Grant at Gettysburg

[general]

Was Sherman so close to Georgia? In OTL was'nt he a year, Vicksburg and Chickamauga away? Or is this a butterfly?

[usertron2020]

Originally Posted by general

Was Sherman so close to Georgia? In OTL was'nt he a year, Vicksburg and Chickamauga away? Or is this a butterfly?

Yes. The Battle of Shiloh was the true POD. The language is confusing, I'll admit. Paul V McNutt established the POD at the very start, when it was just a Discussion Group. When I got permission to turn it into a story thread, the conditions remained the same. Unfortunately, I was and am still very new to this. When I announced the thread would be started, I wrote that the POD was Grant's arrival with the AotP. What I meant to say was that was the POD for the Army of the Potomac, for the conditions are little changed for them. All the battles, and defeats, are the same prior to Grant's takeover as General-in-Chief.

My bad. So I'll try to make the Western campaigns more clear. But remember, this active thread has covered only 1 full 24hr period so far.

So here goes:

SHILOH CAMPAIGN
Warned by runaway slaves the previous day, who manage to reach Grant himself in time, Grant heeds their warnings (despite Sherman's doubts) and pulls the army back to a better defensive position, leaving only Quaker guns and just enough pickets to convince A.S. Johnston that Grant is still where Johnston thinks he is. Launching an attack without proper reconnaissance, with a tactical deployment that would get a first year plebe thrown out of West Point (Corps lined up in three rows, instead of three separate left, center, and right formations?), against Beauregard's pleading not to attack? The only reason A.S. Johnston is thought of as a hero is because he managed to get himself killed. Since when is it the job of a Department Commander to "take that hill?" With Grant and his men at the ready, Johnston's men blunder in, completely disorganized by the time they reach Grant's chosen line of engagement, between the original Hornet's Nest and the river, where the gunboats are. With Johnston dead, the Confederates are attacking as a mob against the Union army who, though green themselves, are fighting with their backs to the river and nowhere to go but forward. Grant ultimately emerges victorious, and with Don Carlos Buell arriving with HIS army, Grant has the fresh forces to destroy the army of now General Beauregard. And he did.

VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN

He then took Corinth, and moved on Vicksburg. By taking the route of passing by Vicksburg, then landing on the east side of the Mississippi, heading for and taking Jackson, before moving west again and sealing Vicksburg off to lay siege, Grant is using the strategy he employed after his first two attempts failed IOTL (Overland from Corinth, then canal building, IIRC). By using the 3rd strategy first, he saves many months of campaigning. Once Vicksburg falls, Port Hudson falls as indefensible. With these victories under his belt, Grant gets command of all Union forces west of the Alleghenies, and his old commanding officer, Major General G.W. Halleck is kicked upstairs to Washington as US Army Chief-of-Staff (glorified clerk, though a good one).

CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN

Sorry, but the Chattanooga Campaign was little more than an occupation as Braxton Bragg failed to protect the city in time. The city is well secured as Sherman is building up his forces (The situation at Chattanooga was a logistical nightmare for some time).

No Chickamauga yet. But then, Rosecrans hasn't done anything to get himself fired yet, either. It's still up in the air whether this battle happens or not.

Bragg's invasion of Kentucky and Stone's River HAVE been butterflied away.

Sherman is stronger at this time than the Union Army was IOTL, but as explained in previous posts about Bragg's infamous recall orders, the Confederates are doing better than you would expect under the current circumstances. Especially without the losses from the OTL only Stone's River battle and Kentucky invasion.

[general]

Ah. Thanks, Usertron. I take your point. Many thanks.

[Hyperion]

It should be very interesting to see how the battle goes on the upcoming day.

Will Hood and Anderson's divisions be sent into battle again, or have those two formations been crippled too badly to be of use. I would think that also having at least three known general officers KIA would give the men in those formations pause before going back into battle.

In any case, even if they do, unless another fresh unit absorbs them and takes over partial or total control of their attack, I would think that any attack that some units would try would be a disaster due to massive casualties the day before, and a gutted chain of command.

[usertron2020]

Originally Posted by Hyperion

It should be very interesting to see how the battle goes on the upcoming day.

