Less Blood On The Snow: an alternate Carpathian campaign

http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Carpathian_Battles
http://warchron.com/russianOrderofBattle.htm
http://books.google.com/books?id=JN...AEwAw#v=onepage&q=carpathian campaign&f=false
http://www.amazon.com/Blood-Snow-Carpathian-Winter-Studies/dp/0700617205


Von Linsingen, Commander of Südarmee


Falkenhayn and His Staff


Conrad inspecting Troops


Commander of the Russian 8th Army, Alexi Brusilov

Background
In OTL in very late 1914 Germany agreed to send 2 1/2 infantry divisions and a cavalry division to the Carpathian Front to support her collapsing ally Austria-Hungary. Initially Falkenhayn and Ober Ost, in an issue both agreed on for once, were opposed to the plan until Kaiser Wilhelm intervened and personally 'requested' Falkenhayn complied. However there was still much tension between Falkenhayn and Conrad over the creation of the "Südarmee", as the AHs didn't provide the agreed upon mountain equipment, von Linsingen was warning against an offensive in the terrible climate and terrain, and the AH general staff displayed extreme incompetence and disconnect with the front. There were several arguments between Germany and AH over deployment of the Südarmee and the extreme casualties it took being forced to attack in the middle of winter in the Carpathian mountains.

So obviously there was an opportunity for Falkenhayn to exert more control over Südarmee's deployment. The Germans held the power in the relationship and could dictate to a point with AH. They seemed to have been taken in by Conrad's negotiating tactic of threatening to cut a deal with the Russians, but here I am suggesting the Falkenhayn takes a stronger stand against Conrad and gets to deploy Südarmee where he wants.

POD: OHL demands and gets the AH to agree to deploy Südarmee north of the Carpathians around Gorlice, where the Russians were launching their own offensives to break the link between the AH 3rd and 4th armies. Falkenhayn demands again that any offensive involving Südarmee would have to be in this area.

This forces Conrad, already worried that his forces in the Carpathian Mts. cannot hold by themselves to redeploy significant forces from the 4th and 3rd armies (thanks to the Germans stabilizing the Dunajec-Gorlice Sector) further East into the mountains. Believing that an offensive in the Carpathians will fail without the Germans to stiffen the front, Conrad begrudgingly agrees to launch his offensives to relieve Przemysl from the Gorlice-Tarnow sector, but only on the condition that the Germans provide even more troops, artillery, and munitions considering that the Russians have built up signficant defenses there. Von Linsingen supports Conrad, speaking with Falkenhayn directly about conditions at the front, stating that while his force was enough to hold his sector, any advance would require significant reinforcement.

After much debate and acrimony, especially involving Ober Ost, Falkenhayn agreed, as the AHs need a way to stop the endless flood of Russians from pouring through the Carpathian passes, which have all been captured by the Russians. Russian forces in this sector were less prepared and numerous than on Germany's Eastern Front. Additionally Falkenhayn demanded that von Linsignen would have control of the entire offensive, German officers would be brought in help command and control the AH forces involved, and once the front was secure AH forces would have to be made available for the Serbian Front. These conditions grated heavily, but with the Russians pushing forward constantly Conrad, even after all his protests logged with his and the German government, was forced to acquiesce by his own Kaiser. Nevertheless, Conrad still had no intention of focusing on Serbia for some time. In fact, to punctuate this point, he continued massive transfers of troops from the Serbian front.

Edit:
This is a working draft, which I will try and polish as I go.





Maps of the Battle Area

Just a fair warning, I have been doing some reading on the Eastern Front for my other TL and the sheer incompetence of the AH staff during the winter of 1915 really floored me. Even understanding the limitations and goals of the AH general staff at the time, it is nigh incomprehensible why they launched an offensive in the dead of winter in the Carpathian mountains, probably the roughest terrain in Europe, after suffering about 1.25 million casualties, about half the pre-war army including reservists, in the previous 5 months.
So, in order to get my frustration out about the whole affair, I decided to run a little thought experiment about what might have been had the German General Staff decided to stand up to the Austro-Hungarians a little.
I'm not abandoning my other TL, just putting it on hiatus while I work this through a bit and try to figure out how I should edit the Eastern Front section.

