Washington Naval Treaty Fails

[DaleCoz]

I don't think I've posted this yet here. It's from my October 2009 AH Newsletter.

What Actually Happened: After World War I, the US was in a position to quickly displace the British Royal Navy as the strongest naval power in the world. The US had enough powerful modern battleships and battlecruisers in the ipeline that by 1924 the US navy would surpass the British. Given the lead time for building new capital ships, the British could not avoid being surpassed, even with a massive national effort. The British would still have more capital ships, but most of them would be older and far less powerful than the ones in the US fleet.

In spite of that seemingly powerful position, the US had a problem. In the aftermath of World War I, isolationism was growing and it was looking increasingly likely that many of those new ships would be scrapped rather than being completed. The US basically bluffed on a weak hand. Great Britain and Japan knew that the US could outbuild them if it chose to do so. The US offered to give up its potentially dominating position in favor of parity with Britain and near-parity with Japan—a 5-5-3 ratio in capital ships. That meant that the US would scrap most of the powerful new battleships and battle cruisers it was building. In return, the British would scrap enough older ships to get to tonnage equality with the US. The Japanese would scrap several ships they were building and agree to overall inferiority to the US and Britain in capital ships. The US proposed a ‘battleship holiday”—essentially no more building of battleships for 10 years. That didn’t quite happen, but it came close. In addition the treaty limited the tonnage of battleships and aircraft carriers the powers could build. It limited the size and armament of the cruisers the powers could build, so that cruisers didn’t become battleships in everything but name. A treaty cruiser had 8 inch guns and theoretically weighed 10,000 tons. Many of the naval powers cheated a little on the limits. The Japanese cheated quite a bit, and ended up with more effective cruisers because of the cheating.

The Washington naval treaty shaped the US, British and Japanese fleets of the early part of World War II. It finally broke up when the Japanese refused to renew it in the mid-1930s, but most of the ships of the early part of World War II were either allowed to remain in service due to the Washington naval treaty or were built within treaty limitations.

The treaty also forbade the US and Britain from building new fortifications and certain other types of facilities in the Far East. That left the Philippines less fortified than the US wanted them to be, and left Guam essentially defenseless.

[DaleCoz]

What might have happened: Japan calls the US bluff. They demand equality with the US and the British and walk out when they don’t get it, counting on the growing isolationism of the US to scupper US building plans. With Japan not on board, the US is faced with Japanese naval plans to build 8 capital ships every three years. If they do that and the British and US don’t respond, the Japanese will end up with a larger and more modern navy than either of their potential opponents within a fairly short time. On the other hand, Britain is not financially able to keep up that kind of pace after the financial drain of World War I, and the US congress does not want to pay for the program that would give the US dominance.

Given the Japanese refusal to reach an agreement, the US stretches out, but does not scrap its building program. US anti-Japanese sentiment is such that the US is not willing to allow the Japanese to build up a fleet that could dominate the Pacific. US and British officials quietly agree not to build at a rate faster than is necessary to maintain a 5-5-3 ratio in relationship to the Japanese.

The Tokyo earthquake of September 1923 puts this incipient arms race on hold for a while. The Amagi, one of the battlecruisers Japan was building, is destroyed beyond repair, and the widespread damage that killed over a 100,000 people from the earthquake and subsequent fires and Tsunamis and left over a million homeless also left the Japanese government with less resources to pursue an arms race. Also, the US humanitarian response to the earthquake impresses the Japanese and temporarily defuses tensions between the two countries. The Japanese quietly cut back on their buildup, though they don’t entirely stop it, partly due to interservice rivalries with the Japanese army. Through the rest of the 1920s, the three major naval powers tacitly adhere to approximately the 5-5-3 ratio, though the Japanese don’t acknowledge that they have accepted that ratio.

Navies are somewhat larger and more expensive in the 1920s than they were historically, and the US maintains a somewhat larger army due to the perception of a potential Japanese threat. In the booming 1920s, the stain of building and manning the extra battleships and battlecruisers is minimal for the US, but serious for the British. However, the British are unwilling to give up their centuries-old naval dominance to the US or Japan, so they maintain a building program that they really can’t afford.

The British try to economize by upgrading older ships and keeping them in se4rvice longer, but the new US and Japanese battleships with 16 inch guns and sophisticated designs that incorporate the lesson of Jutland are much more powerful than pre-World War I British designs. British capital ships are considerably old than US or Japanese equivalents, so the amount of building or rebuilding necessary to maintain parity is much larger for the British than it is for the US or Japan. By 1929, the British ‘equivalence’ to the US has become an increasingly threadbare pretense, with numbers filled out by older, less powerful ships partially rebuilt but unable to really compete with US and Japanese ships.

