Washington Naval Treaty Fails

[stevep]

Guys

I don't know if the AJA had lost meaning. True there is no German threat forcing Britain to concentrate the bulk of its forces in the North Sea. Even so its better having allies carrying a bit of the burden than having to try and be strong everywhere. Especially since if Japan, if not an ally is at least a rival. Furthermore the alliance gave political/diplomatic influence over Japan and the fact it was allied to one of the great European powers gave more influence inside Japan to those more liberal elements.

Not to mention the original purpose of the alliance have been common concerns about Russia. The empire had gone and the state was in an awful mess but there was still the potential of the SU being a threat, to Japan, to the ME or to interests of both powers in China.

As such I don't think Britain needs to see America as strongly hostile to have reasons to favour renewal of the alliance. I very much doubt that America, while it might be resentful, would be overtly hostile and if so I still think Britain would seek to resolve any problems by means other than military.

Steve

Originally Posted by Captain Lincoln F. Sternn

Agreed. I think the British Empire also understood that America was moving back to its traditional isolationism and underfunding of the military. Japan was likey to use its military, America was not and Britain, Australia and New Zealand understood this. Canada has and always will be frightened of America (with good reason). Afterall, if Arnold had been just a little better general---No Canada at all, just North Montana

Originally Posted by Redbeard

I agree that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (AJA) had lost its meaning by the ending of WWI - in OTL.

But if we have an ATL, where USA for whatever reason show very aggressive intentions (and capability), the situation will again be similar to WWI - i.e. RN has an enemy that requires concentration of force (in the Atlantic) and Japan is then better as an ally than as whoknowswhat. But it requires that the relation to USA is beyond all hope of repair.

I do think however, that USA becoming that hostile towards UK is quite unlikely. A naval race between rivals - perhaps, but that doesn't necessarily mean open hostilities, especially when there really isn't any good reasson.

Concerning France and the Maginot Line I used to consider it a waste of resources and a millstone around the French army's neck. But the fact that it didn't take up any significant part of French military spending and the fact that it did perform its job of channeling the Germans away from the French-German border has convinced me that the France's problems lay elsewhere.

The French army of 1940 wasn't especially defensively minded. On the contrary its biggest mistake was taking the offensive into Belgium as as soon as the Germans were seen moving. Had Gamelin been more cautious or defensive if you like, he would have let Belgium be Belgium and kept his strategic reserve in place until the German main trust had been positively identified. Even with all the operational and tactical shortcomings of the 1940 French Army that would probably have had the German offensive bog down before a breakthrough is achieved.

The French were as good soldiers as any, but the combination of a very rigid and slow decision cycle with a massive operational blunder (going into Belgium and being cut off) was more than anybody could have withstood. And even then, what remained of the French army actually put up a good fight in June 40, accelerating German losses. In a few weeks the French learned to go from WWI type continious frontline to 360 degree defensive positions deployed in chequerboard formation - a very effective way to counter armoured assaults, but by June too much had been lost to keep cohesion.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[stevep]

Divish While I think the main board is dead some of the guys have resurrected a previous version of it @ http://alltheworldsbattlecruisers.yu...adnoughts.html I wasn't involved in the WTRE discussion as before my time unfortunately, but did heard about and read up on it later. Not sure whether there would be no economic consequences for Britain from completing the planned 8 ship programme, but they could be mixed with some benefits. Also don't think Britain would be looking at somehow reviving the two power standard. The US fleet especially would still be pretty damned large and powerful. While the RN would, I believe, have a qualitative edge that also would not be known to the other powers and only be assumed by the RN without actual combat to confirm it. Steve

Originally Posted by Dilvish

Redbeard,

I remember the WTRE discussion from Bob Henneman's old board (RIP). The impression I got there was that the Japanese building program would be curtailed by economic factors, made even worse by the earthquake. The US building program would stall out due to a penny-pinching Congress, plus whatever ships survived the program would be obselete. The British meanwhile, would be producing their advanced battleships with no worry of economic consequences. This would also lead to a Royal Navy that would be superior to the Japanese and American fleets combined (the old Two Power standard).

In such a case, could this push Japan and the USA closer together, seeing the British Empire as a possible enemy to both?

[DD951]

Originally Posted by stevep

I'll echo that. Very likely the sort of way the USN would have tried to go. Although since the SD's were supposed to be 24kt ships would a 25Kt have been that much of a change?

