Mercury Burning: The Allies win the Battle of Crete

"Before Crete we had never won a battle. After Crete we never lost one"

Winston Churchill

"The German invasion of Crete in May 1941 stands as the greatest disaster in the history of airborne warfare. Up until that point, airborne operations had been used mainly in a tactical and operational context to seize key objectives in advance of the ground forces, such as the seizure during the Balkan campaign of the bridge over the Corinth Canal on the 26 April 1941, and the seizure of the Belgium fortress of Eban Emael on the 11 May 1940. The German invasion of Crete (codenamed Operation Merkur, or Mercury, after the Roman God of communication, travel and thievery – the counterpart of Hermes, the messenger of the Gods in Greek mythology) has been the only strategic airborne operation aimed at attacking and occupying such an important target and what followed after the first transports approached Cretian airspace we know why. The operation was the brainchild of Generalmajor Kurt Student, the commander, and fanatical proponent of the airborne arm who believed that the paratroopers could operate in their own right and not merely be used to support the Wehrmacht. His faith in them was the main reason he took such a fatal gamble"

From "Blood, Sweat and Tears: An objectionist view of the Second World War" by Len Deighton



The island of Crete is just over 160 miles long and varies from seven to thirty-six miles in width. There are four mountain ranges (that almost seem to form a continuous spine along the island) that all come together in the central mass of Mount Ida. To the southwest is the Sphakia (White) mountain range, which literally falls into the sea at certain points and make access to the area very difficult. Rain falling on this range irrigates the northern strip of coastal land around Suda Bay and supports the town of Canea. Moving eastwards there is a depression, the Mount Ida range, another depression and then another coastal strip of land with Heraklion, the principle town, after which the mountains rise again to the summit of Mount Dikhti. The relatively poor harbours have meant that Crete has remained isolated and even by 1941, was behind in facilities and communications infrastructure compared to the rest of the Mediterranean.

The Germans were right to believe that it was important to take the island. After all, Crete has always been considered a strategic point in the Mediterranean that had greatly been enhanced by the appearance of aircraft in warfare. A British airfield on Crete could be used to raid deep into the Balkans Rumanian oil fields) or be used against North Africa. Suda Bay was also a harbour with great potential as a naval base and so whoever controlled Crete had a major advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean. The potential benefits for the Germans were obvious, it was however, a difficult place to attack, especially from the air.

The immediate background to Operation Mercury lies in the events of 1940 and 1941. With the postponement of Operation Seelöwe , Hitler decided to opt for a peripheral strategy, as recommended by others in the Nazi hierarchy such as Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring and Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, to try and bring Britain to the negotiating table before American assistance could prove effective or the Soviet Union decided to enter the war on the Allied side. Even the Army considered a Mediterranean strategy with the Chief of Staff, General Franz Halder discussing with General Walter von Brauchitsch options in case Sealion proved impossible and concluded that “we could deliver the British a decisive blow in the Mediterranean, shoulder them away from Asia, help the Italians in building their Mediterranean empire and, with the aid of Russia, consolidate the Reich which we have created in western and north-western Europe.” In October 1940, Hitler attempted to cement a Mediterranean coalition by travelling on his personal train to visit General Franco at Hendaye and Marshal Pétain – the only time Hitler left his headquarters for anybody other than El Duce, a sign that he attached a great deal of importance to the plan. Neither meeting was entirely successful – Hitler’s meeting with Franco drawing a comment from Hitler that “rather than go through that again I would prefer to have three or four teeth taken out” as both leaders were wary of loosing colonial territory so as to persuade the other to join the Axis cause. These diplomatic efforts were conducted so that the Wehrmacht could conduct an assault on Gibraltar and then deploy reinforcements to the Italian forces in Libya and then drive for the Suez Canal.


