Washington Naval Treaty Fails

[HMS Warspite]

As mentioned by others, the 8-8 program of Japan was already quite advanced underway (2 BB's complete, or fitting out, 2 BB's on the final stages of construction, 4 BB's to be ordered soon, 4 BC's in final stages of (hull) construction, (although one would be destroyed in the 1923 Earthquake) and four BC's to be ordered soon. This meant money needed to construct these was spend already for eight out of sixteen vessels of the program. Funds were already present for the con tinuation of the program. I see no problem whatsoever here, especially with the knowledge that the post Washington Navaltreaty period included a vast buildignprogram of supporting units, espeecially the very expensive Cruiser and destroyer programs, which were not calculated in the original 8-8 program.

I therefore can conclude that the Japanese were very much capable of completing the original 8-8 program with their economical background, but could not create a large supporting fleet to accompany the capital ships as well at the same time. Since the Heavy Cruiser program was actually more expensive than the 8-8 capital ships alone and also had additional programs in it for the new special type destroyers, the likelyhood of a completed 8-8 program, without the Washington Treaty would be a rather unballanced big gunned fleet, with too few supporting units in the fleet.

[Redbeard]

Post WWI British economy had the wish to lower the war time taxes to pre war level as a major theme and this of course put a strong pressure on public spending.

In times where no realistic threat against GB and her Empire could be seen in any forseeable future that of course had rearmament programmes be way down the priority list compared to tax reductions and spendings on social programmes etc.

In OTL the WNT in itself was a major reason for the British being confirmed in seeing no major threat to the Empire - things were in balance - and the only other power to count with was a good friend.

If the WNT fails, that equation is changed, and the British will have to keep the balance by building instead of treaties. Funding the G3s and after that the N3s or what ever will only mean a slight reduction in the planned tax cuts. But keeping the RN the major navy of the planet will be incredibly expensive in both maintenance, manning and when the pre-war and wartime ships need replacement.

If that is to be "politically funded" over a longer time span I think all we need however are some stronger anti-British rethorics from American government - not that unlikely - certainly not when you have experienced the British-Americans feuds on warships1

The British before WWII were extremely keen on protecting their Empire - that was the rationale behind all foreign policy. So let some battleship happy bloke win a presidential election in USA - and next have him do some Kaiser-like rethorics - and we have a British-American naval race started.

Might actually lessen the crisis if/when it comes, as a certain level of public spending is kept, but it will be interesting to see how congress reacts to a wish for an entire new fleet, as the ones they funded before 1922 now are largely obsolescent. It must be remarked, that where the British had a both clear and generally accepted and understood legitemacy for their huge navy, it will be quite another matter to ask for funding for a high seas USN just beacuse the "limeys need a lesson!".

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Redbeard

Post WWI British economy had the wish to lower the war time taxes to pre war level as a major theme and this of course put a strong pressure on public spending.

In times where no realistic threat against GB and her Empire could be seen in any forseeable future that of course had rearmament programmes be way down the priority list compared to tax reductions and spendings on social programmes etc.

In OTL the WNT in itself was a major reason for the British being confirmed in seeing no major threat to the Empire - things were in balance - and the only other power to count with was a good friend.

If the WNT fails, that equation is changed, and the British will have to keep the balance by building instead of treaties. Funding the G3s and after that the N3s or what ever will only mean a slight reduction in the planned tax cuts. But keeping the RN the major navy of the planet will be incredibly expensive in both maintenance, manning and when the pre-war and wartime ships need replacement.

If that is to be "politically funded" over a longer time span I think all we need however are some stronger anti-British rethorics from American government - not that unlikely - certainly not when you have experienced the British-Americans feuds on warships1

Know just what you mean. That's why I left that site.

The British before WWII were extremely keen on protecting their Empire - that was the rationale behind all foreign policy. So let some battleship happy bloke win a presidential election in USA - and next have him do some Kaiser-like rethorics - and we have a British-American naval race started.

Possibly the thing is some difference which makes the British more favourable to continuing the alliance with Japan. Despite it not being directed against the US and having nothing to do with them the US navalists were very hostile to it. Possibly have the Japanese express their concerns about the Americans a bit better and some sympathy generated in Britain, leading to an approach to make say a proper 3 party defence treaty. When the US rejects that the basis is there for a renewal of the alliance. From there some US politicians go off the deep end, claiming its a threat and tensions rise.

This also has the big advantage for Britain of maintaining the alliance and quite possibly undercutting the militant expansionists in Japan, which makes Britain's position a hell of a lot safer in the 30's and 40's presuming things develop similar to OTL.