Steve

The South Dakotas were designed for 23 kts, which was a 2-2.5 kt increase over previous ships. USN thinking at the time considered speed relatively unimportant, on the grounds that their analysis saw firepower, protection, and range as more important attributes in a capital ship, while seeing its most likely operational role being that of a large navy, which would operate as a single concentrated battlefleet on the stragegic offensive, in accordance with Mahanian thought, led the planners to conclude that it didn't have to chase down an enemy, but rather, the enemy would come to it. The increase in speed by two knots was seen as a relatively minor tactical consideration to meet speed increases in foreign battlelines. Indeed, the South Dakotas were rather a departure from typical US battleship evolution in that it used the enlarged size over the Standards to buy more firepower and speed, without improving protection or range; the only other US battleships to make similar design trade-offs were the Iowas, which were a special type, partially intended as a battlecruiser-killer.

Although the USN did conduct several design studies into battlecruisers between 1909-14, the concept was repeatedly rejected as an inferior fighting ship to the conventional dreadnought in that the battlecruiser was too fragile to stand in the battleline because of the sacrifises in armor and firepower made to gain speed, and if battlecruisers were allowed to operate independently (contrary to doctrine which considered keeping the fleet together as a paramount imperative), they risked being defeated in detail, weakining the fleet for little gain. Coming to those conclusions about battlecruisers, the General Board declined to buy any, as they would take the place of more useful dreadnoughts, on the reasoning that if the battlecruiser was as good of a fighting ship, then the typical capital ship of the first-class navies would be a 28-30 kt battleship with the characteristics typical of the OTL battlecruiser. The Lexingtons were considered to be strategic scouts, sort of a cruiser on steroids, large, fast, powerful ships that couldn't be forced to fight by capital ships (supposed to be several knots faster than foreign BCs) and could overwhelm smaller cruisers and destroyers which could through overwhelming firepower. (Of course, that relied on some rather large assumptions about foreign capital ship design and that their captains and admirals wouldn't make the error of thinking they had sort of a fast battleship instead of a cruiser- sort of the WW1 equivalent of the Humphreys-designed 44 gun frigates as the closest USN historical analogy- and fight enemy BCs & BBs instead of using their speed to decline action except at very long range if possible, as their designers & the General Board intended.) The fast battleship studies came about when the USN learned of the true nature of the Hood and wanted to have designs available if foreign navies were going to merge the battlecruiser and battleship into a new type of fast battleship, but didn't want to start that revolution in naval design itself.

[HMS Warspite]

I have to agree with DD951 in mentioning the USN post WW1 planning was rather conservative and very Mahanian, rather than more modern, including the lessons learned in the Great War, in which the USA themselves did only participate for just a year at best. This lack of experience and certainly in naval warfare was very clear in the Battlefleet only thinking of the postwar period, as it mostly ignored the more important supportfleet needed to both protect the battlefleet and even more the more important communicationlines for trade and commerce. In the eighteenth century, such a policy was well funded, given the means available at that time, but the post WW1 period made it obsolete.

If this fleet was created as planned, the USN would be quite unballanced and very vulnerable to all kinds of modern warfare already developped elsewhere. Luckily the US also put great efforts in the Washington Treaty allowed reconstruction of capital ships into Aircraft Carriers, therefore remediing the most direct consequenses a bit, but not much. Without the Carrierdevelopment, allowed by the OTL treaty, the USN was in a possition of the Dinosaurs in the time of the Asteroid impact 65 milion years before. So the USA badly needed the Washington Naval Treaty to force it to look for alternatives in more modern warfare.

[Larrikin]

Originally Posted by HMS Warspite

I have to agree with DD951 in mentioning the USN post WW1 planning was rather conservative and very Mahanian, rather than more modern, including the lessons learned in the Great War, in which the USA themselves did only participate for just a year at best. This lack of experience and certainly in naval warfare was very clear in the Battlefleet only thinking of the postwar period, as it mostly ignored the more important supportfleet needed to both protect the battlefleet and even more the more important communicationlines for trade and commerce. In the eighteenth century, such a policy was well funded, given the means available at that time, but the post WW1 period made it obsolete.