The Carpathian offensives to rescue Przemysl are IMHO Conrad's biggest mistake of the war. That the first offensive had some limited initial success under these conditions does show that the AH had some skill in mountain fighting. For a while I thought von Linsingen was a mediocre general but my estimation has grown some lately.

Tom_B said:

The Carpathian offensives to rescue Przemysl are IMHO Conrad's biggest mistake of the war. That the first offensive had some limited initial success under these conditions does show that the AH had some skill in mountain fighting. For a while I thought von Linsingen was a mediocre general but my estimation has grown some lately.

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I whole-heartedly agree that Conrad made a tremendous mistake, one that nearly single-handedly destroyed the AH empire. Instead it left them militarily crippled for the rest of the war. The problem was the fortress of Przemysl could not be abandoned for political reasons so an offensive had to be launched. The reasoning behind the Carpathian mountains as the site of the offensive was that an open flank could be found there to cut off the Russians, somewhat similar to the battle of Limanova. It seemed that having won a battle for once, Conrad was trying to apply the formula again, hoping to trap the Russians in the mountains and let them wither on the vine.

Apparently though no one in AOK had the desire or competence to visit the front and actually observe conditions before ordering the offensive. Even OHL was appalled by the complete lack of concern for the welfare of AH troops and the complete disconnect that the AHs had with the front.

Though he was certainly no Mackensen, Linsingen was forced to fight in truly horrific conditions that prevented him from truly demonstrating his talent. If you have any sources about the man, please let me know.

Positions in the Carpathians
Also:
http://ru.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Файл:Zayonchkovsky_map33.djvu&page=1
I also have many, many other awesome maps of the area, including some German and Russian ones, but the files are too big to post to the forum...I might try photo bucket if I can find a decent digital camera to use.

General von Linsingen

My knowledge of von Linsingen comes from bits and pieces. Did you know he was one of the few Jewish generals? I still believe he is not without some blame for the Brusilov Offensive though not quite as much as I once assigned. My view of the 1915 GT offensive is that Falkenhayn, Mackensen, Seeckt and even Conrad all collaborated very well from late Apr to mid Aug (after which Conrad lapsed back into over reach mode).

Tom_B said:

My knowledge of von Linsingen comes from bits and pieces. Did you know he was one of the few Jewish generals? I still believe he is not without some blame for the Brusilov Offensive though not quite as much as I once assigned. My view of the 1915 GT offensive is that Falkenhayn, Mackensen, Seeckt and even Conrad all collaborated very well from late Apr to mid Aug (after which Conrad lapsed back into over reach mode).

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He was Jewish? I didn't realize that there were any Jewish people promoted that far. What's the source on that? As to his culpability for the Brusilov debacle, I don't know what his defensive positions were like by that point, but he would have been tertiarily responsible at most, starting with Conrad's denuding of the Eastern Front of most heavy artillery and pulling out 12 of the best divisions for Italy, Josef Ferdinand for his utter disregard for his army group's training, positions, or general readiness.

wiking said:

He was Jewish?

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No, he wasn't. North German Protestant and memer of the Johanniterorden. - He was, however, no Prussian.

rast said:

No, he wasn't. North German Protestant and memer of the Johanniterorden. - He was, however, no Prussian.

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Can you provide more information about the man and an opinion of his generalship?

South Army OOB:
6 German infantry divisions, 1 Cavalry division
9 Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions
Their front roughly corresponds to the positions of the AH 4th army shown on the map above, though it extends slightly further south to the area north of Zboro. The unit neighboring the AH 3rd army is the Hoffman corps, which is comprised of a German division and an AH one.

