So waht happens if the Bismark's rudder doen't jam

So the 21:05 May 26th torpedo attack by the Ark Royal's torpedo plane that actually jammed the rudder of the Bismark misses her by 10 feet. What happens??? I have listed some possible options below:

1) The British continue to follow with whatever resources have fuel. Ark Royal launches more attacks the next morning, (ignoring the threat of German air and submarine attacks). British land based air and submarine attacks off the German ports are planned. Bismarks sinks anyway the next day before she reaches Brest.

2) Bismark survives and limps into Brest (maybe with an extra bomb or two on her deck and another torpedo in her side). Medals are handed out, much propaganda is made, but the Bismark is then bombed day and night and is never usable again eventually the crew is reassigned and the guns are sent to Norway). However, Germany navy's reputation is enhanced. Perhaps Hitler is less cautious committing the big ships in the Arctic. Perhaps the scrap the January 1943 scrap the fleet order never happens.

3) Bismark survives, the Germans realizing the ship is a bomber magnet, surround the port she is in with as much flak and fighters as they can (perhaps pulled from home defence since there is less bombs going there), Bismark is operational again in February 42 and does the channel run back to Germany with the other ships. In the Arctic by October 1942 (after refitting), with both Bismark and Tirpitz present the British don't bother risking convoys in the Barents. Bismark surrenders in Narvik, May 1945, non operational with bomb damage and after much looking over ends up in Bikini Atoll tests (like Prinz Eugen) .
 

Geon

Donor
I have to vote for option 2.

2) Bismark survives and limps into Brest (maybe with an extra bomb or two on her deck and another torpedo in her side). Medals are handed out, much propaganda is made, but the Bismark is then bombed day and night and is never usable again eventually the crew is reassigned and the guns are sent to Norway). However, Germany navy's reputation is enhanced. Perhaps Hitler is less cautious committing the big ships in the Arctic. Perhaps the scrap the January 1943 scrap the fleet order never happens.

The Ark Royal's air attack was the last ditch effort to stop the Bismarck before she could reach friendly air space near Brest. Bismarck's arrival in Brest might have been a major propoganda victory for Germany but it would also have signed the ship's death warrant. The Bismarck had just sunk the pride of the British Fleet H.M.S. Hood. There was no way the British would have let that stand. They would have sent in submarines and bombers and if necessary I could even see them send in a commando raid to sink that ship. Churchill had ordered, "Sink the Bismarck at all costs!" And he meant it! If Bismarck had survived to reach Brest and assuming it survived subsequent attempts to sink it she would probably have been sunk in the Channel Run which occurred later. There was no way the British Navy was going to let her return home for another propoganda victory.

Geon
 

abc123

Banned
I have to vote for option 2.



The Ark Royal's air attack was the last ditch effort to stop the Bismarck before she could reach friendly air space near Brest. Bismarck's arrival in Brest might have been a major propoganda victory for Germany but it would also have signed the ship's death warrant. The Bismarck had just sunk the pride of the British Fleet H.M.S. Hood. There was no way the British would have let that stand. They would have sent in submarines and bombers and if necessary I could even see them send in a commando raid to sink that ship. Churchill had ordered, "Sink the Bismarck at all costs!" And he meant it! If Bismarck had survived to reach Brest and assuming it survived subsequent attempts to sink it she would probably have been sunk in the Channel Run which occurred later. There was no way the British Navy was going to let her return home for another propoganda victory.

Geon



My opinion too...
 

Markus

Banned
She will go to Brest, through the Channel, to Norway and end up as a target for Tallboys and so on. Just like her sistership did.
 

Geon

Donor
With regard to your comments Markus:

She will go to Brest, through the Channel, to Norway and end up as a target for Tallboys and so on. Just like her sistership did.

I would just say this. If Bismarck successfully reaches Brest she will have racked up an impressive propoganda victory for Germany. The Bismarck the pride of the Kriegsmarine has successfully eluded the combined efforts of the RFN and RAF to bring her down.

The UK desperately needed some good news. At the time Bismarck set out Britain was on the defensive on all fronts and had just barely succeeded in holding off the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain. There was very little in good news at this time. I could easily see Churchill ordering every effort to sinking Bismarck in Brest before she could be prepared for another foray.