Might actually lessen the crisis if/when it comes, as a certain level of public spending is kept, but it will be interesting to see how congress reacts to a wish for an entire new fleet, as the ones they funded before 1922 now are largely obsolescent. It must be remarked, that where the British had a both clear and generally accepted and understood legitemacy for their huge navy, it will be quite another matter to ask for funding for a high seas USN just beacuse the "limeys need a lesson!".

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

I wouldn't say obsolescent. The Marylands and SD's are slow but very powerful and will outclass any other battle fleet except possibly the RN until the 30's say, provided that the opponents give battle. The Lexington's, if build to the 1920 design are fast and powerful but damned fragile so don't want to mix it with any enemy capital ships and once carrier a/c develop need to be retired pronto but a lot of existing ships could have similar things said about them.

As you say the perceived need will be the big problem for the USN in getting any new capital ships out of Congress, given how much doubt there was about the existing programme actually being completed. Both because of the lack of a real reason for such a large fleet and if there's any hint of 'those 16 massive new, highly expensive ships we're just completed aren't up to the job' I can see the doors being slammed in the navies face PDQ.

Steve

[DD951]

OK, I was able to shrink those springstyles enough to post them as attachments, and here's the first one, a scheme for an evolved battlecruiser displacing 54k tons, armed with 12x16"/50, belt armor of 10-12", and designed for 29 kts. Although the calcuations seem a bit optimistic, this is one of the things the USN was considering as a the next generation of capital ships, and in a no-WNT TL, a updated deriviative of this design might be something the US tries to build in the BC role in the follow-ons to the 1916 ships.

[Grimm Reaper]

stevep, one problem with that scenario is Canada's opinion on Japan.

Since Canada did far more to support the UK in WWI than Japan did I find it difficult to imagine London not taking Canada's position into account and Canada's opinion of an alliance with the US versus an alliance by proxy with Japan was pretty clear.




Redbeard, anti-British rethorics? You came to the right place, buddy! Make yourself at home!

[DD951]

Here's an example of the other fast battleship concept, a stretched South Dakota, supposedly good for 25 kts (although again, the calcuations seem somewhat optimistic). Besides the fast battleships, the USN was looking at some more conventional designs, references to which can be found in Friedman's volume on US battleships; among these are a sketch for what looks like an enlarged South Dakota armed with 8x18" and 18x6"/53 in triple turrets, while there are also references to proposals for a 'clean sheet' design with the same armament and speed as the South Dakota on a compeletely new hull design, allowing for greater armor and improved stability.

With a failure of a WNT, the USN's plans would probably start with a somewhat downsized 1916 program (offering to defer/cancel/re-order to a 'modified design reflecting WW1 lessons' a couple South Dakotas or Lexingtons, to be built a few years later), perhaps try to build a Lexington hull or two as a carrier, and try to get a few new capital ships and carriers at a pre-1916 pace as 'regularly scheduled' replacements for pre-war ships and to keep pace with what the IJN & RN are adding. With cruisers, the USN would also try to get some more as that's a major capability gap, although the designs would be more or less like the OTL ones (the treaty cruiser being what the USN considered the smallest cruiser likely to be operationally useful). As far as destroyers, the USN is more or less going to be stuck with those 250+ four-pipers that got spammed during WW1, while submarine construction is likely to be pretty much the same (refitting the R & S-class boats to correct deficiencies and a handful of prototypes for updated, Americanized versions of late-war German U-boats such as U-135 & U-142, in an effort to create long-range cruiser submarines that could operate in direct support of the battlefleet in a Plan Orange offensive.)

[Cook]

Sigh,

Originally Posted by David S Poepoe

But the Maginot Line did work.

Originally Posted by Larrikin

The Maginot Line took less than 5% of France's defence expenditures during it's construction, and made sure that the Germans had to go north through Belgium and Luxembourg.

Originally Posted by Larrikin

It would have worked fully if the King of Belgium hadn't been such a prat, even after a copy of the German's plans to invade France through his country again ended up in Allied hands.

He had half his army sitting on the Belgian-French border, instead of manning the forts and defences facing Germany.

For those strange people that insist that the Maginot line worked I will present Exhibit A: German Troops entering Paris on 14 June and French capitulation on 22 June 1940.

The Maginot was a very effective barrier, against French understanding of Armoured Warfare. Against a German invasion it clearly wasn’t so flash.

Japanese Super Battleships would have performed the same role, resources would have gone into them instead of Aircraft Carriers and Japan ends up with even less anti-submarine warfare capability.

Originally Posted by Cook

Battleships can’t stop submarines and with allied subs preventing oil reaching the home islands, more battleships means Japan’s shortage of oil becomes acute sooner.

[simonbp]

Without the WNT, would the UK have gone after the Dominions to pay for the Navy? I know they did to some extent (e.g. HMS Canada), but having the Dominions pay for and man some of the capital ships would both allow Britain to both have a sort of "parity" with the US, while also helping to placate Canadian/Australian fears of the Japanese...