ITTL the forces and artillery used to attack Warsaw on January 31st are instead used with the South Army. 156 Heavy artillery pieces and mortars are supporting the attack, with 60% coming from AH sources. that means that many are older types, without modern recoil mechanisms. The AH units used in the attack, most from the Serbian Front (OTL Puhallo Group, used to attack by the AH 3rd army), have been reequipped with modern artillery pieces and have extra field howtizers attached given the importance of their mission. As a result the attack (including both South Army and AH 4th army) has slightly over 1,000 guns with about 250,000 rounds accumulated, mainly by stripping fortresses of their stocks, units in quiet sectors, and German support for the offensive. There are also 22 aircraft for the operation, about half AH.

Also, because AH 3rd army, Szurmay Group (which had been expanded with units from the Balkans and AH 4th army to make up for the South Army being deployed further north), and Pflanzer-Baltin Group are not attacking here and in fact are more focused on improving supply and fortifying positions back from the Carpathian passes, they have reserves to sustain them during the Russian offensive.

Conrad wanted to attack in the Gorlice-Tarnow area OTL, but didn't think he had the firepower to overcome the Russian 3rd army's defenses. Now that he has the forces necessary, he is less concerned with holding on in the Carpathian mountains, as his often grandiose imagination now is fixated on drawing the Russians into a trap from which they will be unable to extract themselves when the Germans cut them off from the norths side of the mountain passes. As a result, Conrad is less concerned with Hungarian political pressure to defend in the mountains and isn't as worried about pulling heavy artillery from defending units. Paradoxically this actually helps the Austro-Hungarians, as less focus on supplying extra batteries, especially the heavy guns, means that more supply can focus on food and other needs of the troops and remaining, lighter artillery batteries. Additionally more barbed wire can be brought up and horses used IOTL to move artillery forward during the attack can focus on supply needs.

Russian 3rd army defenses are still formidable, but as they have only had about 5-6 weeks to fortify their positions in winter with frozen ground/snow and have been focused on attacking around Gorlice rather than digging in. Their defenses are considerably weaker than May 2nd when OTL's Gorlice-Tarnow happened. Here there is only a 1st line, which is packed with troops and an incomplete second line, which does not yet offer decent protection against heavy artillery.

Furthermore, the fact that Germans will be in charge of the offensive, including organizing for the AHs means that efficiency will drastically improve now that effective staff planning can be done and AH artillery units have to answer to German commanders and staff officers. Even though the AH military had become somewhat of a militia after 1914, the presence of trained and effective staff officers goes a long way to rectifying many of the deficiencies in AH units. OTL this was seen at Gorlice-Tarnow, as AH units, which had previously performed very poorly under AH command, suddenly were able to keep pace with the German attack and defeat Russian forces which had previously beaten them with ease. Also the sense of professionalism that was brought to these units helped boost morale signficantly, propelling the AHs forward where previously they had gone into battle expecting to lose.

I don't recall my source for von Linsingen being Jewish other than it was on the web and therefore possibly suspect. As I have said before he never gets any large scale treatment.

Here is the badly GIMPed image of the layout of the battlefield. Red is the Südarmee's major thrusts. Blue is the 4th AH army's attack. Green is the Wisloka river, the proposed halt line of the offensive. This is planned as a limited attack with limited objectives, though Conrad thinks otherwise.

wiking said:

Can you provide more information about the man and an opinion of his generalship?

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The von Linsingens were members of the ancient Hessian nobility, one branch later settled in Hanoveranian lands. The Hessian line went extinct in the 18th century, but the Hanoveranian line survived. They provided several Generals to the Hanoveranian army.

Alexander von Linsingen must have been a tough and difficult to live with fellow. Groener had clashed with him already before the war, and in 1918 complained that he couldn't work with him. As a consequence L. was recalled from his position in the Ukraine and given command in Berlin and Brandenburg.
It had been hoped that this General known as resolute would be able to stifle any kind of revolution or rebellion in the German capital. But in the end, L. was not able to stem the tide.