In addition one has to consider Hitler's mindset which seems to have been: If it works once try it again. It's not inconceivable that if Bismarck survives to reach Brest there might be an attempt by Hitler on an even more audacious gamble in sending out Bismarck in company with Scharnhorst, and Gniesenau and other surface assets to sink more British cargo shipping. Given the beating at this time that British shipping was taking from Doenitz's submarines the very thought of a large surface raiding fleet led by Bismarck, in addition to the propoganda possibilities might prompt Churchill (who had a gambler's heart) to launch a commando attack of Brest or a major RAF bomber/torpedo attack on the port or both!

Geon
 
If Bismark reaches Brest then an awful lot of innocent french people living in and around Brest are going to die. The RAF will throw everything it possesses at the port and a lot of bombs are going to miss.
 
Basically the tactical situation would not chance much, as Bismarck would simply join the ships already in Brest, eventually sail with them again for either North Atlantic again, or Germany, through the Chanel. Basically just as others say.

Politically it makes a lot of difference, as the Germans would not likely abbort their wishes to send heavy surfaceships into the Atlantic, which was abrubtly ended by the OTL sinking of Bismarck. So it is ot unlikely that Tirpitz would also make a dash into the Atlantic, following the otehr heavy units, unless Hitler somehow chanced the policy to keep his fleet in beeing in Norway, because of the War against Russia.
 

Graehame

Banned
Assuming the Bismarck gets to Ste. Nazaire (not Brest) at the end of May, she probably would have needed a couple of months in port to repair her battle damage, & maybe-- maybe-- a month or two more to repair damage incurred from bomber raids while in port. This puts us into the early Aug thru early Sep time-frame.
Beginning in early Sep most of the remaining German Fleet (Tirpitz, Scheer, Nurnberg, Koln, Emden, & Leipzig) was used in the Baltic bottling up what was left of the Russian Fleet in Leningrad, or else undergoing repair or refit. The Leningrad blockade was considered a high priority by Hitler & lasted thru the end of '41, so the ships involved wouldn't have been available to reinforce the Bismarck in the N Atlantic until Jan '42-- the month in which the Tirpitz was finally reported battle-ready. (Although not yet fully battle-ready during the latter part of '41, it was felt that the Russian Fleet wasn't much of a threat, so the Tirpitz was used in the Baltic on what amounted to its shakedown cruise.)
The Lutzow was under repair during this period (thru Jan) & the Hipper was undergoing refit. The Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, & Prinz Eugen, of course, were operating from Brest.
BTW, the success of the Brits at destroying the Bismarck in port can be estimated from their success (or lack thereof) vs the Tirpitz later in the war, when their capabilities were considerably greater. It took from Jan '42 until Sep '43-- 20 months!!!-- for a Brit attack to have any effect whatsoever. Midget subs, minor damage. 15 Russian level bombers attacked the Tirpitz on 10 Feb '44 & did virtually no damage. A raid on 3 Apr by 41 Brit dive bombers scored 15 hits, then a raid by 92 a/c launched by 3 Brit carriers on 17 Jul scored zero hits. Despite the 15 bomb hits scored in Apr, the Tirpitz conducted exercises at sea at the end of Jul. On 22 Aug another 75 Brit a/c conducted a raid, causing no appreciable damage. On 24 Aug another 77 Brit a/c attacked, scoring 2 hits & minimal damage. On 29 Aug another 56 Brit a/c attacked, scoring zero hits. On 15 Sep 21 Brit Lancaster bombers attacked, scoring 2 hits with considerable damage, but the Tirpitz was still able to get underway a month later & change her anchorage. On 29 Oct 39 Brit Lancasters attacked again, scoring zero hits. On 12 Nov 31 Lancasters attacked again, this time with Tallboy bombs, scoring 3 hits & causing the ship to capsize & sink.
All of Churchill's bluster aside, early in the war, when Brit aircraft & bombsights weren't that good & the Tallboy bomb hadn't yet been invented, their ability to sink a German battleship in port was dubious at best.
In light of the above, I'd say the Bismarck joins the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, & Prinz Eugen in the N Atlantic in Aug or Sep '41, & at that time-- when Brit air coverage isn't that great & the US hasn't yet entered the war-- wreaks considerable havoc. These ships engage in 1 cruise prior to Jan, then another in Jan to facilitate the breakout of the Tirpitz with the Scheer, Lutzow, & Hipper. Despite the fact that the US is in the war by this time, US training is weak, US-Brit cooperation is poor, the Arctic nights are long, the winter weather is lousy, & all these factors work to the advantage of the Germans. Nevertheless, their chances of successfully breaking into the N Atlantic are about 50-50-- UNLESS...
There is 1 factor that could significantly tip the scales in favor of the German Fleet. Cooperation between the Luftwaffe & the Kriegsmarine was notoriously poor. If the Luftwaffe based a sqdn of long-range torpedo bombers at Bergen & another at Brest (the BV-138 is my preference), preferably under Kriegsmarine command, & used 4 a/c to shadow the German ships in rotation with the rest of the sqdn on-call, then this would enable the Germans to shoot down those silly Fairey-Swordfish biplanes the Royal Navy used, to damage RN heavies, or both. The Bergen sqdn escorts halfway, then the Brest sqdn takes over.
If the Germans employ long-range torpedo bombers then the breakout succeeds, with maybe 2 or 3 of the German ships being damaged in the process. The others then escort them into port.
 