Will Hood and Anderson's divisions be sent into battle again, or have those two formations been crippled too badly to be of use. I would think that also having at least three known general officers KIA would give the men in those formations pause before going back into battle.

In any case, even if they do, unless another fresh unit absorbs them and takes over partial or total control of their attack, I would think that any attack that some units would try would be a disaster due to massive casualties the day before, and a gutted chain of command.

All excellent points, Hyperion, thank you. Remember, though, that McLaws' Division has suffered worse than Anderson's (Mahone's Brigade saw little action). Also, no Confederate Division suffered as much damage nor did as much damage to the enemy as Hood's. Gutted, as you said.

[usertron2020]

July 3rd The Third Day Pre-Dawn 3AM

Union Army Headquarters

General Meade, waking up, readying for the day, preparing for battle.

No blasted sleep. No sleep worthy of the name, anyway. Grant's just getting forty winks. Good. He'll need it. Good God almighty, what a day we had yesterday! But it could have been worse, far worse. Well, let Lee come now. We're as ready as we've ever been for him. Readier than Malvern Hill. That was just a corps action. Today he'll throw his whole army against us. I pray, I truly pray he does. He'll face the worst beating he's ever faced if he does.

All that's left to do is wait on Lee. Grant is still taking my advice, another thing to be grateful for. When he's countermanded me, as he did over Culp's Hill and XII Corps, he turned out to be right. When it looks like he's making a mistake, he's been willing to listen, like over the matter of trusting Sickles. Now just have the men get ready. Gibbon knows, I told him. The center (II Corps). They hit us on the left (The Round Tops) and the right (Cemetery and Culp's Hills). Now, it will be the center. A classic Napoleonic move. Doesn't Lee realize we can recognize such elementary tactics? Or maybe he doesn't care? Well, we are going to show General Robert E. Lee he should care. And that what didn't work at Waterloo won't work here either. Meade smiled at that. Very dramatic thoughts, George, he said to himself, but that's NOT what happened at Waterloo. "Nappy" never attacked Wellington's left flank, not seriously. Oh well. Still a nice thought. There are the makings of a potential Waterloo here. LEE'S! All we need is two more days. One more for Lee to expend his reserves, and one for us to go after him. We destroy Longstreet and Hill, and Ewell's not getting home. Or if he does, it'll be his one corps plus whatever the Rebels can scrap up to join him. Like the Invalid Corps.

[usertron2020]

On the previous description of the Vicksburg Campaign: I am making a break with Paul V McNutt on one point. At the start of the Discussion Group he has Grant moving overland from Corinth to take Vicksburg. In my thread, it's south by riverboat and marching from the south to the northeast at Jackson, then straight west to Vicksburg. IOTL, there's no way General Nathan Bedford Forrest (The best cavalryman on either side, IMHO) allows an overland campaign. IMHO, neither can or will he here ITTL. IOTL he wrecked the supply depots that forced Grant to start all over again with the canal building strategy (also failed). This is the one change from his disc. group. Sorry Paul.


Also, the lack of a "Chattanooga Campaign" is based on Bragg's expectation of a thrust directly across the Deep South to take Mobile, Birmingtham, Selma, and Montgomery. Though this would gut the Deep South, Grant has calculated correctly that it would leave too many vulnerable supply lines behind him, ready to be destroyed by Confederate raiders.

Hence the relatively easy occupation of Chattanooga. The numbers, and Bragg's incompetence, are beginning to tell against the South. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, just as you couldn't say a nice thing about Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston within Jeff Davis' earshot, neither could you say a discouraging word against Braxton Bragg (Bragg was a world class suckup).

Originally Posted by usertron2020

it's south by riverboat and marching from the south to the northeast at Jackson, then straight west to Vicksburg.

How is Grant getting south of Vicksburg by riverboat?

[usertron2020]

Originally Posted by cw1865

How is Grant getting south of Vicksburg by riverboat?

Good point, and it does require further clarification. Grant had at his disposal perhaps the best brown-water Navy Admiral in the world at that time, David Dixon Porter. Porter understood the essential needs of riverine combat, and how he and his men lived and died on inter-service cooperation. When I spoke of passing by Vicksburg? I didn't mean simply sailing past it with vulnerable wooden transports in broad daylight, which would subject even armored gunboats to the plunging fire of the Vicksburg Bluffs.