Hitler meets with Petain during his historic train journey

Hitler had in fact vetoed earlier Italian designs on Yugoslavia as it was tied economically to the Reich and he wanted to keep the Balkans relatively stable. He had intervened in a dispute between Hungary and Rumania over the region of Transylvania, as Germany depended upon Rumanian oil exports and while he had allowed the transfer of some territory to Hungary, had guaranteed the remainder of Rumania and sent a large military ‘training mission’ to the country. This upset the Soviets who had seen that part of the Balkans as traditionally being part of their sphere of influence and despite German diplomatic assurances, accused the Germans of breaching Article III of the Non-Aggression Pact that called for joint consultation.

Having established some form of stability in the Balkans, the Fuhrer strongly recommended to the Italians that the status quo be kept there for the time being as Hitler was anxious that a war with the Soviet Union be started when and where he wished it to start it, not as a result of some crisis in the Balkans. This immensely annoyed Mussolini who was afraid that the war might end before the Italian Armed Forces could show their prowess in battle to the world. Greece seemed to be the exception to the Balkan rule, as it was really part of the Mediterranean theatre and could serve as a strategic outpost to support the Italian drive against Egypt and the Suez Canal and Hitler had tried to interest Mussolini in both Greece and Crete as early as July 1940. Both OKH (the Army High Command) and OKW (the High Command of the Armed Forces) had considered plans to implement the joint Italian-German offensive in the Mediterranean and concluded that an attack on Greece would be an essential part of any campaign. Such an attack would take place after the Italian capture of Mersa Matruh that would provide the Axis with airfields in North Africa from which to give air support to the drive towards Suez and an airborne invasion of Crete. Although led by General Metaxas and maintaining a neutral position, Greece was bound strategically and economically to Britain and the Greek Royal Family had strong British connections. Occupying mainland Greece and Crete would pre-empt a British move into Greece that would directly threaten Italy, provide an additional base for operations against the Italian advance in North Africa and threaten the Rumanian oil fields. Therefore an Italian attack on Greece suited Hitler’s overall plans and he may even have given Mussolini a green light when the two met at the Brenner Pass on 4 October...

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All comments and criticsms are welcome

very nice. keep going.

ddtim said:

very nice. keep going.

Click to expand...

Thankyou

Background: The Axis move South

The Italian intelligence assessment of the Greek Armed Forces was unflattering at best and therefore an easy victory was confidently predicted. British intervention would be forestalled by the simultaneous launching Marshal Graziani’s second-stage of his North African offensive against Mersa Matruh. Mussolini launched his attack on 28 October after issuing an ultimatum to the Greeks. Unfortunately he had ignored warnings that the Italian forces in Albania were completely unprepared to conduct an autumn campaign and had not even been assigned engineers. The lack of a clear and sensible strategy – such as pushing directly towards the vital port of Salonika instead of pushing across the mountain range of the Epirus – exasperated Hitler almost to the same degree as the campaign’s completely inefficient and uncoordinated execution. He later stated that he had counselled against undertaking the expedition at that point. The Italian campaign in Greece quickly came to a complete halt and the Greeks then launched a counter offensive, which drove the Italians out of their country and threatened Albania itself. The Italian position in the Eastern Mediterranean started to completely unravel as the British first damaged half the Italian battle fleet in a daring raid on the port of Taranto on 11 November, then intervened in Greece by sending RAF squadrons there and a battalion[1] to Crete to secure Suda Bay allowing the Greeks to transfer the Cretan V Division to the mainland and finally took the initiative in the desert war after Marshal Graziani had stopped at Sidi Barrani to reorganise his supply lines. The attack completely defeated the Italian force of ten divisions in Libya and threatened the entire Italian position in North Africa.



Greek soldiers celebrate Christmas Day on the Albanian front.