Assuming the Bismarck gets to Ste. Nazaire (not Brest) at the end of May, she probably would have needed a couple of months in port to repair her battle damage, & maybe-- maybe-- a month or two more to repair damage incurred from bomber raids while in port. This puts us into the early Aug thru early Sep time-frame.
Beginning in early Sep most of the remaining German Fleet (Tirpitz, Scheer, Nurnberg, Koln, Emden, & Leipzig) was used in the Baltic bottling up what was left of the Russian Fleet in Leningrad, or else undergoing repair or refit. The Leningrad blockade was considered a high priority by Hitler & lasted thru the end of '41, so the ships involved wouldn't have been available to reinforce the Bismarck in the N Atlantic until Jan '42-- the month in which the Tirpitz was finally reported battle-ready. (Although not yet fully battle-ready during the latter part of '41, it was felt that the Russian Fleet wasn't much of a threat, so the Tirpitz was used in the Baltic on what amounted to its shakedown cruise.)
The Lutzow was under repair during this period (thru Jan) & the Hipper was undergoing refit. The Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, & Prinz Eugen, of course, were operating from Brest.
BTW, the success of the Brits at destroying the Bismarck in port can be estimated from their success (or lack thereof) vs the Tirpitz later in the war, when their capabilities were considerably greater. It took from Jan '42 until Sep '43-- 20 months!!!-- for a Brit attack to have any effect whatsoever. Midget subs, minor damage. 15 Russian level bombers attacked the Tirpitz on 10 Feb '44 & did virtually no damage. A raid on 3 Apr by 41 Brit dive bombers scored 15 hits, then a raid by 92 a/c launched by 3 Brit carriers on 17 Jul scored zero hits. Despite the 15 bomb hits scored in Apr, the Tirpitz conducted exercises at sea at the end of Jul. On 22 Aug another 75 Brit a/c conducted a raid, causing no appreciable damage. On 24 Aug another 77 Brit a/c attacked, scoring 2 hits & minimal damage. On 29 Aug another 56 Brit a/c attacked, scoring zero hits. On 15 Sep 21 Brit Lancaster bombers attacked, scoring 2 hits with considerable damage, but the Tirpitz was still able to get underway a month later & change her anchorage. On 29 Oct 39 Brit Lancasters attacked again, scoring zero hits. On 12 Nov 31 Lancasters attacked again, this time with Tallboy bombs, scoring 3 hits & causing the ship to capsize & sink.
All of Churchill's bluster aside, early in the war, when Brit aircraft & bombsights weren't that good & the Tallboy bomb hadn't yet been invented, their ability to sink a German battleship in port was dubious at best.
In light of the above, I'd say the Bismarck joins the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, & Prinz Eugen in the N Atlantic in Aug or Sep '41, & at that time-- when Brit air coverage isn't that great & the US hasn't yet entered the war-- wreaks considerable havoc. These ships engage in 1 cruise prior to Jan, then another in Jan to facilitate the breakout of the Tirpitz with the Scheer, Lutzow, & Hipper. Despite the fact that the US is in the war by this time, US training is weak, US-Brit cooperation is poor, the Arctic nights are long, the winter weather is lousy, & all these factors work to the advantage of the Germans. Nevertheless, their chances of successfully breaking into the N Atlantic are about 50-50-- UNLESS...
There is 1 factor that could significantly tip the scales in favor of the German Fleet. Cooperation between the Luftwaffe & the Kriegsmarine was notoriously poor. If the Luftwaffe based a sqdn of long-range torpedo bombers at Bergen & another at Brest (the BV-138 is my preference), preferably under Kriegsmarine command, & used 4 a/c to shadow the German ships in rotation with the rest of the sqdn on-call, then this would enable the Germans to shoot down those silly Fairey-Swordfish biplanes the Royal Navy used, to damage RN heavies, or both. The Bergen sqdn escorts halfway, then the Brest sqdn takes over.
If the Germans employ long-range torpedo bombers then the breakout succeeds, with maybe 2 or 3 of the German ships being damaged in the process. The others then escort them into port.


