppose this attack and Longstreet’s rapid assault was then blunted, slowed and eventually stopped by Porter’s new line and more and more federal troops were engaged.

At this moment Longstreet believed a flank attack could win the day and sent Lawrence O’Bryan Branch’s brigade from A.P. Hill’s division to march around the federal flank and strike it. Branch managed this but his numbers were too few to achieve anything.

The lines were still static when Johnston sent G.W. Smith’s chief of staff, Jasper Whiting, to find Longstreet and discover what was happening. In addition, J.B. Washington of Johnston’s own staff was sent forward to assess the situation. Longstreet told Whiting that the federals were close to defeat and all he needed was an additional brigade and he could drive them from the field, Washington and Whiting however were not so sure.

Whiting arrived back with Johnston at around 17:30 and relayed Longstreet’s message but kept his own council about the situation. Johnston sent a order to Magruder to send Longstreet one or two brigades in support but as Magruder grudgingly began to follow his orders Washington arrived with news that not only were the Federals entrenched and safely so but also that more federals were reported to be on their way.

A Confederate Cavalry unit had spotted federal movement while patrolling Longstreet’s flank and immediately reported that to Longstreet while Washington was present. Longstreet understood the danger of this but was reluctant to give up his own offensive.

With night coming quickly upon them and with more federals arriving Johnston made the call to end the battle there. He then sent Magruder new orders that countermanded his first ones and recalled those Brigades that had been on route to Longstreet while sending Longstreet orders to withdraw and secure a position on the Southern side of the river at Mechanicsville.

Aftermath

Longstreet had let Johnston down. Not only had Longstreet failed to achieve any semblance of victory but he had modified Johnston’s plans without authority to do so and resorted to a plan of battle more likely to fail than Johnston original plans, he had gotten involved in a pointless argument with Magruder that had delayed the start of the battle for hours and tried to prolong it beyond its usefulness. Nevertheless Johnston gave Longstreet the benefit of the doubt and didn’t say anything against him for the battle.

Longstreet did not go so far as to claim the battle was a victory but made excuses as to why it had failed. He blamed Magruder for ignoring orders and delaying the battle, he blamed Branch for not attacking vigorously enough and he added a small amount of blame on Jasper Whiting and J.B. Washington for preventing reinforcement from reaching him and inciting the order to have the battle called off when he was on the cusp of victory.

Johnston was somewhat to blame as he had left the whole battle in the hands of Longstreet but despite this his reputation did not suffer at all. However President Davis had come forward to watch the battle and was less than impressed with the outcome. Although he publically gave Johnston his support he questioned Johnston's ability in private.

Fitz John Porter was praised profusely by McClellan for his defensive work. Though in truth it had been little to get exited about McClellan praised Porter as if he were the saviour of the Union and recommended he recieve the official thanks of the Federal Congress.

However despite the failure of the attack Johnston’s main strategical aim was achieved. McDowell and McClellan did not link up. Admittedly this was more to do with Jackson’s actions in the Valley – with Johnston’s full knowledge and support - than any movement of the Army of the Potomac (CS) but nevertheless the main aim was achieved.

I just read this TL. Well written.
I'm very interested to see how the ACW will unfold without Lee.
I hope it is not dead.
Bump!

Battle of Seven Pines

Prelude

Though Longstreet had failed in his attempted offensive this movement north of the river had given Johnston one more opportunity that he intended to take advantage of.

McClellan had been shaken by the Confederate attack and began to worry about a bigger build up on his flank that could roll up his line. To strengthen this position he sent parts of Franklin, Sumner and Hintzelman’s Corps to reinforce Porter’s position. As a result Erasmus Keyes’ Corps became even more isolated at the junction at Seven Pines than it had been before.

Johnston now sought to exploit this chance and to give G.W. Smith another chance to prove his worth. Johnston’s new plan was to converge Smith’s wing with the addition of half of Magruder’s division against this position. In doing this he could bring between 40,000 and 50,000 men against 33,000.

His plan was to sent Huger to the take up position and secure the right on the Charles City Road, have D.H. Hill launch a diversionary attack directly against the federal position on the Willaimsburg Road at the Junction of Seven Pines and send the main attack by Whiting’s division, reinforced by elements of Magruder’s divisions and led by Smith himself, down the Nine Mile Road.

Johnston sent written orders to D.H. Hill, Benjamin Huger, W.H.C. Whiting and G.W. Smith. They were somewhat vague and a bit hard to understand but Johnston had trust that each of the men he contacted would understand fully or at least understand enough that they would be in generally the right place at the right time to be able to use their own initiative to follow the coming battle through to victory.

Johnston also sent a message on May 30th to Richmond in which he explained his intention to launch another offensive south of the Chickahominey.

President Davis had been less than pleased with the messy failed attack north of the river but realized that attempting to make anything of it while a large army sat outside Richmond would only be putting more troubles to the field commander’s shoulders so kept quiet in his discontent. He did however make certain that Johnston knew he would ride out to watch the next offensive in person.

General Lee too was somewhat discontent but for an entirely different reason. Lee believed that he could be of great help to the Confederate cause in the field and was fed up with his stint in office work. Though never one to actually speak out against an assignment he made clear his own discontent when he offered to serve under Johnston in any capacity he saw fit for the coming battle. Johnston, however, still remembered how Beauregard had gotten the lions share of credit for the victory at 1st Manassas and feared what the Southern newspapers might say about a victory if Lee should come forward to the army, he feared that would give Lee all the credit for a victory, so while he was honoured that Lee would willing offer to serve under him he refused the offer.

