Carrier development, during and post WWI- help
- Thread starter CarribeanViking
- Start date
).It would also help if the RN had begun to develop heavier than air aviation earlier.
A possible POD is the Report of the Esher Committee published in January 1909. It said that the Army and RN should do airships instead of aeroplanes, the result being HMA No. 1 The Mayfly.
IIRC Lord Esher changed his mind a few months after his report was published and said that he should have recommended that the Army and RN buy 40-50 aeroplanes for service trials.
The RFC (Naval Wing) later the RNAS was formed in 1912. A start in 1909 doesn't mean the RNAS of 1914 ITTL have aeroplanes or aircraft carrying ships as good as 1917 IOTL because the money needed wouldn't be available. However, would give the RN 3 extra years to develop the theory of naval aviation.
This POD is too late for the first flight from a British warship to be advanced by exactly 3 years (January 1912 to January 1909). But the Hermes trials could be brought forward from 1913 to 1910. The Ark Royal could be commissioned in 1912 instead of 1915. The purchase of the Campania could also be brought forward 3 years. It would also help if her sister ship the Lucania wasn't scrapped in 1909 so that she could be acquired too.
Whether that means the RN commissions its first flush deck aircraft carrier 3 years earlier is another matter.
A possible POD is the Report of the Esher Committee published in January 1909. It said that the Army and RN should do airships instead of aeroplanes, the result being HMA No. 1 The Mayfly.
IIRC Lord Esher changed his mind a few months after his report was published and said that he should have recommended that the Army and RN buy 40-50 aeroplanes for service trials.
The RFC (Naval Wing) later the RNAS was formed in 1912. A start in 1909 doesn't mean the RNAS of 1914 ITTL have aeroplanes or aircraft carrying ships as good as 1917 IOTL because the money needed wouldn't be available. However, would give the RN 3 extra years to develop the theory of naval aviation.
This POD is too late for the first flight from a British warship to be advanced by exactly 3 years (January 1912 to January 1909). But the Hermes trials could be brought forward from 1913 to 1910. The Ark Royal could be commissioned in 1912 instead of 1915. The purchase of the Campania could also be brought forward 3 years. It would also help if her sister ship the Lucania wasn't scrapped in 1909 so that she could be acquired too.
Whether that means the RN commissions its first flush deck aircraft carrier 3 years earlier is another matter.
I haven't looked for the source, but IIRC the Admiralty subsidised the construction of Campania and Lucania so that if required they could be requisitioned by the RN and used as armed merchant cruisers. Also the Cunard Line might be glad to be rid of her in 1911-12 if the Admiralty made them a decent offer.
Admittedly that does not fit in with the Wikipaedia article on RMS Campania which says her last commercial voyage was in September 1914 when was replaced by the RMS Aquitania.
However, not having these ships available in 1911-12 might be a good thing. It might strengthen the Admiralty's case to buy a purpose built ship with the Treasury.
Admittedly that does not fit in with the Wikipaedia article on RMS Campania which says her last commercial voyage was in September 1914 when was replaced by the RMS Aquitania.
However, not having these ships available in 1911-12 might be a good thing. It might strengthen the Admiralty's case to buy a purpose built ship with the Treasury.
Yes, I was in a foul mood about that; partly because I really am stuck, not so much on the tactics and technology as the behind the scenes shouting match and wrangling for budget that will determine what actually happens.
I'll reconstruct the post in a bit- much of it was a list of what happened in OTL as a jumping off point, no less than eleven small carriers, three large although two of them almost too late.
The abolition of the R class is a result of the major fleet action both sides were expecting early in the war- in my TL, it actually happens, the High Seas Fleet attempts to intercept the BEF on it's way to France.
As a result of the casualties there sustained, by both sides, the Grand Fleet emerges with less of a need to pad the battle line out and much more of a need for fast ships- the R class are no longer necessary, and it would make sense to have a couple more R BC's.
But the carriers- Beardmore's proposal, on wind tunnel testing, proved to be highly iffy, did it not? Turbulence behind the islands made it not a particularly wise proposition.