One thing is realy important in this issue of the possible breakout of the Geramn Fleet from Western France, namely the close proximity to open ocean, with little or no possibilities to track any German fleet, with over the Biscay Gulf strong Luftwaffe Pressence as well. The British would have to deploy a strong fleet of scouts from Ireland to Spain, in order to guard this erea, alway's at risk of becomming subject either Airattack, or U-Boote strikes, as these were also commonly found here. The Approaches from Northsea and Arctic to the North Atlantic were more easily guarded, due to the vaster distance away from German controlled airspace and longer routes to travel from base to operational erea for the German ships.

It is not entirely excluded the Bismarck would draw much more attention from the RAF and Royal Navy, compared to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, but it would also create a more heavy response from the Germasn Luftwaffe, keeping more fighters in Western France to cover the German Fleet. (on Hitler's orderes only) So the possibility of keeping the German ships operational at least, excluding engineproblems of internal causes, was better with Bismarck in France, than without, since the likelyhood of a succesfull British attempt to do serious damage was smaller, with the stronger presence of German defenses around the capital ships. (Bismarck was a prestige object for the Führer, so her would keep his precious toy well protected, when in reach of hit powers. Only when at sea, his influence was limmited, due to the Kriegsmarine, which was far from loyal to the political regime in Germany.)

One problem would remain, in the form of geting the German ships eventually back in Germany itself, or Norway if you like it. They had to solve the smae problems as in the OTL, namely the routesellection at the best possible time. Naturally the Chanel was an option, but a difficult one, since the close proximity to British airfields remained a problem. Luck was needed, as with Cerebus, but luck sometimes runs out. One advantage of the Germans was the lack of capabilities of the British to operate effectively in anti shipping warfare in the late 1941 and early 1942, due to lack of both quality and quantity of especially aircraft, capable of doing the job.
 

Graehame

Banned
WARSPITE
Your point is well-taken about the U-boats, but as far as fighters are concerned do realize that in late '41 there were only 2 jagdgeschwader in W Europe-- JG 2 & JG 26. More fighters weren't available without drawing down the offensive vs the USSR, which wasn't gonna happen, so increasing fighter cover for the Bismarck wasn't likely. Increased antiaircraft guns, on the other hand, was very likely. Between heavy flak, camoflage, & the generation of high-density smoke, the ships might have been relatively safe.
Also, thanks for pointing out that the KM "was far from loyal to the political regime." Others on this site seem to think that the KM was a bunch of Nazis, when in fact they were the least political service & had the least political clout because of it.
As for getting back to Germany, I honestly don't see the problem. Why even bother, when drydocks & other shipyard facilities at Brest, Lorient, Ste. Nazaire, & La Rochelle were adequate to the needs of the small German fleet?
I also wonder whether at this point, with 2 BBs, 4 CBs, & 2 CAs in the N Atlantic, the KM might not have considered using the Vichy ports of Tangier, Casablanca, &/or Dakar to base part of their fleet.
 
WARSPITE
Your point is well-taken about the U-boats, but as far as fighters are concerned do realize that in late '41 there were only 2 jagdgeschwader in W Europe-- JG 2 & JG 26. More fighters weren't available without drawing down the offensive vs the USSR, which wasn't gonna happen, so increasing fighter cover for the Bismarck wasn't likely. Increased antiaircraft guns, on the other hand, was very likely. Between heavy flak, camoflage, & the generation of high-density smoke, the ships might have been relatively safe.
Also, thanks for pointing out that the KM "was far from loyal to the political regime." Others on this site seem to think that the KM was a bunch of Nazis, when in fact they were the least political service & had the least political clout because of it.
As for getting back to Germany, I honestly don't see the problem. Why even bother, when drydocks & other shipyard facilities at Brest, Lorient, Ste. Nazaire, & La Rochelle were adequate to the needs of the small German fleet?
I also wonder whether at this point, with 2 BBs, 4 CBs, & 2 CAs in the N Atlantic, the KM might not have considered using the Vichy ports of Tangier, Casablanca, &/or Dakar to base part of their fleet.



