Tactics of a Ango-French War with the US in the late 1880's

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Tintime again.

What tactics would/could be used for a possible war between an Anglo/French against the US?

I should think the first would be to blockade the US ports. Then more troops into Eastern Canada.

I ask this question in relation to my ASB TL.

Any help would be great.:)
 
State the WHY before so as to allow us to know if it's a small affair or a WW1 campaign

It's more of a, drawing up of plans for a possible war rather than going in and fighting. Away of keeping the US down more than anything else. A show of force to start with and taking it up from there. Smaller the better if it even comes to it.

If you wish to read The Sun Never Sets, on the ASB part, you might be able to form it in your mind.:)
 
I'd suggest checking out Roger Parkinson's The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World War (given the price, either the Google Books preview version or trying to borrow a copy). It goes into detail on the kinds of tactics that would have been adopted, which is quite important because naval thinking shifted in the late 1880s. As a result of a series of manoeuvres, certain ideas came in and out of vogue: the 1885 manoeuvres dissuaded direct attacks on fortified ports, the 1888 ones indicated that a blockading force needed a superiority of 5:3 in battleships and 2:1 in cruisers for the blockade to be successful. As such, the exact year you're looking at will have repercussions for how the Royal Navy fights the war.

When you're considering the land war, bear in mind that the government has the Militia Reserve as well as the Army Reserve available for service. The Militia was a part-time force similar to the Volunteers/Territorials: recruits do an accelerated 56-day training at the regimental depot in their first year, and each year the battalion (recruits included) trains for 28 days.* A proportion of these men were allowed to sign up for the Militia Reserve, undertaking in an emergency to join the regular battalions of the regiment to supplement the Army Reservists. They were mobilised in 1878 and 1885, when there were war crises with Russia: on the latter occasion, there were available for service39,244 Army Reservists and 30,813 Militia Reservists (of a total militia enrolment of 110,356). Unfortunately, this has a tendency to get overlooked.

*For comparison purposes, in 1885 the New York National Guard sent 4,586 of its nominal strength of 12,510 to camp for a week.
 
IOTL France issued Poudre B for Lebel rifle in 1886; Britain followed in 1889[?] with the Lee-Metford.

The USA didn't start issuing Ruby & Peyton powder for its' new Krags until 1895.

Unless there are a couple of PODs giving the US armed forces greater resources in the post-ACW period, tactically they could be in for rather a poor time.
 
America starts off in a poor position.

Then the industry and population kicks in and the nation does better and better. In a long war the british lose canada, sorry but they do. Navally the best america can do is defend its own shores. The British and French together simply do not have the naval resources needed to blockade america and do all of their colonial duties.

If its a long war the british and french are forced to walk away from north america. In a short one they do a lot of damage get some concessions and walk away having enraged the hedgemon of north america who now wants revenge.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
In the late 1870s at least, the Americans considered worthwhile volley fire range to be 100-200 yards.

In the age of the Martini-Henry.

Until they can retrain their infantry quite comprehensively, they're f*cked.
 
Why wouldn't the Germans consider taking advantage of the situation for balance of power sake, and getting America as a future ally?

Or at least the Germans throwing an offer to "mediate" with a threat of what happens if they don't.
 
Until they can retrain their infantry quite comprehensively, they're f*cked.
Probably going to have to re-arm and retrain the artillery, too. In 1885 the US regular army were still armed with a mix of 12pdr Napoleons and 3in Ordnance rifles, and they didn't finish replacing them with 3.2in BL guns until 1892. The National Guard was even worse off: in 1903, one third of their artillery was muzzle-loading and 10% was 12pdr Napoleons (41) and brass 6-pounders (2).
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The British and French, not surprisingly, have far more

Tintime again. What tactics would/could be used for a possible war between an Anglo/French against the US? I should think the first would be to blockade the US ports. Then more troops into Eastern Canada. I ask this question in relation to my ASB TL. Any help would be great.:)

The British and French, not surprisingly, have far more significant threats, much closer to home, in the 1880s than anything the Western Hemisphere - along with the reality there is nothing significant for the US, UK, and France to fight about in the 1880s.

Tactics absent the strategic situation are theory, nothing more; without some indication of why the French are not more worried about the Germans and the British are more concerned about - well, everyone, including the French - the trees and forests come to mind.