Given some interest, though, prewar exercises that go some distance to making it sound like a good idea, other conversions could be done- there are at least three ships, one rescuable from the breakers' yard for scrap value like Campania was, the Majestic of 1890, two new and not yet fully fitted out- liners Belgic and Alcantara, leaving 10CS with Alsatian for a flagship-
so in theory, the main event, the second large naval clash of the war (an attempt to break the Northern Blockade) could be attended by a full, four ship Carrier Battle Squadron, carrying sixty to seventy aircraft.
The Shorts 184 was in service at this date, had already been employed in torpedo attack in the mediterranean theatre, and made the bulk of Campania's air group in reality.
And after that, I start drooling uncontrollably. Discount the fighters and you're looking at quite a healthy carrier striking force, some fifty torpedo bombers. (I will get around to writing this up eventually, but suffice it to say that after the event, there will be another exhibit in Portsmouth Historic Dockyard.)
And then? The island style of Beardmore's is unlikely to be acceptable, but what happens to naval design and construction- of carriers and of the rest of the fleet? After the battle experience that would in our timeline only arrive in 1940, here twenty- four years early?
I have a head full of fog, and am trying not to be hopelessly overoptimistic about this.
Razee and convert some of the less useful older ships? the Monmouth class armoured cruisers were fast, reasonably long legged, and almost completely useless as gunships; but how expensive would such a conversion have been?
Build the hangar and flight deck on top of the existing structure, adding a deck, stripping the guns and using their space as a sort of U-shaped lower hangar level, for stores and parts and disassembled spare aircraft?
Come to think of it, at this point the I class dreadnought armoured cruisers, or at least the survivors, are probably no longer considered fit for the gun line.
Fisher's Follies? Would they even be completed as gunships at all, or be carriers from the beginning?
It is an excellent drawing, but the ship would have been a learning experience more than a combat vessel; historically, there is Campania, and with three others providing a mix of seaplane and landplane capability, it is an enormous leap forward that lands- where?
As tempting as it is to complete the G3's as carriers, it's a shade unlikely.
Oh, and thank you for bothering to reply, I'm just in a poor mood these days.
I'll reconstruct the post in a bit- much of it was a list of what happened in OTL as a jumping off point, no less than eleven small carriers, three large although two of them almost too late.
The abolition of the R class is a result of the major fleet action both sides were expecting early in the war- in my TL, it actually happens, the High Seas Fleet attempts to intercept the BEF on it's way to France.
As a result of the casualties there sustained, by both sides, the Grand Fleet emerges with less of a need to pad the battle line out and much more of a need for fast ships- the R class are no longer necessary, and it would make sense to have a couple more R BC's.
But the carriers- Beardmore's proposal, on wind tunnel testing, proved to be highly iffy, did it not? Turbulence behind the islands made it not a particularly wise proposition.
Given some interest, though, prewar exercises that go some distance to making it sound like a good idea, other conversions could be done- there are at least three ships, one rescuable from the breakers' yard for scrap value like Campania was, the Majestic of 1890, two new and not yet fully fitted out- liners Belgic and Alcantara, leaving 10CS with Alsatian for a flagship-
so in theory, the main event, the second large naval clash of the war (an attempt to break the Northern Blockade) could be attended by a full, four ship Carrier Battle Squadron, carrying sixty to seventy aircraft.
The Shorts 184 was in service at this date, had already been employed in torpedo attack in the mediterranean theatre, and made the bulk of Campania's air group in reality.
And after that, I start drooling uncontrollably. Discount the fighters and you're looking at quite a healthy carrier striking force, some fifty torpedo bombers. (I will get around to writing this up eventually, but suffice it to say that after the event, there will be another exhibit in Portsmouth Historic Dockyard.)
And then? The island style of Beardmore's is unlikely to be acceptable, but what happens to naval design and construction- of carriers and of the rest of the fleet? After the battle experience that would in our timeline only arrive in 1940, here twenty- four years early?
I have a head full of fog, and am trying not to be hopelessly overoptimistic about this.
Razee and convert some of the less useful older ships? the Monmouth class armoured cruisers were fast, reasonably long legged, and almost completely useless as gunships; but how expensive would such a conversion have been?