Well taken, by the way.

The point to the Luftwaffe was however more orientated to the Political interest of Hitler in person in the Bismarck, making him to decide to allocate an additional FG or so to their defense. (ommiting Göring, who did not want to do so.) So only he could decide to alter the Luftwaffe strength in Western France, possibly by removing some airunits from Sicily, or somewhere else in the South. (HMS Illustrious was already taken out, so most of the German Luftwaffe could be redeployed to other regions where there was likely to be an enemy threath in the Air. As long as the British Mediteranean Fleet and Malta were more or less out of the fight (both around the time of the Bismarck Affair), the Luftwaffe had options to redeploy.)

By the way, the Germans would very much likely not redeploy Tirpitz before the fall of 1941, at least not outside the Baltic, so that leaves only a possible three BB's at best and one or two heavy cruisers for operations in the Atlantic. Admiral Hipper was undergoing a complete neginerefit and was not available for a long time, while Admiral Scheer was possibly the only ship capable to sail from the German controlled waters to join the rest in France, theoretically, making up a force of three BB's (Bismarck, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with two CA's; Prinz Eugen and Admiral Scheer. Lutzow was still under repairs after her torpedoing by a Beaufort in early 1941, while the light cruisers simply lacked the range to join the ships in France. (Only Nurnberg and Köln were in any operational status, since Emden was not an effective ship, being obsolete in design and Leipzig never had recovered from her serious damage after being torpedoed by HMS Salmon.)

The main problem would be to supply any large German force in the Atlantic, since in the OTL the supplyships for the operation Rheinübung had all been removed form the ocean by the British, making the Atlantic a very hostile place for any future German operation in this part of the world.
Naturally the German ships could make occasional dashes into the North Atlantic, but they still had to return every now and then to refuel and rearm, or repair damage. This could only be done in occupied France, since the Vichy French were unwilling to allow them to make use of their colonial facilities. Admiral Darlan, in controll of the Navy of the Vichy regiume, was not known to be very enthousiastic towards the Germans, opposed to his political superior Petain.

One tactical limmit for using the ports in occupied France was besides the constant danger of airattack, the limmited size of the docks available. Most French drydocks were small and only one in Brest and one in St. Nazaire could take in a Battleship sized ship, with the one in the later city the only one large enough to take in Bismarck and Tirpitz, since the Brest Dock was to narrow.
 
How about, and I know its a stretch but its something I played with when playing RISK, is have the Italian and even parts of the Japanese fleet, move in in a combines axis attack in the Atlantic. Maybe even on England itself?
 
That's extremely unlikely. The Italians would have to fight their way past the RN's Mediterranian Fleet and Force H before joining up with the Kriegsmarine, and the IJN is stretched pretty thin at this moment, so you can forget about them, even if they could do it, and I admit they could have.
 
One crucial and very hard to predict factor would be the effect on British morale. Another one that would be important would be the effect on Roosevelts resolve to assist Churchill. and a third, which naturally I cant find squat about on the net... is what another effective surface raider would do to shipping insurance rates, which were already close to stopping more freighters than the Germans.

I spent yesterday reading Churchills correspondance from late May 41 just to see what he thought was important, and you really get a feeling for his depression until he gets confirmation of the Bismarcks sinking.

Churchill had a raft of problems he had to deal with. The military stuff was bad enough. He'd just told Wavell that they could discuss W's resignation whenever W wanted. German paras were gaining ground on Crete, and the Iraq and Syrian problems were troubling him. He was prodding people to increase war production, he worried about the French Fleet, he had to reassure the Free French, the Australians, the S Africans and the Poles. He had political problems at home. The House of Commons was after him, he was trying to institute a draft in N Ireland, and he had to remind his generals not to offend their allies or the Americans. He took time during the 31 hours Bismarck was out of contact to send a message to Chaing Ki Shek in China, recall the UK wasnt at war with Japan yet.

If Bismarck had made port (very likely imho) the RN would have had to pull units from the Med, rather than send units TO the Med. Timing here is crucial. Crete was about to be evacutated. Most of the men rescued were added to the force that occupied Syria. That battle essentially hinged on those reinforcements. Iraq was settling down that week after HabForce occupied Baghdad, but was by no means secure. Churchill was very worried about Turkeys neutrality if Syria fell. If the RN had pulled its heavy units out of the Crete evac, or not gone in for the last night of the evac, things in N Africa could have gone very differently.
 