[DaleCoz]

The US tries again for a naval arms limitation treaty in 1927, but it falls apart because of British insistence on having enough cruisers to protect its long sea lanes, and Japanese reluctance to formally accept a position of inferiority. The 1920s are an era of relative restraint on the part of the major naval powers, but no formal restrictions.

The emphasis in the 1920s remains battleships, though each of the three navies does build some aircraft carriers, and they do modernize their battleships to make them less vulnerable to aircraft. As they did historically, Lexington and Saratoga become aircraft carriers rather than battlecruisers. Both the British and the Japanese create similar conversions.

The US stock market crash that signaled the start of the Great Depression comes a little earlier than it did historically, but within a couple of months of the historic time. However, it deepens more rapidly in Europe because the British are not able to hold back the cascade of bank failures in eastern and central Europe as long as it did historically. In Europe the depression is even deeper than it was historically.

International trade falls apart in the face of protectionist pressures, just as it did historically. The European powers and the US are hurt by that collapse, but they can be somewhat self-sufficient due to their control of large areas with most of the natural resources their economies require. Cash-strapped governments are forced to cut back operations and maintenance on their oversized fleets, but while economies shrink, the larger ones do have internal markets or colonies capable of sustaining them to some extent.

However, the Japanese find themselves locked out of global markets they have depended on, just as they were historically in the Great Depression. They aren’t self-sufficient, and their small empire is not capable of sustaining even a smaller modern economy. They react the same way they did historically: by an increased militancy aimed at carving their own empire out of China.

So where does this go from here? Does it lead to a World War II approximately on schedule? If so, how is that war different from the historic one? Who wins? Do we end up with more cool battleship versus battleship naval battles? .

[Larrikin]

GB was quite able to afford both the G3 "battlecruisers" and the N3 battleships that they were in the process of designing and constructing.

The USNs mass of new ships were in fact bordering on obselescence already, and the Lexington battle scouts were a seriously flawed design concept. And there was no way Congress was going to pony up the funds to finish it anyway.

The Japanese really couldn't afford the 8-8 program, it would have broken their economy by about 1930.

All in all, the USA and Japan were the winners out of the Washington, with the UK, the one country that genuinely needed a strong fleet, getting screwed by it.

[David S Poepoe]

While I strongly doubt that the British would have built the N3 battleships, as pointed out earlier, they had the financial capital to build the G3s - tho I doubt they had the political capital at home to build them.

I'm not entirely sure that it would be correct in saying that the US bluffed with a weak hand. The British delegation arrived with the offer of cutting their forces more severely and would accept parity with the US - and they were fairly surprised with the terms of Hughes' offer.

Both the British and Americans are not going to keep a bunch of old battleships around. The likes of the Queen Elizabeth and Arizona were given artificial life extensions that wouldn't have been in place without the WNT. The 'Battleship Holiday' needlessly extended the lives of dozens of ships that should have gone to the scrap yard.

[Cook]

To me Japan building more and bigger battleships is like someone saying “If only they’d used bigger guns and more concrete on the Maginot Line…”

Battleships can’t stop submarines and with allied subs preventing oil reaching the home islands, more battleships means Japan’s shortage of oil becomes acute sooner.

[juanml82]

Of course. However, it seemed a sensible course of action in the 1920s.

[David S Poepoe]

Originally Posted by Cook

To me Japan building more and bigger battleships is like someone saying “If only they’d used bigger guns and more concrete on the Maginot Line…”

Battleships can’t stop submarines and with allied subs preventing oil reaching the home islands, more battleships means Japan’s shortage of oil becomes acute sooner.

But the Maginot Line did work.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by David S Poepoe

But the Maginot Line did work.

This must be an entirely new definition of success that I haven’t seen used before.

[HMS Warspite]

Some additional information is necessary to mention as well, since not all seems like it was.

1. Without a Navaltreaty on limmitations of national warfleets, the UK still had all its massive shipbuildingcapacity intact, rather than having it downgraded, due to the treatydemands. British shipbuilding always was fast and produced relatively good quality normally, where the US coudl only match in speed, but not in quality (especialy of navalriffles and turbines.) Japan never wa able to even come close in this, although its quality was often good, especialy of its guns, which were reliable and accurate. Japan simply lacked the productioncapacity to do better. Germany even was capable of outbuildign Japan, if allowed to do so.