At the same time as the Italians were facing crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean; events elsewhere were to change the context of the situation in that theatre. The Germans had faced continued Soviet intransigence and suspicions over their plans for Europe. Since late July, Hitler had been toying with the idea of exactly when to attack the Soviet Union but had decided to defer the decision and try and secure the Balkan and Mediterranean theatres. This would weaken the British position so as to potentially force her to the negotiating table and therefore Hitler was coming around to the idea that the attack on the Soviet Union should be delayed until 1942. Events towards the end of 1940 were to cause a shift in the emphasis in the German war effort irrevocably towards the East and push the timetable up by a year. In November, Molotov visited Berlin for negotiations with Hitler and von Ribbentrop to pave the way for the Soviet membership of the Axis. Despite dangling the tempting offer of a share in the British Empire, Molotov would not be deflected from the Soviet demands to control Finland and Bulgaria as well as control over the exits from the Baltic Sea. Hitler was staggered by the scale of Stalin’s demands and decided the issue of when to attack the Soviet Union had been settled. The Soviet Union had to be destroyed in 1941 before the United States could enter the war decisively. With this the peripheral strategy fundamentally changed character, from having its focus as part of the war against Britain to being a part of the war against the Soviet Union. The southern flank had to be secured so that the British could not be allowed to intervene effectively and threaten the Axis position in the Balkans.
In light of these events and as a result of the new emphasis on an attack on the Soviet Union, the original staff plans for the Mediterranean were revised. Operation Felix (The Invasion of Gibraltar) was put on hold, possibly until late 1942, due to Franco’s bland non-commitment to the Axis cause, but Operation Marita (the invasion of Greece) had become more important than ever to due the need to secure the right flank of the advance into the Soviet Union. In this light, Marita was a limited operation as was the sending of an expeditionary force, the Afrika Korps under General Erwin Rommel, to North Africa to bolster the Italian defence and contain the British advance. Both Göring and Raeder were unhappy at the new emphasis on a move eastwards as they had both greatly preferred to see the UK knocked out of the war before Germany turned its attention east in order to prevent the dreaded two front war. Göring was especially unhappy, as while the Luftwaffe would be very much subservient to the Army’s needs in Barbarossa, in the Mediterranean, the Luftwaffe still have freedom of action and so despite the shift in focus, planning continued for operations against Gibraltar, Malta and Crete, all potential targets of the airborne forces. Fliegerkorps X was transferred from Norway as they specialised in anti-shipping operations and scored their first success by crippling the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious on 10 January.



Molotov is welcomed by Von Ribbentrop, November,1940


While preparations were still underway for Operation Barbarossa, the Germans attacked on 6 April 1941, launching Operation Marita against Greece and Operation Punishment against Yugoslavia (where a coup by a group of military officers had toppled the regime that had acceded to German demands). In a few short weeks they had completely reversed the Axis fortunes in the area and forced the Allies to evacuate their forces after overrunning the two countries. By way of a foretaste of what was to come, Oberst Alfred Sturm’s 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment, 7th Flieger (Airborne) Division was used to capture a road bridge over the Corinth Canal. One of the main escape routes for Allied forces from Megara was across the Corinth Canal where it was spanned by an iron bridge. The bridge was guarded by a ‘close bridge garrison’ of British troops and had been set for demolition by the Royal Engineers. The Germans delayed over executing the operation but once decided, carried it out with characteristic speed and flexibility. The British defenders were numerically sufficient for the task, with a reinforced battalion concentrated on the south side of the bridge supported by AA guns and a few light tanks. The two methods usually open to airborne operations is to either land the troops some distance from the objectives (and therefore away from the strongest part of the defence) to allow them to form up and assault the objective in good order (which was used in Market Garden). The other method is drop the paratroopers as close to the objective as possible, taking into account the need to minimise dispersion, in order to achieve surprise and overwhelm the defenders before they can react accordingly. The latter method was chosen as the means of assault and in the early morning of the 26 April, the German vanguard of parachute engineers, loaded in DFS 230 gliders landed at either end of the bridge after the German close air support had pounded the defenders and proceeded to take it and set to work on the demolition charges. A few minutes later, this was followed up by some 200 Ju52s that dropped two battalions of parachute infantry (one each end of the bridge) that quickly overwhelmed the defenders after a short but sharp battle. Almost as a last act, a British Bofors gun fired at the engineers on the bridge and actually touched off some disconnected explosives that destroyed the bridge. This meant that a large number of Allied troops were saved from being cut off and had escaped and were evacuated to Crete, not Egypt as the Germans guessed.