As a side note, I found that the Austro-Hungarian command was reported to be glad when L. was removed from Südarmee and given another command. He must have been a pain in the ass to them.

rast said:

The von Linsingens were members of the ancient Hessian nobility, one branch later settled in Hanoveranian lands. The Hessian line went extinct in the 18th century, but the Hanoveranian line survived. They provided several Generals to the Hanoveranian army.

Alexander von Linsingen must have been a tough and difficult to live with fellow. Groener had clashed with him already before the war, and in 1918 complained that he couldn't work with him. As a consequence L. was recalled from his position in the Ukraine and given command in Berlin and Brandenburg.
It had been hoped that this General known as resolute would be able to stifle any kind of revolution or rebellion in the German capital. But in the end, L. was not able to stem the tide.

As a side note, I found that the Austro-Hungarian command was reported to be glad when L. was removed from Südarmee and given another command. He must have been a pain in the ass to them.

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To be fair though, the AHs complained about nearly every German that was sent to work with them because they all rightly criticized the terrible "Schlamperei" that the AHs were known for. Cramon was the only exception AFAIK. Even von Seeckt, the rather brilliant staff officer sent to help them, was criticized for being a pain in the ass, though they eventually warmed up to him.

Thanks for the info about his relations with the AHs, I'm going to have to include that part in the narrative.

Interesting your timeline. And yes, WW1 was the war of sheer stupidy, some horror were make by fully hardheadness and arrogance of the officer of all side(the french glory dreams, the Tsar idiotice decision and poor leadership base in birth rather than skill, and an long etc) and that offensive was the idiotic in the KuK side

And if we have a double breakthrough in Gorlice-Ladow with a more sucesful defense in the carpatian.. beside butterfly brusilov(and if with better Artillery an offensive like than can become a bloddy failure to the russian and a chance of a very dangeous CP counter offensive), maybe the Russia will be able to collapse early or even more with the butterflies... try to make peace when they can?

And with the Butterflies in Serbia... they will colapse as historical(when Bulgaria joins to the CP) Or later(for the less focus of KuK) and with the butterflies in either scenario... they will escape to Salonika or being crushed?

And the Italian Front... ,maybe with less causality.. we can have an early caporetto or maybe some offensive to manage to keep out the treousle tomates?


well,a lot of enquire of this timeline, keep with this one(i love your extremly detailed military history background.. that is your degree or major?9

ATT
NIVEK VON BELDO

Nivek said:

Interesting your timeline. And yes, WW1 was the war of sheer stupidy, some horror were make by fully hardheadness and arrogance of the officer of all side(the french glory dreams, the Tsar idiotice decision and poor leadership base in birth rather than skill, and an long etc) and that offensive was the idiotic in the KuK side

And if we have a double breakthrough in Gorlice-Ladow with a more sucesful defense in the carpatian.. beside butterfly brusilov(and if with better Artillery an offensive like than can become a bloddy failure to the russian and a chance of a very dangeous CP counter offensive), maybe the Russia will be able to collapse early or even more with the butterflies... try to make peace when they can?

And with the Butterflies in Serbia... they will colapse as historical(when Bulgaria joins to the CP) Or later(for the less focus of KuK) and with the butterflies in either scenario... they will escape to Salonika or being crushed?

And the Italian Front... ,maybe with less causality.. we can have an early caporetto or maybe some offensive to manage to keep out the treousle tomates?


well,a lot of enquire of this timeline, keep with this one(i love your extremly detailed military history background.. that is your degree or major?9

ATT
NIVEK VON BELDO

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I just read a lot.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/07..._m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_r=0Q64YZG7X9HM34J9D5X9
This is my most recent reading on the war, which, given that it focuses on the Eastern front, more importantly on the AH-Russian front, it is long over due. Unfortunately the narrative is very disjointed thanks to poor editing (I think), but the information contained therein is immensely worthwhile. The sourcing alone is worth the paltry $21.