If this fleet was created as planned, the USN would be quite unballanced and very vulnerable to all kinds of modern warfare already developped elsewhere. Luckily the US also put great efforts in the Washington Treaty allowed reconstruction of capital ships into Aircraft Carriers, therefore remediing the most direct consequenses a bit, but not much. Without the Carrierdevelopment, allowed by the OTL treaty, the USN was in a possition of the Dinosaurs in the time of the Asteroid impact 65 milion years before. So the USA badly needed the Washington Naval Treaty to force it to look for alternatives in more modern warfare.

Spot on, the USN would have been very, very, unbalanced.

Let's compare RN types with their USN counterparts

G3 vs Lexington - the G3 was armoured against the Lexington's guns, the Lexington may as well as not had armour vs the G3's guns.

Elizabethans vs Omahas - Sorry, don't want to be on an under armoured under gunned Omaha if an Elizabethan turns up.

RN battlecruisers (Invincibles, Indefatigables, Cats, Renowns) vs Big 10 AC - speed, fire power, armour in favour of the RN.

RN light cruisers vs USN light cruisers - no comparison, literally, as the USN don't have any.

Etc, etc. The USN flush deck destroyers were significantly inferior to their RN equivalents, the RN already had aircraft carriers not only in service, but had seen action, RN submarines were superior, FAA aircraft of the time were superior in both number and capability, on and on.

The USN may have been building the Mahanian battle line from hell, but that's all they were building, and the ships for it were out dated before they would have even been launched, let alone commissioned.

[Markus]

Larrikin,

the USN´s Colorados were probably the best BB afloat after WW1, the Tennesses were alomost as good and the SoDaks would have been inferior to a G3-class fast BB in terms of speed only. I agree that the Clemsons were not as good as V/Ws but I would not call them significantly inferior.

[HMS Warspite]

Originally Posted by Markus

Larrikin,

the USN´s Colorados were probably the best BB afloat after WW1, the Tennesses were alomost as good and the SoDaks would have been inferior to a G3-class fast BB in terms of speed only. I agree that the Clemsons were not as good as V/Ws but I would not call them significantly inferior.

In terms of protection the USN battleships were all significantly inferior to the proposed G-3 type of the UK, as none could match its scale of protection and especially horizontal armor, which was at best in 1923 for the USN ships a thin deck of 3 inch at best, until upgraded in the 30's in some ships (only the older Nevada's, New Mexico's and Pennsylvania's). None came even close to the 6,5 inch main armored deck of the G-3, to which was added a 1,5 inch weather deck as well. Against plunging fire, all USN BB's were actually not much better than HMS Hood, who also had only 3 inch of deckarmor. (in two layers of 1,5 inch each). Even a 12 inch round could breach trough such light deckarmor, so these slow and wide BB's were perfect targets for heavy shelling, as they also lacked speed to countermanouvre in battle.

It is hard to say, but even the IJN new generation of 16,1 inch gunned ships were better protected than the USN designs, as all had already as designed 4 inch deckarmor, which was later increased to 6 or 7 inch in some parts of the vessel. Only at short range the USN slow BB's had thick armor, but at 13,5 inch thick, this was still likely to be insuficient against 16 inch fire. (thicker plating was not available at the time, so they had to do with it.) Compared to this the IJN ships had thinner sidearmor, but the new G-3 type had 14 to 15 inch sideprotection, which was also inclined to give more protection. With the British still being the manufacturers of the hardest carbonized armored steel, the British ships were quite outclassing all there was under constrcution, or even designed abroad.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Markus

Larrikin,

the USN´s Colorados were probably the best BB afloat after WW1, the Tennesses were alomost as good and the SoDaks would have been inferior to a G3-class fast BB in terms of speed only. I agree that the Clemsons were not as good as V/Ws but I would not call them significantly inferior.

Markus

I don't think anyone's saying the US battle-line wasn't powerful and well protected. However it was slow and the designs would have dated fairly rapidly. More to the point the rest of the fleet had flaws because of the concentration on heavy ships and that significantly weakened its potential capacities.

Steve

[Markus]

Originally Posted by HMS Warspite

In terms of protection the USN battleships were all significantly inferior to the proposed G-3 type of the UK, as none could match its scale of protection and especially horizontal armor, which was at best in 1923 for the USN ships a thin deck of 3 inch at best, until upgraded in the 30's in some ships (only the older Nevada's, New Mexico's and Pennsylvania's).

