Italian War Machine

[RandomIdeaGuy]

I heard somewhere (cannot find it right now, but I will go looking for said statement directly after posting this thread) that one big reason that the Italians did so badly IOTL WWII was that Mussolini had been preparing for WWII to break out in '43. Now here's my question: What would be the effects if the Italians stayed out of any major kind of war until 1943 or somewhere around that date? Also, please keep the discussion on the Italians, I have something else in mind for the Nazis

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by LoyalistColonial

I heard somewhere (cannot find it right now, but I will go looking for said statement directly after posting this thread) that one big reason that the Italians did so badly IOTL WWII was that Mussolini had been preparing for WWII to break out in '43. Now here's my question: What would be the effects if the Italians stayed out of any major kind of war until 1943 or somewhere around that date? Also, please keep the discussion on the Italians, I have something else in mind for the Nazis

Italy was not prepared for war in general because of their poor industrial base, lack of resources and generaly large amount of dead wood in their officer corps... the only way italy makes out in the war is if they join the allies after the writing is on the wall for the germans

[RandomIdeaGuy]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

Italy was not prepared for war in general because of their poor industrial base, lack of resources and generaly large amount of dead wood in their officer corps... the only way italy makes out in the war is if they join the allies after the writing is on the wall for the germans

Regardless, how much better prepared would their army have been with four extra years of preparation?

[DaleCoz]

The Italians would have done poorly no matter when they got involved in the war, as long as Benny the Moose was in charge. He had no ability as a military commander, not even the limited ability Hitler had. His primary problems were lack of ability to focus Italy's limited military/economic strength on one obtainable objective and a tendency toward 'prestige' gestures that hurt Italy militarily. Examples:

1) During the Soviet/Finnish Winter War he sent a considerable amount of scarce Italian war material, including some relatively modern fighters (better than most of the ones in the Italian airforce) to Finland. The Germans impounded the planes, but the Soviets retaliated by cutting off sales of oil to the Italian navy.

2) During the summer of 1940, the only time the Italian army had a realistic chance to do much of anything militarily in the Italian interest, Mussolini had his army splitting its efforts between North Africa and building up for a planned Autumn attack on Yugoslavia. The buildup against Yugoslavia took up as much if not more resources than the Italians put into North Africa.

3) Then there was the ridiculous Italian contribution to the Battle of Britain. The Italians were outclassed enough to be essentially worthless in the Battle of Britain but the roughly 180 planes they had there would have made a considerable difference in North Africa or Greece.

4) The attack on Greece in late 1940 further diluted the Italian war effort, and was done impulsively for prestige reasons. The Italian army had what? Ten days and ten divisions to prepare an attack on a Greek army that, when mobilized, outnumbered the Italians. And the attack started at the height of the fall rainy season. And the Italians had just demobilized half a million men, leaving them with few organized reserves for any kind of emergency, like the ones they soon faced in Greece and in North Africa.

5) The entire Italian war effort followed that pattern. Italy never concentrated its limited resources on an objective. After the Germans bailed them out in Greece, the Italians fought three wars when they barely had the resources for one: North Africa, anti-Partisan operations in the Balkans, and the absurd expeditionary force to Russia, where the Italians not surprisingly got kicked around very badly.

If they had concentrated their resources on one objective they still probably had very little chance of doing anything decisive, but the results might have been less humiliating. The logistics constraints in North Africa would have probably kept them from taking Egypt in the summer of 1940, even with the British weakness there. If they had stayed out of war with the British and attacked Yugoslavia in autumn of 1940 with full force they might have done okay, mainly because the Croatians and Slovenians probably wouldn't have fought and might have revolted--one of the reasons the Yugoslavs fell so quickly to the Germans. Putting the troops that went into Russia into the Balkans might have given them better control of events there. Not having the Soviet oil sales cut off would have meant that it would have been a few months longer before lack of oil put the Italian capital ships permanently in port (it takes a lot of oil to move a battleship).

[RandomIdeaGuy]

Originally Posted by DaleCoz

Not having the Soviet oil sales cut off would have meant that it would have been a few months longer before lack of oil put the Italian capital ships permanently in port (it takes a lot of oil to move a battleship).

What were oil drilling capabilities back then, specifically for the Italians? For instance, would any of the North African oil shown on the map above be of any help to them if they began drilling it?

[lothaw]

Originally Posted by LoyalistColonial

What were oil drilling capabilities back then, specifically for the Italians? For instance, would any of the North African oil shown on the map above be of any help to them if they began drilling it?
Attachment 90069

I think this has been brought up before and the consenus is Italy doesn't have the mining technology or industrial capacity to get the Libyan oil. Only country with the technology at the time was the US.