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[1] 2nd Btn, York and Lancaster Regiment that was eventually followed by 2nd Btn, The Black Watch

I'm waiting for AA guns, radar and Spitfires on Crete, but don't mind me, go on. And if you could get Churchill to stop nattering at Wavell, I'd appreciate it.

German Preparations

Unfortunately, it took time to assemble the necessary men and equipment which were scattered all around Europe and as a result, D-Day for the operation was put back until 20 May, enabling the confused defence of Crete to be put into some sort of order. During this time, the German planning was split between General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Commander, Luftflotte IV) who wanted a single concentrated drop to seize the airfield at Máleme, followed by a build up of additional infantry and heavy weapons. Such an approach might allow the British to reinforce the island and launch a sustained defence of the island. The second plan was put forward by Generalmajor Kurt Student (Commander, Fliegerkorps XI) who wanted to make no less than seven separate drops, the most important ones being around Máleme, Canea, Rethymnon and Heraklion. Such a plan would enable the Germans to seize all the main strategic points at the outset, so long as there was minimal resistance on the ground. In the end, Goering imposed a compromise solution between these two different approaches. There would be two main drops, one in the morning around Canea and the airfield at Máleme, the other in the afternoon against the airfields at Heraklion and Rethymnon.
These drops would be undertaken by the 7th Flieger Division (Generalleutnant W Süssmann), of three parachute regiments (1st under Oberst Bruno Bräuer, 2nd under Oberst Alfred Sturm and 3rd under Oberst Richard Heidrich) each of three battalions with divisional artillery, engineers and signals, as well as the Luftlande Sturmregiment (Airborne Assault Regiment – under Generalmajor Eugen Meindl) that had four battalions (three parachute and one glider) and supporting assets. These had a combined strength of just over 8,000 men. The Luftlande Sturmregiment would capture Máleme airfield by first landing three glider detachments from the 1st Btn (on an AA position near the mouth over the Tavronitis River, next to Hill 107 near Máleme airfield and on a bridge over the Tavronitis River) and then the remainder of the regiment (three battalions) would parachute in and surround the positions of the 5th New Zealand Bde east of the airfield. The 3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment, with two Glider detachments from the 1st Btn, Luftlande Sturmregiment as well as airborne engineer and AA units, would jump into Prison Valley and develop an attack north-east under the command of the divisional commander, Generalmajor Süssmann. The 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment (less the 2nd Btn) would land near Rethymnon with the 1st Btn attacking the airfield and the 3rd Btn attacking the town itself. The 1st Fallschirmjäger Regiment along with the 2nd Btn, 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment would land around Heráklion in a slightly dispersed manner as the Germans were unsure as to the extent of the defensive perimeter around the one good airport on the island. Here the disadvantages of the compromise can be seen as Student clearly wanted to put the weight of the attack on Heráklion, and if it was considered to be that important, why attack it in the second wave?

The assault force would be reinforced by the 5th Gebirgs Division (14,000 men under Generalmajor Julius Ringel) with three regiments of infantry (85th Gebirgsjäger Regiment under Oberst Krakau, 100th Gebirgsjäger Regiment under Oberst Utz and the 141st Gebirgsjäger Regiment under Oberst Jais from the 6th Gebirgs Division), one artillery regiment (95th Gebirgs Artillery Regiment under Oberstleutnant Wittmann) as well as artillery, anti-tank, reconnaissance engineer and signals assets. It would move to Crete by both air and sea. The 5th Gebirgs Division in fact, replaced the 22nd Luftlande Division, which was the natural choice to reinforce the paratroopers, as the division had been trained for airlanding operations in support of the 7th Flieger Division, but was at the time, guarding the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania and would have had a very difficult time in moving to the necessary airfields. However, Gebirgsjäger (mountain troops) had light weapons and were well suited to moving by air transport. They would be given close air support by Fliegerkorps VII under General der Flieger Freiherr von Richthofen. While this was a powerful force, both Löhr and Student correctly perceived the experimental nature of the operation and the inherent dangers of relying solely on a combination of infantry and air support without tank and substantial artillery support. Added to that was the chaos that existed in the Balkans after the campaign and the fact that large numbers of troops were now withdrawing to concentrate for Barbarossa. The Germans were only able to get the 7th Flieger Division and fuel to the airfields around Athens at the last moment. The Germans correctly determined that the operation had the best chance of success if they managed to get the maximum strength deployed as quickly as possible.


