By new do you mean absolute economic superpower that it did? I think the US would have continued it's rapid growth and expansion just perhaps more focused on the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps gaining a much larger stake in Asia depending on the relationship with Japan and events going on in China. So perhaps not the explosion following the world wars but I think a steady growth continues to subtly encroach further and further.
Agreed. As I said about Russia, superpowerdom was partly the war and its outcome but also partly just pverwhelming physical power.
I think German markets and growth might be in jeopardy and I'm really curious how their (Germans) relationship to the UK would evolve. The UK has not bankrupted themselves, so has room to maneuver on the world stage, not being directly tied to an Alliance. It's always amazed me that the two states didn't see the power or logic in working together and get over the things interfering. As markets tighten and the continued military expenses begin to weigh (especially in Germany), perhaps Germany loses her ambition to challenge British naval dominance directly and instead see the wisdom military and fiancially of having the RN as a friend rather than opponent.
While you'd have to ask a naval expert, I've always been under the impression that Britain had pretty much won, and could match Germany ship-to-ship from her better starting position for teh foreseeable future. Certainly this will compell Germany to give it up eventually. I can see an Anglo-German reconciliation coming about if Russia becomes too overbearing, since the whole point of WW1 was, as far as we were concerned, to block a German shot at continental hegemony (and the naval power this would then imply). If Germany can't do this because Russia is to strong (and the panicky Generalstab predicted that 1916 would be the turning point), and indeed if
Russia looks like it could... I think the general weariness of Russian power by Britain and France in the 30s was only partly a matter of communism.
I think Austria-Hungary splits after Frans Joseph dies ... as I think he was the real link holding them together. I see them parting ways and in doing shifting things around.
It's possible. This raises some questions... is Hungary (with a 48% Hungarian population) sustainable? Does she crawl under a Greater German or a Russian umbrella, or fall to bits, or stagger on? Whither Galicia?
Germany will be forced to change her continental politics, again I think this (along with the above statements) should push Germany into a systematic reapproachment to England.
Well, it will probably put paid to Germany's ambitions in the Balkans for the tiem being (speaking of which, it's interesting to consider what Bulgaria, with its powerful army and highly influential irredentist terror organisation, will be up to in these no-war scenarios...), which will promote Russian power and thus perhaps push Britain and Germany together...
Italy will do whatever cowardly things Italy will do.
While I think Italy's great power status was delusional and its irredentism mostly unjustified, this is harsh. After all, one could say that Italy's jumping into the war OTL was excessively
audacious.
Italy will balk at staying with Germany unless an alliance with England is a sure thing and might look to France. Austria (small) has options too. She can continue a relationship with her German brothers and risk eventually being absorbed or make a move to Catholic France or become some sort of replica of Swiss neutrality. I lean toward a German union forming ... again increased or decreased by Germany's apparent isolation on the world stage.
You don't seem to be giving much thought to domestic opinion in Austria (already mostly democratic in 1914, where Hungary was an oligarchy), which makes union with Germany practically unavoidable being eventually absorbed was hardly a "risk" as far as Austrians were concerned.
I see most tend to think Russia is bound to be heading for revolution. I tend to agree that there is just too much social unrest with the classes and population for something not to happen.
But what grounds do we have for assuming this? There was one revolution against Tsarist power when there had not been a war to destroy everybody's... oh, wait, there had, so there was a reolution when there had been a
less severe war and it was basically a complete failure. Can the Tsar not simply use brute force and total control to stay in power? Alexander III and his secret police had already anticipated totalitarianism, and the Bolsheviks, who were precisely elected as Nicholas II was, managed to stay in power through enormous social change (not to mention the war).
The real question for me is what type of government does Russia end up with in the event of a non-Lenin based revolution or reform.
If there's a revolution, Mr. Ulyanov is most unlikely to lead it. His seizure of power was preventable as late as 1917.
Depending on the timing, both France and Germany could lose their key ally around the same time.
Why? It was war and civil war that destroyed Russia's economic base and military power, not the end of Tsarism. After all, the February Revolution was initially welcomed by France and Britain as bringing in a government that could competantly fight a war. Anyway, was Austria really Germany's "key ally" in the same way as teh Entente? Rather a tugboat to the battleship, really.
Poland could appear again if they throw off the Russian chains in Warsaw, for once by their own initiative too.
Unlikely. Poland reappered because the Germans occupied it and then had to leave. With a peaceful revolution, Poland may secure autonomy but it has not the resources to make itself independent, which nobody (save the Poles and maybe French public opinion) wants anyway.
As for Japan ... they are an enigma. Without the world war, are the Brits more or less likely to renew the treaty and stick with the Japanese? Depending on that ... goes Japan as I don't see them ever striking on of the Western powers alone. Russia was and I suppose might be the exception to this.
On the contrary, I predict that Russia's rising power will lead her to reassert herself in the Far East. She did OTL, after all. And won, too. At Khalkin-Gol, and in 1945, when Manchuria was liberated purely by Russian arms and only later handed over to Mao.
Japan either way looks to be in a better situation as they probably can consolidate holdings in China and fully integrate Formosa and Korea.
"Integrate"? That sounds rather unfortunate. Their attempts to Nihonise Korea were all miserable failures.
Their economic power has a very high ceiling if they can avoid war. Their drive for empire might be curbed if they don't have Axis partners to distract attention from.
Of course one has to consider domestic developments as well. Will they even be militant expanionists?
Someone mentioned newfound economic possibilities for the Turks. I hadn't thought of the Ottomans as simply just waiting to be broken up. If they can salvage themselves then German investment and some oil just might do the trick ... the longer the Turks manage to keep a hold on those oil fields the better off they will be. I'm sure Berlin won't be slow to see this either. Possibly more incentive for the Brits to get back in the business of 'protecting' the Ottomans. (Perhaps it's just difficult for me not to see links in everything to a Anglo-German relationship).
They're ina fine position... with teh exception of the 1913 Armenian Reform Package, that is, a Packaged Anatolia to be delivered to Russia. It basically put most of eastern Turkey under the "inspection" of some Norwegians while allocating positions in all branches of the state equally to Muslim and Christian despite Muslims being in majorities over 80% nearly everywhere. With Armenian political life dominated by a ruthless organisation of terrorists, this can only lead to tears. It was essentially a way for Russia to hold the Ottomans hostage, and they entered WW1 in order to dismantle it. With British and German backing, the Ottomans might slip out again with their customary talent for playing off the European powers, but that's assuming Britain and Germany pull together very, very quickly.
While we're in that part of the world, huge Greek butterflies. No National Schism, no flood of Anatolians... it will be practically unrecognisable.