[RandomIdeaGuy]

Originally Posted by lothaw

I think this has been brought up before and the consenus is Italy doesn't have the mining technology or industrial capacity to get the Libyan oil. Only country with the technology at the time was the US.

I was under the impression that the Germans were using oil fields at the time as well though. So, in theory, the Nazis should have the technology to at least mine the lightest green on that map. So, couldn't Italy have bought the needed materials or brought in foreign help (Nazis or Americans, whatever) to help mine that oil?

[Geekhis Khan]

A few quick things...I'll post more in-depth later.

Dale's got the basics of it down. Italy's lack of industry and VERY poor comand and control were serious handicaps. Mussie's lack of focus was another (Benny the Moose...LOL, may have to steal that one).

Part of it was Mussie's needs to compromise with and play off the various factions that kept him in power (army, party, monarchy, etc.). Part of it was Mussie's utter isolation from reality behind a wall of yes-men.

Oil was a no-go. Libyan oil is deep-well stuff deep in the sahara...a sahara not fully "pacified" until 1933. Dumb luck discovery is the only way they'll even find it. Plus it'll take US drill tech and better supporting road infastructure, which will take years to develop and will require better relations with the US post-Ethiopia. Best-case they have the oil coming by the mid 40's, which is VERY optimistic. 50s or 60s is more likely.

FYI, I'll be playing with some of this for my Viva Balbo TL, so read that for some more in-depth answers. (yes, I'm shameless )

[RandomIdeaGuy]

Originally Posted by Geekhis Khan

Oil was a no-go. Libyan oil is deep-well stuff deep in the sahara...a sahara not fully "pacified" until 1933. Dumb luck discovery is the only way they'll even find it. Plus it'll take US drill tech and better supporting road infastructure, which will take years to develop and will require better relations with the US post-Ethiopia. Best-case they have the oil coming by the mid 40's, which is VERY optimistic. 50s or 60s is more likely.

Well, my actual POD is in the 20s, maybe could I have them discover it and they could at least just be using the first few drops when they take on [Spoiler] in '43, and later [Spoiler] in '44?
If Benny the Moose focuses on American relations from '22 onwards (and let's say oil is found accidentally in Libya/Sahara in '25 or so), would that stuff be completely set up (or partially set up) by around '42/'42 when Italy's relations with USA will tank ITTL?

[Geekhis Khan]

That's theoretically possible, but frankly getting wanky.

Even assuming some miraculous discovery of Fezzan oil in the 20's (which was at that time politically and militarily equivalent to today's Waziristan) you still need to 1) secure it (meaning ending a decades-long insurgency), 2) get to it, and 3) get it out of there to a port.

Italy lacks 1) the military might to secure the area before the 30's, 2) the drilling technology, and 3) the roads and trucks to transport it.

America can solve #'s 2 & 3, but Benny the Moose needs to have a real change in philosophy if he's going to cozy up to America, which he holds in contempt for it's decadent Liberal Capitalist Democracy (remember: at it's core Fascism still considered itself a "progressive, radical" doctrine). Changing his opinions requires some plausible justification or it starts going to wank country (note: a leader/nation making all the right decisions is part of the textbook definition of wank...not that a wank's necessarily bad, but should be declared as such or you get burned).

One of the reasons I chose Balbo for my TL was that OTL he favored friendship to the Anglo-Americans and despised Germany and Hitler, offering a plausible non-Axis Italy.

I'm curious what your basic idea is...feel free to PM it if you're willing and I can offer some pointers.

[Cornelius]

Originally Posted by LoyalistColonial

I heard somewhere (cannot find it right now, but I will go looking for said statement directly after posting this thread) that one big reason that the Italians did so badly IOTL WWII was that Mussolini had been preparing for WWII to break out in '43. Now here's my question: What would be the effects if the Italians stayed out of any major kind of war until 1943 or somewhere around that date?

In order to have Italy shift to true neutrality in 1940 is some major falling out with the Germans. People usually forget that Hitler was actually pressing Mussolini to join the war, while Balbo and Ciano were for staying out of the war. The quick fall of France sealed Italy's destiny.

But if relations with the germans had suddendly turned frosty for any reason (personally I would choose the winter war, though) , Mussolini would have probably settled for neutrality, much to the british's joy. Besides bad relations with Germany could also dissuade Mussolini to take any action toward Yugoslavia, too near to Ploesti for Hitler to tolerate any "adventure".

