WI: Stalin attacks in the south in Summer 1942

In OTL, Stalin attacked both in the Leningrad and Rhzev fronts, allowing the Germans to build up a quantitative superiority in men in Ukraine and ultimately the Stalingrad front.

What if Stalin decided that the liberation of Kharkov and ultimately Ukraine was a higher priority, and earmarked men that would have otherwise been used to conduct offensives in other fronts to take part in a southern strategy.

Meanwhile, the Germans mistakenly assume that Russian failures in May mean that they won't have significant force to prevent a German strike in the south. So, they move ahead with Case Blue after the fall of the Crimea.

What happens when the Germans run into a lot more Russians than they expected and vice versa?
 
Umm... they did decide to launch an offensive in the South. That was basically what 2nd Kharkov and the bungled offensives out of the Kerch beachhead was. The resulting destruction of Soviet troops left the Bryansk, Southern and Southwestern fronts with too little forces to mount an effective defense on the Oskel-Torets-Miuz line. A better question is what if Stalin, correctly realizing that the indecisive results of the January-March campaign means the Germans are not as finished as he thought, doesn't go on the offensive and instead play the defensive while the Soviets build-up overwhelming strength. Without the losses of 2nd Kharkov, the Soviets could build up a formidable defense-in-depth (although not as formidable as Kursk, in this case, only half-the-depth) while digging in on the thin neck of the Kerch peninsula (instead of trying to charge out onto the open terrain of central Crimea) would radically increase the time and cost the Germans suffer to take it, delaying the fall of Sevastopol in the process.
 
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Umm... they did decide to launch an offensive in the South. That was basically what 2nd Kharkov and the bungled offensives out of the Kerch beachhead was. The resulting destruction of Soviet troops left the Bryansk, Southern and Southwestern fronts with too little forces to mount an effective defense on the Oskel-Torets-Miuz line. A better question is what if Stalin, correctly realizing that the indecisive results of the January-March campaign means the Germans are not as finished as he thought, doesn't go on the offensive and instead play the defensive while the Soviets build-up overwhelming strength. Without the losses of 2nd Kharkov, the Soviets could build up a formidable defense-in-depth (although not as formidable as Kursk, in this case, only half-the-depth) while digging in on the thin neck of the Kerch peninsula (instead of trying to charge out onto the open terrain of central Crimea) would radically increase the time and cost the Germans suffer to take it, delaying the fall of Sevastopol in the process.

The POD is essentially after the May offensive, though. Stalin still built up for attacks on other fronts. The question is what if he didn't, and focused on the south after May?

In effect, Stalin anticipates that there will be no attack on Moscow and thinks the siege on Leningrad cannot be lifted, so he thinks the south will bring him better ROI.
 
So basically the POD is that Stalin responds to 2nd Kharkov by cancelling the Rzhev-Sychyovka offensive in favor of trying for a new offensive in the south? Well, the Soviet offensive obviously won't be ready in time before Blau starts. Rzhev-Sychyovka wasn't ready to go until July 30th and the necessity of transferring forces south is going to impose additional delays. But the presence of all those forces drawn from the STAVKA reserve deployed behind the Soviet front-lines is going to give the Soviet lines in the south a lot of depth and manpower they lacked IOTL after 2nd Kharkov imploded.

The Germans can still breakthrough, but they are going to exhaust themselves doing so and may not have the strength to exploit it, in which case the breakthrough gets bottled back up. Alternatively, they still have the strength to exploit the breakthrough, but nowhere near as fast as they did IOTL (as a rule, the longer and harder the breakthrough the tougher it will be to exploit it). The Soviets would have plenty of time to set-up a new defensive line along the Don and Donets . The Germans would basically be denied entry to the Caucasus.
 
So basically the POD is that Stalin responds to 2nd Kharkov by cancelling the Rzhev-Sychyovka offensive in favor of trying for a new offensive in the south? Well, the Soviet offensive obviously won't be ready in time before Blau starts but the presence of all those forces drawn from the STAVKA reserve deployed behind the Soviet front-lines is going to give the Soviet lines in the south a lot of depth and manpower they lacked IOTL after 2nd Kharkov imploded.

The Germans can still breakthrough, but they are going to exhaust themselves doing so and may not have the strength to exploit it, in which case the breakthrough gets bottled back up. Alternatively, they still have the strength to exploit the breakthrough, but nowhere near as fast as they did IOTL (as a rule, the longer and harder the breakthrough the tougher it will be to exploit it). The Soviets would have plenty of time to set-up a new defensive line along the Don.

So, would the Germans get to the Don itself and and cross pass Rostov opposite of Kerch by the winter, or does the 300-500,000 men make the difference in this situation?

Does Operation Nordlicht still go through or does it get canned? Without the USSR attacking AGC during the First Rzhev–Sychyovka Offensive Operation, does the operation (whose name I don't know) go ahead to close the gap between Belev and Juchnoff as originally planned? I presume the Russians had more than enough men to repulse it?
 
