In general I would say that beyond the Caucasus, the central powers actually did about as well as they possibly could be expected to in this period of the war. Even in OTL the line ended up being very close to Riga, Minsk, and Tbilisi. In fact the ottomans being more realistic in how they approached the caucuses campaign would probably do the most to hurt Russia further, because the turn around in Georgia was a big boost to Russian morale, especially because after awhile it became the only front they were winning on (until after the revolution they were losing there too).
In general, the central powers did about as much as they could be expected to achieve victory in the east as soon as possible. The war was just sustained for longer than could ever be considered reasonable by Russian government. Which absolutely destroyed itself twice over in their insistence to not accept defeat. Had the provisional government not been an incompetent wreck they'd have requested an armistice by March. But they instituted a war policy deeply in denial of the fact the Russian army was incapable and unwilling to keep fighting the war. Which only made the conditions of the ultimate peace that much worse when the Bolsheviks took power and asked for peace.
From the perspective of winning the war for the allies, it was admirable in that it prevented the Germans from moving the hundreds of thousands of troops in Russia to the western front for almost a full year longer than could have ever been expected. Even the Bolsheviks prevented a withdrawal for a long time by refusing to sign the treaty until it looked like the Germans would be capable of marching on Petrograd.