So what happens if Crete isnt evacuated, Wavell has 16,500 less troops refitting in reserve, sends one less Australian Div to Damascus, the Vichy French defeat the UK in Syria and threaten the Canal... ?

(Bismarck would have required months of repair due to the aerial torp hits alone, but at that point the RN had only BC Renown to counter. All the KGVs were a couple of knots too slow to catch her.)
 

Graehame

Banned
PRAIRIE VOICE
As far as the Italian and Japanese fleet cooperating in the Atlantic, Mussolini had said that he'd never allow any of his ships beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. Not saying this couldn't be overcome, but it would require some Axis naval success in the Med first, & possibly the committment of the Vichy French fleet.
As for the Japs, they aren't at war until Dec '41 with anyone but China. There's a very tight window of opportunity between Pearl Harbor & Midway, during which time the Japs did pull off a carrier raid in the Indian Ocean, but their priority after PH was the US-- not helping Germany with combined ops in the Atlantic.
I personally see no opportunity for the Japs in the Atlantic at all. However, I do think that Hitler could have leaned on France a lot harder to declare war vs the Brits. The RN had attacked the French at Casablanca, Mers el-Khebir, & Dakar. The Brit Army had invaded the French colonies of Lebanon & Syria, & had assisted in the Free French landings in French W Africa. The Vichy armistice required France not only to "assist Germany in all ways short of war", but to defend itself if attacked. Following the surrender of Gen. Dentz in Syria in Jun '41 I think Hitler could have gotten French cooperation in the Med, if he'd insisted, vs either Lebanon or Malta. If the Malta invasion goes forward in the winter of '41-42, when fuel requirements on the Eastern Front permit, then we would have seen some Italo-French naval cooperation, with the remote possibility of moving Italian & French heavy naval units into French W Africa in early '42. This would have encouraged the Kriegsmarine to do the same.
The main reason none of this happened was Hitler's reluctance to put pressure on the French. He was happy with them out of the war & didn't want to upset things.
 
It seems unlikely that even if the Bismark could be made operational will all the working up, tests and crew training required for an Atlantic raid would be impossible in the French Atlantic ports.

Wasn't the Sharnhorst bombed in July 41 when attempting to do this (out of protected harbour doing trials)?????

But maybe that's better anyway (Bismark kept in port). Even if the other warships are sent back to Norway up the channel, you keep Bismark in St. Nazaire (You probably can't raid the dry dock if the Bismark is in it). A strategic threat even if its only vauge (insurance rates, more protection for Toch convoys etc..)

Just pretend your a going to make a raid every once in a while, load up a crew, load up some supplies, plant leaks saying a raid is imminent, then find some good reason to cancel the raid before the ship leaves port.

The strategic overstretch might cause Britain to cancel Arctic convoys (at least at times - Winter 42 perhaps)

All the while the port is a sump pump for bombs (better on France than Germany). Britain keeps submarines of the port for no good purpose etc...

Sort of like Tirpitz the ship becomes less effective, eventually only a flaoting battery, eventually sunk in the summer of 1944.
 
(Bismarck would have required months of repair due to the aerial torp hits alone, but at that point the RN had only BC Renown to counter. All the KGVs were a couple of knots too slow to catch her.)


You seem to forget that the King George V class could make 29 knots in a dash for a short time, while the modernised HMS Renown was good for just some 28 knots at best in a loaded condition, so the King George V class was always the better option in this case. HMS Renown was not only a bit too slow, but also too thinly protected to be of any use against a surfaceship. As a carrierescort her heavy AA outfit was better suited.

By the way, Bismarck's torpedodamage was not likely to be that big, if the ship could get back in port, sicne the only real damage was to the rudder and stering gear in the OTL. Without this damage, only the holes in the hull had to be plated over again, which could easily be done in a couple of weeks. One torpedo from the OTL did not even do structural damage at all, as it hit the main armored belt on the late 24th of May, launched by Lt. Esmond from a Swordfish from HMS Victorious. So the likely damage would be the torpedo from HMS Ark Royal's Swordfish striking midships, propably below the belt and the one that missed the staringgear in this scenario, but propably hit somewhere else on the stern, without affecting either steering, or propulsion, as this would have resulted in her loss, due to the following British Fleet.
 
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