Which US BB? The actual "Big Five" or the SoDaks? From what I found the G3s and SoDaks would have carried more or less the same amount of armour.

So it would have been:

SoDak vs. G3, Colorado/Tennesee vs. QE-class and R/Orion/KGV/Iron Duke vs. Nevada, New Mexico and Pennsylvania classes.

[Larrikin]

Originally Posted by Markus

Larrikin,

the USN´s Colorados were probably the best BB afloat after WW1, the Tennesses were alomost as good and the SoDaks would have been inferior to a G3-class fast BB in terms of speed only. I agree that the Clemsons were not as good as V/Ws but I would not call them significantly inferior.

Remember the G3s were fast battleships, the RNs equivalent to the SoDaks, if they had even been built, would have been the N3s, and those would have definitely been superior to the SoDaks.

The G3 would have had sex to the Lexingtons and then rolled over for a cigar.

There goes your fleet scouts and screening, because there is no way the Omahas could have dealt with the rest of the RNs cruisers.

As for the Clemsons, quite a number of RN, RNR, and RNVR sailors and officers served on both them and on V/Ws, and they regarded the Clemsons as significantly inferior, particularly in sea keeping.

So, really, did the USN, but with 200 of them built it was going to be a long time until the USN could pry more funding out of Congress for replacements.

In a full on fleet encounter, not only would the USN have very likely comprehensively lost the scouting fight, they would also have lost the screening fight, and the RN with the G3s, QEs and Hood had a tactically significant speed advantage of a 10 ship fast wing.

Also remember that USN battleship design was never, ever tested in a full blown fleet battle, or even in normal battleship vs battleship action.

The only two times the USN's surface warfare capital ships came up against opposition capital ships were the night knife fight at less than point blank range in the Slot, and during the target practice at Surigao Strait.

Not only were the new RN ships the result of war time experience that the USN didn't have, the older ships were all battle proven designs. To top it all off, the RN's armour piercing shells were superior to the USN's until at earliest the mid 30s.

[Markus]

Originally Posted by Larrikin

Remember the G3s were fast battleships, the RNs equivalent to the SoDaks, if they had even been built, would have been the N3s, and those would have definitely been superior to the SoDaks.

And in this case the US would have reacted by simply building an N3 equivalent herself. Congress was quite willing to spend money on defence IF there was a reason. G3 and N3 would have been not one but two reasons.

Not only were the new RN ships the result of war time experience that the USN didn't have, the older ships were all battle proven designs. To top it all off, the RN's armour piercing shells were superior to the USN's until at earliest the mid 30s.

Did you read Norman Friedman´s design history of US BB? He says starting with the Nevada´s all BB had a very good armour that got better with each class. He also says the USN did not realize just how good their armour actually was. With regard to wartime experience, the RN shared all its info with the USN.

[Larrikin]

Originally Posted by Markus

And in this case the US would have reacted by simply building an N3 equivalent herself. Congress was quite willing to spend money on defence IF there was a reason. G3 and N3 would have been not one but two reasons.


Did you read Norman Friedman´s design history of US BB? He says starting with the Nevada´s all BB had a very good armour that got better with each class. He also says the USN did not realize just how good their armour actually was. With regard to wartime experience, the RN shared all its info with the USN.

Depends on what Congress considered a good reason, and I'm not sure with an isolationist Congress that they would have even finished what was on the slips, let alone shelled out for more expensive new ships to replace the perfectly good unused ones they already had.

In regard to the armour, I don't have a problem, I'm just wondering how the rest of the ship would have coped. Things pop up in fights that leave the designers and operators going "htf did that go wrong", and the USN BBs were never, ever, really tested in combat.

It's sort of like calling Patton the greatest general of WWII. He was greased lightning on the offensive, and could definitely move men and materiel, but he never fought a defensive battle, and his performance in the only meat grinder he fought wasn't that great. In addition he, like all other US generals in Europe spent men, particularly grunts, way too freely.

Until something gets a full blown testing I'm going to be skeptical.

[HMS Warspite]

A simple fact remains that the USN did not design realy new battleshipdesigns, radically departing from the Nevada Class prototype, since all were basically simmilar in layout, untill the new breed came in the late 30's. All were following the same 1912 thinking, which resulted in the Nevada class and this was not altered, appart from creating bigger ships in every succeding class, sometimes with bigger guns, but never with thicker armor.