2. All USN designs dated from the pre 1914 period and all were basically addaptations of the same basical Nevada Class design. Not very reviolutionary, but quite adequate for a conservative Navy. British designs of 1921 were incorporating the lessons of the great War and realy outclassed any design abroad by a considerable margin. Opposed one to one, the Royal Navy still overpowered any other navy, but the problem was dispersion of the fleet, due to geopolitical reasoning, rather then having the fleet operating in a compact single unit.

3. The Japanese designs basicaly dated from teh 1916 design of HIJMS Nagato and succeding classes, which were superior in layout to the USN designs basically, especially in their poweroutput, as they were some 6 knots faster, but as well protected more or less. (slightly thinner belt, but thicker deckarmor as designed.) Unlike USN postwar battleships, the IJN constantly upgraded and refitted their ships to the most modern levels, while the bigger USN did not do so, out of mainly economical reasons.

The other contenders were not a match at all, sicne their industrial and economical situation did not allow big military spendings and these were forced to allot big proportions of the defense to the army as well, while both the UK and USA could do more to their Naval gains, being isolated on geographical terms. (no landborders to powerfull hostile nations.)

The conclusion is that the technological issue gives most credit to the UK, as the most advanced in Naval technology, seconded by the USA, which was the most outmoded, but second largest in the wirld. Japan was a good second, after teh UK, due to its quality in designs, but limmited to a more regional status, due to its lack of industrial output, compared to the conpetition.

In economical terms, the UK was hit hard economically, due to the war, but still had the flexibility to maintain a large fleet and still produce ships in serious numbers in a short time, since its globally covered economy could raise money everywhere, if needed. (if necessary at the cost of social policy in domestic matters.)
The USA too could do something simmilar, but the main rproblem was its own political will to do so. Unlike the Global interests of the UK and its Dominions, the USA had no real oversea empire, outside the occupied Phillippines and only wanted a large fleet to counter any threath to its (merchantile) interests, especially in the Pacific, as this was being considerd a zone of influence for the USA.
Japan was trying to do the same as the USA, for dominance in the Pacific, which naturally resulted in a fierce competition for dominance there. It economy was not capable to maintain such a policy for very long, but it was not as hopeless as some might think. The 8-8 programm was economically possible, but at the expense of the programs for the supporting units of the fleet (especially the heavy cruiser program, which was actually even more expensive than the original 8-8 program itself.) Japan could do only one of the programs, either the capital ship program, or the one for the cruisers, not both. Historically the IJN was forced to concentrate on the Washington Treaty cruisers of 10,000 tons, and simmilarly the equally potent destroyerbuildingprogram of the large "Special Type" destroyers, since cpaital ships were not longer allowed to be constructed. More money and resources were put in these programs than originally put in the 8-8 program. Simmilarly the Aircraft Carrier program was a direct consequense of the Washington Naval Treaty.

[Markus]

Originally Posted by DaleCoz

That meant that the US would scrap most of the powerful new battleships and battle cruisers it was building. In return, the British would scrap enough older ships to get to tonnage equality with the US. The Japanese would scrap several ships they were building and agree to overall inferiority to the US and Britain in capital ships.

Well, the US did not scrap ships, just hulls in very early stages of construction and the Japanese inferiority was more or less on paper only. The USN was a two ocean navy, the RN had litterally global responsibilities, while the IJN was concentrated in the Pacific by default.

Japan calls the US bluff. They demand equality with the US and the British and walk out when they don’t get it, counting on the growing isolationism of the US to scupper US building plans. With Japan not on board, the US is faced with Japanese naval plans to build 8 capital ships every three years. If they do that and the British and US don’t respond, the Japanese will end up with a larger and more modern navy than either of their potential opponents within a fairly short time. On the other hand, Britain is not financially able to keep up that kind of pace after the financial drain of World War I, and the US congress does not want to pay for the program that would give the US dominance.

The one bluffing would be Japan, they can afford the 8-8 program far less than the UK can afford the N3 BB and the G3 BC(the latter were fast BB in anything but name).

And last but not least, the Maginot Line worked EXACTLY as planned: divert a German offensive north through(!) Belgium, which brings Belgium and the UK into the war.

[Larrikin]

Originally Posted by Cook

This must be an entirely new definition of success that I haven’t seen used before.

