What if Molke doesn't move troops East to fight the Russians in 1914? Would that help the Schlieffen Plan's success? What about the Russian advance in the East.
WI: Molke doesn't move troops East?
- Thread starter ThatOneGuy
- Start date
Gamed this many times. At least the early transfer of the two corps early on. That small a with drawl is hardly noticeable, tho the pair selected did come out of the critical area on the German right wing. Generally speaking the historical right wing was not strong enough to overcome the opposition the French deployed, so a Active and a Reserve Corps make little perceptable difference either way.
John Fredrick Parker
Donor
I'm gonna say the extra troops means von Kluck doesn't see his right flank exposed, preventing the Battle of the Marne happening as OTL.
The result is a pitched battle between the Germans and Allies taking place in the suburbs of Paris, and the French govenrment moving south longer term. Depending on how TTL's “Battle of Paris” goes, the French may find themselves more receptive to an early armistice with Germany, provided the terms are generous; if the Kaiser plays his cards right (eg doesn't try to impose the Septemberprogramme), he can get the French out of the war quickly, ending the conflict by Christmas.
The result is a pitched battle between the Germans and Allies taking place in the suburbs of Paris, and the French govenrment moving south longer term. Depending on how TTL's “Battle of Paris” goes, the French may find themselves more receptive to an early armistice with Germany, provided the terms are generous; if the Kaiser plays his cards right (eg doesn't try to impose the Septemberprogramme), he can get the French out of the war quickly, ending the conflict by Christmas.
The additional roads to support those two corps out to Paris don't exist, so at best they sit behind the lines twiddling their thumbs. At worse they cause a massive traffic jam that snarls the German advance.
Best thing Moltke can have them do is be digging in a fallback line a ways back if things go south.
In the East, Tannenberg was largely already settled by the time those corps showed up so no difference there. There might be alterations to later battles though.
Best thing Moltke can have them do is be digging in a fallback line a ways back if things go south.
In the East, Tannenberg was largely already settled by the time those corps showed up so no difference there. There might be alterations to later battles though.
Riain
Banned
IIRC troops were sent East from the siege of Namur, that was most certainly a mistake considering the desperate need for troops at the Marne and the Race to the Sea. Not that these 2 Corps could have allowed the Germans to capture Paris or anything quite so drastic, but given the difficulties in moving troops from the German/French frontier to front deep in France and the declining strength of the Germans there, these 2 Corps would have been better used in France rather than East Prussia.
The original German plan for invading Belgium and France had factored in these two corps, had it not?
If they were slated to accompany the advance towards Paris, then it seems probable that the German planners had selected routes for them, or at least were convinced that sufficient roads existed.
Now, they may have been simply wrong, or they may have been too optimistic.
Unless someone can either show that the two corps were intended to be left behind in Belgium, or that the planners had not considered the availability of roads in their planning, I think the best we can say with certainty is that the presence of these cops would have somewhat increased the complexity of movement and the likelihood of significant traffic jams.
If the Germans did succeed in getting these two corps forward on time, along with all the rest of their troops, we're looking at a possibility that the BEF and 5th Army mightve been delayed and 6th Army defeated. It would've depended on the two corps, and the rest of German First and Second Armies, being used very skillfully, so this outcome is not a given.
Even had the Germans defeated 6th Army, this might not have been decisive. The damage to the German forces, and the delay induced, might well have caused the further advance to stall. The BEF and 5th Army could still have pushed through the German blocking efforts.
So IMHO it would come down to just how skillfully the Germans used all their forces, and how swiftly/decisively the defeat of 6th Army was achieved.
trajen777
Banned
IN the German plan their is actually a need for an additional 6 corps being built that was never carried forward -- and German population cold easily have afforded this. German spending and % of population vs French mobilization was much smaller. Anyway in the 2 corps situation it is true that their use in the East allowed for the attack into Poland but was 2 late for Tannenberg. That said the entire Shelif. plan was defective in logistics planning - the Germans had the bad situation of having either supplies or troops at the front but not both. If they had attacked through the Netherlands also (per original plan) if they had fallen back on the left instead of attacking and driving back the French to be closer to reacting to Paris and used the additional troops - to either
1. Go through Netherlands (pinning the Brits to fight further to the channel) or
2. having the 2 corps for the race to the sea and gaining significant ground that would make the Allies position for resupply untenable and would have shortened war.
3. As was stated earlier if the corps could have moved up (Netherlands or on a delayed march from the rear ) then Kluck would not have feared the flank being open and then it would have been a close call as to who wins at Marne
Its a interesting statement of WW1 that the Shelif plan was developed, to paraphrase Shelif. " because the French will not be as accommodating as they were in 1870 to rush headlong into battle at the frontier". However another use of the 2 corps would be at the hinge -- between the northern armies and the troops on the Swiz border. If they had (or the Germans had built 2 - 6 more corps) ben utilized in reserve and attacked in flank the attacking French border armies this could have lead to another Sedan. IN fact the French attacking armies at the borders were almost cut off but the Germans had insufficient troops to accomplish this in this area.
1. Go through Netherlands (pinning the Brits to fight further to the channel) or
2. having the 2 corps for the race to the sea and gaining significant ground that would make the Allies position for resupply untenable and would have shortened war.
