Book I - Fading Glory and Class Wars: The Rise of Socialist Britain
Chapter I
A Tale of Two Conferences
The Imperial Conference of 1921 was the first since the end of the Great War, and the first to see the replacement of the Imperial War Cabinet that had emerged as a system to manage and coordinate the British Empire’s herculean war effort. The Conference met in London with delegations from the dominions and India. Chief among the issues that were to be discussed was the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. This issue arose following the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference and was a major concern for British and Dominion policy makers.
At the two extremes of the debate were William ‘Billy’ Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia and Arthur Meighen, the Prime Minister of Canada. Hughes was deeply concerned about the possibility of a hostile Japan in the Pacific. To Hughes, the only logical solution to avoiding a conflict with Japan was to strengthen the alliance with Tokyo and exert a benign influence on Japan to maintain British and dominion interests. To Hughes and the Australian Government, the alliance with Japan was crucial to securing peace in the region. At stake was the security of Australia and New Zealand, along with British possessions in the Far East and Pacific. The spat became increasingly ugly between the Canadians and Australians and soon spilled out into the public domain, taken up with keen interest by the press across the British Empire. Pro and anti-Japanese articles featured heavily, with the Australian press split between supporting British interests and conversely painting the Japanese as the yellow peril that would swamp Australia.
Meighen on the other hand was not so much anti-Japanese as viewing the United States as a more natural ally than Japan. His pro-American views were deeply held and he was concerned that the British Empire could become entangled in a future Japanese-American war, as competing Japanese and American interests in the Pacific began to increase tensions between the two powers. Meighen responded that the United States could respond unfavourably with trade and economic impositions against the British Empire which would disproportionately affect Canada. In a complicated game of trade, tariff and financial bluff and counter-bluff between the British and other dominion delegates, they calculated that the United States would not retaliate in this way. Indeed, there were elements within the wider British Imperial polity that would have welcomed American protectionism as an excuse to increase British tariffs and introduce an ‘imperial preference’ scheme to protect their own economies. However, Prime Minister Lloyd George was quick to silence such talk as the issue of free trade could potentially rupture the increasingly fragile Coalition irrevocably.
The three key men in the 1921 Imperial Conference debate: (l to r) William Hughes (Australia), David Lloyd George (Britain), Arthur Meighen (Canada).
Despite this divisive issue that was threatening the much desired image of imperial unity, Meighen failed to convince the rest of the Imperial Conference that the alliance with Japan needed to be abandoned. However, the British Government did take note of Canada’s concerns regarding the United States and dispatched the venerable Lord Grey, the former British ambassador to the United States, to Washington to support the then Ambassador Auckland Campbell-Geddes in giving the strongest reassurances that the alliance would not harm Anglo-American relations and that the British would have a moderating influence on Japanese policy. Although concerned about the growth of Japanese influence in the Pacific, President Harding was convinced by Lord Grey that the best way to contain Japan was for it to be aligned with the British Empire.
The ramifications of the decision to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance, without radical change for another ten years would have an impact around the world – one that would soon be felt at the Naval Conference in Washington.
The Washington Naval Conference began on 12 November 1921, three years and a day after the guns fell silent on the Western Front. The conference began with nine nations in attendance that had interests in the Pacific and Far East; the United States, Japan, China, France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal. The conference began with the spirit of avoiding the ruinous naval race between the victorious powers – primarily the United States, Great Britain and Japan, all of whom were already launching ambitious new post-war naval building programs. Yet the harried calls for disarmament were to be in vain.
The reasons for the failure of the treaty were many. The first and most obvious was the unwillingness of the Japanese to agree to nothing less than parity in any agreement. Despite the American’s ability to read the Japanese diplomatic cables through the efforts of The Cypher Bureau, it proved of little value to the negotiating team as the instructions from Tokyo were to accept parity in any agreement with the United States as the lowest acceptable agreement. This was partly out of the national desire to be seen and treated as equals on the international stage – as well as the reinforcement from the Anglo-Japanese alliance which had just been renewed. The second reason followed on from the first – that any agreement would be useless without the participation of the Japanese – who were the third major power in the Far East. Politically, the American negotiators led by the Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes were unable to accept Japanese equality in capital ships as the Congress would never ratify such a treaty. This placed them in an impossible position as they failed to restrict the Japanese and at the same time, could not secure limitations which made the Congress wary of unrestricted naval spending. This seemingly contradictory stance was the product of the emerging isolationist sentiment in the United States.