Frankly though this book disturbed me quite a bit. I cannot imagine fighting in the conditions that they did, Russian, German, and AH. Though the Russians come off as supermen, impervious to cold, while the AHs are hapless and dying in droves, the Carpathian winter war was horribly brutal and grinding for them as well. Truly it was also Brusilov's great mistake as well. His forces launched their own offensives in blizzards and lost upwards of a million men in 4 months. They had their setbacks too, though these mainly came after the AH offensives fell apart. Being on the defensive in the Carpathians has its benefits. I wish I had had a chance to see those mountains now, in summer of course!

The Russians had built up quite a defensive line already by January 1915 (though it was significantly stronger in May with 3 fully developed defensive lines), which prompted Conrad, with his weak army (by January 1st there was only 230,000 men left in the Carpathians to guard Hungary) to try and flank the Russians through the mountains. Brusilov had the same idea, especially as he had more men and better routes through the mountains. Here, with the Germans refusing the fight there and offering to attack through the Russian defenses, Conrad is more willing to risk fighting around the Gorlice area.

There are major differences though to the OTL Gorlice-Tarnow operation: here the Russians are weaker in raw numbers: 3rd army had 18 divisions in May, but only 11 by January 23rd. This jumped to 14 by February 1st. Defenses are weaker than OTL May, as I have stated. But also the Russians have more manpower than later, as they haven't yet gone through the bloody offensives in March and April. Also the Russian 9th army is still in Poland whereas in May it was in Bukowina and couldn't be used to reinforce the 3rd army.

In summary, though initially weaker in defense, the Russians have more reserves to commit to the battle as the Central Powers advance.
So nothing is truly guaranteed, least of all success.

I am of the mind that had the AHs managed to defeat the Russians in early 1915, an operational defeat, not tactical, and were able to follow up properly, the Italians might have stayed their entry into the war. So if the AHs and Germans can move up to liberate Przemysl (a rather far-fetched proposition, I know) the Italians would have stayed neutral for longer, with obvious butterflies.

One last tid-bit; the AHs managed to actually outnumber the Russians in mid-February during their second attack and the author of the book above, whose opinion I trust on the matter, seems to think that they could have beaten the Russians if they fought somewhere else more conducive to the attack. I wonder what might have been achieved once the Russian defenses were broken in the Gorlice area once these men become available, but then there is the issue of the Russian 9th army, which would have made an appearance if things become too hot. They had about 4 corps of experienced infantry by February, so are a dangerous foe to worry about if the offensive progresses.

http://s991.photobucket.com/home/wiking85/allalbums
I have some maps posted here, though sadly I cannot get everything I have loaded at the moment. The most important piece is the 2.6 MB image of a relief map of Gorlice-Tarnow, which will be very important to understanding the action to come.

Extremely concerned about the situation at Przemysl and with the Russian offensives in the Carpathians, Conrad pushed Linsingen to launch his attack as soon as possible. Invested with nearly complete authority over the offensive, Linsingen was not to be rushed, both because of his concern over the success of his mission, as he was personally responsible to Falkenhayn, and his lack of concern for AH issues. Because of this and his abrassive attititude, made worse by the AHs' 'schlamperei' (sloppiness-specifically in this case in releation to their staff work and preparations), complaints were repeatedly made to OHL about him. Von Cramon, the German attache to the AH general staff, used his excellent connections there to smooth over these issues, claiming that the delays were part of the plan to trap the Russians in the Carpathians so they could be outflanked, but he too was concerned, especially as AH intelligence shared worrying information regarding the Russians' build up near the mountain passes and around Gorlice.