The Maginot Line took less than 5% of France's defence expenditures during it's construction, and made sure that the Germans had to go north through Belgium and Luxembourg.

It would have worked fully if the King of Belgium hadn't been such a prat, even after a copy of the German's plans to invade France through his country again ended up in Allied hands.

He had half his army sitting on the Belgian-French border, instead of manning the forts and defences facing Germany.

[stevep]

DaleCoz

I would agree with most of the comments above. A no-Washington situation would have been vastly better for Britain, both in terms of military security and possibly also economically as well as it may have avoided/moderated the deprivation that a number of areas suffered in the 20's by recycling resources through them. Also rather doubtful that they would have rebuilt older designs much apart from the Hood [and possibly Repulse and Renown, although with new fast ships coming in that might be less likely]. THis is fairly expensive and probably more cost effective to build a new ship for a little more. Also the R class, like the US SD's were about on their limit with relatively little stretch capacity. [Although have heard there were ideas for reconstructing HMS Australia into a purpose built cruiser killer, for about half the cost of one of the new 8" treaty crusiers. This might have been partly a way for Australia to keep a 'capital' ship status, but if practical might have been adopted for some of the other old ships]. All in all, depending on how an already reluctant US Congress responds to a no treaty situation I think Britain should be able to keep up with the US and definitely keep ahead of Japan. It will struggle for funds but the capacity and will is there to protect Britain's vital interests.

Think Warspite is a bit inaccurate in that although the US designs were developed from a line of descent from the Nevada's they were somewhat more modern. However definitely lacked the experience that Britain gained during the war. The Lexington's were an exception as the 1st US large fast ship but then the initial 1916 design showed the problems with this. However as other posters have said so much depends on the will of Congress to fund the existing programme and any new ones. They can out-build Britain but will they see a need as long as they stay ahead of the IJN?

I can't see Japan completing its 8:8 programme after the earthquake. [Not sure where you get the 8 ships every 3 years as it was estimated it would take until ~1927 to complete them without the quake. Would think the Amagi would have escaped the quake as it would have been launched by then if not for the treaty. It would have been one of the successor vessels mangled by the quake, which would probably have cost the Japanese more as they would have been bigger.

Steve

[David S Poepoe]

Originally Posted by DaleCoz

So where does this go from here? Does it lead to a World War II approximately on schedule? If so, how is that war different from the historic one? Who wins? Do we end up with more cool battleship versus battleship naval battles?

IMO the British are going to mirror the Japanese to a degree in stressing quality over quantity at least regarding capital ships. In order to 'police' the oceans the British will revive Fisher's 'Flotilla Defense System' which concentrates on destroyers and submarines, but will be enlarged to include carriers and cruisers. The main battle fleet will probably not venture further afield than cruises between Britain and the Mediterranean. Any problems in the Far East will be resolved in falling back to Singapore until the battle fleet arrives from Suez.

All 13.5in gunned dreadnoughts will probably be scrapped by 1929. The Queen Elizabeths and 'R' classes will be likely mothballed or farmed out to Canada and Australia, but on their last legs as well. I'm not entirely convinced that the jump to 18in guns will occur and become widely adopted. The G3s will probably see about 20 years of service, but the Royal Navy will formally adopt the concept of the 'fast battleship' and leave off building both battleships and battlecruisers. The carrier will still become predominant - tho in the case of the Royal Navy if they don't regain control of the Fleet Air Arm they will still be handicapped to a great degree.

[jedipilot24]

Lexington, Saratoga, Akagi and Kaga were only converted to carriers because of the treaty. Without the treaty, the US is far more likely to have adopted the policy of the European powers (not including Britain) of focusing on Battleships and Battlecruisers but also having a few carriers just because.

[DD951]

Originally Posted by jedipilot24

Lexington, Saratoga, Akagi and Kaga were only converted to carriers because of the treaty. Without the treaty, the US is far more likely to have adopted the policy of the European powers (not including Britain) of focusing on Battleships and Battlecruisers but also having a few carriers just because.