The failure to reach an agreement on naval limitations and reductions was a bitter blow to those seeking disarmament. However the negotiations in Washington were not a wholly wasted effort. Two separate treaties did emerge from the conference – the so called ‘Four-Power’ and ‘Nine-Power’ treaties. The Four-Power Treaty between The British, French, Japanese and United States cemented an agreement that the great powers would maintain the status quo in the Pacific by respecting existing interests and territorial arrangements. The Four-Power treaty also went some ways in mollifying the concerns of the United States over the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Nine-Power Treaty reaffirmed the ‘open door’ policy in China along with confirming the status quo of the major power’s interests in that country. So although the Washington Naval Conference did not result in the desired treaty on arms reductions, it did resolve some of the potential problems arising in Pacific and Far East.
Despite this, the fallout from the failure of the conference was considerable. Although the British were reluctant to continue a full building program, there would be much effort thrown into maintaining British pride and obligations in the face of foreign competition. However this paled in comparison to the rivalry between the Japanese and the Americans. For the Japanese it was a question of national pride and honour. For the American’s, it was about reassuring their place in the Pacific and ensuring that the Japanese could not challenge their position in any future conflict – despite the assurances of both the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Four-Power Treaty.
In the post war environment, the Imperial Japanese Navy had settled on the financially crippling Eight-Eight program which would continue unmolested in its implementation until the destruction wrought on the islands during the 1923 Kanto earthquake. The earthquake was a terrible national disaster and did halt for the immediate time further naval construction, as much needed resources and manpower were directed towards reconstruction. The aim of the Eight-Eight program was to provide for two modern eight ship battle squadrons complimented with older capital ships in support. For Japan, the apparent failure in Washington was viewed as a success for the Japanese policy of remaining at parity with its main strategic foe in the Pacific, the United States. With construction already well under way of two Tosa Class battleships, four ships of a more advanced design were laid down in the shipyards of Japan – the Amagi class battlecruisers. Indeed hopeful Japanese planners were already preparing a follow up design to these as well in the form of the Kii Class, however the Diet of Japan was slowing the rate of funding available to the navy which was approaching nearly a third of the entire government’s budget. Nevertheless the Japanese pressed ahead, and as soon as yard space was available, the first of the four Kii’s was laid down. By the time of the 1923 earthquake which caused so much devastation in the country claimed one more victim - one of the yet unnamed Kii class as a total constructive loss in its yard. The partially completed hull, twisted, stressed and broken by the tremors, was quick to feel the harsh heat of the cutters torch as it was cut up for scrap. The massive program however did come at the expense of the proposed cruiser program which was abandoned and smaller vessels such as destroyers which received far less attention as well.
In response, the United States continued, if not at the same break-neck pace, but with a similar determination in its own building program. The impressive (although not as technically advanced as the British G3s) South Dakota class battleships were powerful warships capable of matching any of the new Japanese designs. The United States was planning on no less than six of these 43,000 ton floating beasts, along with a revised construction of six Lexington class battlecruisers. The latter class however would soon fall victim to the increasing isolationist views of the United States Congress, with only three being laid down to their original designs, a further two converted to cheaper aircraft carriers and the last of the class scrapped on the slipway with little work completed on her. The US Navy was placated that work on the last of the Colorado class, the USS Washington, would continue instead. Although the South Dakotas were a decent design and a significant improvement over the previous ‘standard type’ which peaked with the preceding Colorados, naval experts viewed the Lexington class as obsolete and woefully under-armoured.
The United States Navy's response: Lexington Class Battlecruiser (Upper), South Dakota Battleship (Lower).
