As the title says, what would the changes have to be to get France to actually withstand the German invasion in WW2 much better than they did OTL? On paper at least, it seems bizarre that they should have lost. I don't know about the French Air Force at the time, but they had a massive navy, lots of troops, and much better weapon technology than the Germans. They even already had a couple of battle-tested (and battle-proven) designs for semi-automatic rifles. The Mle 1918 RSC modification of the Lebel seems to have worked well enough and I heard it was well liked in the Rif War, but why did France abandon that for the MAS 36? I even heard that they had a more advanced design called the MAS 38/39 that evolved into the MAS 49. In addition, they had several top-notch tanks and whatnot, despite them having 1 crewman too few. So, what changes would there have to be to organize these resources into a fighting machine much more capable of beating the Germans, and what would be the consequences?
A better-prepared France in WW2
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Cook
Banned
No equipment changes are necessary, just doctrine, methodology and planning.
The French High command in 1940 was preparing to refight the battles of previous war. And they seem to have managed to forget the lessons of 1917 -1918 and were preparing for the meat grinding artillery duels of 1916.
The French High command in 1940 was preparing to refight the battles of previous war. And they seem to have managed to forget the lessons of 1917 -1918 and were preparing for the meat grinding artillery duels of 1916.
Yeah, my point was they they had good stuff and all, I was just asking what changes would be necessary to use the army more efficiently.
Cook
Banned
In May 1940 the French army was using telegrams and dispatch motorcyclists. Orders were taking up to 24 hours do travel 30 kilometres. Using radio between the front lines to General Headquarters could have profoundly changed things.
Reconnaissance aircraft were returning from flights over the Ardennes and reporting a massive German traffic jam, but no-one acted on the information. A vigorous air attack on the crowded roads and bridgeheads and the assault would have stalled.
After the first attacks on French airfields large numbers of aircraft were sent south to keep them safe. If aircraft are out of range of the battle they are unable to influence it and are useless.
French Armoured doctrine was totally wrong. They had the tanks moving at the same pace as the infantry instead of ranging ahead. Charles De Gaulle was one of the few advocates of tank warfare in France.
Having Commanding Generals who were not in their seventies would have helped too.
Reconnaissance aircraft were returning from flights over the Ardennes and reporting a massive German traffic jam, but no-one acted on the information. A vigorous air attack on the crowded roads and bridgeheads and the assault would have stalled.
After the first attacks on French airfields large numbers of aircraft were sent south to keep them safe. If aircraft are out of range of the battle they are unable to influence it and are useless.
French Armoured doctrine was totally wrong. They had the tanks moving at the same pace as the infantry instead of ranging ahead. Charles De Gaulle was one of the few advocates of tank warfare in France.
Having Commanding Generals who were not in their seventies would have helped too.
Nikephoros
Banned
Sure, Germany had a higher population and a greater economy. Those things are important.
But France had more divisions than Germany. She also had better tanks as well. British capital, while not as significant a factor as it used to be, helped to minimize Germany's economic advantages.
But Germany had a few advantages over the French beyond that. French tanks lacked the radios that German tankers took for granted. French doctrine also sucked horribly, whereas German doctrine was proven/refined in Poland.
Germany won because they cut off a large portion of the French army from its supplies and from the capital. With the advancing German infantry, the French army was unable to sustain itself. With Paris so obviously threatened, the Vichy government was formed. Basically all that.
But France had more divisions than Germany. She also had better tanks as well. British capital, while not as significant a factor as it used to be, helped to minimize Germany's economic advantages.
But Germany had a few advantages over the French beyond that. French tanks lacked the radios that German tankers took for granted. French doctrine also sucked horribly, whereas German doctrine was proven/refined in Poland.
Germany won because they cut off a large portion of the French army from its supplies and from the capital. With the advancing German infantry, the French army was unable to sustain itself. With Paris so obviously threatened, the Vichy government was formed. Basically all that.
Bearcat
Banned
Germany won because the French really didn't want to fight. They spent 20 years desperately seeking a way to avoid a rematch with Germany. They planned a defensive posture that was really designed to make an attack unthinkable.
This TL needs something big, a way to blast the French out of their complacency before Hitler does.
Is there any way to foment a serious war between France and either Italy or Spain, without German involvement, before 1939? A war and its lessons might change the whole French way of thinking.