The Allies Prepare

This of course was a fortunate stance to adopt, as the Germans had badly underestimated the Allied strength on the island. The defence of Greece and Crete was one of the many operations General Sir Archibald Wavell had been forced to undertake with inadequate resources all around his theatre. There were acute shortages of aircraft, heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and even basic supplies that made his job even more problematic, a situation made worse by the evacuation from Greece where much of the infantry had lost their organic heavy weapons, had caused many units to become disorganised, and had severely shaken their morale. Even communications proved to be nearly non-existent with the lack of a properly functioning radio network. Still, the forces on the island numbered some 33,000 Commonwealth troops and 10,000 Greek soldiers, a lot more than the German intelligence estimate of 10,000 Commonwealth troops and the remnants of ten Greek divisions.

At the last moment, Major General Bernard Freyberg, a New Zealander who had fought at both Gallipoli and on the Somme, was placed in command on Crete on 30 April and discovered that virtually nothing had been done to solidify the defences on Crete since the autumn. Freyberg immediately set to work at improving the situation on Crete but given that the date of the German attack was rapidly approaching could not do all that he had wished. Indeed the British had a far better picture of what German intentions were than the Germans had of Allied dispositions. From the end of April, a stream of ‘Ultra’ intelligence, decrypted by the code-breaking office at Bletchley Park, indicated that the Germans were very near to launching an all-out airborne invasion of Crete with the emphasis being on the capture of the airfields and then following that up with air transport of reinforcements, with some coming by sea. Further confirmation came when a Bf 110 crashed in Suda Bay and was found to have the map case and operational order for the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment and a summery of the whole operation. The defenders moved to concentrate on defending the airfields but failed to put them out of use (the RAF, had 6 Spitfires left on the island) . The scene was set therefore for one of the most daring uses of airborne troops in history with the Germans invading with a completely inadequate idea of what they were facing.

Any thoughts so far folks?

The Red said:

Any thoughts so far folks?

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If the Germans have a disasterous airborne invasion, how is that going to effect American Airborne operations in the war?

The Kiat said:

If the Germans have a disasterous airborne invasion, how is that going to effect American Airborne operations in the war?

Click to expand...

Well the Allies will be a lot more cautious after the seeing the disaster that an unsupported airborne operation can be and thus will try to limit Airborne involvement in large scale operations unless they can rely on quick ground support.

The Red said:

Well the Allies will be a lot more cautious after the seeing the disaster that an unsupported airborne operation can be and thus will try to limit Airborne involvement in large scale operations unless they can rely on quick ground support.

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OTL minus Market-Garden.

The First Day

Before dawn on the 20 May, Ju52s on Greek airfields such as Megara, Corinth and Tanagra fired up their engines and started to take off. After the first few, the dust storms that have been caused on the dry, untarmacked runways played havoc with the carefully planned timetable as it took time for the clouds to settle again. Eventually however, the Ju52s gathered and then headed for their objective. Unfortunately, General Süssmann, who was in a glider and due to drop as part of the first wave, was killed when his glider separated from its towrope and crashed on the island of Aegina. Before the main body of the first wave had reached the coast of Crete, Fliegerkorps VII had started to soften up the defences of the island and the glider companies had started to land. The initial glider landings around Máleme proved costly and the Fallschirmjäger failed in its objectives to capture the bridge over the Tavronitis, knock out the anti-aircraft positions but did secure an area on the outskirts of the airfield. The 3rd Btn, Luftlande Sturmregiment started dropping at this point and landed right on top of parts of the 21st and 23rd New Zealand Btns, suffering badly as a result, some being killed as they droppe and many being killed as they searched for weapons containers. The 4th Btn landed west of the Tavronitis and the 2nd Btn landed east of Spilia, both relatively intact but quickly engaged by forces in the vicinity. Meindl collected the glider troops around his HQ and dug in on the airfield’s perimeter and ordered two companies from the 2nd Btn to take Hill 107, the key to Máleme airfield.