Build the hangar and flight deck on top of the existing structure, adding a deck, stripping the guns and using their space as a sort of U-shaped lower hangar level, for stores and parts and disassembled spare aircraft?
Come to think of it, at this point the I class dreadnought armoured cruisers, or at least the survivors, are probably no longer considered fit for the gun line.
Fisher's Follies? Would they even be completed as gunships at all, or be carriers from the beginning?
It is an excellent drawing, but the ship would have been a learning experience more than a combat vessel; historically, there is Campania, and with three others providing a mix of seaplane and landplane capability, it is an enormous leap forward that lands- where?
As tempting as it is to complete the G3's as carriers, it's a shade unlikely.
Oh, and thank you for bothering to reply, I'm just in a poor mood these days.
That's what I sometimes do in my Alt RN of the Great War essays.
It's rather convoluted, but the pre-war Beardmore design sort of evolved into the Hermes that was eventually built by them. With a POD in 1909 the Hermes might be laid down in January 1915 instead of January 1918.
The 3 follies were laid down in Apr, May and June 1915. So if you have a POD in 1909+an effective naval staff by middle 1900s+Fisher on the side of the aircraft carrier supporters if is possible that 3 larger and faster Hermes class might be built in place of Courageous, Glorious and Furious.
No, not at all, saves me having to remember what I typed.
With reference to HMA no.1 and the diversion to lighter than air- remember the Sea Scout class non- rigids? There were about a hundred and fifty of them, seventy thousand cubic foot capacity, plus forty and more under construction of the hundred and seventy thousand foot C (Coastal) Class. They played a major part in @ anyway, and their patrol endurance and presence is going to be hard to ignore or do without.
Now if only there was some way to sweep mines from them, but that may be technically unfeasible.
Anyway, rigid airships- I reckon there is a genuine window of opportunity for them, while they still have a competitive edge before being overtaken by advancing aviation, and that is about the first two thirds of the first world war. By the time you're looking at Albatros D.V's, Camels and SE.5a's, they're no longer worth the risk as weapons of war- and killing enemy scouts is going to be a major role for the fighter component of carrier aviation.
Non- rigids are light and cheap enough that they're worth the hazard, at least into the twenties. (There was an anecdote- one definition of blimp is said to come from "Two types of lighter than air craft; a)rigid and b)limp;" the other being that when you flick the fabric of an inflated nonrigid, it makes a noise like "blimp."
A Sea Scout based on a warship- how much of a hazard would that be? The hydrogen manufacturing plant, now that could go spectacularly wrong.
A though, for aircraft- seaplanes- based on gunships, on the battle line, it might be a better idea instead of carrying them on flying off platforms to treat them as ship's boats; seems a more reasonable extension of existing doctrine without paralysing half the main armament.
Part of the spotting top issue, their being in the wrong place, was to preserve existing arrangements for boat handling, though. Exactly the sort of misplaced priority that a staff system should serve to correct, although a little late in that specific case.
As far as I remember from DK Brown without looking it up, the wind tunnel trials on the Beardmore plan were done in 1917- actually during the war. Either that or 1922.
Campania was not, as said, the only ship going for scrap at the time; but anything obtained on those terms would have a short service life, being already nearly worn out, and be more than half experimental testbed to serve the next, newer-conversion or purpose built generation;
borrowing ships that would otherwise have been fitted out as AMC's for Tenth Cruiser Squadron seems a reasonable interim solution, how were those ships meant to be paid for anyway? There is time and energy being used on them in any case.
(What I actually had roughed out was one of the older ships completed as seaplane, one as landplane carrier, one each of the newer ships too; use the older ships as testbeds, scrap them at the end of the war, rebuild the newer hulls as necessary with the theories and ideas evolved from the older craft. Or is that too sensible?)
Rendering most of the R class unnecessary frees up yard space and workforce that could go to- many things, some of it to the carrier program, much of it to small craft and escorts more likely.
With reference to HMA no.1 and the diversion to lighter than air- remember the Sea Scout class non- rigids? There were about a hundred and fifty of them, seventy thousand cubic foot capacity, plus forty and more under construction of the hundred and seventy thousand foot C (Coastal) Class. They played a major part in @ anyway, and their patrol endurance and presence is going to be hard to ignore or do without.