But for an example of how European infantry might do against a decidedly more low-tech enemy than the US, one can only consider this place:





Best,
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
But for an example of how European infantry might do against a decidedly low-tech enemy than the US, one can only consider this place:





Best,
I'm sure very few nations would do well when some of their rear elements are surprised at close range by an enemy capable of moving at cavalry trot speeds who outnumber them ten or more to one.


When the same nation has time to prepare, you get Roark's Drift.

The two illustrate both the ways in which breech-loading weapons can do extremely poorly (when not able to exploit their advantages) and extremely well (when they are able to do so).




One could equally cite, say, Little Big Horn as an example of how US troops - when surprised - can be comprehensively smashed by a force not much larger than their own and with an array of weapons from modern breechloaders to stone age arrows and clubs.



So, let me put it to you this way. And please answer in some way firmly, rather than this tiresome round of circumlocutions and spot-the-mesa.



How do you think an American force would have done, if similarly surprised at Iswandlana with similar distributions of troops in the same time period? (If you protest that such distributions are not possible with the competence of American troops, just assume Custer f*cked up.)
 
There's also the fact that, assuming rising tensions rather than ASBs suddenly decide to cause the UK/France to declare war randomly, both sides would probably have mobilized and prepared.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
There's also the fact that, assuming rising tensions rather than ASBs suddenly decide to cause the UK/France to declare war randomly, both sides would probably have mobilized and prepared.
Yep.

The Union's mobilization procedures, however (and unfortunately), were crap.
I know it's a decade and more later, but it's the closest we have:


(post topic is the Spanish-American War)
One of the problems is that a lot of people have heard that the US Army was authorised to raise eight (8) army corps each of three to four divisions of eleven thousand men. Therefore they automatically assume that the US did raise an army of three hundred thousand men.

Yet when you look at the Army Corps that did get raised you see they each mustered fewer men than their authorised strength and not all of those mustered were deployed.

First Army Corps for example did not arrive in Cuba until January of 1899 and was dissolved as a formal command shortly thereafter.

Second Army Corps sent one brigade to Cuba and one Brigade to Puerto Rico.

Third Army Corps only ever seems to have mustered some 8,400 officers and enlisted and then disbanded without seeing combat.

Fourth Army Corps did better mustering almost 21,000 but again never saw combat.

Fifth Army Corps seems to have been the key command under which most units actually sent out to fight in Cuba were organised in the field.

Sixth Army Corps never even seems to have gotten started

Seventh Army Corps was one of the larger army corps by muster rolls but was late into the action and seems to have performed only garrison duties in Cuba.

Eighth Army Corps administered the eleven thousand US troops initially sent to the Philippines and took Manila.

There is an interesting article on that last by a National Guard Officer and on the problems of mustering the Regular Army and State Volunteers into one force.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a566629.pdf
 
The problem is that the US by this time has already spread from Maine to Florida to California to Washington State, is the second largest economy in the world, is 3,000 miles away from Europe, has a population of millions and is totally connected by rail. They will be able to blockade the US at great cost but landing troops is suicide.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The Americans, presumably, would not have sent

I'm sure very few nations would do well when some of their rear elements are surprised at close range by an enemy capable of moving at cavalry trot speeds who outnumber them ten or more to one. How do you think an American force would have done, if similarly surprised at Iswandlana with similar distributions of troops in the same time period? (If you protest that such distributions are not possible with the competence of American troops, just assume Custer f*cked up.)

The Americans, presumably, would not have sent leg infantry and field artillery into a similar situation, absent any effective scouting.

There's a reason the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th cavalries were formed in the US RA establishment after 1865; say what you wish about GA Custer, but he recognized mobility was key to the sort of Plains warfare against the native peoples the Army had to fight in the 1860-70s. Seems equally clear that Chelmsford did not see mounted mobility, by cavalry or mounted infantry, in the same way...

And this was true whether they were native peoples (Comanche, Kiowa) who fought mounted or those (Sioux, Cheyenne) who largely rode to battle and fought dismounted.

It is worth making the point that when the US did deploy infantry and field artillery during the Plains wars - which on the offensive was fairly rare - there was never a situation where a battalion equivalent of regular infantry supported by a field artillery battery was overwhelmed in the sense the men of the 24th Regiment of Foot (i.e., line regular infantry, supported by regular field artillery; hardly "rear elements") were destroyed by the Zulu at Isandwhala. British casualties at Isandwhala were 900 of 955 engaged (plus another 470 NNC KIA); US casualties at the Little Big Horn were roughly 300 of 650; half of Custer's command, the detached battalion under Reno and Benteen, fought sucessfully throughout the battle on Reno Hill.

