Operation Michael succeeds

[Blair152]

I'll tell the truth here. WWI isn't my field of expertise. I'm more into World War II. Go to this site www.wikipedia.en.org/OperationMichael for more details. Operation Michael, also known as the Michael Offensive, was Germany's last-ditch effort to defeat the Allies. It began on March 26, 1918,
and the Germans took back most, if not all, the ground they'd lost in 1916.
Germany kicks Britain out of France, makes it to Paris, and is able to dictate
terms to the Allies, all before the AEF sets foot in France.

[wiking]

First I'd like to recommend David Zabecki's "The German 1918 Offensives", which examines this option and the historic outcomes of the battles. It also has tremendously useful maps that you won't find online for this POD.

Now as to this specific question, you'd have to be more specific on the POD. The operation was a major success as it was, but it was the first in a series of offensives, rather than a war-winner by itself. However, if Ludendorff had stuck to his plan and not reinforced failures, costing lots of irreplaceable troops, moving on instead to other operations in sequence, things could have been much different.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Michael
Instead of going after Arras, which was an unnecessary bloodletting, and letting the offensive run its course, Ludendorff could then shift his reinforcements north to run Operation George, instead of losing so many men and being forced to run Georgette, the scaled down version of the plan.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_...Lys_%281918%29
This battle is then much more likely to succeed, having more forces attacking at more points, while the Allied forces have been drawn to Amiens in response to Michael (again as planned). Launched in late March/very early April instead, this operation is much more likely to succeed in taking something(s) vital, like Hazebrouck, Ypres, Poperinghe.
This would provoke the collapse of the very shallow and vulnerable British supply network in Flanders, causing them to pull back to the coast, or risk their troops falling out of supply. While not forcing the Brits to abandon Northern France, or all of Belgium, it would be a major blow to morale and a boost to German ambitions. Now from here, more shots at the British would be necessary and desirable, as they would have had most of their trench lines, which took years to develop, forcibly removed from their control. The British were vulnerable, and if the right steps were taken, they could be driven out of Northern France.

Combine this with a reasonable peace offer, which Ludendorff was supposedly trying to work on, and an armistice perhaps could have been negotiated (assuming the French/British civilian government were convinced that the Germans had hurt them too much and their offer was the best deal). That is still unlikely. The Belgians would have to cut a deal and drop out of the war, again unlikely. From this point the Germans would have to offer a lot of concessions, which they were not likely to do.

The only way to get the French out of the war, the only way to peace at this point, would be to drive the British from the continent and focus on the French. But in driving the British out, which would require excellent luck and skill the German high command did not possess, would probably exhaust German resources, and the British would be back.

I really don't see a good end to the war for the Germans, though with a more success series of offensives, they might not get as raw of a deal if they leverage their position properly (though given German diplomatic records, this is nigh impossible).

[Blair152]

Thank you. I heard about it on the Military Channel program The First World
War. Let's say that the POD's between late February and March 26, 1918.

[wiking]

Ludendorff suffers a major stroke and dies, which given his personality would not be too far fetched. He is the major obstacle; with him running the show, Germany won't be able to negotiate properly, or really run an effective war effort. Though he had done wonders for improving German tactics and creating the proper apparatus for disseminating doctrine, he was a strategic fool, which was only tempered by Hoffmann while serving in the East. Really, have Wetzell or Groener (though he was out of the picture by this point, heading up the war ministry) running the show (perhaps Hoffmann can come West even) intelligent strategy can be used to run the offensives and a reasonable series of terms can be given at the right time. The major problem was that the German high command at this point was run by nut jobs war fanatics, who were tightly connected with war industries bent on making record profits. Honestly, terms should be offered hard on the heels of several major success, but this is hard to imagine given the rather amateurish and extremist mindset of the those running the show at this point.

Honestly, the Allies hold all the cards and Germany at a minimum is going to lose Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, and all gains in the West, which IMHO is a small price to pay for avoiding Versailles and holding on to the East. Hell, if they're lucky, they might even pick up Austria and the Sudeten when the AH empire collapses. Throw in getting to call the shots in the Baltic and Poland and the war was probably 'worth it' for Germany, though I use that in the loosest possible sense.

Their relative power to the West would have increased, though they lost their only ally, but they knocked out Poland, secured their Eastern border, guaranteeing that they are top dog in the East for the foreseeable future, removed their terrible ally AH while absorbing the worthwhile parts and dominating the rest economically.
France has been crippled, despite gaining Alsace-Lorraine, and even if they have to pay an indemnity, lose their colonies, and have their navy limited, it is still worth it due to the economic and political gains.

[miketr]

Zabecki suggests going after Amiens, Logistics hub of British Army in France, as the Germans primary objective. If it was taken it would cause the British all sorts of problems.

My own thought is the best move for the Germans in 1918 if we assume no changes before then, IE USA has entered the war, Russia collapsed, etc. Is to hold on the defensive and offer real negotiations to the Western Allies. Agree up front that Belgium and occupied France will be returned. Hope that the Germans can get the allies talking and get the guns to go silent with out having to hand over their heavy weapons. Ask for to hold onto the occupied territory but be willing to do an armistice in exchange for occupied France and Belgium but not Luxembourg or Alsace-Lorraine. If the Germans can get the war turned off and keep their army they have a chance to work out some type of deal.

