Post-Cold War aftermath of the Balkan Federation

Eurofed · Jan 2, 2010

A question that dawned on me as I revised my post-Valkyrie Cold War maps and proto-TL notes:

A plan that circled in the Comintern and the Soviet bloc up to the early phases of the Cold War was to build the Balkan Federation, some kind of confederal setup between Communist Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Romania. IOTL the Tito-Stalin split put an end to such plans.

Now let's assume that for whatever reason, Tito is not in the position to defy Stalin and Yugoslavia remains true to Soviet allegiance, so those plans are implemented.

I'm going to use the Valkyrie successful PoD, which sets the Iron Curtain rather eastward and makes Stalin go nastier on his slice of Europe: post-Nazi Germany bargains national unity in the post-Anschluss borders and no Soviet occupation for its surrender, Czechia, Slovenia, and Croatia remain in the Western camp, the Iron Curtain is set on the Vistula and the Danube, matching front lines in late 1944 and splitting Poland and Hungary in two. Stalin is pushed into enforcing rushed hard-core Sovietization of everything the Red Army has boots in, including Finland and Yugoslavia. As a result, the Balkan Federation is established betwen loyal Stalinist rump Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania (Greece remains in the Western camp as IOTL). But of course, several other PoDs that nullify the Titoist split are possible.

Now, when the Soviet bloc collapses (most likely 5-15 years earlier or so if we use my PoD, as it would be rather smaller and poorer), the Balkan Federation would surely collapse as well with it as an hated Communist artifact. All the same, its previous existence would blur the border lines in the Balkans somewhat, and give successor nations with rival nationalistic claims added fuel and legitimation for them.

Let's say that Bulgaria is thus able and motivated to renew its old claims on FYROM, and the latter's Bulgar character was not so stamped out as IOTL. Similarly, Albania has an enhanced claim to Kosovo. When rump Yugoslavia collapses, Bulgaria and Albania join the Yugoslav successor wars against Serbia. Quite possibly, Greece supports Bulgaria as an attempt to prevent the distasteful existence of independent FYROM. All the same, Serbia also attempts to clamp down harder on Bosnia, since it does not have any realistic chance of making a bid on Croatian Krajina. OTOH, NATO and EU most likely keep long-standing member Croatia into line, so it does not jump on Bosnia as well.

How would these different post-Yugoslav wars turn out ??

Dialga · Jan 2, 2010

Quicker, and probably just as brutal.

Bulgaria would get FYROM, and Bosnia would be split between Serbia and Croatia. Not so sure about Kosovo and Montenegro.

Eurofed · Jan 2, 2010

Dialga said:
Quicker, and probably just as brutal.

Bulgaria would get FYROM, and Bosnia would be split between Serbia and Croatia. Not so sure about Kosovo and Montenegro.

Bosnia gets split under which lines ? In other words, who gets the Muslim-majority areas (the ones that are left standing after Serbia gives them its attention, that is) ??

Dialga · Jan 2, 2010

The Muslim area would probably go to Croatia (stronger historical ties to the Croats than the Serbs).

Eurofed · Jan 2, 2010

Dialga said:
The Muslim area would probably go to Croatia (stronger historical ties to the Croats than the Serbs).

In other words, much like OTL internal division of Bosnia, probably with the Serbian area getting somewhat larger as the Serb ethnic cleansing is more efficient and radical if they aren't busy in Krajina too (this probably requires that they give up FYROM to Bulgaria rather quickly, and they can likely stalemate Albania over Kosovo).

I Blame Communism · Jan 2, 2010

Well, some things:

-The plans for Bulgarian entrance to Yugoslavia, which were the most advanced and detailed, called for Bulgaria to get the Western Outlands back (not that anyone really cares...) and for FYROM to be united with Pirin in a socialist Macedonist republic.

-We have rival precedents (Montenegro and Kosovo vs Serbs and Croats in Bosnia) as to whether Macedonia and Bulgaria would associate after the end of Yugoslavia. Possibly some sort of Serbia-and-Monetenegro arrangement, but a bit more enduring? After all, the west will have much less of an interest in making Macedonia seperate, especially with Greece aboard.

-Whichever way (Macedonia goes alone or joins Bulgaria), Serbia won't make any effort to stop it (they didn't OTL), and it's unlikely that Serbia and Bulgaria will fight, especially not in the same brutal way we saw in the Balkans OTL (they basically get on, and you can't have Serbs and Bulgars commit Bosnian-style cleansing on eachother because the Serbo-Bulgar divide is linguistic and so blends to indistinguishability at the edges, whereas Serb-Croat-Bosniak is an essentially religious and not at all linguistic thing).

-How big is Croatia? Croatia as we understand it now (and all the other Balkan states except Slovenia) was drawn onto the map by Tito. A western-backed Croat regime might contain more of the 1939 Banovina. If it does, the question of Bosnia is resolved: Serbia can easily hold the rest.

-The internal arrangement of Yugoslavia may look very differant. Kosovo will probably be joined to Albania, given the Yugoslav regime's essentially anti-Serb policy, in which case the Kosovo question might be nothing but a few Serb militants in the province and some angry nationalist soapbox speakers in Belgrade, but that's to be optimistic.

-Montenegro may not exist. The only reason an entirely dynastic-religious state which hadn't even denied its own Serbness was evangelised by communists of all people was to prevent Megaserbia from dominating the federation. If the federation contains no or few Croats and a bunch of distinct, Serb-sized nations, this probably won't be necessary.

-The Serbs weren't particularly "busy" with Krajina, which consisted of local militias and JA remnants throwing up barricades, not a Serbian invasion and cleansing ala Bosnia.

Eurofed · Jan 2, 2010

I Blame Communism said:
Possibly some sort of Serbia-and-Monetenegro arrangement, but a bit more enduring? After all, the west will have much less of an interest in making Macedonia seperate, especially with Greece aboard.

This makes sens and seems plausible.

-Whichever way (Macedonia goes alone or joins Bulgaria), Serbia won't make any effort to stop it (they didn't OTL), and it's unlikely that Serbia and Bulgaria will fight, especially not in the same brutal way we saw in the Balkans OTL (they basically get on, and you can't have Serbs and Bulgars commit Bosnian-style cleansing on eachother because the Serbo-Bulgar divide is linguistic and so blends to indistinguishability at the edges, whereas Serb-Croat-Bosniak is an essentially religious and not at all linguistic thing).

This is true as well.

-How big is Croatia? Croatia as we understand it now (and all the other Balkan states except Slovenia) was drawn onto the map by Tito. A western-backed Croat regime might contain more of the 1939 Banovina. If it does, the question of Bosnia is resolved: Serbia can easily hold the rest.