The South Dakota Class of 1920 was simply as good, or bad as a Nevada Class BB, with a slight increase in speed (if not bulged after building, dropping speed again) adn bigger caliber guns. In a shortrange fight, it was propably as good as any other BB as her big guns could defeat any existing armor at close range, but equally, her protection could be breached at close range. The real difference was at longer range, since this was the more logical consequense of the bigger guns available (and aircraft beginning to appear). Against plunging fire, or AP bombs of around 250 KG and more, her 3 inch armored deck was of no real help anymore. AP shells and bombs could easily reach the vitals and do their job, just as good as USS Arizona, with her strengthened 5 inch deckarmor, proved not able to resist an AP bomb of 800 Kg, dropped by a B5N at only 5000 feet up. You need much more protection to resist such large ordonance.

Any successor of the South Dakota of 1920 would be a repead again, since designing a realy new ship would take up a lot of time. Increasing deckprotection on the existing design, without much redesigning was not possibly either, as the weight of the armroed deck would become too big to be carried in the hull, making the ship dangereously topheavy. So a redesigned South Dakota offshoot with perhaps 18 inch guns was possible, but the ship again was still basically simmilar to a Nevada in both strength and weakness. Anyway, the new breed of the British outclassed them seriously as did the IJN ships by a more narrow margin, following the comming of HIJMS Nagato and her successors.

When compared to eachother, the British G-3 and look a likes were a class on their own, having no real equals elsewhere, untill the comming of HIJMS Yamato in the late 30's. Even the twenty years younger USS Iowa class was slightly inferior in layout, although much more modern adn with further ranging weapons. Actually the Iowa would be a batltecruiser compared to a G-3 in protectionscheme, as she had less protection than the G-3, which was called a battlecruiser more due to its designed speed, rather than anything else. In a way, only the direct OTL offshoot of the G-3 and the new breed in Britain (Nelson, King George V and Vanguard Classes) were created and still were much more heavily protected than any other capital ship wherever else, except HIJMS Yamato. (but often sacrificed in firepower, or speed)

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Markus

And in this case the US would have reacted by simply building an N3 equivalent herself. Congress was quite willing to spend money on defence IF there was a reason. G3 and N3 would have been not one but two reasons.

Congress was quite willing, reluctantly, to spend on defence if it thought there was a reason. All the evidence is that they, correctly, didn't think the RN was a threat. Not to mention that while the USN was building up to 16 powerful new ships the RN was planning 8 or possibly at most 12 [ have heard rumours of at most 8 N3s]. Furthermore the US, like many other people, including unfortunately the British PM, thought that the G3's had 8" hull armour like the Lexingtons.

Also, without the wartime experience the RN had I doubt the USN at the time could come up with a comparable design. Britain passed a fair amount of information to the US and it gained experience working with the British fleet but wouldn't have gained all the information, nor probably successfully appreciated it all.

Did you read Norman Friedman´s design history of US BB? He says starting with the Nevada´s all BB had a very good armour that got better with each class. He also says the USN did not realize just how good their armour actually was. With regard to wartime experience, the RN shared all its info with the USN.

They were a good design, for their purposes, of a Mahanian battle fleet but that concept was somewhat flawed and beginning to be outdated. Also, as Larrikin pointed out the US capital ships were never tested as a fleet in the battle they were designed for until 44, under vastly different circumstances.

Steve

[PhilKearny]

I have my doubts that Parliament would be able to fund a fleet of G3s. G3s would have been at a minimum 50% more, if not 100% more than the Rodneys. The G3s displaced 50% more--on paper, without creep. The G3s were to have 160,000 hp turbines, while the Rodneys had 45,000 hp--around 3.5 time more. Power costs money and is probably the greatest expense in the ships. Further, the larger turbines and boilers would involve greatly more maintenance expense and obviously more fuel expense. The cost of building and maintaining the G3s could have caused a government crisis.

Further, the G3s' armament would not have been all that impressive in reality. While a 16 inch gun sounds great the G3s would still be stuck with rather poor 16" gun used on the Rodney and Nelson, which was hardly an advance over the very nice 15 inch used prior to it. Further, the mounts were less than successful. It took the better part of 20 years to get the guns and the turrets on the Rodsol and Nelsol to work in manner approaching the design specs.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_16-45_mk1.htm

The shortcomings of the BL 16 inch Mk 1 and its troublesome mount undercut the claims that the Royal Navy learned all that much about capital ships during the Great. Even more so, if you look at powder handling in Jutland in the Great War and on the Hood in the Great Patriotic War, one has to ask, "What did the Royal Navy learn?"