If / when this is refused the best they can on the defensive. Perhaps launch limited offenses against weak points like Italy. Attempt to bleed the allies for every inch and keep the same offer open. Allied political resolve was very weak in 1918 and the Germans logistics and food situation had hit rock bottom and were actually getting better, if only minorly.

Michael

[Mikestone8]

Originally Posted by wiking

Ludendorff suffers a major stroke and dies, which given his personality would not be too far fetched.

Iirc, he and Hindenburg had a narrow sqeak in September 1917, when their train was involved in a collision. In the event, the other train just missed their carriage and they suffered no more than bruises and injured dignity. But if Ludendorff had been killed (assume that Hindenburg is lucky and survives) the whole Michael business would have been planned by someone else. $64,000 question of course is who. Hoffman, Groener and Seeckt are the ones who immediately spring to mind, but there are other possibilities. Anyway, my gut instinct is that at this stage in the game almost anyone would be better than Ludendorff.

[Hörnla]

IMHO, the point is that the scale of the military success won't be decisive unless ASB-proportions are reached.

The Germans might be able to get close to Paris, but not into it.

They might be able to hurt the British a lot more, but not to push them out of the war altogether.

What counts in late 1917/early 1918 would be a German realization that they have already reached an overall strategic victory concerning their original war aims, i.e. breaking up the Entente.

This should be accompagnied by a peace-offer which would have to be supported by all levels which matter: OHL, Kaiser, Reichstag and also there has to be at least one Austro-Hungarian signature somewhere.

This could be a possible draft:

-Germany is ready to give up all occupied territories in France, Belgium and Luxemburg - withdrawal will be gradual over a period of six months and accompagnied by general demobilisation on all sides.
- Germany accepts a payment-plan with the Belgium government covering a certain amount of the damages done there. The bill is to be set by a committee of neutral, Belgian and German officials.
-A plebiscite will be held in Alsace-Lorraine under Neutral observation. Germany will give up all places with a vote in favour of France and negotiate viable corridors to any French enclaves.
-Germany is ready to limit its Navy to 49% of the world largest Navy and proposes an international conference to end the Naval Arms Race.
-Prussia will abolish the 3-Class-Suffrage.
-Austria gives up Gradisca and the Trentino.
-Trieste & Western Istria will hold a referendum; should this referendum be favourable to Italy, Trieste will be internationalized and become Italian as soon as Italy has financed an expansion of the harbors of Rijeka and Spalato to bring them (combined) up to 60% of the capacity of Pola & Trieste combined. (This should be less expensive than a month of war...)
-Serbia, Montenegro and Albania will be restored in their pre-war borders with the exception of the Serbian-Bulgarian border. Serbia is not allowed to unite with either of its neighbours.
-War guilt is to be accepted by all major powers with a special mentioning of the Serbian role.
-Neither the Baltic States nor Finland are not to become part of the German Empire or to enter a federal association with it.
-There shall be an independant Polish state at least within the borders of Congress Poland. Any further offers to Poland are decided in Vienna or Berlin.
-A treaty with the Ottoman Empire is to be worked out at a international conference. The same applies the fate of the German Schutzgebiete.
-The CP are ready to accept the USA as "neutral" for all further comitees and negotiations if they are willing to accept these points as a base for peace within reasonable time.
-The treaties of Bukarest and Brest-Litowsk are valid.

The fat cat is the war winner for Germany. Everything else includes some ground for negotiations and concessions (plebiscites in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no plebiscite in Lorraine and some more points wouldn't hurt). In the end, everyone can feel as a winner (besides Russia which unfortunately has different problems at this point of time).

Germany should also just once in its lifetime be able to stage a sensible PR-strategy, both internally as well as externally- the aim is that the offer and its sincereness should become common knowledge in Italy, France, Britain and the USA.

Now...why dying for Belgium or Alsace-Lorraine as long as everything can be achieved by giving up?

Now, these, diplomacy and PR, are the important parts. It is debatable if it is a better strategy now to pursue offensives à la Michael to show that the peace offer is no sign of weakness or if it would be better to publicly announce that "Germany is, and strategically always was, fighting on the defensive". (Some argue, that these offensives were actually a waste of ressources and manpower which left the German Army weaker in the summer of 1918 than it could have been).
This way, the reserves freed by the peace in the East could rather be used to bolster defences on the secondary fronts in Italy and on the Balkans. Germany could even afford to refrain from counter-offensives in France and Belgium and instead just calculate for the public the addition.
(e.g. "During the French spring-offensive, French troops conquered 327 km² at the cost of 200,000 dead within 8 weeks. Our losses amounted to 80,000. The German Government mourns the brave dead of both sides at this point where war has become unnecessary and wishes to point out that for the conquest of the remaining 12,000m² of occupied French territory, France has to sacrifice estimated 7.2 million soldiers within five years of war - or accept our peace offer which also gives will settle the matter of Alsace-Lorraine in a fair and honorable fashion.)