Well, of course this essentially depends on where the final WWII front lines get to be ITTL, since they become the basis for the Iron Curtain.

My basic assumption is that they would be rather close to OTL late 1944 front lines more or less. Last-ditch furious Soviet attempts to break out before Western Allies arrive are most likely largely balanced by Germany throwing everything it still has in a successful last stand, emboldened by the reasonable expectation of a decent peace.

I thus assume that the Soviets would only succeed to seize local victories by breaking into East Prussia and Slovakia, albeit this is not a given (admittedly, this is also a butterfly that neatly disposes of the East Prussian geopolitical headache, and creates a most viable German-Polish border). Of course, this is not strictly necessary, since Germans managed to hold both areas as well up to 1945. But probably Stalin's furious orders to advance at all costs or else beofre the WA arrive produce at least some local successes from terrified Soviet officers, albeit at a terrible price.

For Poland and Hungary this is quite easy to establish, the front was stabilized on the Vistula and Danube for a long while. As it concerns Croatia, IOTL they were able to resist the Soviets and the Titoists in Syrmia up into Spring 1945, so it is quite reasonable to assume they would succeed to hold out till the end of the war ITTL as well. Unfortunately, it is much less easy to assume where the final front line would end up in Bosnia, I was unable to find anything like a decent front chart for the area, but it basically seems that the Soviets-Titoists only managed to clear Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro in late 1944. It is also true that Bosnia was a Titoist stronghold during the war, so it is reasonable to assume that the Croats are only able to hold on their majority areas and historical territories, and not much else. OTOH, this might easily mean the Banovina and not just the OTL modern borders, that largely follow the pre-1918 historical ones.

So to sum it up, at the very least, the Western block may keep OTL modern Croatia, with a bit of luck the 1939 Banovina as well, by really pushing it all of Bosnia as well. On the rest of the eastern front, it may range from just Germany, Czechia, and Slovenia at the very least, which would backstab and doom Croatia, to half of Poland and half of Hungary, with a bit of luck, to East Prussia and Slovakia by really pushing it.

On a final note, depending on how one interprets some military butterflies, Croatia might lose most of Dalmatia and Hercegovina (which would necessarily push Croatia to go and recover it after the Cold War).

-The internal arrangement of Yugoslavia may look very differant. Kosovo will probably be joined to Albania, given the Yugoslav regime's essentially anti-Serb policy, in which case the Kosovo question might be nothing but a few Serb militants in the province and some angry nationalist soapbox speakers in Belgrade, but that's to be optimistic.

Well, yes, but wouldn't post-Communist Serbian nationalists hell-bent to recover Kosovo, or at least the northern portion, just the same ?

-Montenegro may not exist. The only reason an entirely dynastic-religious state which hadn't even denied its own Serbness was evangelised by communists of all people was to prevent Megaserbia from dominating the federation. If the federation contains no or few Croats and a bunch of distinct, Serb-sized nations, this probably won't be necessary.

This is reasonable.

I Blame Communism · Jan 2, 2010

Eurofed said:
Well, of course this essentially depends on where the final WWII front lines get to be ITTL, since they become the basis for the Iron Curtain.

My basic assumption is that they would be rather close to OTL late 1944 front lines more or less. Last-ditch furious Soviet attempts to break out before Western Allies arrive are most likely largely balanced by Germany throwing everything it still has in a successful last stand, emboldened by the reasonable expectation of a decent peace.

I thus assume that the Soviets would only succeed to seize local victories by breaking into East Prussia and Slovakia, albeit this is not a given (admittedly, this is also a butterfly that neatly disposes of the East Prussian geopolitical headache, and creates a most viable German-Polish border). Of course, this is not strictly necessary, since Germans managed to hold both areas as well up to 1945. But probably Stalin's furious orders to advance at all costs or else beofre the WA arrive produce at least some local successes from terrified Soviet officers, albeit at a terrible price.

So I should think: IIRC, the Soviet policy was to advance at a reasonable speed (that being at the discretion of the generals), which would pretty much put the frontline where the Yalta plans were. If Soviet-Western co-operation goes down the toilet, the Soviets can probably ramp up the speed. We have reserves...

Eurofed said:
For Poland and Hungary this is quite easy to establish, the front was stabilized on the Vistula and Danube for a long while. As it concerns Croatia, IOTL they were able to resist the Soviets and the Titoists in Syrmia up into Spring 1945, so it is quite reasonable to assume they would succeed to hold out till the end of the war ITTL as well. Unfortunately, it is much less easy to assume where the final front line would end up in Bosnia, I was unable to find anything like a decent front chart for the area, but it basically seems that the Soviets-Titoists only managed to clear Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro in late 1944. It is also true that Bosnia was a Titoist stronghold during the war, so it is reasonable to assume that the Croats are only able to hold on their majority areas and historical territories, and not much else. OTOH, this might easily mean the Banovina and not just the OTL modern borders, that largely follow the pre-1918 historical ones.

So to sum it up, at the very least, the Western block may keep OTL modern Croatia, with a bit of luck the 1939 Banovina as well, by really pushing it all of Bosnia as well. On the rest of the eastern front, it may range from just Germany, Czechia, and Slovenia at the very least, which would backstab and doom Croatia, to half of Poland and half of Hungary, with a bit of luck, to East Prussia and Slovakia by really pushing it.

Of course, it's questionable whether the west would want Croatia to expand much outside Croat areas (and the Banovina was already 20% Serb), since there's nothing much there except Partisans. Tito OTL gave some support to the Greek communists (who had overwhelming support from those Slavs in the country who hadn't collaborated with the Bulgarian government, giving the war in Aegean Macedonia a slightly national dimension). He might try similar stunts in Croatia...

Eurofed said:
On a final note, depending on how one interprets some military butterflies, Croatia might lose most of Dalmatia and Hercegovina (which would necessarily push Croatia to go and recover it after the Cold War).

Indeed.

Eurofed said:
Well, yes, but wouldn't post-Communist Serbian nationalists hell-bent to recover Kosovo, or at least the northern portion, just the same ?

Quite possibly, given its extremely exagerrated importance to Serbian nationalists. I was being optimistic.

Eurofed · Jan 3, 2010

I Blame Communism said:
So I should think: IIRC, the Soviet policy was to advance at a reasonable speed (that being at the discretion of the generals), which would pretty much put the frontline where the Yalta plans were. If Soviet-Western co-operation goes down the toilet, the Soviets can probably ramp up the speed. We have reserves...