The first wave arrives over the skies of Crete

In the central sector, 3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment had landed well but rather dispersed and with strong resistance from Allied forces in the area (chiefly the 4th and 10th New Zealand Bdes). The glider detachments landed and partly completed their objective to knock out AA batteries (at high cost) and moved south to join the main body. The Engineer Btn had a rough reception from the 8th Greek Regt around Episkopi. Two battalions however, captured the village of Agia and set up the regimental command post, being joined by the divisional command post that had landed nearby. By midday, things were looking bleak for the Germans with none of the original objectives being secured. Casualties were mounting quickly, especially amongst the commanders, and many pockets of Fallschirmjäger were pinned firmly in place. None of this was known to Student who ordered the second wave to commence deployment. The aircraft had to be refuelled by hand which led to a delay, and therefore a disconnect opened up between the arrival of the air support and the arrival of the second wave of Fallschirmjäger. The dust was again a problem and so the aircraft had to take off in small groups with the Fallschirmjäger being delivered in penny packets. The 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment (less the 2nd Btn) dropped into an area held by the 19th Australian Bde and the 4th and 5th Greek Regts. However, the combination of planning with incomplete information and a wildly dispersed drop actually counted for the Germans as the 3rd Btn (Hauptmann Weidemann) landed away from enemy positions, formed up and headed west towards their objective of Rethymnon, but unexpectedly ran into fierce resistance from civilians and armed police and so were unable to take the town. Two companies of the 3rd Btn (Major Kroh) dropped onto the 2/1 Australian Btn while the remainder of the 3rd Btn gathered themselves and moved westwards to support their comrades in taking Hill A that overlooked the eastern end of the Rethymnon airfield. They dug in but faced numerous Australian counterattacks from the 2/1 Australian Btn under Lt Colonel Campbell. The regimental HQ with Oberst Sturm landed between the two on top of the 2/11 Australians and 4th Greek Regt with many being killed or captured. The 1st Fallschirmjäger Regiment with the 2nd Btn, 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment dropped around Heráklion and suffered the most of all the formations dropped that day. They dropped onto the 14th Infantry Bde area with the 1st Btn dropping to the west and southeast of the airfield and caught in a crossfire between 2/Leicesters, 2/4 Australian Btn and 2/Black Watch, the 3rd Btn dropping to the west of the town and started to move eastwards, part of the 2nd Btn, 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment (the other part still in Greece) landing way to the west and unscathed and the 1st Btn landing way to the east untouched. The 1st Btn eventually gathered itself and moved westwards to join up with the 2nd Btn. Meanwhile, the British under Brigadier Chappell were looking to be reinforced by the 1/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who had landed at Tymbaki on 19 May and counterattacked into Heráklion, driving out the 3rd Btn who had managed to fight its way into the harbour.


New Zealander troops pose in front of casualties from the failed landing at Episkopi

By the end of the first day, the Fallschirmjäger were already staring disaster in the face, however the situation was deeply worrying for Freyburg who had been getting reports of huge numbers of enemy Fallschirmjäger dropping all along the north coast of the island and all his garrisons under attack simultaneously – a picture which Student, despite the maxim of concentration, had wanted to give. Even so, Student was in a difficult position. As far as he could ascertain, things had gone badly just about everywhere. Heráklion had held, and there was no news, which meant bad news, from Rethymnon. There was no secure point of entry open to the Gebirgsjäger anywhere. Many of the Allied AA and field artillery guns, causing heavy casualties amonngst the Germans in terms of men and equipment. The only possible opening was in the west at Máleme where the Luftlande Sturmregiment had a small hold on both the western end of the runway and at the foot of Hill 107. To test if aircraft could land there, Student sent a staff officer, Hauptmann Kleye, on a Ju52 who landed at dawn on 21 May. Luckily, the ground to the northwest of the runway was dead to most of the New Zealanders except a few right at the top of Hill 107. Kleye was thus briefed on the situation and took off again. After this, six aircraft landed on the runway at 08.00 to unload ammunition and supplies that were badly needed by the Fallschirmjäger. After this, the stream of Ju52s became steady with the Gebirgsjäger from the 100th Gebirgs Regiment starting to arrive. At this point, Student decided that his maximum point of effort would be switched from Heráklion to Máleme with Meindl being evacuated and replaced by Oberst Bernhard Ramcke. His remaining Fallschirmjäger would be dropped west and east of the airfield to respectively, reinforce Ramcke and take the defenders in the rear. Unfortunately those dropping to the east dropped onto the New Zealanders and suffered serious casualties, although the survivors fortified the village of Pirgos on the road between the airfield and Canea. The remainder dropped without incident and after reinforcing the infantry at the foot of Hill 107, assaulted it, by midday ,after heavy Allied and German casualites it could be called one of the few German victories on Crete...