Too many times what I've written is either talking over (or under) the knowledge of my readers. Some have complained of a lack of knowledge of basic geography of Gettysburg, and demanded more details. Others have virtually cried "ASB" on the grounds that the geography at Gettysburg (at one particular point) has changed by an elevation of 3 feet (I suspect you know who I'm talking about), thereby making the whole thread worthless!

I DON'T MEAN YOU! I'm happy to clarify points I may have left too unclear, and correct whatever mistakes I can, since it doesn't materially affect the course of the story. Unlike in OTL, Grant is not coming to grief with one failure after another. His decision here, ITTL, is to avoid the failed attempts at Vicksburg and and use his final strategy first. Here it is:

1) March 2 Corps worth of his army (McClernand and McPherson), south, on the west side of the Mississippi River, 20 miles northwest of Vicksburg.

2) Follow the Roundaway Bayou on it's western edge and cross at the closest point to New Carthage, thereby bypassing the morass of swamps and bayous on the west bank of the Mississippi. Also, building roads where they can't be bypassed.

3) While the army is building up in New Carthage, Admiral Porter's flotilla sails. The boats are on a one-way trip. If the campaign fails, they are trapped. They can't get back North again under heavy fire, fighting a countervailing current. Timed for a clear, moonless night, in blackout conditions, single file, and at a dead slow speed. Even with all this, the Yankees are spotted, but despite this, the Union loses only one transport and minimal casualties. The guns of Vickburg are meant for DIRECT DEFENSE against an attacker trying to take the city by river, NOT to completely obstruct naval movement. The river's just too damn big. Against that many targets (11) at once, the Confederate fire is dissipated. Though had the Yankees tried to land TROOPS there, it would have been a slaughter. After facing a lighter barrage at Warrenton, about 8 miles to the south, the flotilla reaches New Carthage and links up with Grant.

4) The army and flotilla advances to the town of Hard Times, Louisiana. The army is marched from there to De Shroon's plantation.

5) Stymied, the army needed a way to cross into hard, solid ground on the east bank of the river that would make it possible for the army to supply itself from the river easily, while avoiding anymore swamps. A runaway slave directs them to Bruinsburg, 6 miles downriver on the east bank, but on dry ground.

6) Meanwhile, Benjamin Grierson is doing his own "ride around the enemy" that will take him all the way from Tennessee to Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

7) General Sherman is lauching several minor diversions at Haines Bluff, about 20 to 25 miles north of Vicksburg.

8) Grant marches overland to take Port Gibson, and Grand Gulf (the latter with Porter's help).

9) With his army now completely across the Mississippi River, and his supply base secure, Grant marches off, to Jackson, and his destiny...

10) If you say you need more details, whether it's about riverboat movements or Grant's favorite brand of bourbon, I swear I'll pelt you with green olives!

I'm a fellow Civil War buff just like yourself. I've read in much detail about many of the campaigns. I've also visited many of the battlefields in the east. I have yet to go to Vicksburg, but would like to go there. The focus of the rivers in the West (in the West they're like arteries whereas in Virginia they tend to be barriers), does make Vicksburg Campaign difficult to fully grasp because when you read the account, really at the same time you had better be looking at a map: Yazoo being a prime example: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...r62March63.png

If you look at how they did it in reality: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Vi...prilJuly63.png

On that map you can see the Mississippi making meanders, swamps, oxbow lakes, very difficult terrain.

New Carthage might be a difficult place to make a crossing, the Confederates could potentially seal off that meander (kind've like Bermuda Hundred)

What Grant does brilliantly in that campaign is to prevent a junction of Johnston and Pemberton.

[usertron2020]

Originally Posted by cw1865

I'm a fellow Civil War buff just like yourself. I've read in much detail about many of the campaigns. I've also visited many of the battlefields in the east. I have yet to go to Vicksburg, but would like to go there. The focus of the rivers in the West (in the West they're like arteries whereas in Virginia they tend to be barriers), does make Vicksburg Campaign difficult to fully grasp because when you read the account, really at the same time you had better be looking at a map: Yazoo being a prime example: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...r62March63.png

If you look at how they did it in reality: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Vi...prilJuly63.png

On that map you can see the Mississippi making meanders, swamps, oxbow lakes, very difficult terrain.