Now if only there was some way to sweep mines from them, but that may be technically unfeasible.
Anyway, rigid airships- I reckon there is a genuine window of opportunity for them, while they still have a competitive edge before being overtaken by advancing aviation, and that is about the first two thirds of the first world war. By the time you're looking at Albatros D.V's, Camels and SE.5a's, they're no longer worth the risk as weapons of war- and killing enemy scouts is going to be a major role for the fighter component of carrier aviation.
Non- rigids are light and cheap enough that they're worth the hazard, at least into the twenties. (There was an anecdote- one definition of blimp is said to come from "Two types of lighter than air craft; a)rigid and b)limp;" the other being that when you flick the fabric of an inflated nonrigid, it makes a noise like "blimp."
A Sea Scout based on a warship- how much of a hazard would that be? The hydrogen manufacturing plant, now that could go spectacularly wrong.
A though, for aircraft- seaplanes- based on gunships, on the battle line, it might be a better idea instead of carrying them on flying off platforms to treat them as ship's boats; seems a more reasonable extension of existing doctrine without paralysing half the main armament.
Part of the spotting top issue, their being in the wrong place, was to preserve existing arrangements for boat handling, though. Exactly the sort of misplaced priority that a staff system should serve to correct, although a little late in that specific case.
As far as I remember from DK Brown without looking it up, the wind tunnel trials on the Beardmore plan were done in 1917- actually during the war. Either that or 1922.
Campania was not, as said, the only ship going for scrap at the time; but anything obtained on those terms would have a short service life, being already nearly worn out, and be more than half experimental testbed to serve the next, newer-conversion or purpose built generation;
borrowing ships that would otherwise have been fitted out as AMC's for Tenth Cruiser Squadron seems a reasonable interim solution, how were those ships meant to be paid for anyway? There is time and energy being used on them in any case.
(What I actually had roughed out was one of the older ships completed as seaplane, one as landplane carrier, one each of the newer ships too; use the older ships as testbeds, scrap them at the end of the war, rebuild the newer hulls as necessary with the theories and ideas evolved from the older craft. Or is that too sensible?)
Rendering most of the R class unnecessary frees up yard space and workforce that could go to- many things, some of it to the carrier program, much of it to small craft and escorts more likely.
If its of any use. This the aircraft carrier section from a Royal Navy in the Great War essay I started in October 2012.
I have the bare bones of a RN pre 1WW TL that has the DNC going the X4 Fast battleship route AFTER Dreadnought and Invincible
Basically they enter WW1 with More and faster battleships but only a handful of Battle Cruisers but more heavy light Cruisers earlier
With another pod giving the RN a heavier than air component earlier I can see a "Float plane Support Cruiser" being developed to support Cruiser Squadrons by operating amphibian Aircraft and then later being adapted as OTL but 3 years earlier to operate fixed wing ---- or something along those line
Basically they enter WW1 with More and faster battleships but only a handful of Battle Cruisers but more heavy light Cruisers earlier
With another pod giving the RN a heavier than air component earlier I can see a "Float plane Support Cruiser" being developed to support Cruiser Squadrons by operating amphibian Aircraft and then later being adapted as OTL but 3 years earlier to operate fixed wing ---- or something along those line
Circa 1910, Blimps were the best choice for naval patrol aircraft. They served the same role as picket ships, warning they the Grand Fleet of approaching enemy vessels.
Blimps were viable long-range patrol aircraft until 1960. The USN flew them over convoys during WW2 and U-boats soon learned that they had to stay submerged - or die - any time WALLY aircraft flew over convoys. It took until 1944 for fixed wing (B-24 Liberator bombers) to close the mid-Atlantic gap. Until 1960, the USN flew a fleet of radar-equipped, blimps to track Russian submarines in the mid-Atlantic Ocean. The mid-Atlantic gap
Was eventually closed by a combination of hydrophones, attack submarines, P-3 patrol planes and satellites.
As for mine-sweeping ... there were a few experiments with blimps pulling mine-sweeping gear. I wonder if blimps had sufficient horsepower to pull mine-sweeping gear into a strong wind.