Matters were much more complicated on the ground as the build up was delayed by a number of issues. Linsingen was concerned about the loyalty of the locals in the area around Gorlice-Tarnow, so as part of his plan the inhabitants were evacuated before any reinforcements could be brought in. Obviously this delayed the build up signficantly, especially given the weather and the quality of communications in the area, but it also distrupted Russian intelligence gathering signficantly, preventing them from realizing the increase of enemy forces until too late. Furthermore the late decision to reinforce South Army with more German troops and heavy artillery also pushed back the jump off date. Additionally the continuous Russian attacks on Gorlice and surrounding heights in support of 8th army's drive through the Dukla pass forced Linsingen to focus on holding ground rather than preparing an advance. The benefit of constant combat operations though let Linsingen mask his build up and allowed new forces to acclimate themselves to combat conditions in the area without drawing attention. Aerial reconnaissance could also operate without drawing suspicion, appearing only to aid in defensive operations.

Ultimately d-day was set for February 10th, which gave AOK and Ober Ost time to work out dates to release the AH 2nd army from Poland to act as reserves for the offensive if it progressed. However, the delay also gave the Russians time to continue their drive through the mountains, pressing very hard on the AH forces desperately trying to fortify themselves. Nevertheless the Russians lunged forward, experiencing early successes in capturing forward positions of the AH 3rd army and Szurmay group. These losses threatened to turn the flank of South army as well, that is until a blizzard swept through the mountains. Exposure casualties mounted and supply was threatened as snow fall and white-outs halted the advance. It seemed like a miracle to the hardpressed AHs, who used the time to hunker down and try to dig in. Bullishly pressing forward, the Russians managed to take some positions by surprise in the storm, but casualties where not worth the gains. Still the advance caused General Ivanov, commander of the Russian Southwest Front, to commit the majority of his reserves to Brusilov's advance. As the weather broke the Russians moved foward again, running into AH positions and caving the front in despite having trouble moving artillery forward. Casualties were high, but the advance pressed onward, deeper into the primeval depths of ominous peaks and frosted woodlands.

Meanwhile Linsingen and his staff were nearing completion of their planning operations. Artillery and munitions had been brought up and sited. Most of it had registered during Russian attacks or during minor counterattacks on crucial heights. Officers and NCOs had been briefed while German officers had integrated themselves within AH units. In Poland the AH 2nd army was finishing redeployment planning, with the staff heading to the Szurmany group to take over, bringing some units with, while the bulk of units were ready to head to the AH 4th army. South Army had integrated recently arrived AH reserves, including 6 divisions from the Balkan Front. Sectors were divided up and rehersals for attack were underway. At Przemysl horses were being slaughtered en masse to keep the garrison feed, while they waited for relief.

After weeks of preparation, the Habsburg-Hohenzollern offensive was set to start on February 10th. By now, thanks to Conrad ruthlessly stripping his forces from all fronts, Südarmee and the AH 4th army had amassed nearly 1500 artillery pieces and 25 divisions against roughly 680 Russian artillery pieces and 12 divisions. Each side had 4 cavalry divisions present as well. A further corps from the AH 3rd army would be participating in a side operation to maintain contact with Südarmee as it advanced against the Russian 3rd. After all the careful preparation and minor pushes to secure important terrain in the face of several Russian attacks, all the necessary jump off points were secured, including several peaks to the south of Gorlice with nearly panoramic views of the battlefield. These peaks, Przegonina, Watkowa, and Swierzowa (837, 847, and 803 meters respectively) were crucial to the success of operations south of the Ropa river and to the flank of the operation. As a result the Russians were also interested in them and on February 9th they launched an offensive to recapture them.

Thanks to near complete air supremacy and the observation post on these heights, the Germans and AHs were well aware of Russian preparations and had marked nearly every artillery position and bunker in the area as targets for their offensive. Still, when the Russians unleashed their bombardment in conjunction with the neighboring 8th army’s offensive through the Dukla pass, Linsingen made an executive decision: waiting to counter this attack by holding back his artillery would have cost him a golden opportunity to catch the Russians in concentrated areas; an attack now would heavily disrupt them if launched now. During the Russian preliminary bombardment artillery, which by now had fully assembled and was finishing final planning, was unleashed and hit all targets with their full weight.