New Carthage might be a difficult place to make a crossing, the Confederates could potentially seal off that meander (kind've like Bermuda Hundred)

What Grant does brilliantly in that campaign is to prevent a junction of Johnston and Pemberton.

OK, I just spent the last 90 minutes writing a response to your post. When I was finished, and hit enter, the website decided it didn't know me anymore and wiped out my post. So now I'll keep it short and sweet. Grant didn't cross AT New Carthage, for the very reason you mentioned, it can be sealed off on the east side of the river. He went south to Hard Times, and then De Shroon's, on the west bank of the river. Then he CROSSED at Bruinsburg, a point with hard ground, a safe point for resupply, and far away enough to insure no interference from Pemberton. From there he took Port Gibson, and Grand Gulf, protecting his flank. From there, it was off to the races.

Pretty thin for a response, considering what I lost.

[usertron2020]

I AM CURRENTLY WORKING ON THE START OF THE THIRD DAY, BUT I WANTED TO REFRESH THE READERS ON TROOP POSITIONS AS THEY ARE ON THE THIRD DAY OF BATTLE AT DAWN. THIS POST WILL DEAL WITH THE UNION ARMY. THE COURSE OF POSITIONS WILL BE NORTH (CULP'S HILL) TO SOUTH (BIG ROUND TOP).

THE UNION RIGHT FLANK IS AS FOLLOWS-

CULP'S HILL: XII CORPS (SLOCUM) NOTE-GREGG'S CAVALRY IS IN XII CORPS REAR

EAST SIDE OF CEMETERY HILL: XI CORPS (HOWARD)

WEST SIDE OF CEMETERY HILL: I CORPS (NEWTON)


THE UNION CENTER (CEMETERY RIDGE) IS AS FOLLOWS-

II CORPS (GIBBON) NOTE-KILPATRICK'S CAVALRY IS IN II CORPS' REAR

VI CORPS (SEDGWICK)

III CORPS (SICKLES)

V CORPS AYRES DIVISION


THE UNION RIGHT (THE ROUND TOPS) IS AS FOLLOWS-

LITTLE ROUND TOP: V CORPS (SYKES) BARNES DIVISION (MINUS VINCENT'S BRIGADE)

BETWEEN THE ROUND TOPS: V CORPS BARNES DIVISION VINCENT'S BRIGADE THE 16TH MICHIGAN AND 83RD PENNSYLVANIA

BIG ROUND TOP: V CORPS BARNES DIVISION VINCENT'S BRIGADE THE 44TH NEW YORK AND 20TH MAINE

WITH THE SUPPLY TRAINS BEHIND THE ROUND TOPS: DEVIN'S CAVALRY

THOUGH THE 20TH MAINE AND 44TH NEW YORK ARE DUE FOR RELIEF, THIS HAS NOT YET HAPPENED. ALSO, IT CAN BE ARGUED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WHETHER I CORPS IS IN THE RIGHT FLANK OR THE CENTER SINCE IT FACES BOTH GETTYSBURG(TOWN) AND THE EMMITTSBURG/SEMINARY RIDGE POSITIONS OF THE ENEMY.

VI CORPS IS LISTED AS A WHOLE CORPS BECAUSE THEY ARE BEING UNITED AT DAWN TO THE EARLY MORNING HOURS DURING WHICH THEY WILL NOT BE MOLESTED, THEREFORE THEIR POSITION IS POSTED AS A GIVEN. SIMILARLY, WEED'S BRIGADE IS LISTED AS REJOINING ITS PARENT DIVISION FOR THE SAME REASON. THE CONFEDERATE TROOPS OPPOSITE THEM ARE IN NO MOOD FOR SUDDEN SPOILING ATTACKS OF OPPORTUNITY, ONLY FOR MARGINAL GAIN. NOT AFTER WHAT THEY WENT THROUGH YESTERDAY.