Markus said:

OTL minus Market-Garden.

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So, will Patton still make a rush for Berlin?

OKH_1946 said:

So, will Patton still make a rush for Berlin?

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Don't underestimate the power of the Butterfly.

What, exactly, is the PoD? I know that OTL Crete was a pretty close run thing and could have been rescued for the Allies by slightly different defence. Is the PoD the General who died? or the argument over the plans? or something else?

I'd like some idea of how this differs from OTL, as most of us don't have precise details of the campaign in our heads.

(Personally, I like putting in parenthetical notes 'unlike OTL where...'. Ya, that kind of spoils a 'textbook' kind of explanation. Other people use footnotes....

I'd really like to see the Allies win, but I'd also like to understand what I'm reading (i.e. WHY are the Allies winning this time).

Dathi THorfinnsson said:

What, exactly, is the PoD? I know that OTL Crete was a pretty close run thing and could have been rescued for the Allies by slightly different defence. Is the PoD the General who died? or the argument over the plans? or something else?

I'd like some idea of how this differs from OTL, as most of us don't have precise details of the campaign in our heads.

(Personally, I like putting in parenthetical notes 'unlike OTL where...'. Ya, that kind of spoils a 'textbook' kind of explanation. Other people use footnotes....

I'd really like to see the Allies win, but I'd also like to understand what I'm reading (i.e. WHY are the Allies winning this time).

Click to expand...

1) The Germans failed to take the bridge over Tavronitis.

2) The Germans did much less damage to AA weapons.

3) Theres less trouble in recieing infromation from Enigma so the Allies have a good idea of the German plan.

4) The Allies have planes in Crete

5) The New Zealanders did not retreat from their positions around Maleme Airfield.

There are a few others but those are the main ones.

Dathi THorfinnsson said:

What, exactly, is the PoD? I know that OTL Crete was a pretty close run thing and could have been rescued for the Allies by slightly different defence. Is the PoD the General who died? or the argument over the plans? or something else?

Click to expand...

There:

From the end of April, a stream of ‘Ultra’ intelligence, decrypted by the code-breaking office at Bletchley Park, indicated that the Germans were very near to launching an all-out airborne invasion of Crete with the emphasis being on the capture of the airfields and then following that up with air transport of reinforcements, with some coming by sea. The defenders moved to concentrate on defending the airfields but failed to put them out of use (the RAF, had 6 Spitfires left on the island) .

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In OTL Freyberg got raw Ultra material and misinterpreted it. He expected a seaborne invasion by armoured forces supported by paratroopers landing in the rear. Thus far too many troops defended beaches and far too few airfields but nevertheless the Germans had hellish problems to capture just one airfield.

The Red said:

1) The Germans failed to take the bridge over Tavronitis.

2) The Germans did much less damage to AA weapons.

3) Theres less trouble in recieing infromation from Enigma so the Allies have a good idea of the German plan.

4) The Allies have planes in Crete

5) The New Zealanders did not retreat from their positions around Maleme Airfield.

There are a few others but those are the main ones.

Click to expand...