No, the idea that the Soviets somehow held back and could have achieved more in 1943-45 if they wished is a pro-Soviet legend. In reality, the OTL performance is pretty much the high mark of what they could have done, and they expended pretty much all the resources of their country and a huge amount of help from their allies and mistakes of their enemies to achieve it. America indeed held back much of its vast untapped potential and could done more, the USSR did not.

If they did not achieve more, it's because they were getting exhausted locally or strategically, or because the Germans successfully checked them for a while. Stalin could have consumed his residual military resources a bit more wastefully, but not substantially more so, since the USSR was quite scraping the bottom of its resouces barrel in 1944-45. Anything more substantial would have meant very serious consequences to the USSR, such as risking economic and social collapse, or leaving the country and empire utterly bereft of the basic forces to defend itself and keep order after the war. They *don't* have the reserves.

Of course, that tiny extra available bit of efforts that Stalin may achieve by scraping the bottom of the barrel extra hard and terrorizing the officers may achieve something significant, or it may not, as military butterflies go, or it may not, but nothing strategically game-changing. Surely not Berlin or Vienna in late 1944, nor certainly even Oder-Neisse and Prague. All the more so, since the scenario is giving better cards to the Germans for their last stand: they are leaving the Western Allies advance unopposed and can throw everything they have left in France, Low Countries, Italy, Scandinavia on the Eastern front, without being hampered by WA bombing, their morale and last efforts revitalized by the perspective of saving their country from Bolshevik occupation and rampage and achieving a decent peace if they can pull that last stand. Moreover, without "keep everything" rambling Adolf at the helm, they can fight smart for a time, and prioritize. The Wehrmacht was able to achieve local counterattacks or successful theater defenses up to the end of 1944 (and they won't lack the resources wasted e.g. in the Ardennes offensive).

Having factored all of this, I can only conclude that in the very most Soviet-favorable scenario, they could have reached the German-Polish border (or the Oder, if you wish), the Czech-Slovak border, the German-Hungarian border, and the outskirts of Slovenia.

In a middle-expectations scenario, they are substantially stalemated on the most vital fronts for Germany, the Vistula and the Danube, although they manage to overrun less vital areas like most of East Prussia, Slovakia, and Bosnia.

In the most-German favorable scenario, they manage to keep the final front line pretty much where it was in Autumn 1944, which means the West also keeps East Prussia, Slovakia, and maybe most or all of Bosnia (as you said, the non-Croat areas were Titoist-ridden, which makes it doubtful whether the Germans, or even the Croats, would waste precious last-stand resources to keep it, too).

Unfortunately for Europe, a successful anti-Nazi coup in such a late date as July 1944 means that it's too late (besides saving many, but certainly not all, Holocaust victims and WWII casualties) to change the outcome of Bagration, and hence prevent the Soviet breakout in eastern Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and eastern Hungary as well.

It seems to me that picking the middle outcome is the most sensible choice.

Of course, it's questionable whether the west would want Croatia to expand much outside Croat areas (and the Banovina was already 20% Serb), since there's nothing much there except Partisans. Tito OTL gave some support to the Greek communists (who had overwhelming support from those Slavs in the country who hadn't collaborated with the Bulgarian government, giving the war in Aegean Macedonia a slightly national dimension). He might try similar stunts in Croatia...

I agree about why they may not want to keep non-Croat Bosnia. OTOH, 20% is generally not enough to make a minority *really* troublesome. Tito (or more likely whomever more reliable Stalinist stooge the NKVD puts in his place) could well play that trick effectively IF the West gets to keep all or most of Bosnia, and he may fuel the insurgency among Bosniac Serbs and Muslims. OTOH, I do not really expect it to be much effective in Croatia-Banovina. Croat nationalism is going to dampen the appeal of Communism among the Croat population to a great extent. See the successful last stand the NHD made against Tito up to mid 1945. Any such communist insurrection is going to be crushed rather swiftly.

As a more general point, with the Cold War breaking out in the last days of WWII, I totally expect Stalin, besides enforcing swift hardcore Sovietization on occupied countries, to fuel Communist unrest in the Western bloc. However, Americans will swiftly get in full-bore Cold War mode, too, which means they shall be quick and generous in supporting anti-Communist European forces and governments, too, both with a Plan Marshall and military aid. This roughly means that a Communist insurgency in Greece shall play out much like OTL (greater Soviet support is balanced by greater, quicker US support), as it would in a hypothetical Western-bloc Bosnia. The Communists may attempt coups and insurrections in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechia, Croatia but they shall be quickly crushed (most likely getting their butts banned for their trouble). As for West Poland and West Hungary, I expect that the division of the country shall diminish the appeal of the Communists to a fringe.

Therefore, coming back to the original issue, so far the discussion seems to conclude that the PoD would deliver a rather different outcome for post-Cold War Balkans: Bulgaria would move, with probable covert Western support, to pull not-too-unwilling Macedonia back into a federal embrace, and hence stabilize it; Serbia can keep control from the start of Montenegro and a Bosnia with the Croat parts cut off, and hence is not motivated to ethnic cleansing; and of course 1939 Croatia and Slovenia have been an happy and stable member of NATO and EU for decades.

OTOH, Albania would keep Kosovo, which would make them happy, but may make Serbian nationalists most unhappy. The best outcome might be that Serbia makes a swift surgical strike and seizes North Kosovo, which with could make a sensible partition and a de facto outcome reluctanlty and unofficially accepted by all. OTOH, if Serbia gets unreasonable (not too hard), it could go for the whole Kosovo, which would mean total war with Albania. Most likely, Serbia would easily win and occupy Albania, and may be easily tempted to keep it, since it was an old pre-WWI expansionistic claim. Albanian guerrilla would soon ensure in occupied Kosovo and Albania, putting Serbia to the siren call of ethnic cleansing, which they are likely to answer eagerly. What is the West going to do in this situation ? On one hand, it would be the first time that Serbia goes really nasty ITTL. OTOH, an ongoing ethnic cleansing on the shores of the Adriatic has a remarkable destabilization potential. Would NATO still intervene ? And would air bombing still be sufficient or they would invade by ground ? All the while, are Bosnian Muslims still going to be content with sharing a country with hyper-nationalistic and atrocity-happy Serbs, or would they try to pull out, likely expanding the rebellion-repression cycle there ? and what would Croatia, and NATO, do about it ?