Russian forces south of the Ropa were assembled in their trenches and artillery had their ammunition dumps pushed forward. Still unaware of the forces arrayed against them, Radko-Dimitriev’s troops were not prepared for what now fell upon them. Slightly more than 500 guns including 70 heavy pieces (over half of Südarmee’s total) opened up on the 6 Russian divisions in the area, both those concentrated for the assault and in reserve, as batteries marked for targets north of the Ropa even joined in. During the coming 5 hours the Russian positions were struck in depth, with multiple ammunition dumps detonated by artillery strikes. AH and German aircraft were scrambled to keep an eye on the Russian positions and note reinforcements being moved up or positions which had survived intact. Infantry units which had anticipated another 12 hours of preparation time were activated and prepared quickly to follow up on the bombardment. 6 divisions, 3 German, 3 AH, as well as 2 cavalry divisions, 1 AH, 1 German, were waiting for the final order to be given to attack. Until then tens of tons of high explosives were hurled at the enemy. Russian artillery was suppresses or destroyed in the deluge, while the infantry, which had been packed into forward trenches waiting for the order to attack, were slaughtered artillery and mortars of all calibers rained down hell upon them. Anyone who tried to flee was blown to bits, while those trapped in their positions where buried alive or suffered the same fate. Finally by early afternoon the rain of shells ceased and an oppressive silence fell across the battlefield. Habsburg and German soldiers advanced into the Russian lines, finding little left to oppose them. Survivors were too stunned to resist and had to be led back into captivity stumbling and confused as if punch-drunk. The first day objectives were met within two hours of the start of the advance, as Russian positions were not manned for the defensive, meaning most of the resistance that should have been met died or was captured in the forward lines. Various strong points remained that did hold up the advance here and there, but these could be bypassed and followed up on after the artillery had a second go at them. In fact, the snow proved a greater factor in slowing the advance than the enemy. Nevertheless, once the mainline had been breached, the Russians followed up disorganized counterattacks where possible. These were beaten off with artillery or massed rifle fire, but it was clear that the Russian forces between the Wisloka and Ropa were badly smashed. Mobile field artillery batteries were attached to the attack groups to provide fire support at first call, which helped massively in maintaining the advance.

The attacks toward Biecz, Dembowiec, and Zmigrod progressed splendidly, as the group was much lower and flatter than the positions the Germans were advancing from, meaning the artillery had had excellent observation of Russian positions and had obliterated them. To the East however the Russians held steep and rough ground, which fell in the AH sector. The attacks toward the Wisloka in the direction of Dukla were held up thanks to the Russian forces in this area not participating in the attacks on Südarmee positions and the general nature of the terrain. AH forces also were not as thorough in their preparations as the Germans or mixed units, especially as the AH 3rd army did not have German advisors. As a result the attacks captured forward positions with heavy losses and stopped there, or were halted altogether. As a result the crucial flank positions near Kolan were not seized, forcing Südarmee to divert a number of heavy guns to this area. The northwest bank of the Wisloka had to be cleared entirely and the ridgeline overlooking Myscowa securced to prevent the Russian 8th army from counterattacking and disrupting the offensive.

February 9th saw the early success of the offensive with heavy losses to Russians, badly chewing up 4 Russian divisions and locking down another two in defensive operations. Artillery had to be moved forward for the next push, especially as the advance was now being enfiladed on the flanks by Russian artillery across the Ropa and Wisloka. First day gains brought Südarmee forward to the Libusza-Lipinki-Osiek line, a massive gain, which brought them through the Russians’ main line of resistance. Snow and poor roads held up supply and artillery units meaning the next leap was not likely to be as quick, especially as the Russians appeared to have rushed their reserves to the area. Casualties had been moderate overall, though the lowest with the Germans thanks to better preparations and professionalism. To the East Russian defenses held up near Kolan and Krempna, with the AH units there suffering comparatively heavily.

As there seems to be little interest in this thread, I will cancel it and go back to my other project.