[Larrikin]

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

I have my doubts that Parliament would be able to fund a fleet of G3s. G3s would have been at a minimum 50% more, if not 100% more than the Rodneys. The G3s displaced 50% more--on paper, without creep. The G3s were to have 160,000 hp turbines, while the Rodneys had 45,000 hp--around 3.5 time more. Power costs money and is probably the greatest expense in the ships. Further, the larger turbines and boilers would involve greatly more maintenance expense and obviously more fuel expense. The cost of building and maintaining the G3s could have caused a government crisis.

Further, the G3s' armament would not have been all that impressive in reality. While a 16 inch gun sounds great the G3s would still be stuck with rather poor 16" gun used on the Rodney and Nelson, which was hardly an advance over the very nice 15 inch used prior to it. Further, the mounts were less than successful. It took the better part of 20 years to get the guns and the turrets on the Rodsol and Nelsol to work in manner approaching the design specs.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_16-45_mk1.htm

The shortcomings of the BL 16 inch Mk 1 and its troublesome mount undercut the claims that the Royal Navy learned all that much about capital ships during the Great. Even more so, if you look at powder handling in Jutland in the Great War and on the Hood in the Great Patriotic War, one has to ask, "What did the Royal Navy learn?"

The G3s were already funded, in fact the first 2 had already been laid down, with the next 2 to follow the year after. As for cost over runs and weight creep, the British ship builders were very good at making sure neither happened, after all they had been building capital ships at a rapid rate for 20 years and hadn't had any problems before.

As for the 16" Mk1, what went into the Nelson and Rodney was problematic because it had been fiddled with to get weight down for the WNT limits, and in fact those two came in underweight. It is not the same gun and mount that would have gone into the G3s.

As for powder handling on the Hood, powder handling had nothing to do with it, the Mighty 'ood took a shot to the after main magazines through a recognized weak spot that was going to be addressed at the major refit that was put on hold by the outbreak of war.

[PhilKearny]

Originally Posted by Larrikin

The G3s were already funded, in fact the first 2 had already been laid down, with the next 2 to follow the year after. As for cost over runs and weight creep, the British ship builders were very good at making sure neither happened, after all they had been building capital ships at a rapid rate for 20 years and hadn't had any problems before.

As for the 16" Mk1, what went into the Nelson and Rodney was problematic because it had been fiddled with to get weight down for the WNT limits, and in fact those two came in underweight. It is not the same gun and mount that would have gone into the G3s.

As for powder handling on the Hood, powder handling had nothing to do with it, the Mighty 'ood took a shot to the after main magazines through a recognized weak spot that was going to be addressed at the major refit that was put on hold by the outbreak of war.

As to funding, the fact that initial funding had been budgeted did not mean that the money was spent. There different between what is budgeted and then paying the bill. Further, in the post Great War world, with the new pressures, cost over runs are likely. Again, the G3s would be far more expensive to operate due to the more expensive fuel and maintenance bills. Also, I believe none of the G3s were never laid down.

Actually, the Royal Navy were not miracle workers in having ships meet design weight. The Queen Elizabeths were seriously overweight and as a result slower than planned. The last capital ship built prior to the WNT, the 'Ood, also came in grossly overweight--though this was mainly due to design reworking done after the glaring flaws in Royal Navy capital ship design exploded into sight at Jutland.

That the turret functioned poorly in the Nelsons was probably only in part in due to the weight savings expediencies. Part of it was poor design, similar to that suffered KGs. However, the considerable ballistic failings of the BL 16 inch guns and short barrel life were not due to this. Rather, these were due to the incorrect design assumptions and a rather poor design.

Review of the Nelsons also show that the naval architects for the Royal Navy were not quite as brilliant or advanced as their acolytes assert. The Nelsons are a design, heavy design but offer little improvement over the QEs, let alone the Colorados of the Uniteds States. The Nelsons suffered from poor gun lay out, poor reliability, and poor handling. Given the practical problems with Nelsons, one has to wonder about the reality of the G3s. Vaporware is always better than hardware.

As to what sunk he 'Ood, she may well been sunk as a result of poorly stored 4 inch ammunition rather than by penetration of her main magazine.