Hmm, if that's the case, is there any possible way to get the French to go to war with Spain over the Rif, AKA Spanish Morocco? I heard somewhere, can't remember where unfortunately, that the French intervention in the Rif War between Spain and the Riffian insurgents was rather unpopular in France, and they only intervened out of paranoia that the Rif would inspire the rest of Morocco to rise up against colonial authorities, which was apparently unfounded as the Moroccans in Fez and other cities viewed the Riffians and ruffians. Perhaps a different French government, or even different colonial authorities, have less paranoia about the situation and in light of the Spanish atrocities in the war (decapitating Riffians, use of mustard gas, etc) use it as an opportunity to drive the Spanish from Africa?
Such a war would inevitably end in a French victory in light of their superior weaponry and experience, and would raise a new generation of officers by the time of WW2, officers who fought a different kind of war. Also, on a smaller note, such a war would also allow French to really apply their new weapons and fix any weaknesses by WW2 anyways. Although the butterflies might actually screw up history unexpectedly, as this was OTL the war in which Francisco Franco really gained some prestige and experience that proved invaluable to the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.
mowque
Banned
yes they were tired and sick of war. Economically stretched, and would they want to turn away from the main task at hand, keeping Germany in line?
Well, they went to war with the Riffians IOTL. And I'm sure they knew they'd be fighting a tough and experienced enemy. After all, up until the French intervention on the Spanish side, the Spanish were getting whooped by the Riffians. The French intervening on the Riffian side probably wouldn't waste much more resources than in OTL, as long as they keep it the war in the colonies of course, which is the idea.
The French
Some little things that would have made a considerable difference:
1) Keeping the 3 DLMs (sort of a light armored divisions that grew out of French cavalry) together and in central reserve rather than using them as screening forces for the advance into Belgium, and sending the best of the three DLMs, along with 6 of the better French active divisions north nearly to Holland. The idea was that when the Germans poured through Belgium, these guys would hit them on the northern flank. That little brainstorm put half of the French strategic reserve (and the best of it) in about the worst possible position to intervene when the Germans came through the Ardennes.
2) Building more DLMs rather than DCRs. A little explanation: The French had two types of armored divisions. The DLMs grew out of the French cavalry, and were built around the S35 tank, probably the best French design of the war. They were quite mobile and a pretty good match for a German panzer division if they were on the defensive, though they didn't have the offensive punch of a panzer division. They were designed to help the French seize as much territory as possible in the early stages of the war before the front lines hardened and gains started to be measured in yards rather than miles. The French had three DLMs as of May 1940, with another one in the works. Given a political decision to do so, they could have probably had at least six DLMs by May 1940. Instead they poured effort into building DCRs
DCRs were essentially the infantry answer to an armored division. They were built around the B1-series of tanks and were designed to provide a lot of power in a limited area. Once the front lines hardened,the French figured that the DCRs would provide the punch to push the Germans back in a series of offensives that would gain a few miles at a time. The French had three DCRs, with another one coming online shortly after the German invasion started. They were powerful, but poorly suited to the war as it actually developed. The last two DCRs to come online were also poorly trained, and hadn't been together as units long, which made them weaker than they might otherwise have been.
3) The bulk of the French light tanks had good armor but poor guns, especially the ones with the short-barreled 37mm guns--which was all of the H35s and R35s, and a large percentage of the H39s and R40s. The French made matters worse by giving most of their light tanks more high explosive shells and fewer armor-piercing shells than it turned out that they needed. Give more of the R40 and H39 light tanks the longer-barreled 37mm guns and more armor-piercing shells and the French would have done at least somewhat better.
4) Giving the French infantry some final capacity against tanks. Most armies of the era equipped themselves with anti-tank rifles, with limited but better-than-nothing capability against the tanks of the time. The French didn't. They depended on anti-tank artillery. In the absence of that artillery the infantry felt helpless against tanks, which didn't help morale. Anti-tank rifles were more security blankie than effective weapon, but they helped fight the morale impact of tanks.
5) Get the bugs out of the AMC-35 and get it into production. The AMC-35 was supposed to be the light tank for the DLMs (the cavalry-derived light armored divisions). They had a two-man turret and on paper should have been a reasonably effective tank. Unfortunately, they had a lot of issues, including apparently very short cross-country range, and the French built a lot fewer of them than they initially wanted to, and only issued the few that they did build to improvised units in the last desperate days of the war.
