Von Rundstedt gets his way - Germans fall back to defend Paris

OTL, Rommel wanted to attack ont he beaches, feeling Allied air power was too strong and that falling back toward Paris, as von Rundstedt wanted, would be suicidal.

So, let's suppose some Resistance fighter gets lucky and wounds Rommel in April or so of 1944, enough time for von Rundstedt to implement a plan to fall back toward Paris while Rommel recovers.

What effect? Does it shorten the war? Or just casue a much greater battle around Paris? Or, does Hitler try to shoot von Rundstedt from Berin because at this point he will not have his armies giving one inch of ground? (Okay, realistically, just replace him.) Although witht hat madman von Rundstedt could theoretically be shot I suppose.)
 
The big mistake that the Germans made (really Hitler's mistake) was not truly committing to either strategy.

Rommel wanted, from my understanding, an all-out assault on the landing beaches. He wanted to try and throw the allies into the sea on D-Day. But when D-Day happened, Rommel wasn't there. And the German commanders on the ground delayed using the panzers to attack the allies.

The problem for the Germans (aside from the obvious ones) was that France just isn't really suited to the kind of defensive campaign they so successfully waged in Italy. There's just too many open spaces. The allied armies could always find room to manoeuvre in France.
 
The problem for the Germans (aside from the obvious ones) was that France just isn't really suited to the kind of defensive campaign they so successfully waged in Italy. There's just too many open spaces. The allied armies could always find room to manoeuvre in France.

I say they did a splendid defensive campaign with what they had and it took the allies to months before breaking out after taking lots of casualities
 
I say they did a splendid defensive campaign with what they had and it took the allies to months before breaking out after taking lots of casualities

Oh I agree, I'm just saying their job was made virtually impossible because the terrain. Too long a line to hold.
 

Cook

Banned
OTL, Rommel wanted to attack ont he beaches, feeling Allied air power was too strong and that falling back toward Paris, as von Rundstedt wanted, would be suicidal.

This is mixing up of two separate issues.

Prior to the invasion, Rommel wanted the available panzer divisions spread out and located in close proximity to each of the potential landing beaches, so that the closest divisions could be expected to go into action as the allies landed on the first day, before they could get a firm foothold. von Rundstedt thought that this would mean the divisions would be attacking piecemeal, and would lack sufficient strength to push the Allies back into the sea; his preferred strategy was to concentrate the panzer divisions as a reserve, back from the landing beaches and in a central location until the whereabouts of the invasion could be determined, then he would attack with all of the panzer divisions together, an blow that the Allies would be unable to resist.

Hitler compromised, holding the panzers back from the potential invasion beaches, but not sufficiently concentrated in any location. Worse, he forbade them from moving forward without his express orders to do so. The result was that of the three panzer divisions (21st Pz, 12 SS PzandPz Lehr) south of the Rhine and sufficiently close to the Normandy beaches to have attacked while the initial landings were taking place, none were even able to move until after Hitler had woken which, because Hitler was an insomniac who stayed up regularly until 4am, didn’t happen until close to mid-day. Consequently only one (the 21st Pz) actually managed to go into action in the afternoon of the first day.

Hitler gets much of the blame for this failure, which he rightfully deserves, but had von Rundstedt had his way, none of the panzer divisions would have been close enough to the beaches to be involved in action on the first day and all would have suffered heavily from air attack as their approached Normandy in the days after D-day.

If Rommel had had his way, perhaps all three panzer divisions would have been able to secure the ground immediately behind the beaches and blocked the beach exits. Had they done so, things would have been extremely grim.

Once the Allies were ashore, both the senior commanders had essentially the same plan; to drive the Allies back out of Normandy. The only difference seems to have been that while Rommel initially still believed that that was achievable, von Rundstedt never did.

von Rundstedt then wanted to conduct a fighting withdraw, falling back to each major river line and making the Allies fight hard for the ground, essentially trading ground for time while husbanding his forces. Rommel for his part wanted to shorten his line, giving up the Cotentin and concentrating his forces in the critical ground behind Caen and there defeating the Allies in localised counterattacks as they tried to fight their way out towards Paris. Hitler would have none of that, ordering that repeated counterattacks be made and that troops should be sent to defend the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg ‘to the last bullet’.

So really the disagreement in strategy wasn’t so much between the two field marshals, but between the field marshals and the Fuhrer, and by that time in the war such disagreements only ever had one result.