There's also the reality the Sioux and their allies included some portion - I've seen estimates of 200 or more - armed with breech-loading Henry and Winchester repeaters; not a weapon found among the Zulu impis in any numbers, who remained armed largely with spears.

But if Isandwhala is not a "appropriate" measure of the efficacy of British infantry in this period, than what is?

Majuba Hill? Bronkhorstspruit? Laing's Nek? Schuinshoogte/Ingogo?

All of which were fought against a "Western" enemy, of course, and I am unaware that the British Army units that saw action in South Africa in 1880-81 (including, but not limited to, elements of the regular 58th, 60th, 92nd, and 94th regiments) demonstrated any special prowess over their enemies when it came to marksmanship, small units tactics, operations, grand tactics, and strategy.

This was the war, after all, where the British commander-in-chief's - Major General George P. Colley - personal command in the field resulted in Majuba Hill.

Best,
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
The problem is that the US by this time has already spread from Maine to Florida to California to Washington State, is the second largest economy in the world, is 3,000 miles away from Europe, has a population of millions and is totally connected by rail. They will be able to blockade the US at great cost but landing troops is suicide.
Yeah, defending Canada is about it. The point is mainly that there's time for the British to entrench in Canada, and then the blockade can bite.


In the 1880s, the US navy was... crap.

Let's use 1888.

Armoured Cruisers:

None. (the UK has twelve.)

Protected Cruisers:

Atlanta (2 8", 6 6", no armoured belt but 2" barbettes)
Boston (2 8", 6 6", no armoured belt but 2" barbettes)
Chicago (4 8", 8 6", 2 5", no armoured belt but 2" barbettes)
Vesuvius (commissioned 1890) (3 15" pneumatic guns, essentially a monitor)

(The RN has over thirty.)

Battleships:

None. (See below for a subset of UK.)

Torpedo boats:

None. (the RN has at least a dozen.)

Dispatch vessel:

USS Dolphin (1 6").

Sloop of war:
Mohican and Galena (1883 and 1880)
Wooden ship with 1 9" and 8 8"


Carry-overs from pre-1882:


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_States_Navy#cite_note-Swann141142-74
By the time the Garfield administration assumed office in 1881, the Navy's condition had deteriorated still further. A review conducted on behalf of the new Secretary of the Navy, William H. Hunt, found that of 140 vessels on the Navy's active list, only 52 were in an operational state, of which a mere 17 were iron-hulled ships, including 14 aging Civil War era ironclads. Hunt recognized the necessity of modernizing the Navy, and set up an informal advisory board to make recommendations.


Basically, fuck-all that could stand up in a serious fight.






By comparison, RN battlefleet built since 1870:


Seagoing

Iron Duke (10 9", 4 6", 6" armour minimum belt)
2 Swiftsure (10 9", 4 6", 6" armour minimum belt)

Sultan (8 10", 4 9", 6" armour minimum belt)

2 Devastation (turret ships) (4 12", minimum belt thickness 8.5" iron with 16" teak backing)
Alexandra (2 11", 10 10", 12-6" belt)
Temeraire (4 11", 4 10", 11-5.5" belt)
Superb (16 10", 4 torpedo tubes, 12-7" belt)
Neptune (4 12.5" 2 9", 2 torpedo tubes, 12-9" belt)
Dreadnought (4 12.5", machine guns, 14-8" belt)
Inflexible (4 16", 4 torpedo tubes, 24" belt(!!))
2 Ajax (4 12.5", 2 6", 18" citadel)
2 Colossus (4 12", 5 6", 2 tubes, 14-18" citadel)
6 Admiral (4 12" or 2 16.25" or 4 13.5", 6 6" or 10 6", belt 18-8")


Coastal

Abyssinia (4 10", 4 8", belt 7")
Hotspur (BIG RAM, 2 12", 2 6", belt 11-8")
Glatton (2 12", belt 12-10")

4 Cyclops (4 10", belt 8-6")
Rupert (BIG RAM, 2 10", 2 6", 4 torpedo tubes, belt 11-9")
2 Belleisle (4 12", 2 torpedo carriages, belt 6-12")
2 Conqueror (2 12", 4 6", 5 torpedo tubes, 12-8" belt)






Conclusion:


The USN is fucked. Completely fucked. The entire useful navy only outnumbers the modern RN battleships about two to one.
In other words... rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves.
 