More recently, heavy helicopters (Sikorsky CH-53 and Mi-17) have worked as mine-sweepers. Heavy-lift helicopters make good mine-sweepers because of their massive engines. CH-53 was developed as an enclosed cabin version of the Sikorsky Skycrane and every successive version has more powerful engines.
If we are speculating, I would like to see a through-deck carrier or angled flight deck much earlier. POD a commercial carrier is converted to an aircraft carrier, but because of space restrictions, she has two elevators installed outboard. The first elevator is amidships on the port side and the second elevator is outboard of the starboard stern. Fear of the crash net/barrier sees pilots "cheating" landings to the port side of the deck.
Airplanes that have just landed-on are man-handled to the starboard side of the forecastle to clear the deck quickly. During a re-fit, her arrestor cables are re-aligned to match the angled landing-deck. Without the do-or-die threat of an arrestor/crash net, pilots' stress levels would reduce when landing-on. As long as you had enough space alongside the landing strip (to secure airplanes that had just landed) you would only need a crash net for emergencies.
Blimps were viable long-range patrol aircraft until 1960. The USN flew them over convoys during WW2 and U-boats soon learned that they had to stay submerged - or die - any time WALLY aircraft flew over convoys. It took until 1944 for fixed wing (B-24 Liberator bombers) to close the mid-Atlantic gap. Until 1960, the USN flew a fleet of radar-equipped, blimps to track Russian submarines in the mid-Atlantic Ocean. The mid-Atlantic gap
Was eventually closed by a combination of hydrophones, attack submarines, P-3 patrol planes and satellites.
As for mine-sweeping ... there were a few experiments with blimps pulling mine-sweeping gear. I wonder if blimps had sufficient horsepower to pull mine-sweeping gear into a strong wind.
More recently, heavy helicopters (Sikorsky CH-53 and Mi-17) have worked as mine-sweepers. Heavy-lift helicopters make good mine-sweepers because of their massive engines. CH-53 was developed as an enclosed cabin version of the Sikorsky Skycrane and every successive version has more powerful engines.
If we are speculating, I would like to see a through-deck carrier or angled flight deck much earlier. POD a commercial carrier is converted to an aircraft carrier, but because of space restrictions, she has two elevators installed outboard. The first elevator is amidships on the port side and the second elevator is outboard of the starboard stern. Fear of the crash net/barrier sees pilots "cheating" landings to the port side of the deck.
Airplanes that have just landed-on are man-handled to the starboard side of the forecastle to clear the deck quickly. During a re-fit, her arrestor cables are re-aligned to match the angled landing-deck. Without the do-or-die threat of an arrestor/crash net, pilots' stress levels would reduce when landing-on. As long as you had enough space alongside the landing strip (to secure airplanes that had just landed) you would only need a crash net for emergencies.
Potential POD's
The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 – 1945, Guy Robbins
Page 13
Samson duly flew off the forecastle of the old battleship Africa in Sheerness harbour on 10th January 1912. His aeroplane (a Short 538) was equipped with pontoons attached to the wheels for emergency tough-down on the sea. As a result Seuter and Rear Admiral E C T Troubridge, Chief of the War Staff, suggested trials in four cruisers of the Home Fleet before issuing two machines per warship in the fleet. Further experiments involved flying-off from cruiser’s deck at sea and while underway at 10 ½ kts.
Unlike Ely, however, Samson never attempted to follow up these experiments (taking off) by flying onto a ship despite having a technique proposed for doing so. In December 1911 Lieutenant H A Williamson, a submariner, forwarded a proposal to the Admiralty to convert existing warships, or even to build a new carrier, to launch and retrieve aeroplanes for fleet anti-submarine duties. This design was rejected by Samson as too complicated, but primarily because he had decided to develop seaplanes. He considered flying onto a ship too dangerous for fast machines and unnecessary for seaplanes.
The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 – 1945, Guy Robbins
Page 15
Churchill authorised the conversion of a merchant ship, but sufficient funds were unavailable in the 1912/1913 Estimates and the Treasury refused any extra. Sueter therefore secured permission to prepare the old cruiser Hermes for seaplane experiments and proposed in December, that Beardsmores build a 15kt carrier (a variant of their original design) to pioneer flying (seaplanes) from her deck. She was to become a depot ship for destroyers once she had gained data for the fleet carrier.
