Washington Naval Treaty Fails

[stevep]

Phil

a) The G3's were funded. That has been mentioned in a number of places on several boards.

b) The main problem with the 16" guns was due to weight-saving measures. Which was a waste as the ships came out under-weight. However a 35k ship drastically cut down from 48k is bound to have problems. The original G3 design would have been far roomier. Even so its a myth that Rodney damaged itself in the fight with Bismarck.

c) The Treaty didn't fully stop the naval race. It prevented new capital ships but the newly designed 10k cruisers made virtually all older ones redundant. Coupled with as mentioned serious shortfalls in scouting elements. [In Britain a lot of cruisers were relatively small and short ranged, having been designed for the stand off against Germany. In Japan and America, other than now obsolete protected and armoured cruisers there weren't really any suitable units]. Give you one guess who built the largest number of such ships?

Steve

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

Boy, I feel as I posted something about German superweapons having limitations on a Luft 46 board.

As to WTRE: What research? A string of assertions from a former board is hardly research.

Concerning the economic effect of Naval race, no one has cited anything. There were no budget figures, no economic projects or economic studies showing a naval race would not have ruined England financially. All I see are unsupported claims that fail to consider the dire economic straits the of the times.

As to the WTRE "research" and my arguments, the WTRE assertions do not flatly do anything to my arguments.

How are my claims about the Nelsons contradicted? Nothing in the cites to "WTRE project" "flatly contradicts" my claims, let alone undercuts my claims in any material fashion. Nor does anything change the fact that the BL 16 inch Mark I gun was less than a success.

The Nelsons were generally viewed as serious underachievers with relatively poor guns--relatively a poor design, for whatever reason. If the Nelsons may have been an "attempt to shoehorn too much ship into too little tonnage" that means they were a poor design. That suggest the designers were not as flawless as suggested earlier. Nothing in the WTRE material has contradicted this.

Posters have repeatedly suggested the G3s would super ships because the Royal Navy had special knowledge gained from combat in the Great War. Had Admiralty and the naval architects of the Royal Navy been possessed of such superior knowledge from the Great War than the rest of the world, the Nelsons probably would have been a better ship. Instead, they ill conceived ships that in many cases could not fire the main batteries effectively without damaging the ships from muzzle blast. If the Admiralty had such special knowledge, they would not have ended up with the inaccurate, short-lived BL 16 in Mk I but instead would designed a better weapon.

Again, the G3s would have been saddled with this indifferent weapon. Nothing in the WTRE has contradicted this assertion. Finally, as I cited before, the Nelsons turrets and mounts were based on the G3s designs. History shows that that the Royal Navy Rodneys and KGs had considerable issues with turrets and mounts. It is reasonable to suspect the G3s would have some of these issues. Nothing in the WTRE contradicts this.

Again vaporware always seems better than what is delivered.

[PhilKearny]

Golly, this appears more and more similar to engaging See Lowe supporters.

Originally Posted by stevep

Phil

a) The G3's were funded. That has been mentioned in a number of places on several boards.

I repeat: Just because the Parliament had the money in place in the Estimates (budget bill) does not mean that the nation could truly afford to build the ships. The money was not spent. Spending of it may have resulted in the worsening of an already bad economy, the state of which I discuss further below.

b) The main problem with the 16" guns was due to weight-saving measures. Which was a waste as the ships came out under-weight. However a 35k ship drastically cut down from 48k is bound to have problems. The original G3 design would have been far roomier. Even so its a myth that Rodney damaged itself in the fight with Bismarck.

Do you have a cite for your assertions? I do.