Now, how would change the italian army with three more years of preparations?

First, they would probably adapt their doctrines and learn as much as possible from the battle of France the invasion of Russia and the war in the Pacific. They would for sure understand the importance of tanks and motorized divisions.

Second, they would try to modernize their equipment as much as possible. This is quite a tricky point since, besides the limited industrial base, Italy doesn't have a lot natural resources and those on the free market are going to be gobbled up by the belligerant nations. If relations with Germany are not too bad, you could have the italians getting some from the germans in exchange for foodstuff and sulphur (aluminium too, IRRC, but I'm not sure).
This of course, is going to limit the number of new tanks, trucks and planes that can be produced and given to the army.

Generally speaking we could suppose a few division equipped with medium tanks (probably the P40-42, not bad, but neither really good), some good planes and an air carrier for the navy. The MAB could also mass produced and see a wider distribution among the troops.

As for the lybian oil, it's nearly impossible for Italy to discover and exploit it before the fifties. You could change italian politics since the twenties to have good relations with the USA, but that would cause so many butterflies that probably WW2 would never happen (or would be a rather shorter affair).

[Geekhis Khan]

Ok, now on to the novel of a post in answer to the OP:

Italy has several major hurdles to overcome if it's going to be a viable military power. It can fair fairly well but will never achieve German-level success without serious ASB. Best case is, yes, stay out of the war as long as possible and maybe jump on the Allied bandwagon when the writing is on the wall.

First, as stated earlier by others, economically it's in a hard spot. Its industry is newborn and ranks far behind its European neighbors in output and potential output. It has no natural resources to exploit. It does not have enough agricultural potential to feed its population. It is because of this utterly and completely dependent on imports and sea trade. It is therefore very vulnerable to blockades. The fact that Britain controls both Gibraltar and Suez and has influence in Turkey means the RN can choke off the Med pretty much at will. OTL during the entire course of the war Italy produced fewer tanks, planes, trucks, etc. than Britain in a half year and the US in a month.

The Empire made this position worse, not better. All the colonies were money-losing operations. Ethiopia alone cost four times the annual Italian GDP to maintain. Libyan Oil is the only moneymaker, and, as I stated before, any serious exploitation will have to be after the war.

Strategically, it's in a bad position. As a peninsula it's major cities are vulnerable to sea power, and where it's located geographically its major industrial cities are vulnerable to air raids from any of its neighbors.

Culturally and politically it's divided. Mussie's true genius was political in his ability to play off the myriad factions that fought for influence in the nation, including but far from limited to: the Agrari (big landowners), the industrialists, the royal/noble families, the Church, the Army, the Navy, regional/parochial interests, and factions within the hodge-podge Fascist party (Nationalists, semi-socialists, syndicalists, unionists, reactionaries, radicals, centralists, decentralists, various blocs and cabals, the local Ras', the Militia, the party hierarchy, individual generals and party gerarchi, etc.). Getting the nation to steer in one direction is difficult to say the least.

One result of this lack of direction resulted in the haphazard implementation of Corporative bureaucracies that, rather than create the theoretical streamlined, clockwork organizations simply created tangles of redundant and inefficient bureaucracies.

The military was as much a bluff as anything else. The numbers were limited and the capabilities inflated to appear formidable. Balbo was responsible for a lot of this as his transatlantic flights made headlines, but aircraft production never got above a few hundred a year. Also, all three branches lacked any unified strategic doctrine. The army, navy, and AF all battled for limited funds and all developed independent strategic doctrines in isolation. Ironically each had a (subservient) place for the other two services, which they never really coordinated with the other ones (ex. the Navy's Med strategy relied on undefined "assistance" from the AF, who didn't really develop viable anti-ship capabilities until mid-war). Also, all the services were internally without cohesive direction. The army was divided between Infantry-Artillery conservatives and Mechanized-Motorized (incl. tanks) progressives, the navy had the typical battleship/air power divide, and the AF waffled between Douhetist strategic bombers and Mecozzian tactical support.

Command/control wise they are in very poor shape: the old Savoy elites that dominated the army were at best stuck in 1917...many seemed stuck in 1817! Mussie's need for control and personal security meant that promotion was based more on loyalty to him than on merit. Also, the Land of Marconi desperately lacked radios.

The Ethiopian and Spanish wars also taught the wrong lessons, making them believe that their outdated biplanes and tankettes were actually sufficient, which combat against modern forces proved horribly wrong.