The Board refused permission to build her since Churchill had ruled against any more depot ships and they required proof of the feasibility of seaplanes at sea plus further design work due to the invention by Shorts of folding seaplanes. Another factor was that the Air department had already spent £0.5 million on restarting the airship programme.
The Grand Fleet, D K Brown
Page 74
There were several trials between 1903 and 1908 when the Admiralty decided that kites as then known had little to offer – there is a note by Brown ‘It is interesting that the problem of the disturbed air behind the funnels and superstructure was already apparent.’
Page 75
There were two proposals for aviation ships in 1913, Admiral Mark Kerr suggesting a purpose built ‘true’ carrier while the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, had a less ambitious scheme. He wanted to convert an Eclipse class cruiser, removing the main mast and building a landing platform aft with a take-off platform forward. Special cranes would lift planes from one deck to the other. In the event, an even more limited scheme was adopted – this was the conversion of the cruiser Hermes.
Ader wrote a book on military aviation in 1909 which contained his proposal. Here is the wiki article on the book:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L'Aviation_Militaire
"L'Aviation Militaire" is especially famous for its precise description of the concept of the modern aircraft carrier with a flat flight deck, an island superstructure, deck elevators and a hangar bay.
On the structure of the aircraft carrier:
"An airplane-carrying vessel is indispensable. These vessels will be constructed on a plan very different from what is currently used. First of all the deck will be cleared of all obstacles. It will be flat, as wide as possible without jeopardizing the nautical lines of the hull, and it will look like a landing field."
—Military Aviation, p35
On stowage:
"Of necessity, the airplanes will be stowed below decks; they would be solidly fixed anchored to their bases, each in its place, so they would not be affected with the pitching and rolling. Access to this lower decks would be by an elevator sufficiently long and wide to hold an airplane with its wings folded. A large, sliding trap would cover the hole in the deck, and it would have waterproof joints, so that neither rain nor seawater, from heavy seas could penetrate below."
—Military Aviation, p36
On the technique of landing:
"The ship will be headed straight into the wind, the stern clear, but a padded bulwark set up forward in case the airplane should run past the stop line"
—Military Aviation, p37
The book received much attention, and the US Naval Attaché in Paris sent a report on his observations, before actual experiments took place in the United States a year later[1]
[FONT="]"L'Aviation Militaire" was translated into English by Lee Kennett under the title "Military Aviation" (for Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, 2003, ISBN 1-58566-118-X). [/FONT][FONT="]
[/FONT]
The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 – 1945, Guy Robbins
Page 13
Samson duly flew off the forecastle of the old battleship Africa in Sheerness harbour on 10th January 1912. His aeroplane (a Short 538) was equipped with pontoons attached to the wheels for emergency tough-down on the sea. As a result Seuter and Rear Admiral E C T Troubridge, Chief of the War Staff, suggested trials in four cruisers of the Home Fleet before issuing two machines per warship in the fleet. Further experiments involved flying-off from cruiser’s deck at sea and while underway at 10 ½ kts.
Unlike Ely, however, Samson never attempted to follow up these experiments (taking off) by flying onto a ship despite having a technique proposed for doing so. In December 1911 Lieutenant H A Williamson, a submariner, forwarded a proposal to the Admiralty to convert existing warships, or even to build a new carrier, to launch and retrieve aeroplanes for fleet anti-submarine duties. This design was rejected by Samson as too complicated, but primarily because he had decided to develop seaplanes. He considered flying onto a ship too dangerous for fast machines and unnecessary for seaplanes.
The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 – 1945, Guy Robbins
Page 15
Churchill authorised the conversion of a merchant ship, but sufficient funds were unavailable in the 1912/1913 Estimates and the Treasury refused any extra. Sueter therefore secured permission to prepare the old cruiser Hermes for seaplane experiments and proposed in December, that Beardsmores build a 15kt carrier (a variant of their original design) to pioneer flying (seaplanes) from her deck. She was to become a depot ship for destroyers once she had gained data for the fleet carrier.