3. As was stated earlier if the corps could have moved up (Netherlands or on a delayed march from the rear ) then Kluck would not have feared the flank being open and then it would have been a close call as to who wins at Marne
Its a interesting statement of WW1 that the Shelif plan was developed, to paraphrase Shelif. " because the French will not be as accommodating as they were in 1870 to rush headlong into battle at the frontier". However another use of the 2 corps would be at the hinge -- between the northern armies and the troops on the Swiz border. If they had (or the Germans had built 2 - 6 more corps) ben utilized in reserve and attacked in flank the attacking French border armies this could have lead to another Sedan. IN fact the French attacking armies at the borders were almost cut off but the Germans had insufficient troops to accomplish this in this area.
jahenders
Banned
Not sending those divisions East, coupled with the Germans more faithfully following the planned route of attack, COULD have made the difference and gotten the Germans to France. The French and Brits were reeling and just a bit more pressure at critical points could have broken them.
Assuming they get to Paris, the plan is then to try to hammer the French field armies. At that point, the French probably either ask for terms or pull back South and fight on (probably the former). If France goes, then UK goes. If they go (and Russia's already having trouble against the Germans), Russia goes.
Assuming they get to Paris, the plan is then to try to hammer the French field armies. At that point, the French probably either ask for terms or pull back South and fight on (probably the former). If France goes, then UK goes. If they go (and Russia's already having trouble against the Germans), Russia goes.
This is close to my opinion (somel other posters seem to be ignoring the German logistical problems). If Guard Reserve Corps is used to close the gap between First and Second Armies then Seventh Army can be deployed on the right of First Army as originally intended.
Riain
Banned
I think Van Creveld shows that moving large German forces from the left wing to the right is very difficult, they could get trains to the German/Belgian border but would have to march the rest of the way without logistical support. However if the choice is an attempt at redeployment and the offensive on the left wing I'd go for redeployment, it won't win the Marne but might win the Race to the Sea, and holding the Pas De Calais could be enough for Germany to win the war.
Can you explain that?
More sea bases for the u-boats, screw up Entente logistics, deprive France from an economically important region and encircles Verdun.
Or at least I think so.
John Fredrick Parker
Donor
I think the idea behind von Kluck not exposing his right flank isn't that it wins the Battle of the Marne, but changes where and how the battle is fought -- if the German army makes it to Paris, while the French government goes with the initial plans of withdrawing to the south, then the French might well be more receptive to German armistice offers (assuming the latter don't push their luck). Even if the Germans advance is halted, if the battle happens in the suburbs of Paris, I think this would happen.
Riain
Banned
Can you explain that?
The way I see it WW1 was all about the balance of forces, holding the Pas de Calais area will upset the OTL balance of forces.
- It will require lower quality manpower and use less resources to hold the coast, the German guns will fire less, wear out less and use less shells than guns in OTL trench lines did
- It will allow the Germans to have a coast shipping route, mainly for warships
- It will make the narrows a battle zone for coastal guns, mining/sweeping, uboats and light naval forces, all this will preclude sending British merchant ships through to the Thames.
- Britain will have to devote a much larger force than OTL occupied Belgium to dominate this coast, I could imagine it being a major battle front at the expense of something else (THIS IS A BIG ONE)
- Supply lines to the BEF will be longer than OTL and consume more resources, again at the expense of something else
None of this and other things is glamorous, but WW1 wasn't won/lost with big naval battles and grand army sweeps, and the advantages tend to accrue to Germany to the detriment of Britain.
Except they did not. John Keegan notes in his book on World War 1 that Von Schlieffen's inability to figure out how to find the road space for the transport for two additional corps led him to despair over the prospects of the plan. The discrepancy was never really solved.
Plus didn't they outrun their supplies OTL? Having more forces only exasperates the problem. Once again a marvelous plan on paper fails the logistics test...
That's the information I was asking for.
Since the German planners apparently could not figure out routes for these units, then their being sent east probably didn't fatally compromise the right wing, as it's highly unlikely that they could've got forward anyway -- or, at least, they would've slowed down the rest of the advance if they did get forward, which still wrecks the timetable and gives France more time to send blocking forces north..
So, these corps could more profitably be used elsewhere; the trick is to have this alternate employment planned in advance, rather than shuffling them around at the last minute so that they aren't in place at the moment when they could've been used to best effect.
Frankly, they could've made a useful (though not decisive) difference almost anywhere they were placed (the East, the Ardennes, Alsace-Lorraine), but instead were wasted counter-marching about while the first battles were being fought.
It's quite a big advantage to the Germans having control of the Pas de Calais - and a significant disadvantage to the Entente - which is why the British fought so desperately to deny it to them. Wiking's incomplete Marne Without Moltke timeline takes a plausible look, I think, at how this could have been done, and what the consequences might have been - a good likelihood of a German victory in the West by 1916. The reasons Rian gives for this advantage are a decent summary. British cross-Channel logistics quickly become headache-inducing once they're forced back to shipping through Cherbourg and points further west. Likewise, as Wiking pointed out, the British must now keep more troops on the SE coast to reassure the civilian population, and divert more resources to coastal defenses - mines, guns, etc.
I think others here are correct to suggest that the two corps won't make the difference between success and failure of the Schlieffen Plan in the autumn of 1914. Those corps did have roads assigned to them, but the general staff's underestimation of the logistical issues remains. But if they're available on the German flank, they at least make for a less messy retreat for Kluck, and a much better situation for the German race for the ports.