Yeah, defending Canada is about it. The point is mainly that there's time for the British to entrench in Canada, and then the blockade can bite.


In the 1880s, the US navy was... crap.

Let's use 1888.

Armoured Cruisers:

None. (the UK has twelve.)

Protected Cruisers:

Atlanta (2 8", 6 6", no armoured belt but 2" barbettes)
Boston (2 8", 6 6", no armoured belt but 2" barbettes)
Chicago (4 8", 8 6", 2 5", no armoured belt but 2" barbettes)
Vesuvius (commissioned 1890) (3 15" pneumatic guns, essentially a monitor)

(The RN has over thirty.)

Battleships:

None. (See below for a subset of UK.)

Torpedo boats:

None. (the RN has at least a dozen.)

Dispatch vessel:

USS Dolphin (1 6").

Sloop of war:
Mohican and Galena (1883 and 1880)
Wooden ship with 1 9" and 8 8"


Carry-overs from pre-1882:





Basically, fuck-all that could stand up in a serious fight.






By comparison, RN battlefleet built since 1870:


Seagoing

Iron Duke (10 9", 4 6", 6" armour minimum belt)
2 Swiftsure (10 9", 4 6", 6" armour minimum belt)

Sultan (8 10", 4 9", 6" armour minimum belt)

2 Devastation (turret ships) (4 12", minimum belt thickness 8.5" iron with 16" teak backing)
Alexandra (2 11", 10 10", 12-6" belt)
Temeraire (4 11", 4 10", 11-5.5" belt)
Superb (16 10", 4 torpedo tubes, 12-7" belt)
Neptune (4 12.5" 2 9", 2 torpedo tubes, 12-9" belt)
Dreadnought (4 12.5", machine guns, 14-8" belt)
Inflexible (4 16", 4 torpedo tubes, 24" belt(!!))
2 Ajax (4 12.5", 2 6", 18" citadel)
2 Colossus (4 12", 5 6", 2 tubes, 14-18" citadel)
6 Admiral (4 12" or 2 16.25" or 4 13.5", 6 6" or 10 6", belt 18-8")


Coastal

Abyssinia (4 10", 4 8", belt 7")
Hotspur (BIG RAM, 2 12", 2 6", belt 11-8")
Glatton (2 12", belt 12-10")

4 Cyclops (4 10", belt 8-6")
Rupert (BIG RAM, 2 10", 2 6", 4 torpedo tubes, belt 11-9")
2 Belleisle (4 12", 2 torpedo carriages, belt 6-12")
2 Conqueror (2 12", 4 6", 5 torpedo tubes, 12-8" belt)






Conclusion:


The USN is fucked. Completely fucked. The entire useful navy only outnumbers the modern RN battleships about two to one.
In other words... rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves.

No one is arguing that but to blockade thousands of miles of coastline from three thousand miles away would be very expensive even if the US didn't have a navy at all.

Also the US was very self reliant. It is big enough that it isn't really dependent on imports. It produces enough food, coal, iron, timber, nickel , copper etc. to run itself. It would make it poorer, but it wouldn't bankrupt it by a longshot.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The Americans, presumably, would not have sent leg infantry and field artillery into a similar situation, absent any effective scouting.

There's a reason the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th cavalries were formed in the US RA establishment after 1865; say what you wish about GA Custer, but he recognized mobility was key to the sort of Plains warfare against the native peoples the Army had to fight in the 1860-70s. Seems equally clear that Chelmsford did not see mounted mobility, by cavalry or mounted infantry, in the same way...

And this was true whether they were native peoples (Comanche, Kiowa) who fought mounted or those (Sioux, Cheyenne) who largely rode to battle and fought dismounted.

It is worth making the point that when the US did deploy infantry and field artillery during the Plains wars - which on the offensive was fairly rare - there was never a situation where a battalion equivalent of regular infantry supported by a field artillery battery was overwhelmed in the sense the men of the 24th Regiment of Foot (i.e., line regular infantry, supported by regular field artillery; hardly "rear elements") were destroyed by the Zulu at Isandwhala. British casualties at Isandwhala were 900 of 955 engaged (plus another 470 NNC KIA); US casualties at the Little Big Horn were roughly 300 of 650; half of Custer's command, the detached battalion under Reno and Benteen, fought sucessfully throughout the battle on Reno Hill.