The Board refused permission to build her since Churchill had ruled against any more depot ships and they required proof of the feasibility of seaplanes at sea plus further design work due to the invention by Shorts of folding seaplanes. Another factor was that the Air department had already spent £0.5 million on restarting the airship programme.
The Grand Fleet, D K Brown
Page 74
There were several trials between 1903 and 1908 when the Admiralty decided that kites as then known had little to offer – there is a note by Brown ‘It is interesting that the problem of the disturbed air behind the funnels and superstructure was already apparent.’
Page 75
There were two proposals for aviation ships in 1913, Admiral Mark Kerr suggesting a purpose built ‘true’ carrier while the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, had a less ambitious scheme. He wanted to convert an Eclipse class cruiser, removing the main mast and building a landing platform aft with a take-off platform forward. Special cranes would lift planes from one deck to the other. In the event, an even more limited scheme was adopted – this was the conversion of the cruiser Hermes.
Ader wrote a book on military aviation in 1909 which contained his proposal. Here is the wiki article on the book:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L'Aviation_Militaire
"L'Aviation Militaire" is especially famous for its precise description of the concept of the modern aircraft carrier with a flat flight deck, an island superstructure, deck elevators and a hangar bay.
On the structure of the aircraft carrier:
"An airplane-carrying vessel is indispensable. These vessels will be constructed on a plan very different from what is currently used. First of all the deck will be cleared of all obstacles. It will be flat, as wide as possible without jeopardizing the nautical lines of the hull, and it will look like a landing field."
—Military Aviation, p35
On stowage:
"Of necessity, the airplanes will be stowed below decks; they would be solidly fixed anchored to their bases, each in its place, so they would not be affected with the pitching and rolling. Access to this lower decks would be by an elevator sufficiently long and wide to hold an airplane with its wings folded. A large, sliding trap would cover the hole in the deck, and it would have waterproof joints, so that neither rain nor seawater, from heavy seas could penetrate below."
—Military Aviation, p36
On the technique of landing:
"The ship will be headed straight into the wind, the stern clear, but a padded bulwark set up forward in case the airplane should run past the stop line"
—Military Aviation, p37
The book received much attention, and the US Naval Attaché in Paris sent a report on his observations, before actual experiments took place in the United States a year later[1]
[FONT="]"L'Aviation Militaire" was translated into English by Lee Kennett under the title "Military Aviation" (for Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, 2003, ISBN 1-58566-118-X). [/FONT][FONT="]
[/FONT]
Something I have wondered about a few times is what could have been done with the depot ship Vulcan (probably only seaplanes) or with the Protected Cruisers Powerful and Terrible - Friedman does mention in a footnote that Armoured Cruisers of the Drake class were looked at for potential seaplane carrier conversion.
What I would want to know is - could you trunk the funnels of Powerful/Terrible to one side and put a full length flight deck over a hanger on the existing hull?
What I would want to know is - could you trunk the funnels of Powerful/Terrible to one side and put a full length flight deck over a hanger on the existing hull?
The issue with fast battleships is that nobody had quite understood, by 1914, how useful high speed was going to be; machinery was expensive, the fuel to feed into the machinery was a major factor in the size and cost of the hull of the ship-
in general, the battle line's 21 knots seemed adequate to the task, and only major increases on that- to 25 knots or better- seemed to matter very much; and that could only be achieved at such an increase in size and cost that either corners would have to be cut, elsewhere- battlecruiser armour, ahem-
or no corners cut, in which case the ships involved would be highly expensive and at a severe disadvantage in that they would always be fighting against odds.
Consider; one Admiral class was the cost equivalent of two and a half, more or less, QE class. It does make sense not to push it too far; greater performance was possible, but it rapidly encountered diminishing economic returns- an Admiral, or two, against their cost equivalent in QE's would be a desperately uneven and almost certainly losing fight.
Prewar fast battleships are unlikely, even although they were contemplated, because the disadvantages seemed to outweigh the advantages.
Genuine changes in technology- like the three knots Dreadnought gained over her contemporaries by moving to turbines, or the (intended) four knots the QE's gained over the rest of the dreadnought line by moving to oil firing, yes, by all means, take advantage of that; but just piling on more of the same, overdeveloping existing technology, is a good way to find oneself at odds of five to two against.