You seemed to have ignored this cite the first time I linked to it. So, for your convenience and edification, I have reproduced part of it below. From the Naval Weapons Site on the BL 16 inch Mk I gun (this web page provides a bibliography; a Google book search will reveal other sources that offer the same conclusions):

These weapons were originally intended to be used on the never-built "G3" battlecruisers. When those ships were cancelled as a result of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty, the guns and turrets already on order were redesigned slightly and then used on the only two British battleships built in the 1920s, HMS Nelson and HMS Rodney. These were the last wire-wound guns built for the Royal Navy and the only ones to see service mounted in triple turrets. The unusual all-forward turret arrangement was adopted in order to save weight, as this meant a reduced citadel length. A similar approach was taken in the later French Dunkerque and Richelieu designs.From inadequate firing trials, a mistaken theory was promulgated by the Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO) that held that a high-velocity, low-weight projectile would have superior armor penetration characteristics at large oblique angles of impact, a conclusion which was the opposite of previous findings. This theory was not substantiated by later trials, but these took place too late to affect the decision to use a lightweight APC projectile for new designs. As a result, these guns proved to be only marginally better in terms of armor penetration than the previous 15"/42 Mark I and much less satisfactory than those older guns in terms of accuracy and barrel life. [Emphasis added.]

Even if the weight savings caused problems with the shell handling, interlock, turret mount, etc., (which I do not concede were the primary cause), the problems with the BL 16 inch gun itself was not caused by weight savings. The inaccuracy, excessive barrel wear, and relatively poor penetration were due to design errors.

As to whether the whole gunnery system--such as the interlocks, etc.--would have been better on G3s than on the Nelson than the Nelsons is speculation on both our parts. My speculation, however, is supported by the facts that the gun systems for the G3s were adopted by the Nelsons, the G3 guns and turrets did not work well on the Nelsons, and later designed gun systems worked less well on the KGs. These facts allow me to reach the very reasonable conclusion that Admiralty had problems in the designing gun turrets and accompanying systems for capital ships if more than two guns were involved and G3s would have suffered as a result. While not a politically correct answer, it is very reasonable.

If the blast damage to the Nelsons from their own guns is a myth, it certainly is a persistent one. Do you have a cite that the blast damage was a myth? Looking in Google books I find multiple volumes that report that the Nelsons had trouble with blast damage. For example, a myriad of results repeating this "myth" can be found with a search on Google Books using theses words: blast damage Rodney Bismarck. Other searches using similar words reveal reports of the Nelsons suffering blast damage on other occasions. Here is a well written, if sarcastic, summary of the Nelsons, stating that blast damage did occur. While by no means a primary source (nor does it cite a primary source), the writer presumably did some research before committing his opinions to ink--unlike many of the postings here. Do you having evidence that the blast damage is just a myth rather than fact?

c) The Treaty didn't fully stop the naval race. It prevented new capital ships but the newly designed 10k cruisers made virtually all older ones redundant. Coupled with as mentioned serious shortfalls in scouting elements. [In Britain a lot of cruisers were relatively small and short ranged, having been designed for the stand off against Germany. In Japan and America, other than now obsolete protected and armoured cruisers there weren't really any suitable units]. Give you one guess who built the largest number of such ships?

That's what treaties do--they limit full blown arms races, turning them into less expensive ones.

I will give you one guess about that the state of that builder's economy and if that builder could have afforded a full blown naval race after having been bled white in the Great War. The post war economic situation was not good for your aforementioned builder, with the builder's economy being in a full blown depression in some ways more severe than the Great Depression. Further, Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill's inane policies in the 1920s to defend Sterling stunted economic growth prior to the Great Depression.

The builder of all those treaty cruisers, the UK, could not have afforded a full blown naval race that the WNT negotiated away. Obviously, Japan could afford such a race even less. The United States alone had the wherewithal for such a race, but the United States chose not to engage in one for whatever the reasons. The reason the Unites States could afford such a race was its economy was so much bigger than the other powers because of the size of the United States relative to the other powers and because the United States had not squandered its treasure in the Great War but rather had profited handsomely from the war. Had a full blown naval race occurred, the economic consequences may have been terrible for all involved, with Japan probably suffering the most, then the UK, and the US suffering the least.