I Blame Communism · Jan 3, 2010

Eurofed said:
No, the idea that the Soviets somehow held back and could have achieved more in 1943-45 if they wished is a pro-Soviet legend. In reality, the OTL performance is pretty much the high mark of what they could have done, and they expended pretty much all the resources of their country and a huge amount of help from their allies and mistakes of their enemies to achieve it. America indeed held back much of its vast untapped potential and could done more, the USSR did not.

While America certainly had vastly more untapped potential available, I think you're exagerrating. I think we know that you're in the habit of labelling anything that is at all "pro-Soviet" a legend, even such verifiable and dubiously Russophile facts as "The Nazis murdered one quarter of the people of Belarus".

If the Soviets used "all the resources of their country", where did the picture-perfect combined-arms blow against Japan come from?

Eurofed said:
If they did not achieve more, it's because they were getting exhausted locally or strategically, or because the Germans successfully checked them for a while. Stalin could have consumed his residual military resources a bit more wastefully, but not substantially more so, since the USSR was quite scraping the bottom of its resouces barrel in 1944-45.

Absolutely it was, but then, so was Britain. That doesn't either power wasn't capable of being more reckless with those resources to put the emphasis on capturing German territory and not destroying Germany's ability to fight. I read an essay a while back asking whether the western allies could have tried to lunge at the centre of the Nazi state and decapitate it, causing German units to start surrendering even if the allies were left tactically vulnerable, for instance. I wasn't persuaded that the plan was a sound one, but a strong case was made that it could have been launched.

Eurofed said:
Anything more substantial would have meant very serious consequences to the USSR, such as risking economic and social collapse,

Like what happened already? There was no civilisation in the areas Germany had occupied. Cities were rebuilt from scratch (glance at the population history of St.Petroleningrad), banditry had become a way of life, the collaborating partisans didn't lay down arms until the 1950s, food shortages were severe.

Eurofed said:
or leaving the country and empire utterly bereft of the basic forces to defend itself and keep order after the war.

I take it you assume that the Soviets needed armoured divisions to keep their citizens in line? Not so.

Eurofed said:
They *don't* have the reserves.

The expression implies callus use of human life, not the actual existence of reserves. I'm not talking about new formations they were holding back and could have formed if they'd needed as they had the men and industry (like America), I'm talking about depleting their existing forces even more.

Eurofed said:
Of course, that tiny extra available bit of efforts that Stalin may achieve by scraping the bottom of the barrel extra hard and terrorizing the officers

More stereotyping: the Soviet army was always a totalitarian one, but Stalin let his generals be generals after they vindicated themselves at Kursk. Zhukov and Konev were not the sort of men who needed to be threatened before they sent hundreds of Russians troops to their deaths, far from it.

Eurofed said:
may achieve something significant, or it may not, as military butterflies go, or it may not, but nothing strategically game-changing. Surely not Berlin or Vienna in late 1944, nor certainly even Oder-Neisse and Prague. All the more so, since the scenario is giving better cards to the Germans for their last stand: they are leaving the Western Allies advance unopposed and can throw everything they have left in France, Low Countries, Italy, Scandinavia on the Eastern front, without being hampered by WA bombing, their morale and last efforts revitalized by the perspective of saving their country from Bolshevik occupation and rampage and achieving a decent peace if they can pull that last stand. Moreover, without "keep everything" rambling Adolf at the helm, they can fight smart for a time, and prioritize. The Wehrmacht was able to achieve local counterattacks or successful theater defenses up to the end of 1944 (and they won't lack the resources wasted e.g. in the Ardennes offensive).

Nevertheless, transferring resources across Europe takes time and is a huge logistical undertaking, and the German army was, Sudden Rush of Inspiration to Save the Nation from the Russian Scourge not withstanding, coming to bits.

Eurofed said:
Having factored all of this, I can only conclude that in the very most Soviet-favorable scenario, they could have reached the German-Polish border (or the Oder, if you wish), the Czech-Slovak border, the German-Hungarian border, and the outskirts of Slovenia.

I never suggested anything more.

Eurofed said:
In a middle-expectations scenario, they are substantially stalemated on the most vital fronts for Germany, the Vistula and the Danube, although they manage to overrun less vital areas like most of East Prussia, Slovakia, and Bosnia.

In the most-German favorable scenario, they manage to keep the final front line pretty much where it was in Autumn 1944, which means the West also keeps East Prussia, Slovakia, and maybe most or all of Bosnia (as you said, the non-Croat areas were Titoist-ridden, which makes it doubtful whether the Germans, or even the Croats, would waste precious last-stand resources to keep it, too).

Actually, the Croat areas were riddled with Partisans too. Croats are a nation like any other and didn't all support the Ustashe. Tito was himself Croat-Slovene (and fought for Austria-Hungary in the Great War), and the "Titoists" are going to be in government in pro-West Croatia, too. No less a man than the King of Yugoslavia had said officially that, communist though he wasn't, only the Partisans were trying to defend the people from the fascists and the Ustashe and Chetniks were opprtunistic murderers. Everyone knew how vile the Ustashe had gotten and they were not going to be tolerated, what with being a pack of bona-fide Nazist-collaborating terrorists.

In 1944-45 Yugoslavia, everybody from the king to the peasants to Winston "Bah! Monarchy!" Churchill had had taken camps: the Fascist occupiers, or the Partisans. Valdemar II has said of Yugoslavia "You know a country is dysfunctional when communists are its best option". Who else is going to take over the new Croat state?

Eurofed said:
Unfortunately for Europe, a successful anti-Nazi coup in such a late date as July 1944 means that it's too late (besides saving many, but certainly not all, Holocaust victims and WWII casualties) to change the outcome of Bagration, and hence prevent the Soviet breakout in eastern Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and eastern Hungary as well.

"Bagration" fell mostly in Soviet Belarus and Ukraine. It did extend into the Baltic states, where the Soviet ocucpation was of course illegal and disasterous for everyone, but in Bulgaria, you should remember, it wasn't a case of the Soviets rolling in and taking over: it was a broad-based pro-Soviet coup almost the day they crossed the Danube.

Eurofed said:
It seems to me that picking the middle outcome is the most sensible choice.

So I should think.

Eurofed said:
I agree about why they may not want to keep non-Croat Bosnia. OTOH, 20% is generally not enough to make a minority *really* troublesome.

The 10% Serbian population of Croatia, 1991, disagree.

Eurofed said:
Tito (or more likely whomever more reliable Stalinist stooge the NKVD puts in his place) could well play that trick effectively IF the West gets to keep all or most of Bosnia, and he may fuel the insurgency among Bosniac Serbs and Muslims. OTOH, I do not really expect it to be much effective in Croatia-Banovina. Croat nationalism is going to dampen the appeal of Communism among the Croat population to a great extent.