6) Keep units together long enough for them to develop unit cohesion. As a rule of thumb, a division takes at least a year to function effectively as a unit. The French over-mobilized, taking key skilled labor out of the defense industry. Then they demobilized about half a million men in stages, breaking up units when those units should have been learning to work together. Then, to make matter worse, the French realized that they had a lot of young, fit men in Maginot line fortress units. They pulled a lot of those guys out and put them in their poorer quality reserve units to stiffen them. Not a bad idea, but it meant that a lot of French units were collections of strangers rather than a team. That explains the way a lot of French units fell apart.
7) Either accelerate or delay the changeover of French fighter units from the Morane-Saulner fighters to the Dewoitine ones. A large number of the fighter wings were transitioning at the time of the German attack and weren't available for the crucial first few days.
8) Spend less effort on the R35 tanks and more on--well, just about any of the other tank options. R35s were designed to accompany infantry and really weren't suited to much else, including supporting infantry against tank attacks. The French built a lot of them, and spread them out among a lot of independent tank battalions, which meant that while the French had a lot of tanks, most of those tanks were spread out in units that weren't designed to fight in large units. That meant that the Germans were able to concentrate roughly 70% of their armored power at the crucial point, and at best the French might have managed 30% of theirs there.
Some little things that would have made a considerable difference:
1) Keeping the 3 DLMs (sort of a light armored divisions that grew out of French cavalry) together and in central reserve rather than using them as screening forces for the advance into Belgium, and sending the best of the three DLMs, along with 6 of the better French active divisions north nearly to Holland. The idea was that when the Germans poured through Belgium, these guys would hit them on the northern flank. That little brainstorm put half of the French strategic reserve (and the best of it) in about the worst possible position to intervene when the Germans came through the Ardennes.
2) Building more DLMs rather than DCRs. A little explanation: The French had two types of armored divisions. The DLMs grew out of the French cavalry, and were built around the S35 tank, probably the best French design of the war. They were quite mobile and a pretty good match for a German panzer division if they were on the defensive, though they didn't have the offensive punch of a panzer division. They were designed to help the French seize as much territory as possible in the early stages of the war before the front lines hardened and gains started to be measured in yards rather than miles. The French had three DLMs as of May 1940, with another one in the works. Given a political decision to do so, they could have probably had at least six DLMs by May 1940. Instead they poured effort into building DCRs
DCRs were essentially the infantry answer to an armored division. They were built around the B1-series of tanks and were designed to provide a lot of power in a limited area. Once the front lines hardened,the French figured that the DCRs would provide the punch to push the Germans back in a series of offensives that would gain a few miles at a time. The French had three DCRs, with another one coming online shortly after the German invasion started. They were powerful, but poorly suited to the war as it actually developed. The last two DCRs to come online were also poorly trained, and hadn't been together as units long, which made them weaker than they might otherwise have been.
3) The bulk of the French light tanks had good armor but poor guns, especially the ones with the short-barreled 37mm guns--which was all of the H35s and R35s, and a large percentage of the H39s and R40s. The French made matters worse by giving most of their light tanks more high explosive shells and fewer armor-piercing shells than it turned out that they needed. Give more of the R40 and H39 light tanks the longer-barreled 37mm guns and more armor-piercing shells and the French would have done at least somewhat better.
4) Giving the French infantry some final capacity against tanks. Most armies of the era equipped themselves with anti-tank rifles, with limited but better-than-nothing capability against the tanks of the time. The French didn't. They depended on anti-tank artillery. In the absence of that artillery the infantry felt helpless against tanks, which didn't help morale. Anti-tank rifles were more security blankie than effective weapon, but they helped fight the morale impact of tanks.
5) Get the bugs out of the AMC-35 and get it into production. The AMC-35 was supposed to be the light tank for the DLMs (the cavalry-derived light armored divisions). They had a two-man turret and on paper should have been a reasonably effective tank. Unfortunately, they had a lot of issues, including apparently very short cross-country range, and the French built a lot fewer of them than they initially wanted to, and only issued the few that they did build to improvised units in the last desperate days of the war.
