Malaya garrison redeployed to North Africa, May 1941

April 1941, Siege of Tobruk begins. In June 1941 operation Battleaxe begins.

ATL... Churchill demands that North Africa be reinforced by re-deploying 135,000 men and 200+ aircraft from Malaya. They depart in early May 1941, arriving in Alexandria by mid-June 1941. In addition Force Z is not sent, but remains in the Med as part of a MS/North Africa first strategy.

What is the impact of an additional 135,000 British and CW/Imperial troops in North Africa? The manpower will be welcome, especially the Australian Division, and while they'll all arrive with their arms and kit, it will still present great logistical challenges.

With only 5,000 troops and 50-odd aircraft left in Malaya by end of May 1941, do the Japanese strike now from FIC, or still wait until they move on Pearl Harbour? The risk being that once North Africa is clearly won, far more British military might will be free to return to Malaya. Does Japan consider advancing the Pearl Harbour strike? Does the Malay sultan and the local population take up arms to defend against the coming Japanese?

How does Australia react when Malaya is exposed, the RN has left the region and now the majority of its army and navy is in North Africa? Even New Zealand and Canada's Pacific coast would be exposed by Britain's departure from the region.

NOTE - IDK the precise dates the British/CW troops and aircraft from Dec - Feb 1942 Malay campaign arrived in Malaya. Thus it's likely the 135M troops and aircraft above were not all in place by May 1941. For argument's sake, let's have them re-deployed either from Malaya or before they arrived in Malaya.

Australian, British and British Indian Army Divisions that aren't needed at the North African Front could be transferred back to India and Australia to defend those regions as the IJN and IJA naval invasion would have overwhelm Malaysia and Singapore quite rapidly....

But no massive Commonwealth Garrison force would have been forced to surrender en-massed like in OTL...

Something tells me the Commonwealth won't last long after WWII if this happens...

The Imperial forces in Malaya during the 1941-42 campaign

Admiral Beez said:

April 1941, Siege of Tobruk begins. In June 1941 operation Battleaxe begins.

ATL... Churchill demands that North Africa be reinforced by re-deploying 135,000 men and 200+ aircraft from Malaya. They depart in early May 1941, arriving in Alexandria by mid-June 1941. In addition Force Z is not sent, but remains in the Med as part of a MS/North Africa first strategy.

What is the impact of an additional 135,000 British and CW/Imperial troops in North Africa? The manpower will be welcome, especially the Australian Division, and while they'll all arrive with their arms and kit, it will still present great logistical challenges.

With only 5,000 troops and 50-odd aircraft left in Malaya by end of May 1941, do the Japanese strike now from FIC, or still wait until they move on Pearl Harbour? The risk being that once North Africa is clearly won, far more British military might will be free to return to Malaya. Does Japan consider advancing the Pearl Harbour strike? Does the Malay sultan and the local population take up arms to defend against the coming Japanese?

How does Australia react when Malaya is exposed, the RN has left the region and now the majority of its army and navy is in North Africa? Even New Zealand and Canada's Pacific coast would be exposed by Britain's departure from the region.

NOTE - IDK the precise dates the British/CW troops and aircraft from Dec - Feb 1942 Malay campaign arrived in Malaya. Thus it's likely the 135M troops and aircraft above were not all in place by May 1941. For argument's sake, let's have them re-deployed either from Malaya or before they arrived in Malaya.

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The Imperial forces in Malaya during the 1941-42 campaign amounted to:

8th Australian Division (2 brigades)
9th Indian Division (3 brigades)
11th Indian Division (3 brigades)
and various garrison and fortress troops made up of a mixture of British, Indian Army (including prewar regulars, wartime units, and ISF units), and a small Malayan contingent.

None of the above were well suited for a mobile mechanized campaign, and the existing order of battle in the Mediterranean and Middle East had, if anything, plenty of leg infantry with partial motorization.

As it was in the same period (CRUSADER to Gazala), the British/Imperial forces amounted to two British armored divisions (1st and 7th), one British motorized cavalry division converting to armor (1st Cavalry to 10th Armoured) and multiple first-line infantry divisions (British 6th/70th, 50th, 51st, and 56th Infantry divisions; 4th, 5th, 8th, and 10th Indian; 6th, 7th, and 9th Australian; 1st and 2nd South African; 2nd New Zealand; two Indian Army second-line divisions (1st Cavalry/31st Armoured and 6th Infantry) and multiple independent armored/tank and infantry brigades, including the cadre of the Polish 3rd and 5th divisions.