Politically later on, the ineptitude and inefficiency had reached critical mass. By the late 30s Mussie was living in a bubble. He was, at heart, a self-doubting and paranoid man whose bluster and bravado was as much a facade and bluff as the "might" of the Fascist Nation. After the victory in Ethiopia he became so popular (practically a demigod) he started to believe his own hype. He surrounded himself by sycophants and yes men. He used blackmail and threats to pacify his gerarchi, seeing each and every one of them as a threat. Balbo was the only one who got away with public criticism of Mussie and the nation due to his own popularity and his indispensability (he was one of the few actually making things work at some level).


What Italy did have in its favor:

The myth of Italian cowardice and personal ineptitude is utterly false. Individual Italian soldiers, sailors, and airmen were actually very brave and skilled and fought well at an individual and squad level. The British commanders spoke well of Italian bravery in Africa despite the futility of it all. The NCOs and junior officers were skilled and disciplined and individual units fared well man-for-man. It was piss-poor strategy and command doctrine that sacrificed many in pointless and ill-planned battles.

Italian "Special Forces" were possibly the world's best at the time. Italian Frogmen proved very dangerous to Allied shipping and taught the Allies a thing or two after the war (lessons taken to heart by by the SeALs). Italian Alpini (mountain troops) and Bersaglieri (rangers/snipers) fought with distinction on all fronts, including in Russia.

Italian Artillery was good and performed well, even with the technological inferiorities of many designs.

Italian late-war aircraft were very good and their pilots the match of any peers. There just never were enough of either to come close to attrition rates.


So, later war means:

More time to build up their forces, more time to develop better weapons, time to observe and learn from the active combatants, and opportunity to jump on the Allied bandwagon late in the war, hoping for easy spoils.

If they opt for a "parallel war" option (not allied to Germany, not at war with the Allies, merely opportunistically attacking smaller neighbors (Yugo, Greece, etc.)), they have some hope of limited gains if they move carefully and with proper preparation, but face possible post-War (diplomatic, economic) retributions if they don't have some diplomatic justifications to placate the allies.


However:

They still suffer from the same command/control issues and lack of inter-service cohesion. Observation of the war alone may not do much to change this, particularly since OTL the high command showed a chronic inability to notice any shortcomings and a chronic ability to assume best-case for their forces. Only hard-learned lessons in combat will expose this, and honestly they have a very small window for that learning curve before they run out of weapons and supplies.

The Axis, regardless of when they enter the war, is going to be the doom of Italy. Unless your 20's POD drastically realigns who is fighting when and where, any OTL sort of situation will doom the Axis and with it Italy.

Mussie is unlikely to do the "right things" without a serious change in personality. He may avoid joining the war in 1940, but he WILL get his nation involved in some war sometime soon. It's central to his being and his desires, which OTL almost always overwrote any caution or proper planning. Best case is late Allied, but more likely is the parallel war scenario. And if he acts as impulsively as OTL he'll face a bigger quagmire in the Balkans than he expects, such as OTL's Greek debacle.

[BlairWitch749]

Assuming a later entry even put back to 43 Italy doesn't resolve its problems

Mussolini like Hitler liked to see large numbers of divisions on his maps and wanted "8 million bayonets" so there were a lot of very low caliber people put into the armed forces.

Forgetting their equipment short commings (maybe if they come in with the allies at the end they could get fitted out by the west a la the free french... the Germans were never going to give them anything of value) it doesn't change that their officers were not of particularly high caliber and that the relationship between the officers and men were generally poor (ie officers got special food and much better treatment Rommel in particular was stunned by the lack of bond that so characterized the German army)

In otl the Italian divisions that served with the German army for two years did become first class... ariete and trieste mechanized divisions were given critical missions and developed a first class reputation with the Germans and with the British by 1942

The smartest thing the italians could do to improve their efficiency and still stay out of the war would be for them to not disband the CVT after they come home from Spain. The CVT had large numbers of men who had combat experience and had cooperated with tanks and aircraft (40k men or so all told) the CVT should have formed the basis of training for all other divisions. They could be sent to Russia as volunteers to keep abreast of the latest developments in mechanized warfare and then play teacher to the rest of the army

[chris N]

The a numerous problems with Italy. To begin with during the First World War it Took Italy until late in 1917 to begin to produce artillery in quantities that were needed. Italy never developed the Automobile industry that the other major European Powers had thus it lacked both the industrial capacity and the mechanics that were needed to maintain them. While the Italians did produce some good guns a lot of their artillery were either former foreign guns (Skoda artillery guns capture or taken as war reparations from the Austro-Hungarian Empire or copies). If WWII had been like WWI then Italy might have done quite well.