WHILE SURVIVORS FROM CRAWFORD'S DIVISION (V CORPS, THE DEVILS DEN DEBACLE) HAVE MOSTLY FINISHED COMING IN (THOSE THAT CAN), THEY ARE BEING KEPT BY THE SUPPLY TRAINS FOR FULL REST AND RECOVERY. THE DIVISION WILL BE FORMALLY DISBANDED AND THE MEN REASSIGNED TO OTHER UNITS MATCHING THEIR HOME STATES.

PLEASE, ANY QUESTIONS?

[Kevin in Indy]

Awesome, Usertron - keep it up!

[usertron2020]

Originally Posted by Kevin in Indy

Awesome, Usertron - keep it up!

Kevin in Indy: High Water-Awesome to the Max!

And just for that: The positions of the troops of the Army of Northern Virginia are as follows, going south to north-

LONGSTREET'S (FIRST) CORPS (THE CONFEDERATE RIGHT FLANK)

Hood's Division (4 brigades)---------------------------------
Law's brigade (4th, 44th, & 48th Alabama) in the Devil's Den
Texas (Robertson's) brigade covering the approaches to the Devil's Den
Colonel D.M.DuBose, commanding Benning's (wounded) brigade covering Texas brigade's flank and leading back to Peach Orchard Ridge
Luffman's (wounded) brigade (heavy casualties) pulled back to the rear for rest

McLaws' Division (4 brigades)----------------------------------------------
Kershaw's brigade leading from Peach Orchard Ridge to Seminary Ridge
Colonel Goode Bryan, commanding Semmes' (mortally wounded) brigade on Seminary Ridge
Wofford's brigade on Seminary Ridge
Barksdale's brigade on Seminary Ridge

Pickett's Division (3 brigades)-------------------------------------------
Kemper's brigade
Garnett's brigade
Armistead's brigade-all three brigades approaching Gettysburg/Seminary Ridge on the Chambersburg Pike in the above order


HILL'S (THIRD) CORPS (THE CONFEDERATE CENTER)

Anderson's Division (5 brigades)--------------------------
Colonel Sanders brigade (Wilcox KIA) on Seminary Ridge
Lang's brigade on Seminary Ridge
Gibson's brigade (Wright KIA) on Seminary Ridge
Taylor's Brigade (Posey KIA) on Seminary Ridge
Mahone's Brigade on Seminary Ridge

Heth's (soon to be Pettigrew's) Division (4 brigades)-----------------------
Fry in command of Archer's brigade (Archer captured) resting behind Seminary Ridge
Pettigrew's (soon to be Marshall's) brigade resting behind Seminary Ridge
Davis' brigade resting behind Seminary Ridge
Brockenbrough's brigade resting behind Seminary Ridge

Trimble's Division (4 brigades)(Pender wounded, not seriously)---------------
Lowrance's brigade (Scales wounded) on Seminary Ridge
Lane's brigade on Seminary Ridge
Thomas' brigade on Seminary Ridge
Perrin's brigade on Seminary Ridge


EWELL'S (SECOND) CORPS (THE CONFEDERATE LEFT FLANK)

Rodes' Division (5 brigades)-------------------------------------
Ramseur's brigade on Long Lane (sw road from Gettysburg(town)
Iverson's brigade on Long Lane (sw road from Gettysburg(town)
Doles' brigade on Long Lane (sw road from Gettysburg(town) into Gettysburg itself
Daniel's brigade with Johnson's Division supporting Jones' brigade
O'Neal's brigade with Johnson's Division supporting Williams' brigade

Early's Division (4 brigades)-------------------------------------------
Hay's brigade east and adjacent into Gettysburg(town)
Gordon's brigade east of Hay's brigade
Avery's brigade east of Gordon's brigade
Smith's brigade with Johnson's Division supporting the Stonewall brigade

Johnson's Division(4 brigades)-----------------------------------------
Jones' brigade facing southwest by west towards Culp's Hill
Williams' brigade facing southwest by west towards Culp's Hill
Steuart's brigade facing southwest by west towards Culp's Hill
The Stonewall brigade supporting Steuart's brigade

STUART'S CAVALRY (7 brigades)------------------------------------
Jenkin's brigade protecting the supply trains
Imboden's brigade protecting the rear of the Army of the Northern Virginia
The remaining 5 brigades (Hampton, Fitz Lee, Robertson, Jones, and Chambliss are with Stuart, currently north of Ewell's Corps)

The AoNV Artillery is now being concentrated in the center.