[PhilKearny]

A big thank you to DD591 for those two posts!

[PMN1]

Taken from WTRE, an intereasting What If where the UK builds its G3's.


If the US were to be hostile, or ambivalently neutral, towards the UK and the Empire, it would be in our best interests to have as many SoDaks and Lexingtons started or built as possible (“Bind my enemy with chains of gold”). These twelve ships would be:
a. Expensive to build;
a. Technologically obsolescent;
b. Making an already unbalanced fleet even more top-heavy with battleships and battlecruisers;
c. Out-designed by the RN’s new ships;
d. Too slow (SoDaks) to be able to pick a range at which to fight against the next generation capital ships, or too fragile to remain in range of a fight (Lexingtons) with one;
e. Too complicated to easily rebuild to modern (1920’s) standards;
f. Expensive to rebuild;
g. This would also ensure that the USN had twelve ships that were drains on the US Treasury, and were also:
h. Unpopular politically with the Republican party,
i. A drain on operating expenses,
j. But too new to replace by scrapping.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

A big thank you to DD591 for those two posts!

I'll echo that. Very likely the sort of way the USN would have tried to go. Although since the SD's were supposed to be 24kt ships would a 25Kt have been that much of a change?

Steve

[stevep]

Grimm

Canada was hostile to the continuation of the alliance because that meant an upset US. Similarly Australia and New Zealand were, by most sources I've read, in favour of a continuation because it gave them security against an upset Japan.

Steve

Originally Posted by Grimm Reaper

stevep, one problem with that scenario is Canada's opinion on Japan.

Since Canada did far more to support the UK in WWI than Japan did I find it difficult to imagine London not taking Canada's position into account and Canada's opinion of an alliance with the US versus an alliance by proxy with Japan was pretty clear.

Redbeard, anti-British rethorics? You came to the right place, buddy! Make yourself at home!

[stevep]

Simon

I don't think Canada paid for HMS Canada, which was one of the ships we had been building for Chile and, after a refit returned to them after the war. There had been talk of Canada buying 4 battleships about 1913-14 but that fell through, due to internal disputes about it in Canada.

What your probably thinking about are the I class BCs Australia and New Zealand which those two nations paid for. [Australia also manned it's ship but New Zealand lacked the manpower so transferred it to the RN]. Also later the Malaysia colonies paid for a QE class BB, given the name Malay.

Its an option that might have been possible although whether there was the will after the war I'm not sure.

Steve

Originally Posted by simonbp

Without the WNT, would the UK have gone after the Dominions to pay for the Navy? I know they did to some extent (e.g. HMS Canada), but having the Dominions pay for and man some of the capital ships would both allow Britain to both have a sort of "parity" with the US, while also helping to placate Canadian/Australian fears of the Japanese...

[Larrikin]

Originally Posted by Cook

Sigh,





For those strange people that insist that the Maginot line worked I will present Exhibit A: German Troops entering Paris on 14 June and French capitulation on 22 June 1940.

The Maginot was a very effective barrier, against French understanding of Armoured Warfare. Against a German invasion it clearly wasn’t so flash.

Japanese Super Battleships would have performed the same role, resources would have gone into them instead of Aircraft Carriers and Japan ends up with even less anti-submarine warfare capability.

Counter sigh - idiocy of Belgian King, who didn't man the Belgian defences facing Germany. In effect these were the northern extension of the Maginot line, and why France didn't continue it all the way to the coast, which they could have done.

[Grimm Reaper]

The French plan was that the Maginot Line would keep the Germans off French soil, forcing them to take a longer route through Belgium and perhaps Holland.

At that point, beyond the obvious advantages of buying time and adding one or more allies, the French Army would engage and crush the enemy.

Unfortunately once the shield was done the sword was allowed to rust.



stevep, absolutely true but it would seem unlikely that after Canadian sacrifices made in WWI that Canadian opinion would not have been of some importance in London.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Grimm Reaper

stevep, absolutely true but it would seem unlikely that after Canadian sacrifices made in WWI that Canadian opinion would not have been of some importance in London.

Grimm

Canada was of considerable importance, not just for its performance in the wars - as it helped out in the Boer war as well. However the same could be said of Australia and New Zealand. Not to mention British interests in China and the wealth of the Malayan colonies.

Most of all a US with various hot-heads blowing off with threats is awkward but unlikely to actually cause any serious problems. An angered Japan, the only fleet in a real position to threaten British interests after WWI, is potentially a lot more serious as they had been very willing to go to war to make their point.

Steve

[David S Poepoe]

Originally Posted by Grimm Reaper

Unfortunately once the shield was done the sword was allowed to rust.

I think its more correct to consider that the sword had been dulled and broken by the Great War.