Markus said:

There:



In OTL Freyberg got raw Ultra material and misinterpreted it. He expected a seaborne invasion by armoured forces supported by paratroopers landing in the rear. Thus far too many troops defended beaches and far too few airfields but nevertheless the Germans had hellish problems to capture just one airfield.

Click to expand...

Ah. Thanks, the both of you. That helps me keep things straight a lot better.

The Situation Worsens

What the Germans feared most came true by the second day. The 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 28th (Maori) New Zealand Btns began a strong local counterattack to force them away from Máleme airfield. The counterattack started late and managed to get to the perimeter of the airfield after being held up by the Germans fortified in Pirgos. The commanding officer of the 22nd New Zealand Btn, Lt Colonel L W Andrew VC had been wary of his mission to defend not only the airfield but quite a wide area around it as well but by the evening he had managed to retake the western end of the runway (and prevent the adventurous landings of the Ju52s) With no help coming , the Germans decided to withdraw to prevent being overrun , casualties were beginning to skyrocket with the continued Allied pressure and the desperate shortages of ammunition. This effectively handed the battle to the Allies as they had abandoned the airfield and couldn't start to reinforce the Fallschirmjäger with the 5th Gebirgs Division.

At sea, the continued presence of a large number of Royal Navy ships had, until the Ultra revelations, seemed inexplicable in the face of complete Luftwaffe air superiority, but signals intelligence had warned the British that the initial force from the 5th Gebirgs Division (3rd Btn, 100th Gebirgs Regiment) were on their way to reinforce the Fallschirmjäger. The convoy had left Piraeus harbour on the 19 May and had reached the island of Milos the next day where they rested. It left Milos that evening as the second group left Piraeus. At around 23.00 it was located by a Royal Navy force of three cruisers and four destroyers just as it rounded Cape Spatha and despite the valiant efforts of an Italian destroyer, sank the majority of the convoy with heavy casualties. The 3rd Btn ceased to be an effective fighting force with around 250 survivors being picked up from the water although a group of around 100 managed to make it ashore with their weapons. Later that day another Royal Navy force (four cruisers and three destroyers) located the second convoy at dawn but that managed to retreat while the Luftwaffe distracted the British ships who had to withdraw under the increasing pressure of German air attack. Later that day, the Luftwaffe mounted a major offensive against any British ships that could be found and sank two cruisers and four destroyers, as well as damaging three more ships.

The End

Recognising the Allied advantage, Freyburg decided to launch a major night attack to drive the Germans from the island. Freyburg turned the operation over to Brigadier Edward Puttick who failed to concentrate additional forces to support Hargest. The Australians arrived early and so the operation and so most of the action took place when the Luftwaffe was not in a position to intervene. By this time, the afternoon of the 22nd, the Germans were rapidly retreating everywhere on Crete. Sporadic fighting fighting continued for 5 days but after a week long campaign the German invasion of Crete had been crushed.

Out of an assault force of just over 22,000 men, the Germans suffered some 8,500 casualties, of which 5,700 were killed or missing in action with the rest being quickly transferred to Egypt then Britain as prisoners. All Ju52s used in the campaign were lost along with large supplies of other equipment. The Allies suffered almost 3,000 casualties (of which just over 1,700 were killed). The Royal Navy suffered 1 aircraft carrier, two battleships, six cruisers and seven destroyers badly damaged and another three cruisers and six destroyers sunk with the loss of over 2,000 men. The RAF lost some forty-seven aircraft in the battle. Exactly how many Greek soldiers and Cretan civilians died during the fighting will never be known.

The Battle of Crete destroyed Hitler's faith in airborne forces and for the rest of the war they would mainly be used as elite infantry. Student was court-martialed and spent the rest of the war in quasi-exile in a mountain lodge in Bavaria. The morale boost for the allies was enormous. This was a victory and needed no silver lining, the failures of Greece were forgotten and Churchills leadership was secure. Although this would not be the biggest German defeat of the war, nor was it the first allied victory but the unstoppable German army had been soundly whipped and no-one could hide that.
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All comments and criticisms welcome

A very interesting read , good job The Red !

The End? I was hoping there would be more.