Remind me which anti-communist national movement hadn't covered its hands in the blood of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, to say nothing of Croats?

Eurofed said:
See the successful last stand the NHD made against Tito up to mid 1945.

Because they knew they were going to be strung up the second the Germans were gone for what they had done. By Croats. I hope you're not going to try and apologise for the Ustashe.

Eurofed said:
Any such communist insurrection is going to be crushed rather swiftly.

Who by?

Eurofed said:
As a more general point, with the Cold War breaking out in the last days of WWII, I totally expect Stalin, besides enforcing swift hardcore Sovietization on occupied countries, to fuel Communist unrest in the Western bloc. However, Americans will swiftly get in full-bore Cold War mode, too, which means they shall be quick and generous in supporting anti-Communist European forces and governments, too, both with a Plan Marshall and military aid. This roughly means that a Communist insurgency in Greece shall play out much like OTL (greater Soviet support is balanced by greater, quicker US support), as it would in a hypothetical Western-bloc Bosnia. The Communists may attempt coups and insurrections in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechia, Croatia but they shall be quickly crushed (most likely getting their butts banned for their trouble). As for West Poland and West Hungary, I expect that the division of the country shall diminish the appeal of the Communists to a fringe.

Not impossible. The Soviets were capable of sticking to the word, but then, they're going to be feeling pretty betrayed.

Eurofed said:
Therefore, coming back to the original issue, so far the discussion seems to conclude that the PoD would deliver a rather different outcome for post-Cold War Balkans: Bulgaria would move, with probable covert Western support, to pull not-too-unwilling Macedonia back into a federal embrace, and hence stabilize it; Serbia can keep control from the start of Montenegro and a Bosnia with the Croat parts cut off, and hence is not motivated to ethnic cleansing; and of course 1939 Croatia and Slovenia have been an happy and stable member of NATO and EU for decades.

With you so far.

Eurofed said:
OTOH, Albania would keep Kosovo, which would make them happy, but may make Serbian nationalists most unhappy. The best outcome might be that Serbia makes a swift surgical strike and seizes North Kosovo, which with could make a sensible partition and a de facto outcome reluctanlty and unofficially accepted by all. OTOH, if Serbia gets unreasonable (not too hard), it could go for the whole Kosovo, which would mean total war with Albania. Most likely, Serbia would easily win and occupy Albania, and may be easily tempted to keep it, since it was an old pre-WWI expansionistic claim. Albanian guerrilla would soon ensure in occupied Kosovo and Albania, putting Serbia to the siren call of ethnic cleansing, which they are likely to answer eagerly. What is the West going to do in this situation ? On one hand, it would be the first time that Serbia goes really nasty ITTL. OTOH, an ongoing ethnic cleansing on the shores of the Adriatic has a remarkable destabilization potential. Would NATO still intervene ? And would air bombing still be sufficient or they would invade by ground ? All the while, are Bosnian Muslims still going to be content with sharing a country with hyper-nationalistic and atrocity-happy Serbs, or would they try to pull out, likely expanding the rebellion-repression cycle there ? and what would Croatia, and NATO, do about it ?

I'm rather unhappy with this characterisation of Serbs. They're a people like any other. The terrible regime that came to power in the Yugoslav War was a product of unique and troubling politics. Butterflies will ensue.

Eurofed · Jan 3, 2010

First of all a general statement: if you agree that the German-Polish, Czech-Slovak, German-Hungarian, and Slovenian border is pretty much the high mark of what the Soviets could have achieved in this scenario, pressing on the fullest and wastefully consuming their residual resources, then we are in reasonable agreement.

Second, I do agree that Stalin could have pushed for more, by consuming more of his waning manpower reserves. I only argue that there would have been definite limits to this (besides the obvious point of utter exhaustion) in that he would have needed (or perceived to need) some spare after the war in Europe ended to a) defend its newfound empire against the Americans b) keep restive (re)conquered peoples into line c) invade Japan.

I Blame Communism said:
If the Soviets used "all the resources of their country", where did the picture-perfect combined-arms blow against Japan come from?

Well, let's say that the divisions he kept in the Far East were more or less the absolute last scraps in the manpower barrel. And I don't think he would have risked use them in Europe, since he didn't use all of them even in 1941. Moreover, losing (the opportunity to gain) Manchuria and Korea to gain an extra piece of Poland or Hungary is not an exact zero-sum game, but close to.

Absolutely it was, but then, so was Britain. That doesn't either power wasn't capable of being more reckless with those resources to put the emphasis on capturing German territory and not destroying Germany's ability to fight. I read an essay a while back asking whether the western allies could have tried to lunge at the centre of the Nazi state and decapitate it, causing German units to start surrendering even if the allies were left tactically vulnerable, for instance. I wasn't persuaded that the plan was a sound one, but a strong case was made that it could have been launched.

No question about this.

Like what happened already? There was no civilisation in the areas Germany had occupied. Cities were rebuilt from scratch (glance at the population history of St.Petroleningrad), banditry had become a way of life, the collaborating partisans didn't lay down arms until the 1950s, food shortages were severe.

Well, let's say that on top of that, if Stalin had totally wasted the troops that were on the front in 1944-45, he would have had to stop the war then and there, or draft women in large numbers, and that would have collapsed Soviet economy and war effort, since there would have been no one left to run the factories, services, and till the fields.

I take it you assume that the Soviets needed armoured divisions to keep their citizens in line? Not so.

Not the Russians themselves, no, but I have to remind you that there were plenty of anti-Communist insurgents in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Poland, and Romania, up to the early 1950s.

The expression implies callus use of human life, not the actual existence of reserves. I'm not talking about new formations they were holding back and could have formed if they'd needed as they had the men and industry (like America), I'm talking about depleting their existing forces even more.

We may agree about this.

More stereotyping: the Soviet army was always a totalitarian one, but Stalin let his generals be generals after they vindicated themselves at Kursk. Zhukov and Konev were not the sort of men who needed to be threatened before they sent hundreds of Russians troops to their deaths, far from it.

True, then let's see that Stalin urges them to be even more "enthusiastic". Whereas IOTL he cautioned them in 1944-45 to remind that there were no reserves after the current crop.

Nevertheless, transferring resources across Europe takes time and is a huge logistical undertaking,

Very true, nonetheless, the stop of Allied bombing would definitely help. Moreover, just like the Soviets can consume their own residual resources with more abandon, so the Wehrmacht can spend theirs on the Eastern front like there is no tomorrow in this scenario (since after the surrender, defending the new border shall be the chore of the Yankees).

and the German army was, Sudden Rush of Inspiration to Save the Nation from the Russian Scourge not withstanding, coming to bits.