6) Keep units together long enough for them to develop unit cohesion. As a rule of thumb, a division takes at least a year to function effectively as a unit. The French over-mobilized, taking key skilled labor out of the defense industry. Then they demobilized about half a million men in stages, breaking up units when those units should have been learning to work together. Then, to make matter worse, the French realized that they had a lot of young, fit men in Maginot line fortress units. They pulled a lot of those guys out and put them in their poorer quality reserve units to stiffen them. Not a bad idea, but it meant that a lot of French units were collections of strangers rather than a team. That explains the way a lot of French units fell apart.
7) Either accelerate or delay the changeover of French fighter units from the Morane-Saulner fighters to the Dewoitine ones. A large number of the fighter wings were transitioning at the time of the German attack and weren't available for the crucial first few days.
8) Spend less effort on the R35 tanks and more on--well, just about any of the other tank options. R35s were designed to accompany infantry and really weren't suited to much else, including supporting infantry against tank attacks. The French built a lot of them, and spread them out among a lot of independent tank battalions, which meant that while the French had a lot of tanks, most of those tanks were spread out in units that weren't designed to fight in large units. That meant that the Germans were able to concentrate roughly 70% of their armored power at the crucial point, and at best the French might have managed 30% of theirs there.
French light cavalry
It might also have helped if the French had come up with a more effective organization for their cavalry divisions. They had 5 DLCs, light cavalry divisions that each had a mechanized component (including a dozen or so tanks) and a horse-mounted component (though the horses were to get the units to battle, after which they would dismount and fight as infantry). The two components of the DLCs didn't work very well together because they moved at very different paces, and the mechanized component couldn't cover the rough territory that was where the horse cavalry did well.
BTW: retention of horse cavalry at the beginning of World War II wasn't unusual. The Germans had a horse cavalry division in the early part of the war, and the Soviets had a LOT of part mechanized/part horse-mounted cavalry units in 1941 and 1942.
It might also have helped if the French had come up with a more effective organization for their cavalry divisions. They had 5 DLCs, light cavalry divisions that each had a mechanized component (including a dozen or so tanks) and a horse-mounted component (though the horses were to get the units to battle, after which they would dismount and fight as infantry). The two components of the DLCs didn't work very well together because they moved at very different paces, and the mechanized component couldn't cover the rough territory that was where the horse cavalry did well.
BTW: retention of horse cavalry at the beginning of World War II wasn't unusual. The Germans had a horse cavalry division in the early part of the war, and the Soviets had a LOT of part mechanized/part horse-mounted cavalry units in 1941 and 1942.
usertron2020
Donor
Limits of OTL French politics
Also, nobody's mentioning personnel beyond DeGaule. The French had the
problem of replacing failed officers with older and older ones. By the
time of Vichy you had octogenarians in charge
In fact, the main
reason Lloyd George wasn't given a job in Winston's government was
the stated example of using hoary old survivors of the last war.
With a nursing home in charge of your war efforthow could you
expect brilliant innovation, drive, administrative grip, and a sound
forward thinking military doctrine? The conditions required for this
particular thread are so far outside the limits of OTL that its veers
periously close to the dreaded ASB
If you want this to work, how about postulating it starting from
the closing days of WWI Russia totally collapses, while the Central
Powers hold together long enough to get a treaty that satisfies
NO ONE I The point being everybody but the US and UK come
out of the war with a chip on their shoulders. I'm not suggesting the Treaty
of Versailles wouldn't be written, just different enough to give the
perception to the French that they had been rooked Remember,
politics is ALL ABOUT perception The perception doesn't have to
be real or even logical. Like a stab in the back that never happened
With BOTH France and Germany angry it could lead to both a more
aggressive French policy and a distrust of the older WWI marshals and
generals
Also, nobody's mentioning personnel beyond DeGaule. The French had the
problem of replacing failed officers with older and older ones. By the
time of Vichy you had octogenarians in charge
In fact, the mainreason Lloyd George wasn't given a job in Winston's government was
the stated example of using hoary old survivors of the last war.
With a nursing home in charge of your war effort
how could youexpect brilliant innovation, drive, administrative grip, and a sound
forward thinking military doctrine?