There's also the reality the Sioux and their allies included some portion - I've seen estimates of 200 or more - armed with breech-loading Henry and Winchester repeaters; not a weapon found among the Zulu impis in any numbers, who remained armed largely with spears.

But if Isandwhala is not a "appropriate" measure of the efficacy of British infantry in this period, than what is?

Majuba Hill? Bronkhorstspruit? Laing's Nek? Schuinshoogte/Ingogo?

All of which were fought against a "Western" enemy, of course, and I am unaware that the British Army units that saw action in South Africa in 1880-81 (including, but not limited to, elements of the regular 58th, 60th, 92nd, and 94th regiments) demonstrated any special prowess over their enemies when it came to marksmanship, small units tactics, operations, grand tactics, and strategy.

This was the war, after all, where the British commander-in-chief's - Major General George P. Colley - personal command in the field resulted in Majuba Hill.

Best,


Let's look at that Isandhlwana order of battle more closely, shall we?

Distance at surprise: 7 miles.
Defences: not much (no time).

British forces

1837 total, of which British 748 and 1100-odd Native and Colonial.
2 guns.


Zulu force
15,000 engaged, 5,000 Loins (reserve).


That means that the odds were between 8:1 and (if counting engaged troops versus British-Martini-armed-troops) 20:1.

Ultimate cause of defeat: lack of ammunition to units on too wide a perimeter.

Zulu casualties: at least 1000 killed, 2000 wounded.



Now, in the rematch at Kambula?

Zulu forces were about the same.

British forces were 2,000 British (so still 10:1 odds).

This time a defensive laager was actually formed. Result:

29 killed and 54 wounded British.
2,000 Zulu killed.


Overall conclusion:

Military f*ckup at the officer level, doesn't say much one way or the other for troop prowess.



By the way, do we have an 1880s period war with... well, anyone... for the US so we can gauge them? There's the 1898 Spanish American War, but that's over a decade later.
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
Forces at Isandhlwana included

Let's look at that Isandhlwana order of battle more closely, shall we?

Imperial forces at Isandhlwana included:
  • 950 Europeans
  • 850 Natal NC
By late evening, 55 of the Europeans were still alive ... perhaps 300 Natal (native African troops) still survived; 470 of their bodies were found in the camp and along the fugitive's trail ... Six full companies of the 2nd Warwickshire (Regiment) had died without a single survivor - the 24th Regiment had lost 21 officers and 581 men. The Royal Artillery had lost 68 men. - from The Washing of the Spears by Donald Morris.

In additon, the Natal white colonial units had lost 58 men; of the Europeans who had officered the native (African) units, 84 were slain.

So, again, 950 British imperial troops (including at least 670 British Army regulars, infantry and artillery) armed with breechloading rifles, revolvers, and with artillery in support, overwhelmed and destroyed by men largely equipped with spears.

And of course, this is all of two years before the experience of the 1st South Africa war pitted British regulars vs. a "white" enemy, which ended in the results of:
  • Bronkhorstspruit
  • Laing's Nek
  • Schuinshoogte/Ingogo
  • Majuba Hill
Now, obviously, depending on whatever points of departure from historical reality, ripples, eddies in the space-time-continuum, whatever, has resulted in world where the US, UK, and France are apparently at daggers drawn in some as yet unspecified year in the "late 1880s" trying to suggest a strategic balance based on historical reality is a goose chase of gargantuan proportions, but since the OP has not offered any sort of explanation, one does what one can with the historical record...

Which, in the case of the Zulu War of 1879 and the 1st South African War of 1880-81, does not suggest the European armies - British or otherwise - are particularly more or less adept at resolving political disputes through battlefield action than any OTHER Western army might or might not be...

However, without running off the rails yet again when reality intrudes, given the absolute lack of information in the OP, there is no clue in the OP; the US could have been building Skeered o' Nuthin's since 1861, or the Russians have invented dirigibles capable of aerial bombardment, or the Chinese have discovered fission weapons in 1888...

It's entirely up to the author in terms of whatever speculative fantasies they wish to build, since there is no context to the question.

Best,
 
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