"When the order is given, unleash hell"-A Roman General, and many others.
(Russell Crowe, actually)

[Hyperion]

So the Confederates have four brigade commanders dead, one mortally wounded that will die at some point, and one is a POW.

Anderson's division has been pretty much gutted at the command level.

[usertron2020]

If anyone's wondering why so much more detail is being given to Confederate positions than Union, there are good reasons.

1st) As mentioned before, Confederate units are 40-60% larger than their Union counterparts, making each Confederate brigade more important due to their numbers.

2nd) Confederate unit structure is better for offensive thrust, but more prone to serious casualties IF they get hung up in a shootout or melee.

3rd) Union units suffer with an excessively extended command structure (7 Corps!) that prevent the rapid response times enjoyed by the Rebels.

4th) Union units however are able to withstand greater shocks to their command structure and have greater unit flexibility on the field regarding the
absorption of casualties.

5th) The Union troops at Gettysburg, except for V Corps, are in a very packed position compared to the relatively spread out Confederates. Holding the interior lines means the absolutely precise positions of individual brigades (and even divisions for now) are not that relevant to the story.

Sorry, STILL no story update, but I mostly write after midnight and I've got the dreaded 3:30 AM Forum shutdown staring me in the face. This is ALOT easier on the weekends!

[Bulls Run]

Just curious usertron, what are your favorite reference materials for the Civil War? Your knowledge and detail are too good to be just Wikipedia (like most of mine.)

I was just rereading General Gordon's account of Gettysburg in his memoir and it's very interesting especially after reading your story. Boy, he really came down HARD on Longstreet.

[usertron2020]

Originally Posted by Bulls Run

Just curious usertron, what are your favorite reference materials for the Civil War? Your knowledge and detail are too good to be just Wikipedia (like most of mine.)

I was just rereading General Gordon's account of Gettysburg in his memoir and it's very interesting especially after reading your story. Boy, he really came down HARD on Longstreet.

I'll be happy to give you a list of my reference materials later tonight. As far as General Gordon is concerned, well, ALL Southern Generals except Pickett came down on Longstreet after the war. After all, Longstreet became a Republican, AND criticized Lee after Lee's death. These were two mortal sins in the South, esp. about Lee. One did not besmirch the good name of the "Marble Man". Considering Gordon was on the opposite flank/side of the battlefield from Longstreet, he really doesn't have ANY first hand information himself. Longstreet's headquarters was halfway down Seminary Ridge AND on the opposite side of Gettysburg(town) from Gordon's brigade. If Gordon wanted to criticize Longstreet for his performance during the retreat from Richmond, then he would know what he was talking about. I suspect Gordon was simply writing to appeal to his southern readers, who would happily suck up anything (Buy his book, that is) crucifying Longstreet. MEMOIRS ARE ALMOST NEVER A VIABLE SOURCE OF HISTORY, ONLY A RECORD OF THE WRITER'S STATE OF MIND AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION.

[usertron2020]

Originally Posted by Hyperion

So the Confederates have four brigade commanders dead, one mortally wounded that will die at some point, and one is a POW.

Anderson's division has been pretty much gutted at the command level.

I haven't bothered to report regimental commander casualties, for the most part, but they were much worse, as you could expect. Although I have all the names available, I don't want this thread to collapse into what would look like a memorial for the dead.

[usertron2020]

Bulls Run

As promised, here are a few of the more helpful sources I've used for this thread:

The Cavalry at Gettysburg by Edward G. Longacre

Gettysburg: The Second Day by Harry W. Pfanz

Gettysburg by Stephen W. Sears

Last Chance For Victory by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward

General Ulysses S. Grant: The Soldier and the Man by Edward G. Longacre

GRANT by Jean Edward Smith

GRANT and SHERMAN: The Friendship That Won the Civil War by Charles Bracelen Flood

I have other sources, but they are less relevant to the story at this time.