[Dilvish]

Regarding the state of US naval aviation at the time, I don't think any of us here really know the truth of the situation. I lean towards the US Navy having a strong interest in naval aviation, both land- and ship-based. I suspect that part of this interest was to deal with the Navy's weakness in scouting forces. I believe that the Navy was already considering converting some Lexington's into carriers. I know that the Lexington's as is were not popular ships. I need to find Friedman's book about US aircraft carrier design history.

[marklbailey]

I see in this old thread the ancient myth that the UK could not have afforded the G3 class, and various claims about WTRE.

WTRE used actual UK budgetary data (which can be verified by looking at the Brasseys of the time, which had RN budgetary data). The analysis was done by a bloke who saves poorly-run or failing companies for a living by sorting our their finances. So the WTRE financial summary is quite accurate:

QUOTE
Financial impact of the proposed capital ship construction program on the economy of the United Kingdom

The forecast impact on the expected United Kingdom Budgets, of the construction of four, 46,000 ton, G3w class fast battleships, was calculated on an Excell spreadsheet, and would be as follows:

Total cost of the G3 Program: £40.146 MM
Total cost of the O3 Program: £14.843 MM
Additional cost of the G3 Program over the O3 program: £25.303 MM

Forecast annual expenditures on the G3 Program:
1921 £1.244 MM
1922 £7.770 MM
1923 £8.349 MM
1924 £8.787 MM
1925 £9.732 MM
1926 £4.964 MM
Total £40.146 MM

Historical surplus (deficit) available from RN Estimates, caused by not spending all Authorised funding, but including O3 program:
1921 £6.583 MM
1922 £7.392 MM
1923 £3.962 MM
1924 £0.106 MM
1925 £0.495 MM
1926 £0.957 MM
Total £19.469 MM

Additional funding required for G3 over O3:
1921 £1.244 MM
1922 £4.101 MM
1923 £5.381MM
1924 £5.818 MM
1925 £6.763 MM
1926 £1.995 MM
Total £25.303 MM

Historical budgetary surplus (deficit), United Kingdom:
1921 £38 MM
1922 £69 MM
1923 £76 MM
1924 £34 MM
1925 £20 MM
1926 £(8) MM

Impact of G3 Program on the UK budget surplus:
1921 £38 MM (funding for G3 not spent, but Authorisation carried forward under Force Majeur)
1922 £69 - 5 = 64 MM
1923 £76 – 5 =71 MM
1924 £34 – 6 =28 MM
1925 £20 – 7 = 13 MM
1926 £(8) – 2 = (10) MM

I therefore conclude that the UK could have easily afforded the G3 Program (which was absolutely not what I had expected).
UNQUOTE

Also routinely unknown is that the G3 allocation of funds was simply re-scheduled. ~15M was expended on the O3 class ships, and the rest on the large light cruiser program (County class - yes, when built they were rated on armour and they were indeed CL) in order to maintain employment and the health of that part of the industry scheduled for retention.

let me restate that so there is no mistaking the point: the budget allocation of the G3 purchase was expended by diverting it to O3 and cruiser construction.

Those who argue that the 'G3 could not be afforded' also place themselves in the position of arguing that the O3 BB and the County class did not, in fact, exist.

Treasury was never averse to reasonable expenditure on heavy warships, it maintained employment on critical regions and maintained a number of lucrative export industries.

This myth is like a whack-a-mole. No matter how many times you whack it, it just keeps popping up.

Cheers: Mark

[MattII]

Well one positive effect for Britain would be that they never build the Nelrods.

[AdA]

The great victim would be Japan. France and Italy would get in a minor race among themselves. The RN would cut its losses and be happy to play second to the French on the Med and to the USN on the Pac, The only ones crazy enough to try and stay in a decade long race with the USN would be the Japanese, and they would go bankrupt. they would then be unable to afford an army large enough to invade China, and their fleet would suffer the fate of the Soviet Navy in the 90s once the entire Japanese economy colapsed and Japan underwent a decade of change and turmoil before becoming, in the late 30s, a time appropriate version of its current self...