Ground force reinforcements sent to Malaya in 1942 included the British 18th Infantry Division and two brigades of Indian infantry; given the weakness of Allied air power during the Malaya campaign, a far better move would have been to leave the two Indian brigades with their parent division (17th) in Burma, and put the British 18th Division ashore in Ceylon as the nucleus of the defense force there.

Whatever the British needed in the Med/Middle East in 1941-42, it was not more infantry...

Likewise, the RAF, RAAF, and RNZAF units, although certainly significant in terms of air crew and ground personnel, were not equipped to the standard necessary in the Med/Middle East (they weren't equipped to the standard necessary for the Far East, either, but that's another story.)

With the Japanese in French Indochina at army strength, the British had to try and create a baseline defense force at the corps level (the prewar garrison had amounted to two mixed brigades) and the 9th and 11th Indian divisions were probably the best available units; the error - as it was in Hong Kong - was reinforcing a vulnerable salient; the 8th Australian Division could have made a huge difference in Papua, for example, and the 18th British could have made the difference in Burma if it could get there in time to acclimate; if not, it would have been very useful in Ceylon and India in 1942-43.

Force Z should have withdrawn into the Indian Ocean in December, once it became clear the Japanese air forces had the advantage.

Hindsight, of course.

Best,

Awesome POD!

That would be a sweet curb stomp of Rommel, that's for sure!

Japan probably misses the "opportunity" and takes Malaya OTL chronology. They don't attack until they lose any hope of the US trading with them. Great Britain is not going to be shuttling troops back to Singapore if they already committed to a "crush the Nazis in North Africa first, the Pacific be damned" strategy.

The result is that Rommel's dreams of grandeur are truncated. The Axis probably switches to a "defense of Libya" strategy. I don't know if increased British assets helps Malta or not. It might have the butterfly of the Axis pouring resources into the capture of the island, being that they have no chance at Egypt. If so, it lengthens Italy's participation in the war and may affect German exuberance in 1942, which ended very badly for the Nazis...but I still think the Nazis out-stupid themselves.

All-in-all, I think this POD has a good chance at sowing up North Africa by 1942, which means that if Malta is not captured there can be British landings in Greece which will succeed, and Anglo-American landings in Sicily and then Italy. This leads to an earlier German collapse in the East, likely before D-Day, which will force Hitler to pull reserves out of France which results in a very fast occupation of France, other than certain ports that will hold out as IOTL. The war may end a few months early with luck. The Brits losing 100K men early in the war that could have been put to good use is a big difference maker.

kclcmdr said:

Australian, British and British Indian Army Divisions that aren't needed at the North African Front could be transferred back to India and Australia to defend those regions as the IJN and IJA naval invasion would have overwhelm Malaysia and Singapore quite rapidly....

But no massive Commonwealth Garrison force would have been forced to surrender en-massed like in OTL...

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It is a toss-up between the Australian troops refusing to board the ships (by order of the Australian Government), or them hijacking them when on board. Abandoning Malaya without a fight is completely unacceptable to Australia in mid-1941.
Actually, good luck using a port with Australian troops in it to evacuate other troops, unless you are prepared to open fire on them.

Poor leadership was rampant in nth Africa in mid 41 which accounts for the lack of results from battleaxe and crusader. Assuming that a large number of troops could be moved from malaya I doubt that they would achieve great results.

Errolwi said:

Abandoning Malaya without a fight is completely unacceptable to Australia in mid-1941.

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But sending them to join their brothers in North Africa keeps them all safe, and then when Germany is smashed, the troops could be sent if not back to Malaya then to Australia.

And if Australian troops refuse to embark they'll be left as they were OTL, to die on Japanese bayonets and POW camps, or they can seize the ships and sail for Australia. There is no real option to reinforce Malaya, so options are concentrate the Australians where they can make a quick and decisive difference; lose half of them in Malaya; or run for Oz on seized ships.