Actually, the USN had been seriously studying various concepts for large, fast carriers since about 1919, seeing them at the very least as an important part of the scouting/raiding element of the large fleet the 1916 program and the concepts for follow-on programs. By the time of the WNT negotiations, the designers were working on the series of preliminary designs that evolved into the OTL Lexington CV, and was seriously considering putting a couple into the next request for construction, either as new hulls, or repurposing a couple Lexington BC hulls under construction, as there was some dissatisfaction with that design, and the General Board was considering whether it wanted to build all six, while kicking around concepts for fast battleships along the lines of the Hood (2 basic concepts, a stretched South Dakota for 25 kts, or an evolution of the Lexington design into a ship in the 50-60k range with 8-12 x 16"/50, battleship armor, and 28-30 kts), but were reluctant to propose such a ship for fears of starting a revolution in capital ship design, which would not only start a new naval race, but render the entire US battleline, including the 1916 program ships obsolescent, and were waiting to see which direction the RN & IJN would go before giving those concepts the go-ahead (before the WNT intervened).

[PhilKearny]

Originally Posted by DD951

Actually, the USN had been seriously studying various concepts for large, fast carriers since about 1919, seeing them at the very least as an important part of the scouting/raiding element of the large fleet the 1916 program and the concepts for follow-on programs. By the time of the WNT negotiations, the designers were working on the series of preliminary designs that evolved into the OTL Lexington CV, and was seriously considering putting a couple into the next request for construction, either as new hulls, or repurposing a couple Lexington BC hulls under construction, as there was some dissatisfaction with that design, and the General Board was considering whether it wanted to build all six, while kicking around concepts for fast battleships along the lines of the Hood (2 basic concepts, a stretched South Dakota for 25 kts, or an evolution of the Lexington design into a ship in the 50-60k range with 8-12 x 16"/50, battleship armor, and 28-30 kts), but were reluctant to propose such a ship for fears of starting a revolution in capital ship design, which would not only start a new naval race, but render the entire US battleline, including the 1916 program ships obsolescent, and were waiting to see which direction the RN & IJN would go before giving those concepts the go-ahead (before the WNT intervened).

DD591, interesting information. This sounds very reasonable. Do you recall any sources for this, as I would enjoying knowing more about this?

[DD951]

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

DD591, interesting information. This sounds very reasonable. Do you recall any sources for this, as I would enjoying knowing more about this?

There's some stuff on the subject in Friedman's design histories for carriers and cruisers, including some of the preliminary designs for the carriers as sketches or models and springstyles for the evolved-BC fast battleships; the Naval Historical Center used to have scans of springstyles of several different versions of both fast battleship concepts online, but took them down; I have them saved on my computer but would need to see if I can shrink them enough to post on the forum yet still have them remain legible.

[Larrikin]

Originally Posted by DD951

Actually, the USN had been seriously studying various concepts for large, fast carriers since about 1919, seeing them at the very least as an important part of the scouting/raiding element of the large fleet the 1916 program and the concepts for follow-on programs. By the time of the WNT negotiations, the designers were working on the series of preliminary designs that evolved into the OTL Lexington CV, and was seriously considering putting a couple into the next request for construction, either as new hulls, or repurposing a couple Lexington BC hulls under construction, as there was some dissatisfaction with that design, and the General Board was considering whether it wanted to build all six, while kicking around concepts for fast battleships along the lines of the Hood (2 basic concepts, a stretched South Dakota for 25 kts, or an evolution of the Lexington design into a ship in the 50-60k range with 8-12 x 16"/50, battleship armor, and 28-30 kts), but were reluctant to propose such a ship for fears of starting a revolution in capital ship design, which would not only start a new naval race, but render the entire US battleline, including the 1916 program ships obsolescent, and were waiting to see which direction the RN & IJN would go before giving those concepts the go-ahead (before the WNT intervened).

The large scouting/raiding concept for carriers is very much an extension of the concept of the Lexington class BCs. When you come right down to it the logical successor to the BC is the CV, only you need a generation or so of aircraft capability to come down the pike to make it happen in turns of destructive power.

[Cockroach]

As others have said the first round of G3s probably is affordable, but the N3s may not be (and I'd expect to see 'em recast as evolved G3s rather than slow 18" gunned monsters anyway).

The US could certainly afford to go on expanding their fleet better than the British or Japanese, but I'm not certain there's the political will for said expansion while the 1916 programme ships are still new.

The Japanese economy wasn't up to completing the 8-8 program:either it collapses; the program is scaled back or an earth quake sees to it.

So, the poms gain at least four modern all or nothing armoured fast capital ships; the yanks gain half a dozen obselesent 'nothing or nothing' armoured Battlecruisers and seven 16" gunned slow Battleships; Japan's outcome is unclear.

Carrier development will continue but expect more Hermes and Langleys (small airgroup, slow) followed by Rangers (too large airgroup on a smallish hull) rather than the major jump seen in OTL.