The treaty was a way out for all the major world navies to avoid an arms race they (except the US) could not afford.
Let's imagine Britain makes all the cuts in its budget that allow the G3 to be built. How are they gonna follow them up when the USN introduces their follow on designs to the South Dakotas and Lexington classes? And how are they gonna man them? Could the RN provide crews for more ships without crippling the economy?
And the carrier and cruiser programs would suffer, a lot. If all else follow OTL the RN of the early 30s will have the G3, the BCs and the QEs and little else...
Not the ideal base to contain the rise of the KM...

[AdA]

The money not spent on the G3 paid for the Nelsons, the first Counties, but didn't it also paid for the convertion of the Corageous, Furious and Glorious?
And wouldn't a non Washington logic force the building of the N3, wich would then produce all the economical clusterfucks generally attibuted to the G3 on this discussions?

[alspug]

The single most important facet of no washington treaty is that the Armour manufacturers will not go away . this means that their is Armour available for the KGV class etc . hostorically their was big problems with getting enough armour to build them . Tanks needed armour as well . so in this case tanks / cruisers / battleships and carriers will be built faster and more concurrently .

[marklbailey]

I have never understood people's adverse views of the O3 design. Nelson and Rodney were the fastest and most powerful battleships in existence for many years, were very reasonably priced, and in their middle age gave excellent service 1939-45.

What more can be asked?

it is an artifact of much better knowledge of RN BB that everyone thinks them somehow less than they were. It's a most curious historical phenomena.

N3

We do not and never will know if the N3 was a genuine build option, a 'maximum battleship' option, a bluff, or something in between. Such consensus as there is tentatively considers N3 to be a maximum BB 'option of last resort'. Only to be built if things go badly pear-shaped. it is now considered that the IJN 18" designs were similar, almost but not quite serious ships. Everyone knew that the 18" barrier, once broken, would mean heavy expense and high levels of political risk.

For the RN - why bother, really? In the G3 type ship they had a genuine fast BB a decade (at least) ahead of anything anyone else had. And people thought it was a BC with a 7" belt: they carefully advertised the order for 7" armour. The belt armour contract was not advertised, and the impression was developed that the G3 7" deck armour was its belt armour.

I have always suspected that the replacement for the 13.5" BB fleet would have been a second order for G3+, probably two ships in 1926 estimates and a refinement of the design. Possibly even called a BB version, with the speed understated (that's speculative on my part).

Cheers: Mark

[AdA]

Originally Posted by marklbailey

I have never understood people's adverse views of the O3 design. Nelson and Rodney were the fastest and most powerful battleships in existence for many years, were very reasonably priced, and in their middle age gave excellent service 1939-45.

What more can be asked?

it is an artifact of much better knowledge of RN BB that everyone thinks them somehow less than what they were. Most curious.

Cheers: Mark

They would be the fastest if Nagato had a number of its boilers unoperational...
Nagato and Muso were faster than the Nelsons.
As for powerful, they did have 9x16'', but if those were superior to the 8x16'' of their Japanese and US rivals is a matter of opinion.
They did well on WW2, but so did the QEs. Given a more than ten years advantage on design, the reason people don't like the Nelsons is because a modernized QEs would arguably have been better...
It migh also have something to do with looks. Never underestimate the price of uglyness...

[Richter von Manthofen]

I actually LIKE the Rodney/Nelson

[marklbailey]

AdA: Let's imagine Britain makes all the cuts in its budget that allow the G3 to be built. How are they gonna follow them up when the USN introduces their follow on designs to the South Dakotas and Lexington classes?

Comment: For the RN no budget cuts are needed. The money was approved, appropriated, and spent after a delay.
On the USN, How could Congressional approval be obtained for follow-on USN BB and 'giant scout' production? Why would the USN even want them when it had no cruisers? (Not to mention the block obsolescence problem from hell)

Some Congressman will say 'you have more 16" ships than the rest of the world combined and because the British are building two more you want entire new classes?' Seriously, how is that going to fly?