As for stupidity Mussolini was certainly one for making mistakes. He has the country declare war before all of the Italian merchant marine vessels had returned home. He next fails to stockpile critical supplies such as oil. He also tries to attac one country after another before the Italian military had a chance to win anywhere. Italian resources should have been concentrated on finishing off the Brits not wasted in fighting the Battle of Britain or attempting to conqueror Greece.
Another act of stupidity was reducing the fighting strength of Italian Divisions so as to create more divisions. It would have been better to have retained 3 regiments of infantry in a division.

[AMF]

Originally Posted by Geekhis Khan

The Empire made this position worse, not better. All the colonies were money-losing operations. Ethiopia alone cost four times the annual Italian GDP to maintain. Libyan Oil is the only moneymaker, and, as I stated before, any serious exploitation will have to be after the war.

Hello Geekhis Khan,
could you kindly explain the sentence about Ethiopia costing Italy four times the Italian GDP? Did it cost four times the GDP from the time Italy started to conquer Ethiopia to the point it was conqured by the British, or did it even cost four times the annual GDP every year? Does the number also cover the cost of Italian military operations in Ethiopia or only administrarion, subsidised immigration, infrastructure etc.?
It is clear that Ethiopia lost Italy massive amounts of money, I just would like to know how massive exactly.

Thank you very much in advance if you can clarify this.

[AMF]

Originally Posted by Geekhis Khan

Oil was a no-go. Libyan oil is deep-well stuff deep in the sahara...a sahara not fully "pacified" until 1933. Dumb luck discovery is the only way they'll even find it. Plus it'll take US drill tech and better supporting road infastructure, which will take years to develop and will require better relations with the US post-Ethiopia. Best-case they have the oil coming by the mid 40's, which is VERY optimistic. 50s or 60s is more likely.

Originally Posted by Cornelius

As for the lybian oil, it's nearly impossible for Italy to discover and exploit it before the fifties. You could change italian politics since the twenties to have good relations with the USA, but that would cause so many butterflies that probably WW2 would never happen (or would be a rather shorter affair).

To the best of my (very limited) knowledge, the finding part had already been done, the wikipedia article on count Ardito Desio claims that Desio discovered oil in Libya in 1938. Of course discovering and exploiting the oil deposits in time for WW II are completely different matters.

[Geekhis Khan]

Originally Posted by AMF

Hello Geekhis Khan,
could you kindly explain the sentence about Ethiopia costing Italy four times the Italian GDP? Did it cost four times the GDP from the time Italy started to conquer Ethiopia to the point it was conqured by the British, or did it even cost four times the annual GDP every year? Does the number also cover the cost of Italian military operations in Ethiopia or only administrarion, subsidised immigration, infrastructure etc.?
It is clear that Ethiopia lost Italy massive amounts of money, I just would like to know how massive exactly.

Thank you very much in advance if you can clarify this.

To be honest I'm not totally sure myself. I'm quoting one of my Viva Balbo sources, possibly incorrectly, certainly incompletely. I'll track that quote down when I get the chance and try to dig into it more and answer some of that when I can.

Originally Posted by AMF

To the best of my (very limited) knowledge, the finding part had already been done, the wikipedia article on count Ardito Desio claims that Desio discovered oil in Libya in 1938. Of course discovering and exploiting the oil deposits in time for WW II are completely different matters.

Glad you mentioned Desio. Yes Desio indeed found oil: a very small amount of subsurface oil. He did so while searching the desert specifically at the request of Balbo, actually. Unfortunately for Fascist Italy it only represented the insufficient subsurface supplies and wasn't taken at the time to represent any real hope of near-term exploitable oil deposits. Not enough worth salvaging, in other words. However, it does offer a stepping stone for later exploration, or some POD where Desio comes across evidence of the larger deep-well deposits. If Italy is neutral you theoretically could get a US company involved in the early 40's. However, the question of infrastructure remains, as do thorny political questions for a regime that claims to favor Italian efforts first. I'd expect years wasted on insufficient domestic company attempts, particularly with Mussie at the helm pushing for autarchy. Plus a US company is going to want its share, particularly if they had to build the roads and pipelines (etc.), and fears of their efforts getting nationalized will scare many of them away. Assuming Italy takes the discovery seriously and start down the road to exploiting it, it'll still be the 50s before everything is in place to get it pumping, transported, distributed, and sold, possibly later.