The bottom line is that the Royal Navy's design were not light years better than other designs, the G3s were not miracle ships, and the G3s may not have been affordable.

[Paulo the Limey]

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

As to funding, the fact that initial funding had been budgeted did not mean that the money was spent. There different between what is budgeted and then paying the bill. Further, in the post Great War world, with the new pressures, cost over runs are likely. Again, the G3s would be far more expensive to operate due to the more expensive fuel and maintenance bills. Also, I believe none of the G3s were never laid down.

Actually, the Royal Navy were not miracle workers in having ships meet design weight. The Queen Elizabeths were seriously overweight and as a result slower than planned. The last capital ship built prior to the WNT, the 'Ood, also came in grossly overweight--though this was mainly due to design reworking done after the glaring flaws in Royal Navy capital ship design exploded into sight at Jutland.

That the turret functioned poorly in the Nelsons was probably only in part in due to the weight savings expediencies. Part of it was poor design, similar to that suffered KGs. However, the considerable ballistic failings of the BL 16 inch guns and short barrel life were not due to this. Rather, these were due to the incorrect design assumptions and a rather poor design.

Review of the Nelsons also show that the naval architects for the Royal Navy were not quite as brilliant or advanced as their acolytes assert. The Nelsons are a design, heavy design but offer little improvement over the QEs, let alone the Colorados of the Uniteds States. The Nelsons suffered from poor gun lay out, poor reliability, and poor handling. Given the practical problems with Nelsons, one has to wonder about the reality of the G3s. Vaporware is always better than hardware.

As to what sunk he 'Ood, she may well been sunk as a result of poorly stored 4 inch ammunition rather than by penetration of her main magazine.

The bottom line is that the Royal Navy's design were not light years better than other designs, the G3s were not miracle ships, and the G3s may not have been affordable.

The research done in the previously mentioned Washington Treaty Re-envisaged project flatly contradicts the points you've made. Please remember that the Nelson's were an attempt to shoehorn too much ship into too little tonnage to meet the treaty obligations, the G3s were under no such restrictions.

[DD951]

Originally Posted by HMS Warspite

A simple fact remains that the USN did not design realy new battleshipdesigns, radically departing from the Nevada Class prototype, since all were basically simmilar in layout, untill the new breed came in the late 30's. All were following the same 1912 thinking, which resulted in the Nevada class and this was not altered, appart from creating bigger ships in every succeding class, sometimes with bigger guns, but never with thicker armor.

The South Dakota Class of 1920 was simply as good, or bad as a Nevada Class BB, with a slight increase in speed (if not bulged after building, dropping speed again) adn bigger caliber guns. In a shortrange fight, it was propably as good as any other BB as her big guns could defeat any existing armor at close range, but equally, her protection could be breached at close range. The real difference was at longer range, since this was the more logical consequense of the bigger guns available (and aircraft beginning to appear). Against plunging fire, or AP bombs of around 250 KG and more, her 3 inch armored deck was of no real help anymore. AP shells and bombs could easily reach the vitals and do their job, just as good as USS Arizona, with her strengthened 5 inch deckarmor, proved not able to resist an AP bomb of 800 Kg, dropped by a B5N at only 5000 feet up. You need much more protection to resist such large ordonance.

Any successor of the South Dakota of 1920 would be a repead again, since designing a realy new ship would take up a lot of time. Increasing deckprotection on the existing design, without much redesigning was not possibly either, as the weight of the armroed deck would become too big to be carried in the hull, making the ship dangereously topheavy. So a redesigned South Dakota offshoot with perhaps 18 inch guns was possible, but the ship again was still basically simmilar to a Nevada in both strength and weakness. Anyway, the new breed of the British outclassed them seriously as did the IJN ships by a more narrow margin, following the comming of HIJMS Nagato and her successors.

When compared to eachother, the British G-3 and look a likes were a class on their own, having no real equals elsewhere, untill the comming of HIJMS Yamato in the late 30's. Even the twenty years younger USS Iowa class was slightly inferior in layout, although much more modern adn with further ranging weapons. Actually the Iowa would be a batltecruiser compared to a G-3 in protectionscheme, as she had less protection than the G-3, which was called a battlecruiser more due to its designed speed, rather than anything else. In a way, only the direct OTL offshoot of the G-3 and the new breed in Britain (Nelson, King George V and Vanguard Classes) were created and still were much more heavily protected than any other capital ship wherever else, except HIJMS Yamato. (but often sacrificed in firepower, or speed)

The South Dakotas were a 1916-17 design, tweaked during the construction hiatus of WW1 and frozen in mid 1918.