I suspect NZ would also be pretty angry about this - we spent a bit of money on the Singapore base pre war and this would be a pretty big slap in the face.

Admiral Beez said:

But sending them to join their brothers in North Africa keeps them all safe, and then when Germany is smashed, the troops could be sent if not back to Malaya then to Australia.

And if Australian troops refuse to embark they'll be left as they were OTL, to die on Japanese bayonets and POW camps, or they can seize the ships and sail for Australia. There is no real option to reinforce Malaya, so options are concentrate the Australians where they can make a quick and decisive difference; lose half of them in Malaya; or run for Oz on seized ships.

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You're acting as if the Dominion governments didn't have a veto on the use of their troops. If this move is ordered, then the Australian troops in the Middle East won't be available for offensive operations (and will be demanded to be returned immediately). It isn't about 'saving' the troops (large scale collapse and mass imprisonment wasn't foreseen in mid-41), it's about defending Australia. The best place to do that isn't in Australia , it's by basing warships north of Australia. If that isn't happening, the Australian populace will demand the return ASAP.
You realize that the AIF troops were all volunteers, right? Enlistment of troops available for service outside Australia will plummet.
As soon as the Japanese attack (if not sooner), the NZ troops will be withdrawn as well (OTL's decision to remain was on a knife-edge). There are hundreds of NZ aircrew (and a donated squadron worth of Wellingtons) serving in the RAF. There will be a rabid re-evaluation of this situation (tricky, as many are actually in the RAF, although later joiners may have come through the EATS pipeline and be RNZAF, seconded to the RAF) when the abandonment is suggested.

Good points all round. Just to clarify, I'm not advocating this ATL, just looking at possible impacts and events.

What's needed in Nth Africa are more tanks a good commanders for them.

Bringing Hobart back to command armoured divisions/corps would be a better move then bringing in more infantry, especially units short or artillery and all the other stuff like those in Malaya were.

Julius Vogel said:

I suspect NZ would also be pretty angry about this - we spent a bit of money on the Singapore base pre war and this would be a pretty big slap in the face.

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What if they manned Singapore, but not the rest of Malaya?

pattersonautobody said:

What if they manned Singapore, but not the rest of Malaya?

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Singapore still gets overrun. It's an island, yes, but not really that far from Malaya to pose an issue to the Japanese crossing the Straits of Johor. There's absolutely no combat width on the small island. It's better to hold Malaya up to Pattani as per Operation Matador and force Japan into attrition warfare.

I was suggesting a withdrawal but a token force in Singapore to placate Australia and new Zealand.

pattersonautobody said:

I was suggesting a withdrawal but a token force in Singapore to placate Australia and new Zealand.

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Oh. Pretty sure leaving bare troops behind would still piss off ANZAC, since it's plainly obvious they're going to die for nothing. They'd prefer if the British left more to protect Malaya as a whole.

Remitonov said:

Oh. Pretty sure leaving bare troops behind would still piss off ANZAC, since it's plainly obvious they're going to die for nothing. They'd prefer if the British left more to protect Malaya as a whole.

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How about the Aussies are moved to Africa, but the Indians stay in Malaya?

8th Australian Division (22nd and 27th brigades)

Admiral Beez said:

How about the Aussies are moved to Africa, but the Indians stay in Malaya?

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8th Australian Division (22nd and 27th brigades only, so at 2/3rds strength) was closed up in Malaya by August, 1941; using the same shipping, presumably the entire division (including the detached 23rd Brigade) could be in Egypt by the autumn-winter of 1941; probably does not go forward into the desert, but is detailed instead to the Nile Delta as a defense force.

Which means when the Japanese attack in December, it's probably the best placed to go back to the Southwest Pacific upon Curtin's request, so the 8th probably goes first and ends up in Papua by the spring of 1942 after various sidetrips; it is followed by the 7th.

The 6th Division may actually stay in Ceylon for much of 1942, and then return to Australia in the winter of 1942-43 with the 9th Division.

Bottom line, there's really no significant impact on the course of the desert war, other than Auchinleck having one more division (not trained for the desert, of course) at the time of GAZALA...