Johnston therefore had pressure from Davis and an added worry that Lee may be gunning for his job; he therefore had every reason to make certain the next battle would be a victory.

For that reason G.W. Smith was summoned to Johnston’s HQ where the plan was discussed in great detail for several hours.

Meanwhile McClellan had gotten up from his sickbed to visit Fitz John Porters’ position. The battle of the 29th had greatly concerned him about the security of his right flank and the intelligence he was receiving led him to believe that the Confederates were not only outnumbering him but were preparing a new attack around Mechanicsville. Thus McClellan saw this position as his weakest point and needed much reinforcement.

McClellan never really understood the mistake he made here because by reinforcing this position as much as he did he came to gain a clear local superiority over his enemy on that flank but he didn’t believe it. On the other hand he had weakened his other flank and that would now be in great danger.

Battle

May 31

Huger, D.H. Hill and Whiting were all up early and attempting to move as soon as possible but here too, like Longstreet’s attack two days before; their movements were hampered by more than just the weather.

G.W. Smith, for reasons he never really explained, had decided that the plan Johnston wanted to implement was far too risky. He claimed at a later date the his wing was fully capable of completing Johnston’s plan and driving the Federals back to the river but he felt that it would be bloody business and that the advance along the Nine Mile Road was impractical.

Rather than do the same thing Longstreet had done and modify the plan on the spot Smith decided instead to call it off. By 11:30 all his division commanders had received a message from Smith ordering them to halt and return to safer positions.

As morning turned into afternoon G.W. Smith lay in his sickbed, refusing to let the attack go forward, claiming illness as the reason and refusing to delegate command to another.

At 12:00 General Lee had ridden up to the front from Richmond to find out what was happening but nobody in Johnston’s HQ could tell him. Half an hour later Johnston sent J.B. Washington down the Nine Mile Road to find Smith and discover what was happening.

Washington rode forward and found Whiting stationary on the Nine Mile Road. Whiting complained that Smith had called the attack off due to a personal illness and had refused to delegate responsibility to anyone else. Whiting was incensed that an opportunity to smash a large portion of the enemy was being wasted.

Washington then chose to ride to Smith’s HQ on the Williamsburg road. There he found D.H. Hill and Benjamin Huger in person in a heated argument with Smith, who was still in his bed, trying to get the order to halt overturned. Washington spoke with Smith and received the same reason for the lack of movement – that Smith was too ill to command the advance – and reported back to Johnston by 14:00.

Johnston was not pleased and left for Smith’s HQ without saying a word to Lee or the arriving President Davis. Once he arrived he spoke with Smith and he was offered the same excuse. He handled this by relieving the responsibility of the attack from Smith while he was ill and taking command himself.

At 14:40 he then set about launching the attack as planned but it was much later in the day and the delay had allowed the Federals to entrench further. When Hill’s attack came it had initial success but ground quickly to a halt. Whiting launched his attack on the flank and had initial success as well but with the arrival of Heintzelman’s Corps – diminished though it was – this too ground to a halt.

McClellan had been with Sumner when the attack began on the southern flank. He ordered Sumner to be prepared to move a division in support while he went to find out what was happening. He arrived at the junction at Seven Pines at around 16:00 and attempted to find Keyes or Heintzelman to find out the situation.

It was at this point that McClellan’s luck turned sour. While he was riding through the woods around Fair Oaks Station, looking for one of his subordinates, a cannon ball exploded besides him and sent him sprawling to the floor. McClellan was struck down injured in the heat of battle.

By 17:30 Johnston realized the battle was going to accomplish nothing and called it off. If he had not been in such a bad mood about Smith’s performance during the day he may had attempted to continue the fighting the next day but instead he called Smith’s wing back to safer positions.

Aftermath

For the Confederates it was once again another failure. Smith, just like Longstreet, had let his commander down but Smith’s failure was inexcusable in Johnston’s eyes. Longstreet, at least, had attempted to fight; Smith had simply refused to even try. Johnston made it quite clear to Lee that he didn’t care where Smith was sent but he was no longer welcome in the Army.

Smith was reassigned to the Adjutant Generals department soon after and spent most of his life trying to defend himself over Seven Pines. Huger, as the next most senior commander, got command of the wing until something else could be decided.

Davis was, once more, discontent with the outcome of the battle. His trust in Johnston was greatly shaken and he took the fact that Johnston had not spoken to him during the battle and ridden off to deal with Smith as a public snub and deliberate insult. Only Lee’s council stayed Davis’s hand as Davis wanted to sack Johnston then and there then replace him with Lee.

For the Federals it was another minor success. They had defeated a Confederate attack and retained the command of the positions they held at the beginning of the battle. But it was not all good news for them as their commander McClellan suffered a serious wound and had to be transported back to Washington to recuperate.

The loss of McClellan from the field meant that Sumner now rose to command, as he was the next most senior general. But McClellan’s presence in Washington would cause great problems as he quickly began arguments with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and President Lincoln.

Happy to see this TL back.

Bump. Bump...