As for follow-up designs, if you have something a decade or more ahead of everyone else and they do not know that, why not order ships of a refined type? Two to replace the 4 Orions, then four (in two groups spaced probably 2 years apart) to replace the seven surviving Audacious and Iron Duke class and Erin.

AdA: And how are they gonna man them? Could the RN provide crews for more ships without crippling the economy?

Comment: If one is replacing four 13.5" BB with two ships, how can this be considered a problem? You can man them and reduce overall manpower simultaneously.


AdA: And the carrier and cruiser programs would suffer, a lot.

Comment: Why? The RN was working on a ~7000 ton 'proto-Leander' at roughly a million pounds each. They had no need at all to lay any down before 1925-26 and could extend that to 1926-27 without concern, they had a large number of new cruisers in stock. They went to County class because it became the default standard (two million each) and built 11 of them (and Australia another two).

They realised than that they were too expensive to be afforded in the numbers they needed and went to cheaper Cathedrals and Leanders.

So instead of 13 Counties (26 million) they can build 20 'Leander type cruisers' AND pay for the carrier reconstructions (2,137,134, Glorious's rebuild cost) and still have a couple of million in change.

Are costs in this era not understood?

Cheers: Mark

[marklbailey]

AdA, the protection system on the O3 was far in advance of IJN or USN practise at the time, and contemporary data was that the Nagato class were at best 24 knot ships, like the O3. Most considered them 22-23 knotters.

Nitpicking on guns is relatively irrelevant, all relatively modern BB had enormously powerful guns capable of shattering almost anything afloat. At the end of the day the difference between a 14" hit and a 16" hit on the target is not that much. RN ammunition was certainly better than anyone else's in the era and that's more important that relatively small differences in gun performance.

I've examined a target ship we hit with our 4.5" guns. Damned if I could see any difference with the damage the 5" guns on the DDG did.

Cheers: mark

[AdA]

Originally Posted by marklbailey

AdA, the protection system on the O3 was far in advance of IJN or USN practise at the time, and contemporary data was that the Nagato class were at best 24 knot ships, like the O3. Most considered them 22-23 knotters.

Nitpicking on guns is relatively irrelevant, all relatively modern BB had enormously powerful guns capable of shattering almost anything afloat. At the end of the day the difference between a 14" hit and a 16" hit on the target is not that much. RN ammunition was certainly better than anyone else's in the era and that's more important that relatively small differences in gun performance.

I've examined a target ship we hit with our 4.5" guns. Damned if I could see any difference with the damage the 5" guns on the DDG did.



Cheers: mark

In reality, the Nagatos were faster than the Nelsons, even if the RN was unware of it at the time.

http://www.alternatehistory.com/disc...d.php?t=250787

[Derek Pullem]

Different spin - how long would the treaty have to be delayed to allow the 4 G3 to be completed and what else would get built in the meantime?

[AdA]

Originally Posted by marklbailey

AdA: Let's imagine Britain makes all the cuts in its budget that allow the G3 to be built. How are they gonna follow them up when the USN introduces their follow on designs to the South Dakotas and Lexington classes?

Comment: For the RN no budget cuts are needed. The money was approved, appropriated, and spent after a delay.
On the USN, How could Congressional approval be obtained for follow-on USN BB and 'giant scout' production? Why would the USN even want them when it had no cruisers? (Not to mention the block obsolescence problem from hell)

Some Congressman will say 'you have more 16" ships than the rest of the world combined and because the British are building two more you want entire new classes?' Seriously, how is that going to fly?

As for follow-up designs, if you have something a decade or more ahead of everyone else and they do not know that, why not order ships of a refined type? Two to replace the 4 Orions, then four (in two groups spaced probably 2 years apart) to replace the seven surviving Audacious and Iron Duke class and Erin.