The conditions required for thisparticular thread are so far outside the limits of OTL that its veers
periously close to the dreaded ASB
If you want this to work, how about postulating it starting from
the closing days of WWI
Russia totally collapses, while the CentralPowers hold together long enough to get a treaty that satisfies
NO ONE
I The point being everybody but the US and UK comeout of the war with a chip on their shoulders. I'm not suggesting the Treaty
of Versailles wouldn't be written, just different enough to give the
perception to the French that they had been rooked
Remember,politics is ALL ABOUT perception
The perception doesn't have tobe real or even logical. Like a stab in the back that never happened
With BOTH France and Germany angry it could lead to both a more
aggressive French policy and a distrust of the older WWI marshals and
generals
To my mind, the crucial change which is required is in military leadership.
As is covered above, the resources existed, at least to shatter the offensive out of the Ardennes; even assuming France still falls eventually, which I think is likely, it could be quite a different war.
France falling with less shattering speed means a better-prepared government-in-exile, and perhaps no Vichy.
It was, at least partially, the way France collapsed which drew Mussolini to join the war; other effects could include the French fleet remaining under Allied command, (no Mers-el-Kebir, and in effect a stronger RN), perhaps more of the French Army, maybe even Air Force, being evacuated to the UK.
Still further afield, if there is no Vichy government, perhaps Japan will have to wait to enter Indochina until they declare war? That helps Singapore and Malaya to survive, slows any drive into Burma, and strengthens Allied prospects in the Pacific.
Finally, in the morale aspect, it's less of a blow to the French (and British) to be defeated in a grinding campaign in which they got in some heavy blows of their own, than in an unbelievably fast collapse.
As is covered above, the resources existed, at least to shatter the offensive out of the Ardennes; even assuming France still falls eventually, which I think is likely, it could be quite a different war.
France falling with less shattering speed means a better-prepared government-in-exile, and perhaps no Vichy.
It was, at least partially, the way France collapsed which drew Mussolini to join the war; other effects could include the French fleet remaining under Allied command, (no Mers-el-Kebir, and in effect a stronger RN), perhaps more of the French Army, maybe even Air Force, being evacuated to the UK.
Still further afield, if there is no Vichy government, perhaps Japan will have to wait to enter Indochina until they declare war? That helps Singapore and Malaya to survive, slows any drive into Burma, and strengthens Allied prospects in the Pacific.
Finally, in the morale aspect, it's less of a blow to the French (and British) to be defeated in a grinding campaign in which they got in some heavy blows of their own, than in an unbelievably fast collapse.
BlairWitch749
Banned
Their tanks were better and the French had a far superior artillery park...
they would need to do several things to perform better
1. committ to multiple sorties a day with light bombers and fighters (the germans where not bashful about this and it in effect multiplied the size of their air force)
2. eliminate dead wood from the officer corps and do everything possible to find young energetic commanders for the mechanized divisions
3. eliminate the dyle plan which was foolhardy and keep the armor and mechanized infantry and artillery in central reserve so that you can respond in force to the MAIN German axis of advance
4. seriously correct the supply services that were attached to the armored divisions (ie don't send your tanks out with no freaking fuel and dead radio batteries.)
5. Winnow down the number of infantry divisions and instead select the strongest and most adept men for service in the mechanized corps... let the rest pull defensive duty
6. change the mounts on the m1898 75mm gun so it is effectively an anti tank gun as opposed to a field gun
7. buy some freaking aa guns!
they would need to do several things to perform better
1. committ to multiple sorties a day with light bombers and fighters (the germans where not bashful about this and it in effect multiplied the size of their air force)
2. eliminate dead wood from the officer corps and do everything possible to find young energetic commanders for the mechanized divisions
3. eliminate the dyle plan which was foolhardy and keep the armor and mechanized infantry and artillery in central reserve so that you can respond in force to the MAIN German axis of advance
4. seriously correct the supply services that were attached to the armored divisions (ie don't send your tanks out with no freaking fuel and dead radio batteries.)
5. Winnow down the number of infantry divisions and instead select the strongest and most adept men for service in the mechanized corps... let the rest pull defensive duty
6. change the mounts on the m1898 75mm gun so it is effectively an anti tank gun as opposed to a field gun
7. buy some freaking aa guns!
usertron2020
Donor
Right on the spot
posture starting on Armistice Day-OK that's hyperbole-and forget about
monstrosities like the Maginot Line doesn't that just delay the
end? Change my mind, please!
Excellent points one and all. But if the French don't adopt a more aggressive
posture starting on Armistice Day-OK that's hyperbole-and forget about
monstrosities like the Maginot Line doesn't that just delay the
end? Change my mind, please!