I agree. However, I also note that up to the very end of 1944, there were able of successful local coutrerattacks and defensive battles (e.g. see the Ardennes, or the first battle of East Prussia). The point of incoming severe distintegration was not reached up to early 1945. E.g. picture the resources that were used in the Ardennes, refocused in Poland and Hungary.

I never suggested anything more.

Then we are in reasonable agreement.

Note: although I do not hold it as the most-likely scenario, the one with only 1938 Germany, Czechia, and Slovenia in the Western camp is a wholly plausible one, in my view. Military butterflies come and go, even if I find more plausible to assume that they split evenly.

It is only that while this scenario still has its own quite interesting Cold War consequences (rather stronger NATO and EU and equally weaker WaPa, Communist Finland and North Iran, NATO Sweden, Communist Korea, divided China, jumpstarted economic, security, and political European integration between the "inner six" plus Czechia and Slovenia, Finland with Finnmark, Poland with East Prussia and Lwow), the specific geopolitical effects on the Balkans would be less dramatic. While we would still have the Commie Balkan Federation, and the Bulgar-Macedon unification after the Cold War, Croatia would be kept in Yugoslavia during the Cold War, which means that most likely the post-Yugoslav Wars would unfold much like IOTL.

As a matter of fact, I do have scenario maps and TL notes for several variants of the Post-Valkyrie Cold War Europe, from the most Soviet-successful scenario above, to the most-Western successful one that leaves Slovakia, too, in the Western camp.

Actually, the Croat areas were riddled with Partisans too. Croats are a nation like any other and didn't all support the Ustashe. Tito was himself Croat-Slovene (and fought for Austria-Hungary in the Great War), and the "Titoists" are going to be in government in pro-West Croatia, too. No less a man than the King of Yugoslavia had said officially that, communist though he wasn't, only the Partisans were trying to defend the people from the fascists and the Ustashe and Chetniks were opprtunistic murderers. Everyone knew how vile the Ustashe had gotten and they were not going to be tolerated, what with being a pack of bona-fide Nazist-collaborating terrorists.

No question about the nature of the Ustashe, but, relatively speaking, the real strongholds of the Titoists were Bosnia, Serbia (although they met the serious rivalry of the Chetniks here) and Montenegro, not Croatia and Slovenia. I'm not going to argue anything good about the Ustashe here, except for, genocidal thugs that they were, even more extreme than the SS in some ways, they were militarly able to hold their ground against the Titoist Partisans and the Soviets up to spring 1945, which for the sake of our discussion is most relevant (it is what may put Croatia in the Western camp).

I only have to strongly disagree about the lack of alternatives between the fascist Ustashe and the Titoist Communists, for post-war Croatia. There was a potential alternative leadership for a Western Croatia in the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), which was a centrist-conservative movement not unlike western european christian democracy. Such movement had remained rather unsullied by collaboration with the fascist regime (its leader had been interned by Pavelic and the vast majority of HSS supporters remained passive and neutral for the duration of the war as the Ustasha, the communist Partisans, and the royalist Chetniks fought for control), had a strong popular following (plurality Croat party before the war), and so it would be in excellent position to claim the leadership of the country with generous Western support. So Western Croatia would follow a political trajectory quite similar to Italy.

In 1944-45 Yugoslavia, everybody from the king to the peasants to Winston "Bah! Monarchy!" Churchill had had taken camps: the Fascist occupiers, or the Partisans. Valdemar II has said of Yugoslavia "You know a country is dysfunctional when communists are its best option". Who else is going to take over the new Croat state?

Assuming he survives the war as IOTL, Vladko Macek, the leader of the HSS.

"Bagration" fell mostly in Soviet Belarus and Ukraine. It did extend into the Baltic states, where the Soviet ocucpation was of course illegal and disasterous for everyone, but in Bulgaria, you should remember, it wasn't a case of the Soviets rolling in and taking over: it was a broad-based pro-Soviet coup almost the day they crossed the Danube.

Well, you are right about Croatia. But my point about Bagration as it concerns the Iron Curtain is that in addition to putting the Baltics and eastern Poland under Soviet control, it was the direct cause of the Soviet breakout in Romania, which triggered the coup you speak of, and hence caused Romania, Bulgaria, and eastern Hungary to fall to the Soviets.

Although it is quite likely (not sure; if the Anglo-Americans had been the military occupiers, they would have had ample means to foster the Royalists back in control as they did in Greece, although there would have been most likely a civil war in the late 1940s) that Serbia-Bosnia-Montenegro and Albania could have fallen to homegrown Communists anyway, if Bagration had been avoided before post-Nazi Germany and its allies had made a separate conditional surrender to the Western Allies, all the rest of Eastern Europe would have surely been spared Communism (although Finland would have still been quite vulnerable to Stalin's revenge, and I dunno if it would have been possible to save the Baltic states).

The 10% Serbian population of Croatia, 1991, disagree.

So do you think there would have been a Yugoslavia-sponsored insurgency in post-War Croatia, using Serb minorities in Krajina and Hercegovina as its main base ? Well, that's a possibility, but I think that it would perform just as Greek Communists, range for a while, then be suppressed. As I said, Croat anti-Communists had a very large popular following, and the Western powers would pour them abundant support.

Remind me which anti-communist national movement hadn't covered its hands in the blood of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, to say nothing of Croats?

The HSS.

I hope you're not going to try and apologise for the Ustashe.

I do not. I'm only saying that as WWII fascist armies go, militarly they performed their last stand rather good. OTOH, it is also true that they mostly faced the Communist partisans. Soviet involvement on that front, while it existed, was relativelty limited after the liberation of Belgrade. Quite likely, if the Soviets had made a major committment in the Balkans even after that, they would have conquered Croatia rather earlier. While post-Nazi Germany would have still given some coverage to that front (to avoid an encirclement of their positions in western Hungary and a breakout in Austria and Italy), they didn't have too much to spare, and Poland and hungary would be their topmost priority. OTOH, to a lesser degree, thius would also be true for the Soviets. Nonetheless, such continued major committment to the Yugoslav front is one way you can butterfly Croatia back in the Communist camp.

Who by?

Armies and paramilitary police militias of the anti-communist governments in charge, abundantly supported by America.

I'm rather unhappy with this characterisation of Serbs. They're a people like any other. The terrible regime that came to power in the Yugoslav War was a product of unique and troubling politics. Butterflies will ensue.