AdA: And how are they gonna man them? Could the RN provide crews for more ships without crippling the economy?

Comment: If one is replacing four 13.5" BB with two ships, how can this be considered a problem? You can man them and reduce overall manpower simultaneously.


AdA: And the carrier and cruiser programs would suffer, a lot.

Comment: Why? The RN was working on a ~7000 ton 'proto-Leander' at roughly a million pounds each. They had no need at all to lay any down before 1925-26 and could extend that to 1926-27 without concern, they had a large number of new cruisers in stock. They went to County class because it became the default standard (two million each) and built 11 of them (and Australia another two).

They realised than that they were too expensive to be afforded in the numbers they needed and went to cheaper Cathedrals and Leanders.

So instead of 13 Counties (26 million) they can build 20 'Leander type cruisers' AND pay for the carrier reconstructions (2,137,134, Glorious's rebuild cost) and still have a couple of million in change.

Are costs in this era not understood?

Cheers: Mark

1. THe USN would build to counter the IJN. they didn't need to build to couter the RN. But the RN would be left behinf if it stayed put while there was a USN vs IJN race going on
2. A non WNT RN was going to be bigger than a WNT navy. Would they still scrap the old ships. if they do they loose numbers, if they don't they need sailors.
3. Would the LBC to CV convertions still happen? without the USN and IJN treaty forced convertions? Would they still build new carriers?
4. Woud they still build new cruisers without the artificial new Treaty Cruiser class. Or just keep the WW1 era ones longer?

[HMS Warspite]

Both Nelson and Rodney had been scheduled for an extensive refit in the early 40's, as was HMS Hood by the way. War simply prevented this program to be executed, which meant the Nelson, which already had been refitted technically, but not yet cosmetically, Rodney and Hood would soldier on the way they were, with especially engines in bad need of an overhaul in case of Rodney and firecontrol and uparmoring in HMS Hood.

Technically HMS Nelson and Rodney were the most advanced battleships for years, outgunning and outarmoring all opposition, untill Yamato came around. No battleship appart from Yamato had thicker deckprotection and her 14 inch belt was inclined and of a greater thickness than all older, or even newer battleships, appart form Yamato and King George V. Even the new breed of USN battleship were less in armor thickness.

Problem was that the O3 was always seen as a cut back ship, as a result of the Washington Naval Treaty, as the ships were originally to have been G-3, which was what the Royal Navy and the public wanted. Ascaled down shipwas always poliitically a lesser vessel, so he two best interwar battleships actually build, did not come out favourably, compared to ships with a Great War history and better appearance.

Compared to the realy postwar deveopped design of HMS Nelson and HMS Rodney, their contemporaries in Japan and USA were of an older basical design, as the Nagato had been developped from and 1916 design, although late enough to learn about the lessons of Juttland. The USN design was basically a 1912 design still, unaltered through the South Dakota's and Lexingtons in general layout, which all had started with the Nevada's. Therefore the O3 was more superior in both offense adn defense, as the concentrated grouping of armament and engines were much more and advantage than often seen, as this allowed the ship to become smaller, while still retaining the same firepower, although somewhat hampered by a blind spot, but improved protection. In British thinking the lack of rear guns was not seen as a problem, given the idea that the British would never run away, but give chase. For that the mounting of all nine main guns forward was a serious advantage.

[Richter von Manthofen]

I believe the French basically did the same (forward pointing guns) with the newer Richelieu class)

[AdA]

A streched, bigger, faster, QE. Basically a Caracciolo with revised protection, should be doable under 35000t and probably better balanced than the Nelsons.

[MattII]

Originally Posted by marklbailey

I have never understood people's adverse views of the O3 design. Nelson and Rodney were the fastest...

Weren't the QEs capable of 24 knots?

What more can be asked?

A ship that doesn't have a huge blind spot for its mains and can keep up with its contemporaries would be favourite.