In practise, and in the AH I really must get along with, the decisive driver turns out to be torpedoes- a battlecruiser can move quickly and handily enough as to comb torpedo fire and bring her guns to bear in circumstances that a battleship would have to turn away from or accept the probability of being hit. In an odd way Fisher may have been right; speed is armour, at least against that.
The R BC's would be urgently needed primarily to replace losses, though.
Blimps- the Sea Scouts and Coastals had early aero engines, types obsolete in heavier than air aircraft; 75 and 100hp motors in 1917-18, when Rolls-Royce was bringing 200hp fighter and 350hp bomber engines into service.
Now that I pay attention to the numbers, it's unlikely that they could make much headway into the wind, not towing minesweeping gear- and shades of ASDIC, the RN did not think mines were going to be much of a problem in the war in 1914, because they had sweeping technology, it was a solved issue. Oops.
A blimp design based around the Rolls-Royce Eagle or Sunbeam Cossack would be a different beast- possible, but different; but there was ferocious competition for those engines, not least from the heavy bombers.
the surface raider problem turned out to be far less serious than previously expected, and the patrolling cruisers and armed merchant cruisers less urgently required; the northern blockade kept the best and let the rest go for troopships. I would consider those ships to be available, from october-november 1914 anyway; question then becomes of they would be any good.
the extempore carriers- all eleven of them- did serve, to some effect; but seaplane recovery is bloody hard work and leaves a ship hove to in potentially hostile waters for extended periods, so landing on is much safer for the ship, which does argue for a proper flat top.
in general, the battle line's 21 knots seemed adequate to the task, and only major increases on that- to 25 knots or better- seemed to matter very much; and that could only be achieved at such an increase in size and cost that either corners would have to be cut, elsewhere- battlecruiser armour, ahem-
or no corners cut, in which case the ships involved would be highly expensive and at a severe disadvantage in that they would always be fighting against odds.
Consider; one Admiral class was the cost equivalent of two and a half, more or less, QE class. It does make sense not to push it too far; greater performance was possible, but it rapidly encountered diminishing economic returns- an Admiral, or two, against their cost equivalent in QE's would be a desperately uneven and almost certainly losing fight.
Prewar fast battleships are unlikely, even although they were contemplated, because the disadvantages seemed to outweigh the advantages.
Genuine changes in technology- like the three knots Dreadnought gained over her contemporaries by moving to turbines, or the (intended) four knots the QE's gained over the rest of the dreadnought line by moving to oil firing, yes, by all means, take advantage of that; but just piling on more of the same, overdeveloping existing technology, is a good way to find oneself at odds of five to two against.
In practise, and in the AH I really must get along with, the decisive driver turns out to be torpedoes- a battlecruiser can move quickly and handily enough as to comb torpedo fire and bring her guns to bear in circumstances that a battleship would have to turn away from or accept the probability of being hit. In an odd way Fisher may have been right; speed is armour, at least against that.
The R BC's would be urgently needed primarily to replace losses, though.
Blimps- the Sea Scouts and Coastals had early aero engines, types obsolete in heavier than air aircraft; 75 and 100hp motors in 1917-18, when Rolls-Royce was bringing 200hp fighter and 350hp bomber engines into service.
Now that I pay attention to the numbers, it's unlikely that they could make much headway into the wind, not towing minesweeping gear- and shades of ASDIC, the RN did not think mines were going to be much of a problem in the war in 1914, because they had sweeping technology, it was a solved issue. Oops.
A blimp design based around the Rolls-Royce Eagle or Sunbeam Cossack would be a different beast- possible, but different; but there was ferocious competition for those engines, not least from the heavy bombers.
the surface raider problem turned out to be far less serious than previously expected, and the patrolling cruisers and armed merchant cruisers less urgently required; the northern blockade kept the best and let the rest go for troopships. I would consider those ships to be available, from october-november 1914 anyway; question then becomes of they would be any good.
the extempore carriers- all eleven of them- did serve, to some effect; but seaplane recovery is bloody hard work and leaves a ship hove to in potentially hostile waters for extended periods, so landing on is much safer for the ship, which does argue for a proper flat top.