Do you say that extreme nationalists a la Milosevic would be butterflied out ? Well, that's quite possible if Croatia goes in the Western camp. In such a case, I agree, it is quite possible that rump Yugoslavia/Megaserbia may be content with a sensible partition of Kosovo, which would swiftly neatly settle that mess, and prevent the radicalization in Bosnia.

Well, that would be one more way by which successful Valkyrie would produce a much less dystopic world than IOTL: not only a great deal of Holocaust victims and WWII casulaties would be spared, a large tract of Central Europe would be spared Stalinism (although Finland and South Korea would be screwed), Nazism would be defeated without Grossdeutchsland being carved up and Germans ethnically cleansed (well, except East Prussia), NATO and EU would be much stronger and the Soviet bloc weaker paving the way for its quicker fall, but the tragedy of the Yugoslav Wars could be almost entirely avoided. FYROM finds a confortable place within federal Bulgaria, Croatia is a happy, stable democratic member of NATO and EU in 1939 borders, Kosovo is neatly partitioned, and rump Bosnia stays within a sane mini-Yugoslavia.

I Blame Communism · Jan 4, 2010

Eurofed said:
First of all a general statement: if you agree that the German-Polish, Czech-Slovak, German-Hungarian, and Slovenian border is pretty much the high mark of what the Soviets could have achieved in this scenario, pressing on the fullest and wastefully consuming their residual resources, then we are in reasonable agreement.

Then I think we are.

Eurofed said:
Second, I do agree that Stalin could have pushed for more, by consuming more of his waning manpower reserves. I only argue that there would have been definite limits to this (besides the obvious point of utter exhaustion) in that he would have needed (or perceived to need) some spare after the war in Europe ended to a) defend its newfound empire against the Americans b) keep restive (re)conquered peoples into line c) invade Japan.

Also true.

Eurofed said:
Well, let's say that the divisions he kept in the Far East were more or less the absolute last scraps in the manpower barrel. And I don't think he would have risked use them in Europe, since he didn't use all of them even in 1941. Moreover, losing (the opportunity to gain) Manchuria and Korea to gain an extra piece of Poland or Hungary is not an exact zero-sum game, but close to.

True, although substantial forces that had been in Europe were re-consolidated and sent to Asia, were they performed admirably. Sixth Guards Tank Army had gone right from Cherkasy to Vienna.

Eurofed said:
Well, let's say that on top of that, if Stalin had totally wasted the troops that were on the front in 1944-45, he would have had to stop the war then and there, or draft women in large numbers, and that would have collapsed Soviet economy and war effort, since there would have been no one left to run the factories, services, and till the fields.

True again.

Eurofed said:
Not the Russians themselves, no, but I have to remind you that there were plenty of anti-Communist insurgents in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Poland, and Romania, up to the early 1950s.

True, as I mentioned myself, although I must remind you in turn that Ukraine is more than marshes and forests in Galicia and Volhynia. The Ukrainian partisans in Dniepr Ukraine, which had been effectively nothing prior to the war, came into the open and were obliterated during it. In Galicia, it was partisan warfare; everywhere else, it was just tracking down a few runaways.

Eurofed said:
True, then let's see that Stalin urges them to be even more "enthusiastic". Whereas IOTL he cautioned them in 1944-45 to remind that there were no reserves after the current crop.

Exactly.

Eurofed said:
Very true, nonetheless, the stop of Allied bombing would definitely help. Moreover, just like the Soviets can consume their own residual resources with more abandon, so the Wehrmacht can spend theirs on the Eastern front like there is no tomorrow in this scenario (since after the surrender, defending the new border shall be the chore of the Yankees).

Also true.

Eurofed said:
I agree. However, I also note that up to the very end of 1944, there were able of successful local coutrerattacks and defensive battles (e.g. see the Ardennes, or the first battle of East Prussia). The point of incoming severe distintegration was not reached up to early 1945. E.g. picture the resources that were used in the Ardennes, refocused in Poland and Hungary.

Valid point.

Eurofed said:
Then we are in reasonable agreement.

Note: although I do not hold it as the most-likely scenario, the one with only 1938 Germany, Czechia, and Slovenia in the Western camp is a wholly plausible one, in my view. Military butterflies come and go, even if I find more plausible to assume that they split evenly.

It seems we do.

Eurofed said:
It is only that while this scenario still has its own quite interesting Cold War consequences (rather stronger NATO and EU and equally weaker WaPa, Communist Finland and North Iran, NATO Sweden, Communist Korea, divided China, jumpstarted economic, security, and political European integration between the "inner six" plus Czechia and Slovenia, Finland with Finnmark, Poland with East Prussia and Lwow), the specific geopolitical effects on the Balkans would be less dramatic. While we would still have the Commie Balkan Federation, and the Bulgar-Macedon unification after the Cold War, Croatia would be kept in Yugoslavia during the Cold War, which means that most likely the post-Yugoslav Wars would unfold much like IOTL.

Agreed.

Eurofed said:
As a matter of fact, I do have scenario maps and TL notes for several variants of the Post-Valkyrie Cold War Europe, from the most Soviet-successful scenario above, to the most-Western successful one that leaves Slovakia, too, in the Western camp.

Which would be quite possible.

Eurofed said:
No question about the nature of the Ustashe, but, relatively speaking, the real strongholds of the Titoists were Bosnia, Serbia (although they met the serious rivalry of the Chetniks here) and Montenegro, not Croatia and Slovenia. I'm not going to argue anything good about the Ustashe here, except for, genocidal thugs that they were, even more extreme than the SS in some ways, they were militarly able to hold their ground against the Titoist Partisans and the Soviets up to spring 1945, which for the sake of our discussion is most relevant (it is what may put Croatia in the Western camp).

The Titoist bastions were closest to industry (the miners at Uzice, for instance), but I maintain that the attraction of Ustashe to Croats was little greater than that of the Chetniks to Serbs, the main differance being that the Ustashe were able to ste up state apparatus and use this to recuit people en masse (though the non-radicalised Home Guard were so supremely ineffective that the Partisans often let prisoners go home unarmed and captured them again to bring in weapons, according to Deakin).

Eurofed said:
I only have to strongly disagree about the lack of alternatives between the fascist Ustashe and the Titoist Communists, for post-war Croatia. There was a potential alternative leadership for a Western Croatia in the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), which was a centrist-conservative movement not unlike western european christian democracy. Such movement had remained rather unsullied by collaboration with the fascist regime (its leader had been interned by Pavelic and the vast majority of HSS supporters remained passive and neutral for the duration of the war as the Ustasha, the communist Partisans, and the royalist Chetniks fought for control), had a strong popular following (plurality Croat party before the war), and so it would be in excellent position to claim the leadership of the country with generous Western support. So Western Croatia would follow a political trajectory quite similar to Italy.