If however, von Rundstedt army had been allowed to conduct a fighting withdraw towards the Seine and beyond, then the initial Allied advance would have been faster, but the German army would not have collapsed in August, allowing the Allies to sprint forwards as far as their supply lines would allow them to, to the very border of Germany in a matter of five weeks. The allies would have had to fight their way through northern France, which would have given the Germans time to demolish the channel ports (most critically Antwerp), and the troops stationed in the ports would not have been overrun and isolated; essentially lost to the defence of the Reich. The Allies may not have been approaching the Siegfried Line until December '44, and would have lost a lot more men in the process. With the major ports of Europe wrecked, the Allies would have then begun to really struggle to support the armies as they went beyond the Meuse and Moselle, stretching allied supply lines to the very limit.
 
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Rundstedt's plan may be better, but it is politically unacceptable. It is essentially a fighting withdrawal the moment the allies land. Hence, there is no promise in the plan to actually defeat the Allies.
 
Rundstedt's plan may be better, but it is politically unacceptable. It is essentially a fighting withdrawal the moment the allies land. Hence, there is no promise in the plan to actually defeat the Allies.

This is late war Nazi Germany, politically acceptable and military sound are mutually contradictory concepts.
 
The way I see things the only chance the Germans have of decisively defeating the Western Allies is to inflict a crushing defeat on the Normandy landings.

And in order to do that the Germans needed to have attacked the initial landings with as much force as possible.

By not opposing the landings beyond local forces Germany surrenders the initiative to the WAllies.

After that they will follow their own strategy not one that is preferable to Von Rundstedt's
 
The way I see things the only chance the Germans have of decisively defeating the Western Allies is to inflict a crushing defeat on the Normandy landings.

And in order to do that the Germans needed to have attacked the initial landings with as much force as possible.

By not opposing the landings beyond local forces Germany surrenders the initiative to the WAllies.

After that they will follow their own strategy not one that is preferable to Von Rundstedt's

But they can't pull that off. Germany simply doesn't have the airpower or the tank divisions to place a force capable of crushing an Allied landing on every Northern French beach. Or rather they do but they're in Russia fighting for their lives. Rundstedt's strategy wasn't going to win the war for Germany but then no strategy could do that. However by trading space for time and making the allies pay for every French hamlet and river between Normandy and the Rhine they could inflict much more harm to the Allies at much less cost than their OTL strategy of holding on in Normandy until they Allies achieve a catastrophic (for Germany) breakthrough which see the Allies reach the Rhine in five weeks.
 
But they can't pull that off. Germany simply doesn't have the airpower or the tank divisions to place a force capable of crushing an Allied landing on every Northern French beach. Or rather they do but they're in Russia fighting for their lives. Rundstedt's strategy wasn't going to win the war for Germany but then no strategy could do that. However by trading space for time and making the allies pay for every French hamlet and river between Normandy and the Rhine they could inflict much more harm to the Allies at much less cost than their OTL strategy of holding on in Normandy until they Allies achieve a catastrophic (for Germany) breakthrough which see the Allies reach the Rhine in five weeks.

Or the Allies build up their Strength and achieve a Blitzkrieg in reverse with their much more mobile army's vs a more spread out German army rather than fighting a very intense battle of attrition that resulted in a relatively small battlefield.

Basically the allies get to choose where they fight

We know now that its unlikely that the Allies could have been defeated in Normandy by Rommels plan but by not contesting the invasion - well that's it - the war is lost in the west - there is no way for the German army to win.
 
We know now that its unlikely that the Allies could have been defeated in Normandy by Rommels plan but by not contesting the invasion - well that's it - the war is lost in the west - there is no way for the German army to win.

That is sort of the point, if you don't win at the beaches you aren't going to get some conditions on the armistice which was about all they Marshals realistically hoped for at that point.
 
If Rommel had had his way, perhaps all three panzer divisions would have been able to secure the ground immediately behind the beaches and blocked the beach exits. Had they done so, things would have been extremely grim.

While it may have held off the Allies longer, without air cover to protect the Panzer divisions, the German tanks would have been slaughtered by Hawker Typhoons and other Allied fighters modified for close air support. In short, it would have delayed the Allied advance past the Normandy beaches at most a few weeks.
 
While it may have held off the Allies longer, without air cover to protect the Panzer divisions, the German tanks would have been slaughtered by Hawker Typhoons and other Allied fighters modified for close air support. In short, it would have delayed the Allied advance past the Normandy beaches at most a few weeks.

I'm not sure about that. Deploying the tanks on beaches is a gamble, either it works and the Allies are driven into the sea or the tanks are slaughtered by the RAF and USAAF and there is not much between the Allies and Paris and the advance is brought forward by a month. Considering the state of the Luftwaffe, the size of the Allied airforces and the availability of Naval Gunfire support it was a gamble with very long odds that the Germans.
 
I wonder if it could have been done differently, give Rommel the 21st Pz to do as he would, stick 12th SS Pz in the middle (about where all three were held OTL), and give Von Rundstedt Pz Lehr.
 
21st Panzer was at Caen, moved early on 6th June against the the airborne landings and counter attacked the seaborne landings in the afternoon, where they were stopped dead by anti-tank units.

A successful defence against the Normandy landings requires tank units close to the right beaches, and knowledge that seaborne landings will be made the following morning, so that they are moving in the right direction at first light. Any later and they will be too late.
 
Here is a great post Glenn239, put up on one of my threads, about how Germany could have conducted a successful defence Rundstedt's way:http://forum.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=320590

"15th Army should be equipped with sufficient transportation to allow it to 'pivot' 90 degrees off the coast and take up the line Antwerp-Metz. 15th Army's mines and fortification resources would be split 50/50 between coastal defence and the line Antwerp-Metz.

7th Army's static divisions should be used to fortify the major Atlantic ports. It's mobile divisions, plus the panzer reserves, should operate on the lower Seine northwest of Paris in the mobile defence role using the Seine for supply from Paris. The purpose of the mobile defence is to buy time for 15th Army to pivot into its new positions, and to allow for reserves to be brought to the West Wall for counterattack.

Paris itself is a fortified city with a garrison, which will allow itself to be surrounded, and then fight on under siege.

The western army will create concealed supply dumps throughout Flanders and eastern France. Some of these will be discovered, others will not. The purpose of these dumps is to place supply behind the Allied lines for the counterattack.

When the Allies land in Normandy, the Germans must withdraw major forces from Italy and Russia, accepting when doing so that major territorial losses will occur on both fronts in the 2nd half of 1944. These must travel by rail to the West Wall, and muster in the Ardennes for a counterattack about 3-4 months after the initial landing. By then, the 15th Army is in contact all along its line with Allied spearheads, and the bulk of the 7th Army has been disbursed to various fortified points."


Also if anyones interested i wrote a, partially completed, TL on the Normandy campaign. The basic premise is that Hitler allows Rommel to place 12th SS, Panzer Lehr close to the beaches and brings the 2nd SS Corps over from the Eastern Front earlier: https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=315130
 
A nice plan, until you realise that withdrawing in Russia isn't possible, Withdrawing in Italy will not only allow the Allies free-reign there, but allow them to also withdraw troops from there, and leaving supplies behind isn't such a great idea when you can't be certain when the allies will stop pushing. If it goes as OTL, anything left in France will be lost.
 
That is sort of the point, if you don't win at the beaches you aren't going to get some conditions on the armistice which was about all they Marshals realistically hoped for at that point.

The way I see things the only chance the Germans have of decisively defeating the Western Allies is to inflict a crushing defeat on the Normandy landings.

Except a failed D-Day will neither a means to convince the Western Allies to move away from unconditional surrender or inflict a decisive defeat. Even with a failed D-Day, the Western Allies would still have time, naval & air dominance, numbers, and the Russians on their side. They'll either try again in 1945 after the Soviets kill another few million Germans or shift all of their support on to ANVIL and invade through southern France. Either way the end result is likely the West shakes hands somewhere between the Rhine and the Elbe, if not on the Rhine itself.
 
Except a failed D-Day will neither a means to convince the Western Allies to move away from unconditional surrender or inflict a decisive defeat. Even with a failed D-Day, the Western Allies would still have time, naval & air dominance, numbers, and the Russians on their side. They'll either try again in 1945 after the Soviets kill another few million Germans or shift all of their support on to ANVIL and invade through southern France. Either way the end result is likely the West shakes hands somewhere between the Rhine and the Elbe, if not on the Rhine itself.

I don't you understand the German position.

The Western Allies were openly talking in the press about deindustrializing Germany and letting a third the population die. No German officer could surrender under such conditions without being bested on the field of battle first. And, people like Patton wanted Ike to accept a separate unconditional surrender just to the Western Allies we wouldn't even offer them that as we told them it had to be a joint surrender to Stalin and the WAllies at the same time.

The Japanese managed to convince the Western Allies to be able to only surrender to them not to the Soviets at the same time as well as to keep a certain cadre of people from the noose including the Emperor. After the second nuking we sent feelers in the press that we would let the Emperor live and that was a condition enough for him.

For the German generals in the West they would have accepted a lot, but not the Soviets taking half the country and not its de-industrialization without being defeated first on the field of battle. The German officer corps under the Field Marshals wouldn't have accepted the Marshals surrendering and allowing for an unopposed march into Berlin for the Western Allies until at least late July anyway given the destruction and division that awaited Germany if they couldn't get some terms in France.
 
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