The failure of the Conference had wider implications for the British Government in 1922. The existing G3 class fast battleship design, which was in the early stages of construction, was continued with the option of a repeat should the international situation warrant it. The original four ships of the class would continue as planned. However, the much larger N3 design would not proceed unless the Japanese or the United States escalated their designs to include an 18 inch main armament. The reasons why the British only laid down four of the G3 class were multiple. The lead that Britain maintained in battleships and battlecruisers was more than sufficient, giving the British considerable breathing space. Moreover, the Japanese and Americans were competing against each other, rather than the Royal Navy. Also, the Royal Navy had to protect a vast empire and its sea lanes, which required a balanced fleet of cruisers. As a result, a 7,000 tonne cruiser with a 6 inch main armament was in planning. Thus, the Royal Navy would be more balanced than the top heavy Imperial Japanese Navy and United States Navy, which both continued with their battle-fleet fetishes.
An artists impression of the British G3 design at sea.
Domestically in Britain, the failure of the Conference was met with a diverse range of reactions. The Coalition Government under Prime Minister David Lloyd George felt compelled to continue with the slightly modified naval program, and thus appealed to the hawkish wings of the Liberal and Conservative parties. However there was also strong opposition. From within the Coalition, the Prime Minister faced stiff resistance from those Liberals who saw it as appallingly wasteful spending which could be better directed towards pressing social matters, such as slum clearance and fulfilling the promise of making Britain “a land fit for heroes to live in”.
On the other hand, there were a number of leading Tories who wanted a balanced budget, reduced government expenditure and increased debt reduction. Those in the ranks of the Labour Party were opposed as it was seen as inconceivable that the government would spend vast sums on weapons of war and destruction, so soon after one of the most brutal conflicts in human history. As the Labour Party leader John Robert Clynes said in response to the outcome of the conference, “How is it possible that we are now talking about building new, bigger warships when we are still coming to terms with the terrible devastation wrought by the Great War? Have we learned nothing?”
The decision and the failure of the disarmament treaty did expose the fractious nature of the Coalition Government and was one of the contributing factors to its downfall in mid-1922. The Coalition and its fall are examined in the next chapter.
Chapter I
A Tale of Two Conferences
The Imperial Conference of 1921 was the first since the end of the Great War, and the first to see the replacement of the Imperial War Cabinet that had emerged as a system to manage and coordinate the British Empire’s herculean war effort. The Conference met in London with delegations from the dominions and India. Chief among the issues that were to be discussed was the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. This issue arose following the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference and was a major concern for British and Dominion policy makers.
At the two extremes of the debate were William ‘Billy’ Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia and Arthur Meighen, the Prime Minister of Canada. Hughes was deeply concerned about the possibility of a hostile Japan in the Pacific. To Hughes, the only logical solution to avoiding a conflict with Japan was to strengthen the alliance with Tokyo and exert a benign influence on Japan to maintain British and dominion interests. To Hughes and the Australian Government, the alliance with Japan was crucial to securing peace in the region. At stake was the security of Australia and New Zealand, along with British possessions in the Far East and Pacific. The spat became increasingly ugly between the Canadians and Australians and soon spilled out into the public domain, taken up with keen interest by the press across the British Empire. Pro and anti-Japanese articles featured heavily, with the Australian press split between supporting British interests and conversely painting the Japanese as the yellow peril that would swamp Australia.
Meighen on the other hand was not so much anti-Japanese as viewing the United States as a more natural ally than Japan. His pro-American views were deeply held and he was concerned that the British Empire could become entangled in a future Japanese-American war, as competing Japanese and American interests in the Pacific began to increase tensions between the two powers. Meighen responded that the United States could respond unfavourably with trade and economic impositions against the British Empire which would disproportionately affect Canada. In a complicated game of trade, tariff and financial bluff and counter-bluff between the British and other dominion delegates, they calculated that the United States would not retaliate in this way. Indeed, there were elements within the wider British Imperial polity that would have welcomed American protectionism as an excuse to increase British tariffs and introduce an ‘imperial preference’ scheme to protect their own economies. However, Prime Minister Lloyd George was quick to silence such talk as the issue of free trade could potentially rupture the increasingly fragile Coalition irrevocably.