So, would the Germans get to the Don itself

Possibly. They might even be able to force the Donetz river east of Voroshilovgrad, in which case they could make it as far east as the Chir-Tsymla line, maybe even the Don bend, but that would be as far as the could get and the result be one tempting salient for the Soviets to hit come winter.

and and cross pass Rostov opposite of Kerch by the winter,
No. Soviet defenses along the Don would be too tough. IOTL, the Germans were able to do so because the Soviets didn't have the time or forces to set-up a line on the river so the Germans were able to cross it off the march. ITTL, neither is the case. Trying to cross into the Caucasus via Kerch without an advance from the north is a recipe for getting bottled up at the Kuban river near Temryuk.

Without the losses and overextension at Stalingrad, though, the Soviet winter offensive in 1942 is going to be an absolute slugfest. Both sides will ultimately be stronger and this will translate into the Germans being driven back and suffering losses they can't afford (if less so then IOTL), but avoiding major encirclements.

Does Operation Nordlicht still go through or does it get canned?
Probably still goes through. 11th Army was already on it's way to Leningrad by the time Blau started and it would take even more time to try and turn it around.

Without the USSR attacking AGC during the First Rzhev–Sychyovka Offensive Operation, does the operation (whose name I don't know) go ahead to close the gap between Belev and Juchnoff as originally planned?
Probably not, the Germans simply didn't have the forces for it. They'll have to settle for destroying the Vladimirskoe grouping in Operation Seydlitz.

I presume the Russians had more than enough men to repulse it?
Given the terrain in the area, yes. I'm looking at an awful lot of swamps and heavy forests.
 
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Possibly. They might even be able to force the Donetz river east of Voroshilovgrad, in which case they could make it as far east as the Chir-Tsymla line, maybe even the Don bend, but that would be as far as the could get and the result be one tempting salient for the Soviets to hit come winter.

Would it be defensively easier to hold with better logisitics? Further, would the Germans be more apt to withdraw from the middle of nowhere?

No. Soviet defenses along the Don would be too tough.

So, the Soviets remain an ever-present threat to the Crimea then.

Without the losses and overextension at Stalingrad, though, the Soviet winter offensive in 1942 is going to be an absolute slugfest.

Well, the Germans will be worn by fighting so their numbers will be depleted, though not decimated. Nonetheless, the Russians will qualitatively out number the Germans by a crap ton. The Germans will have to withdraw, though this might make the "backhand blow" more devestating as they will be in a beter position to do it and will have not lost half their heavy equipment.

Probably still goes through. 11th Army was already on it's way to Leningrad by the time Blau started and it would take even more time to try and turn it around.

It would be far too little to do anything, right? WOuldn't the army get decimated against entrenched defenders?

Probably not, the Germans simply didn't have the forces for it. They'll have to settle for destroying the Vladimirskoe grouping in Operation Seydlitz.

SO, do they call it off or is it in effect a big Russian victory?
 
Would it be defensively easier to hold with better logisitics? Further, would the Germans be more apt to withdraw from the middle of nowhere?

Yes and possibly yes. Although given Hitler's frequently irrational contempt towards giving up land, regardless of it's value, I qualified the latter statement. I could easily imagine him issuing a no withdrawal order with the justification that holding the Don-line would keep the Soviets away from the Donbass or some such nonsense. It should be observed, though, that even if he issues a "hold at all costs" order, there were points later in the war where German generals disobeyed those kinds of orders and didn't suffer for it.

Well, the Germans will be worn by fighting so their numbers will be depleted, though not decimated. Nonetheless, the Russians will qualitatively out number the Germans by a crap ton.
Agreed.

The Germans will have to withdraw, though this might make the "backhand blow" more devestating as they will be in a beter position to do it and will have not lost half their heavy equipment.
The flipside is that the Soviets are also in a better position to receive the backhand blow. IOTL, it was launched against a force which had strung itself out and pushed far beyond their railheads in the wholesale rush for the D'niepr. ITTL, the Soviet winter offensive will probably be more akin to Operation Suvorov/Orel then either Operation Star/3rd Kharkov or Operation Rumyanstev/4th Kharkov, albeit somewhat more favorable to the Germans. We're looking at the Soviets steadily pushing the Germans back from one defense line to another here instead of a more straightforward breakthrough-exploitation attempt.

On the whole, this is a POD has the odd effect of being better for both sides: they will still take heavy losses, but the Soviets avoid the decimating losses in both military and economic terms of summer 1942 and the Germans avoid the over-extension and decimating military losses at Stalingrad during the autumn. The war will still tip in the Soviets favor, but it will be more of a steady slide rather then the abrupt reversal of IOTL.

Well, assuming the Germans aren't still overstretched enough that they have to give a notable portion of the line over to one of their Axis minor allies. If they do, then you can bet the Soviets will hone in on that weakpoint like a magnet.

It would be far too little to do anything, right? WOuldn't the army get decimated against entrenched defenders?
In all probability it gets cancelled by a Soviet offensive designed to pre-empt and deflect it, like it was IOTL.

So, do they call it off or is it in effect a big Russian victory?
Likely call it off.
 
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