Actually, the USN was planning to go to an entirely new design for its planned successors to the South Dakotas as the General Board wasn't happy with the protection, which couldn't be improved without a radical redesign and still maintain acceptable margins of stability (but had to order several more than planned in 1919 as the 'bird in hand'), the 'Battleship 1922', the design process of which was started late in 1920, and is described on pages 164-66 of Friedman's US battleships. Although the WNT cut the process short, before a detailed design could be made, while I haven't come across any springstyles, there's enough to deduce the basic characteristics of what it would have been. The ship herself would been about 700' long, about 106' wide (liimted by the Panama Canal), had a draft of about 31', and displaced 45-50k, with a long full-beam midsection (over 20% of the WL length). Armament would have been either 12x16"/50 or 8x18", with a secondary battery of 6"/53 guns, possibly in twin or triple gunhouses. Armor would have most likely been a 16"-10" inclined belt (up to 23 degrees), with a 5" armor deck and a splinter deck of about an inch. Speed would have been 23 kts. In order to save weight, there were discussions of using geared turbines instead of turboelectric drive, which would save about 400 tons in machinery and a couple hundred in uptake protection, thinning the armor located behind the main belt and armor deck, as well as the thin part of the the conning towers.

Also, the WW2 King George V class was somewhat of a retrograde step in armor protection, and not as impressive as its mid-30s contemporaries when put up against Bismarck's 15" guns, as this analysis by Nathan Okun demonstrates (although it does need to be revised, in some aspects, as the author has refined his data about gun & armor performance, found that Italian armor was much better then he originally thought [use the figures of Vittorio Veneto with British armor for more accurate data] and he overestimated the value of the decapping effect of the 1.25" armor-grade outer hull/splinter armor of the WW2 South Dakota).

[PhilKearny]

Originally Posted by Paulo the Limey

The research done in the previously mentioned Washington Treaty Re-envisaged project flatly contradicts the points you've made. Please remember that the Nelson's were an attempt to shoehorn too much ship into too little tonnage to meet the treaty obligations, the G3s were under no such restrictions.

Boy, I feel as I posted something about German superweapons having limitations on a Luft 46 board.

As to WTRE: What research? A string of assertions from a former board is hardly research.

Concerning the economic effect of Naval race, no one has cited anything. There were no budget figures, no economic projects or economic studies showing a naval race would not have ruined England financially. All I see are unsupported claims that fail to consider the dire economic straits the of the times.

As to the WTRE "research" and my arguments, the WTRE assertions do not flatly do anything to my arguments.

How are my claims about the Nelsons contradicted? Nothing in the cites to "WTRE project" "flatly contradicts" my claims, let alone undercuts my claims in any material fashion. Nor does anything change the fact that the BL 16 inch Mark I gun was less than a success.

The Nelsons were generally viewed as serious underachievers with relatively poor guns--relatively a poor design, for whatever reason. If the Nelsons may have been an "attempt to shoehorn too much ship into too little tonnage" that means they were a poor design. That suggest the designers were not as flawless as suggested earlier. Nothing in the WTRE material has contradicted this.

Posters have repeatedly suggested the G3s would super ships because the Royal Navy had special knowledge gained from combat in the Great War. Had Admiralty and the naval architects of the Royal Navy been possessed of such superior knowledge from the Great War than the rest of the world, the Nelsons probably would have been a better ship. Instead, they ill conceived ships that in many cases could not fire the main batteries effectively without damaging the ships from muzzle blast. If the Admiralty had such special knowledge, they would not have ended up with the inaccurate, short-lived BL 16 in Mk I but instead would designed a better weapon.

Again, the G3s would have been saddled with this indifferent weapon. Nothing in the WTRE has contradicted this assertion. Finally, as I cited before, the Nelsons turrets and mounts were based on the G3s designs. History shows that that the Royal Navy Rodneys and KGs had considerable issues with turrets and mounts. It is reasonable to suspect the G3s would have some of these issues. Nothing in the WTRE contradicts this.

Again vaporware always seems better than what is delivered.