The three key men in the 1921 Imperial Conference debate: (l to r) William Hughes (Australia), David Lloyd George (Britain), Arthur Meighen (Canada).
Despite this divisive issue that was threatening the much desired image of imperial unity, Meighen failed to convince the rest of the Imperial Conference that the alliance with Japan needed to be abandoned. However, the British Government did take note of Canada’s concerns regarding the United States and dispatched the venerable Lord Grey, the former British ambassador to the United States, to Washington to support the then Ambassador Auckland Campbell-Geddes in giving the strongest reassurances that the alliance would not harm Anglo-American relations and that the British would have a moderating influence on Japanese policy. Although concerned about the growth of Japanese influence in the Pacific, President Harding was convinced by Lord Grey that the best way to contain Japan was for it to be aligned with the British Empire.
The ramifications of the decision to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance, without radical change for another ten years would have an impact around the world – one that would soon be felt at the Naval Conference in Washington.
The Washington Naval Conference began on 12 November 1921, three years and a day after the guns fell silent on the Western Front. The conference began with nine nations in attendance that had interests in the Pacific and Far East; the United States, Japan, China, France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal. The conference began with the spirit of avoiding the ruinous naval race between the victorious powers – primarily the United States, Great Britain and Japan, all of whom were already launching ambitious new post-war naval building programs. Yet the harried calls for disarmament were to be in vain.
The reasons for the failure of the treaty were many. The first and most obvious was the unwillingness of the Japanese to agree to nothing less than parity in any agreement. Despite the American’s ability to read the Japanese diplomatic cables through the efforts of The Cypher Bureau, it proved of little value to the negotiating team as the instructions from Tokyo were to accept parity in any agreement with the United States as the lowest acceptable agreement. This was partly out of the national desire to be seen and treated as equals on the international stage – as well as the reinforcement from the Anglo-Japanese alliance which had just been renewed. The second reason followed on from the first – that any agreement would be useless without the participation of the Japanese – who were the third major power in the Far East. Politically, the American negotiators led by the Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes were unable to accept Japanese equality in capital ships as the Congress would never ratify such a treaty. This placed them in an impossible position as they failed to restrict the Japanese and at the same time, could not secure limitations which made the Congress wary of unrestricted naval spending. This seemingly contradictory stance was the product of the emerging isolationist sentiment in the United States.
The failure to reach an agreement on naval limitations and reductions was a bitter blow to those seeking disarmament. However the negotiations in Washington were not a wholly wasted effort. Two separate treaties did emerge from the conference – the so called ‘Four-Power’ and ‘Nine-Power’ treaties. The Four-Power Treaty between The British, French, Japanese and United States cemented an agreement that the great powers would maintain the status quo in the Pacific by respecting existing interests and territorial arrangements. The Four-Power treaty also went some ways in mollifying the concerns of the United States over the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Nine-Power Treaty reaffirmed the ‘open door’ policy in China along with confirming the status quo of the major power’s interests in that country. So although the Washington Naval Conference did not result in the desired treaty on arms reductions, it did resolve some of the potential problems arising in Pacific and Far East.
Despite this, the fallout from the failure of the conference was considerable. Although the British were reluctant to continue a full building program, there would be much effort thrown into maintaining British pride and obligations in the face of foreign competition. However this paled in comparison to the rivalry between the Japanese and the Americans. For the Japanese it was a question of national pride and honour. For the American’s, it was about reassuring their place in the Pacific and ensuring that the Japanese could not challenge their position in any future conflict – despite the assurances of both the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Four-Power Treaty.
In the post war environment, the Imperial Japanese Navy had settled on the financially crippling Eight-Eight program which would continue unmolested in its implementation until the destruction wrought on the islands during the 1923 Kanto earthquake. The earthquake was a terrible national disaster and did halt for the immediate time further naval construction, as much needed resources and manpower were directed towards reconstruction. The aim of the Eight-Eight program was to provide for two modern eight ship battle squadrons complimented with older capital ships in support. For Japan, the apparent failure in Washington was viewed as a success for the Japanese policy of remaining at parity with its main strategic foe in the Pacific, the United States. With construction already well under way of two Tosa Class battleships, four ships of a more advanced design were laid down in the shipyards of Japan – the Amagi class battlecruisers. Indeed hopeful Japanese planners were already preparing a follow up design to these as well in the form of the Kii Class, however the Diet of Japan was slowing the rate of funding available to the navy which was approaching nearly a third of the entire government’s budget. Nevertheless the Japanese pressed ahead, and as soon as yard space was available, the first of the four Kii’s was laid down. By the time of the 1923 earthquake which caused so much devastation in the country claimed one more victim - one of the yet unnamed Kii class as a total constructive loss in its yard. The partially completed hull, twisted, stressed and broken by the tremors, was quick to feel the harsh heat of the cutters torch as it was cut up for scrap. The massive program however did come at the expense of the proposed cruiser program which was abandoned and smaller vessels such as destroyers which received far less attention as well.
In response, the United States continued, if not at the same break-neck pace, but with a similar determination in its own building program. The impressive (although not as technically advanced as the British G3s) South Dakota class battleships were powerful warships capable of matching any of the new Japanese designs. The United States was planning on no less than six of these 43,000 ton floating beasts, along with a revised construction of six Lexington class battlecruisers. The latter class however would soon fall victim to the increasing isolationist views of the United States Congress, with only three being laid down to their original designs, a further two converted to cheaper aircraft carriers and the last of the class scrapped on the slipway with little work completed on her. The US Navy was placated that work on the last of the Colorado class, the USS Washington, would continue instead. Although the South Dakotas were a decent design and a significant improvement over the previous ‘standard type’ which peaked with the preceding Colorados, naval experts viewed the Lexington class as obsolete and woefully under-armoured.
The United States Navy's response: Lexington Class Battlecruiser (Upper), South Dakota Battleship (Lower).
The failure of the Conference had wider implications for the British Government in 1922. The existing G3 class fast battleship design, which was in the early stages of construction, was continued with the option of a repeat should the international situation warrant it. The original four ships of the class would continue as planned. However, the much larger N3 design would not proceed unless the Japanese or the United States escalated their designs to include an 18 inch main armament. The reasons why the British only laid down four of the G3 class were multiple. The lead that Britain maintained in battleships and battlecruisers was more than sufficient, giving the British considerable breathing space. Moreover, the Japanese and Americans were competing against each other, rather than the Royal Navy. Also, the Royal Navy had to protect a vast empire and its sea lanes, which required a balanced fleet of cruisers. As a result, a 7,000 tonne cruiser with a 6 inch main armament was in planning. Thus, the Royal Navy would be more balanced than the top heavy Imperial Japanese Navy and United States Navy, which both continued with their battle-fleet fetishes.
An artists impression of the British G3 design at sea.
Domestically in Britain, the failure of the Conference was met with a diverse range of reactions. The Coalition Government under Prime Minister David Lloyd George felt compelled to continue with the slightly modified naval program, and thus appealed to the hawkish wings of the Liberal and Conservative parties. However there was also strong opposition. From within the Coalition, the Prime Minister faced stiff resistance from those Liberals who saw it as appallingly wasteful spending which could be better directed towards pressing social matters, such as slum clearance and fulfilling the promise of making Britain “a land fit for heroes to live in”.
On the other hand, there were a number of leading Tories who wanted a balanced budget, reduced government expenditure and increased debt reduction. Those in the ranks of the Labour Party were opposed as it was seen as inconceivable that the government would spend vast sums on weapons of war and destruction, so soon after one of the most brutal conflicts in human history. As the Labour Party leader John Robert Clynes said in response to the outcome of the conference, “How is it possible that we are now talking about building new, bigger warships when we are still coming to terms with the terrible devastation wrought by the Great War? Have we learned nothing?”
The decision and the failure of the disarmament treaty did expose the fractious nature of the Coalition Government and was one of the contributing factors to its downfall in mid-1922. The Coalition and its fall are examined in the next chapter.
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