The HSS existed and was a very respectable movment, but as I said, while a few people tried to keep their heads down and stick to political principles that no longer applied, the war had divided everybody from the king down into people who were willing to bac the Partisans as the only option and people who weren't. Tito was popular (the HSS may have been a very respectable organisation of democrats, but it hadn't protected anyone from Fascists) and if the Soviets Stalinise Yugoslavia, much os his movement may end up in Croatia.

The western allies are obviously not going to tolerate the establishment of a dictatorship. The HSS are likely to be in opposition, and quite possibly government, eventually. But the allies had already recognise the Partisan government during the war, and I think it likley that some sort of movemnet with a lot of personnel overlap with the Partisans will carry the first elections.

Eurofed said:
Well, you are right about Croatia. But my point about Bagration as it concerns the Iron Curtain is that in addition to putting the Baltics and eastern Poland under Soviet control, it was the direct cause of the Soviet breakout in Romania, which triggered the coup you speak of, and hence caused Romania, Bulgaria, and eastern Hungary to fall to the Soviets.

On the other hand, the arrival of the Soviets was the only thing that ended the complete mess in Belarus, although that will probably happen anyway.

Eurofed said:
Although it is quite likely (not sure; if the Anglo-Americans had been the military occupiers, they would have had ample means to foster the Royalists back in control as they did in Greece, although there would have been most likely a civil war in the late 1940s) that Serbia-Bosnia-Montenegro and Albania could have fallen to homegrown Communists anyway, if Bagration had been avoided before post-Nazi Germany and its allies had made a separate conditional surrender to the Western Allies, all the rest of Eastern Europe would have surely been spared Communism (although Finland would have still been quite vulnerable to Stalin's revenge, and I dunno if it would have been possible to save the Baltic states).

I see what you mean.

Eurofed said:
So do you think there would have been a Yugoslavia-sponsored insurgency in post-War Croatia, using Serb minorities in Krajina and Hercegovina as its main base ? Well, that's a possibility, but I think that it would perform just as Greek Communists, range for a while, then be suppressed. As I said, Croat anti-Communists had a very large popular following, and the Western powers would pour them abundant support.

I agree that it's possible, but not likely to succeed.

Eurofed said:
I do not. I'm only saying that as WWII fascist armies go, militarly they performed their last stand rather good. OTOH, it is also true that they mostly faced the Communist partisans. Soviet involvement on that front, while it existed, was relativelty limited after the liberation of Belgrade. Quite likely, if the Soviets had made a major committment in the Balkans even after that, they would have conquered Croatia rather earlier. While post-Nazi Germany would have still given some coverage to that front (to avoid an encirclement of their positions in western Hungary and a breakout in Austria and Italy), they didn't have too much to spare, and Poland and hungary would be their topmost priority. OTOH, to a lesser degree, thius would also be true for the Soviets. Nonetheless, such continued major committment to the Yugoslav front is one way you can butterfly Croatia back in the Communist camp.

Plausible ideas.

Eurofed said:
Do you say that extreme nationalists a la Milosevic would be butterflied out ? Well, that's quite possible if Croatia goes in the Western camp. In such a case, I agree, it is quite possible that rump Yugoslavia/Megaserbia may be content with a sensible partition of Kosovo, which would swiftly neatly settle that mess, and prevent the radicalization in Bosnia.

It's possible. "Money going up the Sava" was one of the formative factors for Serbian radical nationalism, as wa sthe feeling that the Yugoslav internal boundaries had been drawn to their disadvantage.

Eurofed said:
Well, that would be one more way by which successful Valkyrie would produce a much less dystopic world than IOTL: not only a great deal of Holocaust victims and WWII casulaties would be spared, a large tract of Central Europe would be spared Stalinism (although Finland and South Korea would be screwed), Nazism would be defeated without Grossdeutchsland being carved up and Germans ethnically cleansed (well, except East Prussia), NATO and EU would be much stronger and the Soviet bloc weaker paving the way for its quicker fall, but the tragedy of the Yugoslav Wars could be almost entirely avoided. FYROM finds a confortable place within federal Bulgaria, Croatia is a happy, stable democratic member of NATO and EU in 1939 borders, Kosovo is neatly partitioned, and rump Bosnia stays within a sane mini-Yugoslavia.

An optimistic scenario, but hardly impossible.

Eurofed · Jan 4, 2010

I Blame Communism said:
Then I think we are.

Yup. Behold the amazing sight, ladies and gentlemen: IBC and myself in fairly complete agreement on a major WWII topic.

Which would be quite possible.

Yes. On a sideline, what do you think it is the most probable outcome for NATO Slovakia ? Do they accept to re-establish a federation with the Czechs, or still strive for independence ? My assumption about Czechia is that the Anglo-Americans would undo the Munich Agreement, but would also veto the mass expulsion of the German Sudetes (an ethnic cleansing directly allowed by Anglo-American occupation authorities and performed under the watchful eye of the Anglo-American press would be politically untenable) and would push the Czech to establish a federal structure for the new Republic. But I can't really decide what the Slovaks would do about the perspective of a federal Czechoslovakia and what attitude the Americans would take about it.

The HSS existed and was a very respectable movment, but as I said, while a few people tried to keep their heads down and stick to political principles that no longer applied, the war had divided everybody from the king down into people who were willing to bac the Partisans as the only option and people who weren't. Tito was popular (the HSS may have been a very respectable organisation of democrats, but it hadn't protected anyone from Fascists) and if the Soviets Stalinise Yugoslavia, much os his movement may end up in Croatia.

I think you are too optimistic about the post-war electoral perspectives of the Croat Communists and too pessimistic about the HSS ones. I deem the analogies with Italy, France, and Belgium most compelling. There, too, the Communists had been the spearhead of the Partisan movement and had reaped a large popular following because of it, to the point that many expected their takeover immediately after the war. Nonetheless, in 2-3 years, reorganization of anti-fascist centrist-conservative and anti-communist moderate left political movements and public opinion, the influence of the Church and of America (and gratitude for Plan Marshall), and the propaganda effects of ongoing Sovietization in Eastern Europe, had pushed centrist-conservative and moderate social democratic parties and coalitions back in a confortable majority, with Communists reaping no more than one-third of votes at the polls. Given the ample social and political analogies between Croatia and those countries (especially Italy), I see no reason to expect that in a Western-occupied Croatia, the same pattern would not repeat itself.