The British had plenty of infantry in North Africa and Southwest Asia in 1941-42; what they needed were additional armored and motorized units, trained and ready for active service and capable of being sustained - the only significant opportunities they had to do that were:

a) not break up the 2nd Armoured Division for duty in Greece and the Western Desert in 1941;
b) not delay the conversion of 1st Cavalry Division to 10th Armoured Division in 1941-42, presumably by sending less armor to the USSR;
c) not break up the 8th Armoured Division in 1942 to provide infantry support tank brigades.
d) not equip the Indian 1st Cavalry Division as the Indian 1st/31st Armoured Division in 1942-43.

Absent the above, the British could have sustained the equivalent of three armored divisions in the field in 1941-42 (1st, 2nd, and 7th, presumably), from a total of six armoured divisions (1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, 10th, 1st/31st Indian) that eventually made it to the theater.

Even then, they'd be sidelining half the armored/motorized forces in their order of battle to sustain the other half, but based on what they were able to sustain historically during the CRUSADER, Gazala, and Alamein operations, that's about the most they could manage.

The other alternative, of course, would be to simply pull back to the Alamein-Qattara position in 1941, dig in, and say "wish you were here" to the Italians...

Best,

TFSmith121 said:

8th Australian Division (22nd and 27th brigades only, so at 2/3rds strength) was closed up in Malaya by August, 1941; using the same shipping, presumably the entire division (including the detached 23rd Brigade) could be in Egypt by the autumn-winter of 1941; probably does not go forward into the desert, but is detailed instead to the Nile Delta as a defense force.

Which means when the Japanese attack in December, it's probably the best placed to go back to the Southwest Pacific upon Curtin's request, so the 8th probably goes first and ends up in Papua by the spring of 1942 after various sidetrips; it is followed by the 7th.

The 6th Division may actually stay in Ceylon for much of 1942, and then return to Australia in the winter of 1942-43 with the 9th Division.

Bottom line, there's really no significant impact on the course of the desert war, other than Auchinleck having one more division (not trained for the desert, of course) at the time of GAZALA...

The British had plenty of infantry in North Africa and Southwest Asia in 1941-42; what they needed were additional armored and motorized units, trained and ready for active service and capable of being sustained - the only significant opportunities they had to do that were:

a) not break up the 2nd Armoured Division for duty in Greece and the Western Desert in 1941;
b) not delay the conversion of 1st Cavalry Division to 10th Armoured Division in 1941-42, presumably by sending less armor to the USSR;
c) not break up the 8th Armoured Division in 1942 to provide infantry support tank brigades.
d) not equip the Indian 1st Cavalry Division as the Indian 1st/31st Armoured Division in 1942-43.

Absent the above, the British could have sustained the equivalent of three armored divisions in the field in 1941-42 (1st, 2nd, and 7th, presumably), from a total of six armoured divisions (1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, 10th, 1st/31st Indian) that eventually made it to the theater.

Even then, they'd be sidelining half the armored/motorized forces in their order of battle to sustain the other half, but based on what they were able to sustain historically during the CRUSADER, Gazala, and Alamein operations, that's about the most they could manage.

The other alternative, of course, would be to simply pull back to the Alamein-Qattara position in 1941, dig in, and say "wish you were here" to the Italians...

Best,

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I agree but would add that the British had a number of problems that were less tangible than tank and troop numbers such as command, a difficulty in making successful combined arms groups and deficiencies in some key weapons such as anti-tank guns and tanks themselves. This is why when tank numbers were even such as Battleaxe the British lost half their tanks on the first day and the success of Crusader required almost double the Axis tank strength.

True, which is why the 2-1 odds on the offensive

Riain said:

I agree but would add that the British had a number of problems that were less tangible than tank and troop numbers such as command, a difficulty in making successful combined arms groups and deficiencies in some key weapons such as anti-tank guns and tanks themselves. This is why when tank numbers were even such as Battleaxe the British lost half their tanks on the first day and the success of Crusader required almost double the Axis tank strength.

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True, which is why the 2-1 odds on the offensive would presumably be necessary; certainly being able to sustain 3 divisions/9 brigades against the Axis mobile forces is more likely to create success than the (historical) 1-1 was, generally.

On the defensive, of course, it's another situation entirely for the British et al.

Best,