The Royal Navy wasn't looking to renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and had already started considering Japan as a likely rival in the future. The AJA was on its way out, it had lost its purpose after the Great War.

[Captain Lincoln F. Sternn]

Originally Posted by stevep

Grimm

Most of all a US with various hot-heads blowing off with threats is awkward but unlikely to actually cause any serious problems. An angered Japan, the only fleet in a real position to threaten British interests after WWI, is potentially a lot more serious as they had been very willing to go to war to make their point.

Steve

Agreed. I think the British Empire also understood that America was moving back to its traditional isolationism and underfunding of the military. Japan was likey to use its military, America was not and Britain, Australia and New Zealand understood this. Canada has and always will be frightened of America (with good reason). Afterall, if Arnold had been just a little better general---No Canada at all, just North Montana

[Redbeard]

I agree that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (AJA) had lost its meaning by the ending of WWI - in OTL.

But if we have an ATL, where USA for whatever reason show very aggressive intentions (and capability), the situation will again be similar to WWI - i.e. RN has an enemy that requires concentration of force (in the Atlantic) and Japan is then better as an ally than as whoknowswhat. But it requires that the relation to USA is beyond all hope of repair.

I do think however, that USA becoming that hostile towards UK is quite unlikely. A naval race between rivals - perhaps, but that doesn't necessarily mean open hostilities, especially when there really isn't any good reasson.

Concerning France and the Maginot Line I used to consider it a waste of resources and a millstone around the French army's neck. But the fact that it didn't take up any significant part of French military spending and the fact that it did perform its job of channeling the Germans away from the French-German border has convinced me that the France's problems lay elsewhere.

The French army of 1940 wasn't especially defensively minded. On the contrary its biggest mistake was taking the offensive into Belgium as as soon as the Germans were seen moving. Had Gamelin been more cautious or defensive if you like, he would have let Belgium be Belgium and kept his strategic reserve in place until the German main trust had been positively identified. Even with all the operational and tactical shortcomings of the 1940 French Army that would probably have had the German offensive bog down before a breakthrough is achieved.

The French were as good soldiers as any, but the combination of a very rigid and slow decision cycle with a massive operational blunder (going into Belgium and being cut off) was more than anybody could have withstood. And even then, what remained of the French army actually put up a good fight in June 40, accelerating German losses. In a few weeks the French learned to go from WWI type continious frontline to 360 degree defensive positions deployed in chequerboard formation - a very effective way to counter armoured assaults, but by June too much had been lost to keep cohesion.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[Dilvish]

Redbeard,

I remember the WTRE discussion from Bob Henneman's old board (RIP). The impression I got there was that the Japanese building program would be curtailed by economic factors, made even worse by the earthquake. The US building program would stall out due to a penny-pinching Congress, plus whatever ships survived the program would be obselete. The British meanwhile, would be producing their advanced battleships with no worry of economic consequences. This would also lead to a Royal Navy that would be superior to the Japanese and American fleets combined (the old Two Power standard).

In such a case, could this push Japan and the USA closer together, seeing the British Empire as a possible enemy to both?

Originally Posted by Redbeard

I agree that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (AJA) had lost its meaning by the ending of WWI - in OTL.

But if we have an ATL, where USA for whatever reason show very aggressive intentions (and capability), the situation will again be similar to WWI - i.e. RN has an enemy that requires concentration of force (in the Atlantic) and Japan is then better as an ally than as whoknowswhat. But it requires that the relation to USA is beyond all hope of repair.

I do think however, that USA becoming that hostile towards UK is quite unlikely. A naval race between rivals - perhaps, but that doesn't necessarily mean open hostilities, especially when there really isn't any good reasson.

Concerning France and the Maginot Line I used to consider it a waste of resources and a millstone around the French army's neck. But the fact that it didn't take up any significant part of French military spending and the fact that it did perform its job of channeling the Germans away from the French-German border has convinced me that the France's problems lay elsewhere.

The French army of 1940 wasn't especially defensively minded. On the contrary its biggest mistake was taking the offensive into Belgium as as soon as the Germans were seen moving. Had Gamelin been more cautious or defensive if you like, he would have let Belgium be Belgium and kept his strategic reserve in place until the German main trust had been positively identified. Even with all the operational and tactical shortcomings of the 1940 French Army that would probably have had the German offensive bog down before a breakthrough is achieved.

The French were as good soldiers as any, but the combination of a very rigid and slow decision cycle with a massive operational blunder (going into Belgium and being cut off) was more than anybody could have withstood. And even then, what remained of the French army actually put up a good fight in June 40, accelerating German losses. In a few weeks the French learned to go from WWI type continious frontline to 360 degree defensive positions deployed in chequerboard formation - a very effective way to counter armoured assaults, but by June too much had been lost to keep cohesion.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard