Canada neutral in WW2

So there are a lot of threads out there that analyze the effect of US neutrality throughout the war and the consensus is generally that Western Europe would either end up communist or fascist throughout the 1940s. However before the US entered WW2 and particularly before lend-lease, the UK was heavily dependent on Canada for raw resources (though Canada's version of Lend lease; "Mutual Aid" "The Billion Dollar Gift"), and it was used for the training of a major portion of all commonwealth air crew (British Commonwealth Air Training Plan). In addition the Canadian Navy was pretty much built from scrap with the singular purpose to defend convoys to Britain and to hunt U-boats, eventually ending WW2 as one of the largest navies on Earth. Obviously after the US enters WW2, Canada's role is no longer essential (The US and Britain combined have enough shipping to protect the convoys and 1 field army less (1st Cdn) wont make or break the invasion of Normandy, however the implications of Canadian neutrality in 1940 would likely be pretty serious. What would the result of a Canada that was at best a friendly neutral towards the UK (like the US prior to lend-lease) during the critical period in 1940 where Britain was isolated in Europe and under increasing U-boat strain in the atlantic. How much pressure would the loss of Canadian Lend-Lease resources and RCN convoy protection (not to mention a large number of pilots and planes for the upcoming Battle of Britain) have put on Britain at its most vulnerable point in 1940? Would the loss of Canadian support put enough pressure on the UK's tenuous supply of resources to push it over the edge? Could the UK have REALLY manage to stand alone?

PS: Unlike the rest of the Dominions, the Canadian government made a big deal of asserting its independence at the outset of war, refusing to consider Britain's declaration as binding and only going to war after it passed a vote in the Canadian House of Commons a few days later, so at least THEORETICALLY this situation is possible.

Considering how only one MP, James Shaver Woodsworth, voted against the declaration of war even with the Quebec MPs agitating for amendments calling for "non-participation", this is highly unlikely.

I don't know, if the Quebec reaction had been stronger, perhaps it could have happened. Ireland sat out WW2 and India was very ambivalent, so there is precedent for Canadian neutrality, and it isn't like Churchill or the UK are in much of a position to pressure Canada.

In any case, how would this affect the Allied war effort, particularly in the darkest days of 1940?

It wouldn't have been stronger. If you need proof, look at the 1939 provincial election. Or the relatively subdued reaction to conscription compared to WWI. How the Church hierarchy enthusiastically supported the war effort. By 1943 Duplessis was a leading participant in Victory Bond drives.

No Canadian conscripts went overseas until 1944,

RogueBeaver said:

It wouldn't have been stronger. If you need proof, look at the 1939 provincial election. Or the relatively subdued reaction to conscription compared to WWI. How the Church hierarchy enthusiastically supported the war effort. By 1943 Duplessis was a leading participant in Victory Bond drives.

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No Canadian conscripts went overseas until 1944, however, and there were incidents like the Terrace Mutiny.

A neutral Canada in 1939 onwards is going to leave some rather large holes in the Battle of the Atlantic and presumably Bomber Command, much less five fewer divisions in the British OOB in Europe.

There's another precedent, which is the "Africa Pledge" caveat adopted by the South Africans that limited their all volunteer 1st and 2nd divisions to service in Africa .... Something similar (the "America" or "Atlantic" pledge?) could have severely reduced the availability of Canadian forces for any operations in Europe.

Considering how important the Canadians were to 21st Army Group (one of two army headquarters, ultimately two of six corps), the above sort of limit would be very challenging...

The Australian, Canadian, and South African mobilizations, historically, were all very limited in practical terms in comparison to those of the UK, U.S., and France, for example - any further limits would have had a significant impact on British resources from 1939 onwards.

Best,

TFSmith121 said:

No Canadian conscripts went overseas until 1944, however, and there were incidents like the Terrace Mutiny. ,

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Conscripts were not needed for overseas service at the beginning and were only needed late in the war because of poor decision making at senior levels (they let the army grow larger than the plans, did not sufficiently allow for casualty replacements and actually loaned numbers of men to British units). Thus conscripts were constantly told that they were only ever going to be used for home defence. So you have a group of conscripts primarily from Quebec in a remote BC village, in poor conditions with meagre facilities, treated badly by the locals and thus with resultant morale issues. Then tell them, "Sorry we lied, you're going overseas after all". They got angry and started to refuse orders. It was short lived and resulted in no violence. Not exactly the picture of national disharmony you seem to be trying to portray.

TFSmith121 said:

he Australian, Canadian, and South African mobilizations, historically, were all very limited in practical terms in comparison to those of the UK, U.S., and France, for example -Best,

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UK Population 48 Million - Military 3.3 million - 6.8%
US Population 131 Million - Military 12 million - 9.1%
Canada Population 11 Million - Military 1.1 million - 10%

In WWII more than 40% of the Canadian male population between 18 and 45 served in various branches of the military. Exactly how much more mobilization are you expecting?

TFSmith121 said:

No Canadian conscripts went overseas until 1944, however, and there were incidents like the Terrace Mutiny.

A neutral Canada in 1939 onwards is going to leave some rather large holes in the Battle of the Atlantic and presumably Bomber Command, much less five fewer divisions in the British OOB in Europe.

There's another precedent, which is the "Africa Pledge" caveat adopted by the South Africans that limited their all volunteer 1st and 2nd divisions to service in Africa .... Something similar (the "America" or "Atlantic" pledge?) could have severely reduced the availability of Canadian forces for any operations in Europe.

Considering how important the Canadians were to 21st Army Group (one of two army headquarters, ultimately two of six corps), the above sort of limit would be very challenging...

The Australian, Canadian, and South African mobilizations, historically, were all very limited in practical terms in comparison to those of the UK, U.S., and France, for example - any further limits would have had a significant impact on British resources from 1939 onwards.

Best,

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True, the 1st Cdn was a major component of the British 21st Army group which was the most important British formation on the Western Front, but by 1944-1945, Canadian involvement certainly isn't going to make or break the Western Front, not with the Americans involved. In terms of actual boots on the ground fighting the Germans, Canada was not really essential (the majority of the soldiers Canada mobilized never even were sent to Europe for the war, similar to Australia, although in Australia's case this was due to fear of a Japanese invasion). Where its involvement was critical, especially in the early years, was in supplying the the UK with money, food equipment and industrial muscle (Canada had the fourth largest industrial capacity in the allies after the Big Three, and pumped out all sorts of war materiel for the UK from trucks to bomber planes), in addition to building hundreds of corvettes and destroyers to escort these supplies to the UK. My question is how much additional strain would the UK be under during 1940 if they essentially had to deal with Canada on the same level as with the US. Ie. Having to pay up front for goods, and the transport and escort of these goods being the responsibility of the RN. Could British finances have taken the strain of this? and how much more vulnerable would the convoys be if they had to exclusively rely on the overstretched RN for protection? How much pressure was Britain really under in terms of supplies and finances in 1940 and how much more would it take the Nazis to bring the UK to the negotiating table?

Interesting point with the "Africa Pledge".

Wet Coast said:

Conscripts were not needed for overseas service at the beginning and were only needed late in the war because of poor decision making at senior levels (they let the army grow larger than the plans, did not sufficiently allow for casualty replacements and actually loaned numbers of men to British units). Thus conscripts were constantly told that they were only ever going to be used for home defence. So you have a group of conscripts primarily from Quebec in a remote BC village, in poor conditions with meagre facilities, treated badly by the locals and thus with resultant morale issues. Then tell them, "Sorry we lied, you're going overseas after all". They got angry and started to refuse orders. It was short lived and resulted in no violence. Not exactly the picture of national disharmony you seem to be trying to portray.




UK Population 48 Million - Military 3.3 million - 6.8%
US Population 131 Million - Military 12 million - 9.1%
Canada Population 11 Million - Military 1.1 million - 10%

In WWII more than 40% of the Canadian male population between 18 and 45 served in various branches of the military. Exactly how much more mobilization are you expecting?

Click to expand...

Yes, there was a big mobilization, but most of the Canadian army never was sent to Europe (similar to the US, there were a vast number of soldiers who went through training and never actually left North America). In terms of soldiers actually put into combat vs population the UK far outstrips Canada or the US, which makes sense seeing as it was the only country on this list that was actually fighting to survive.

NamelesStatistic said:

So there are a lot of threads out there that analyze the effect of US neutrality throughout the war and the consensus is generally that Western Europe would either end up communist or fascist throughout the 1940s. However before the US entered WW2 and particularly before lend-lease, the UK was heavily dependent on Canada for raw resources (though Canada's version of Lend lease; "Mutual Aid" "The Billion Dollar Gift"), and it was used for the training of a major portion of all commonwealth air crew (British Commonwealth Air Training Plan). In addition the Canadian Navy was pretty much built from scrap with the singular purpose to defend convoys to Britain and to hunt U-boats, eventually ending WW2 as one of the largest navies on Earth. Obviously after the US enters WW2, Canada's role is no longer essential (The US and Britain combined have enough shipping to protect the convoys and 1 field army less (1st Cdn) wont make or break the invasion of Normandy, however the implications of Canadian neutrality in 1940 would likely be pretty serious. What would the result of a Canada that was at best a friendly neutral towards the UK (like the US prior to lend-lease) during the critical period in 1940 where Britain was isolated in Europe and under increasing U-boat strain in the atlantic. How much pressure would the loss of Canadian Lend-Lease resources and RCN convoy protection (not to mention a large number of pilots and planes for the upcoming Battle of Britain) have put on Britain at its most vulnerable point in 1940? Would the loss of Canadian support put enough pressure on the UK's tenuous supply of resources to push it over the edge? Could the UK have REALLY manage to stand alone?

PS: Unlike the rest of the Dominions, the Canadian government made a big deal of asserting its independence at the outset of war, refusing to consider Britain's declaration as binding and only going to war after it passed a vote in the Canadian House of Commons a few days later, so at least THEORETICALLY this situation is possible.

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Not really. Not without much, MUCH earlier PoDs.

HongCanucker said:

Considering how only one MP, James Shaver Woodsworth, voted against the declaration of war even with the Quebec MPs agitating for amendments calling for "non-participation", this is highly unlikely.

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This.

The degree to which the Canadians did not want to go to war, according to their elected officials, is about the same as the degree to which the US did not want to go to war with Japan in 1941. In both cases, one person voted against.

This despite - in both nations - strong anti-war and anti-involvement currents that had a manifestation in the populace and the MPs.

As it turned out, Canadians did not like Hitler's Germany, and liked the United Kingdom.

Wet Coast said:

Conscripts were not needed for overseas service at the beginning and were only needed late in the war because of poor decision making at senior levels (they let the army grow larger than the plans, did not sufficiently allow for casualty replacements and actually loaned numbers of men to British units). Thus conscripts were constantly told that they were only ever going to be used for home defence. So you have a group of conscripts primarily from Quebec in a remote BC village, in poor conditions with meagre facilities, treated badly by the locals and thus with resultant morale issues. Then tell them, "Sorry we lied, you're going overseas after all". They got angry and started to refuse orders. It was short lived and resulted in no violence. Not exactly the picture of national disharmony you seem to be trying to portray.




UK Population 48 Million - Military 3.3 million - 6.8%
US Population 131 Million - Military 12 million - 9.1%
Canada Population 11 Million - Military 1.1 million - 10%

In WWII more than 40% of the Canadian male population between 18 and 45 served in various branches of the military. Exactly how much more mobilization are you expecting?

Click to expand...

100% mobilization.

"Everyone fights, nobody quits!"

Actually, Canada defined overseas deployment as being outside of North America. Canadian military forces fought in the Aleutian Islands Campaign as early as 1943.

Conscription for unlimited service overseas

Wet Coast said:

Conscripts were not needed for overseas service at the beginning and were only needed late in the war because of poor decision making at senior levels (they let the army grow larger than the plans, did not sufficiently allow for casualty replacements and actually loaned numbers of men to British units). Thus conscripts were constantly told that they were only ever going to be used for home defence. So you have a group of conscripts primarily from Quebec in a remote BC village, in poor conditions with meagre facilities, treated badly by the locals and thus with resultant morale issues. Then tell them, "Sorry we lied, you're going overseas after all". They got angry and started to refuse orders. It was short lived and resulted in no violence. Not exactly the picture of national disharmony you seem to be trying to portray.




UK Population 48 Million - Military 3.3 million - 6.8%
US Population 131 Million - Military 12 million - 9.1%
Canada Population 11 Million - Military 1.1 million - 10%

In WWII more than 40% of the Canadian male population between 18 and 45 served in various branches of the military. Exactly how much more mobilization are you expecting?

Click to expand...

Conscription for unlimited service overseas was the standard in the U.S. and UK, from Day One of their respective wars; other than NZ, none of the "white" dominions had anything approaching the same policy.

"All volunteer" overseas deployments were, by their very nature, significantly more limiting than conscription for overseas service once hostilities break out; the U.S. requirement was the duration + six months. The Canadian requirement was not.

As it was, of the eight divisions mobilized by Canada between during WW II, five went overseas; one brigade from one of the other three (so, one of nine brigades) served as part of the expeditionary force for Operation COTTAGE, the occupation of Kiska after the Japanese evacuation.

Every division mobilized by the U.S. during WW II, both AUS and USMC, went overseas.

Best,

Neutrality seems unlikely, although there is the Irish precedent

NamelesStatistic said:

True, the 1st Cdn was a major component of the British 21st Army group which was the most important British formation on the Western Front, but by 1944-1945, Canadian involvement certainly isn't going to make or break the Western Front, not with the Americans involved. In terms of actual boots on the ground fighting the Germans, Canada was not really essential (the majority of the soldiers Canada mobilized never even were sent to Europe for the war, similar to Australia, although in Australia's case this was due to fear of a Japanese invasion). Where its involvement was critical, especially in the early years, was in supplying the the UK with money, food equipment and industrial muscle (Canada had the fourth largest industrial capacity in the allies after the Big Three, and pumped out all sorts of war materiel for the UK from trucks to bomber planes), in addition to building hundreds of corvettes and destroyers to escort these supplies to the UK. My question is how much additional strain would the UK be under during 1940 if they essentially had to deal with Canada on the same level as with the US. Ie. Having to pay up front for goods, and the transport and escort of these goods being the responsibility of the RN. Could British finances have taken the strain of this? and how much more vulnerable would the convoys be if they had to exclusively rely on the overstretched RN for protection? How much pressure was Britain really under in terms of supplies and finances in 1940 and how much more would it take the Nazis to bring the UK to the negotiating table?

Interesting point with the "Africa Pledge".

Click to expand...

Outright neutrality seems unlikely, although there is the Irish precedent. However, in terms of combat divisions organized, every American division (AUS and USMC) went overseas as combat formations, and all but two saw action; the only exceptions, the 13th Airborne in the ETO and the 98th Infantry in the Pacific, formed their respective theaters' strategic reserves at the close of hostilities and would have been committed to action, otherwise. The 98th, for example, was slated for DOWNFALL, and was training for such in Hawaii at VJ Day. The other exception was the 1943 incarnation of the 2nd Cavalry Division, which did go the the MTO as such but was broken up for use as service troops because of the demands of the separate theater(s).

Three of the eight Canadian Army divisions raised did not (6th, 7th, and 8th), the only exception being one brigade group (13th, IIRC) that was assigned to the expeditionary force for Operation COTTAGE, the occupation of Kiska after the Japanese evacuation.

So not to put to fine a point on it, but the U.S. and UK had significantly different mobilization policies than Australia, Canada, and South Africa.

Best,

Actually, not quite...

Saphroneth said:

The degree to which the Canadians did not want to go to war, according to their elected officials, is about the same as the degree to which the US did not want to go to war with Japan in 1941. In both cases, one person voted against.

This despite - in both nations - strong anti-war and anti-involvement currents that had a manifestation in the populace and the MPs.

As it turned out, Canadians did not like Hitler's Germany, and liked the United Kingdom.

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Actually, not quite.

The U.S. accepted conscription for unlimited overseas service, from the moment the U.S.' war began in 1941. Canada did not until 1944.

Not to diminish the contribution of those Canadians who did volunteer, but there were American draftees conscripted through Selective Service fighting and dying from Dec. 7, 1941 (Dec. 8 west of the Dateline); this was not true for Canadian conscripts under the NRMA.

Best,

Wet Coast said:

Conscripts were not needed for overseas service at the beginning and were only needed late in the war because of poor decision making at senior levels (they let the army grow larger than the plans, did not sufficiently allow for casualty replacements and actually loaned numbers of men to British units). Thus conscripts were constantly told that they were only ever going to be used for home defence. So you have a group of conscripts primarily from Quebec in a remote BC village, in poor conditions with meagre facilities, treated badly by the locals and thus with resultant morale issues. Then tell them, "Sorry we lied, you're going overseas after all". They got angry and started to refuse orders. It was short lived and resulted in no violence. Not exactly the picture of national disharmony you seem to be trying to portray.




UK Population 48 Million - Military 3.3 million - 6.8%
US Population 131 Million - Military 12 million - 9.1%
Canada Population 11 Million - Military 1.1 million - 10%

In WWII more than 40% of the Canadian male population between 18 and 45 served in various branches of the military. Exactly how much more mobilization are you expecting?

Click to expand...

Here are the mobilization and casualty stats for the Commonwealth (admittedly from wikipedia so not super reliable)

1. Number served: UK and Crown Colonies (5,896,000); India-(British colonial administration) (2,582,000), Australia (993,000); Canada (1,100,000); New Zealand (295,000); South Africa (250,000).[295]
2. Total war related deaths reported by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission: UK and Crown Colonies (383,786); India-(British colonial administration) (87,032), Australia (40,464); Canada (45,383); New Zealand (11,929); South Africa (11,903).[273]
3. Wounded: UK and Crown Colonies (284,049); India-(British colonial administration) (64,354), Australia (39,803); Canada (53,174); New Zealand (19,314); South Africa (14,363).[274][296][297]
4. Prisoner of war: UK and Crown Colonies (180,488); India-(British colonial administration) (79,481); Australia (26,358); South Africa (14,750); Canada (9,334); New Zealand (8,415)

Proportional to its size, Canada raised nearly as big an army as the UK (assuming the 11miliilion to 48 million comparison is correct) but as you can see relative to the number of soldiers mobilized, the casualties were much lighter. As others have stated, this was likely due to the bulk of the Canadian army not being fielded in combat, which would have been due to a number of factors, first they were overseas and had a limited oppertunities to actually fight the enemy on a large scale. Secondly, unlike the US, the Canadian Forces lacked the necessary equipment and logistical capability to put a million man army on land and then support it across an ocean.

It is also worth noting that the US mobilization/casualty stats are a lot lower Canada (4.1%) and Britains (6.5% casualty rate for soldiers from the UK and Crown colonies). The US which mobilized 16,353,639 men and had 407,316 killed/missing, resulting in a casualty rate of 2.5%. This suggests, that US troops were even more sparingly used in combat then the Canadians, so even if it is true that all but two US divisions saw actual combat, there were probably many divisions in which small elements of the division saw limited combat, resulting in lower casualty numbers overall. Although to be fare the casualty rate is likely deflated by missing out on the first two years of the war. To be blunt the US and Canada were not fighting a war for their survival so they probably didn't have the same need to spend lives the way the UK did to ensure their safety.

Anyway, this is getting away from the original point, my question is what effect would Canadian neutrality have on the war effort in 1940 when the UK is at its darkest time? Would this have pushed them over the edge, or is this a problem the UK could have comfortably surmounted?

PS: the more limited conscription laws in Canada were probably because Ottawa didn't want to upset Quebec too badly.
PPS: Canada and the US sure had a lot fewer people back then didn't they? Canada's population is roughly 3 times that today, and the US is about 2.5 times larger. Great Britain only gained an additional 24% to its population over the last 60 years.

The limited consciription in Canada was exactly

The limits on conscription in Canada was precisely because of Quebec; same issue in 1914-18.

I will suggest that since the objective of war is NOT to die for one's country, but to make the other poor SOB do it for theirs, relative casualty figures are not really a particularly apt measure of political commitment to a war effort.

Having said that, as far as your question goes, Canadian neutrality in 1939-40 would have been a challenge for the British war effort, but not an insurmountable one.

Best,

TFSmith121 said:

The limits on conscription in Canada was precisely because of Quebec; same issue in 1914-18.

I will suggest that since the objective of war is NOT to die for one's country, but to make the other poor SOB do it for theirs, relative casualty figures are not really a particularly apt measure of political commitment to a war effort.

Having said that, as far as your question goes, Canadian neutrality in 1939-40 would have been a challenge for the British war effort, but not an insurmountable one.

Best,

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I don't know, relative casualty numbers are a good indication of just how desperate a country's situation is (the USSR suffered a military death rate of 25%). Countries that are fighting for survival generally cant pick and choose their engagements the way a country fighting from the periphery can. Also public opinion (which is essential for running a war in a democracy) can support much higher casualties if the fate of the nation hangs in the balance: a good exemplar here would be the US public reaction to the death toll in Vietnam.

Casualty numbers are a good indication of how many

NamelesStatistic said:

I don't know, relative casualty numbers are a good indication of just how desperate a country's situation is (the USSR suffered a military death rate of 25%). Countries that are fighting for survival generally cant pick and choose their engagements the way a country fighting from the periphery can. Also public opinion (which is essential for running a war in a democracy) can support much higher casualties if the fate of the nation hangs in the balance: a good exemplar here would be the US public reaction to the death toll in Vietnam.

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Casualty numbers are an indication of dead, wounded, or missing; trying to vest anything more than that in such is argument, not fact.

The facts are the U.S. adopted conscription for unlimited service as policy in 1940, and carried through with that when the balloon went up in 1941; Canada did not do so until 1944.

John Jones, born in Detroit in 1922, is physically and mentally capable of service and is not a CO, a felon, or anything else that precludes him from service; his Selective Service number comes up, he's caught in the draft, he's in the Army now, and if multiple decisions he has no control over occur, he will find himself in the mud somewhere, presumably as early as 1941, with the rest of the dog faces, and if he makes it home in one piece, he becomes the well known fugitive from the law of averages.

John Jones, born in Windsor the same year, everything else is the same, and even if the NRMA gets him, there is no chance he's going anywhere he doesn't volunteer for until late in 1944.

You can suggest that's the same, but factually, it is not.

Best,

TFSmith121 said:

Casualty numbers are an indication of dead, wounded, or missing; trying to vest anything more than that in such is argument, not fact.

The facts are the U.S. adopted conscription for unlimited service as policy in 1940, and carried through with that when the balloon went up in 1941; Canada did not do so until 1944.

John Jones, born in Detroit in 1922, is physically and mentally capable of service and is not a CO, a felon, or anything else that precludes him from service; his Selective Service number comes up, he's caught in the draft, he's in the Army now, and if multiple decisions he has no control over occur, he will find himself in the mud somewhere, presumably as early as 1941, with the rest of the dog faces, and if he makes it home in one piece, he becomes the well known fugitive from the law of averages.

John Jones, born in Windsor the same year, everything else is the same, and even if the NRMA gets him, there is no chance he's going anywhere he doesn't volunteer for until late in 1944.

You can suggest that's the same, but factually, it is not.

Best,

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Where did I ever suggest that Canadian style conscription was the same as US style conscription? My comment wasn't even about conscription at all, it was about using casualty figures as a relative estimate as two how engaged in active combat the military formations of a particular country are, which I believe is an accurate method of comparison in this case as the US, UK and Canada all had (roughly) similar equipment, similar quality of training and were fighting the same enemies. I don't think it should come as a surprise to anyone that the UK had the highest casualty rate of the three, as obviously, relative to its population size, it had to take on a larger burden because the strategic situation demanded it, ie. they were fighting to avoid conquest, whereas Canada and the US were never in that situation (Indeed FDR made a speech at Queens University where he bluntly stated that any country to try to invade Canada would face war with the US).

Of course conscription couldn't be as strict in Canada, they have Quebec! And unlike the UK Canada didn't have to fight for its survival.