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#1
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The YAMATO goes into the Slot
WWII WI.
During the Guadacanal campaign, there were numerous sea battles in the waters around the island. In particular, the Japanese sent their old BCs into the 'slot' to bombard Henderson field. The main reason they used BCs and not BBs was speed - they wanted to get away from US airpower in the area. The YAMATO - while not a BC - was 'faster' than other IJN BBs like NAGATO. So, they Japanese decide the Time Has Come, and they send her in. Could the presence of the YAMATO have impacted the outcome in this area, or is the most likely outcome that the US sinks her? Mike |
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#2
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It could definately swing the battles, and probably won't get sunk. Yamamoto did consider "parking the Yamato off Guadalcanal", but they never did (I think it may have been held back waiting for the decisive battle).
The problem is the Japanese waould always go after the warships but ignore convoys, so even if the Yamato manages to win a bunch of naval battles, the USA could still get supplies through (Look at Savo Island). It really depends on how it is used. |
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#3
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__________________
Eddie would go! Rule # 32: Gotta enjoy the little things! |
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#4
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How would Yamato do in a night battle against American radar equiped fast battleships? Obviously, the pounding the Washington inflicted on the Kirishima wouldn't do nearly as much to the Yamato, but 9 16in hits at close range would surely do some serious damage.
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#5
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belt: 304mm / 409mm deck: 117mm / 231mm turrets: 406mm / 650mm bulkheads: 280mm / 300mm superstructure: 406mm / 546mm I guess Yamato can take a few hits from Washington. Washington might be in trouble, South Dakota definitely is. |
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#6
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#7
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#8
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So be it, but she is no old BC and can take a few hits and still shoot back. How well would Washington take the return fire? I guess less well.
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#9
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Yamato and her sister Mushashi weren't sent into the Slot primarily due to fuel concerns.
There's an essay on this at combinedfleet.com that lays out all the numbers. It's rather convincing. Bill P.S. Just a small part of the essay I referenced above: Again, knowing what we know about Japanese petroleum usage rates, we have just consumed 5.1% of the IJN's monthly allowance. Was it worth it? You'd better hope so, and you'd better be prepared to repeat the exercise, because airfields have a tendency to repair themselves. This points to one of the frustrating aspects of the Guadalcanal campaign from the Japanese perspective -- decisive results didn't seem to be achievable. Rather, the campaign was one of prolonged attrition. As Admiral Ugaki noted in his diary, "It's infuriating -- we shoot them down and we shoot them down, but they only send in more." (Agawa, p. 326). From a naval perspective this meant that a one-shot attack against Henderson was probably not going to get the job done. Rather, if the Japanese were truly committed to bombarding the island airfield out of business, they needed to be able to mount such operations on a sustained basis. It might take weeks of such activity before the airfield was either eliminated or captured by ground forces. Imperial Naval HQ's refusal to send Yamato and consorts on such a mission to IronBottom Sound may have been an admission of this fact. One such bombardment mission in isolation, while possible, wasn't going to be sufficient in and of itself to secure victory. And the fuel for committing heavy units to Guadalcanal, night after night, doesn't seem to have been available. The 5.1% figure assumes a sortie made up of single Yamato-class vessel with another battleship and normal escorts. If the Yamatos are left behind the figure drops to just over 4%. Last edited by Bill Cameron; May 15th, 2009 at 01:16 AM.. Reason: added postscript |
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#10
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#12
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The Japanese fought better at night in cruiser/destroyer duels because of their superior torpedo, extensive training in its use including the nonlinear tactics needed to maximize its effect, all while the Americans insisted on lining their ships up in a line of battle where they couldn't evade in order to use their radar guided gunnery. Half the battles were the American ships forming line of battle, then half the squadron gets obliterated by the first volley of Japanese torpedos. This wouldn't be nearly as much of a problem in a battleship duel where radar guided gunnery would be vastly more powerful and torpedos less.
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#13
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Mowque, Don't think in absolutes. Yes, Japanese optics were better but, xchen08 correctly points out, it was those optics combined with more realistic training and tactics for nighttime operations, plus very poor USN training and tactics for the same, that led to the initial Japanese advantage. The USN learned rapidly however and that, plus advances in radar, nullified the IJN advantage by mid to late '43. The IJN advantage always didn't work even when they had it. During 2nd Guadacanal in mid November of '42, USS Washington was able to approach IJN Kirishima to a range under 9,000 yards before opening fire. It took only 7 minutes for the USN battleship to leave the IJN battleship a burning cripple. Bill |
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#15
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The question is what happens if she runs into a brand new BB twice her size? |
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#16
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That modernisation was no quick slap-up job, the ship came out 4000t heavier than she went in. In particular deck armour was added to counter the new developments of long range plunging fire and air bombing.
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#17
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The deck armour isnt relevant at short ranges - then its the belt armour.
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#18
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belt: 304mm / 203mm deck: 117mm / 120mm(previously 70mm) turrets: 406mm / 229mm bulkheads: 280mm / 229mm superstructure: 406mm / 254mm |
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#19
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There were no Japanese battleships that had their 12in guns replaced by 14in guns.
__________________
Coincidence? We invite you, the reader with no inclination to do his own research, to decide. |
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#20
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Ohh, than there is a typo in "Janeīs Battleships of the 20th Century".
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