If you want to avoid the Levantine crusades w/ a PoD after 1000 AD

If you want to stop the Crusades after 1000 AD


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raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
the PoD most conducive to this result should be sought:

a) In Western European developments
b) In Byzantine developments
c) In developments within Islamic states
 
Are you planning to make a timeline based on this? We have a surprisingly tiny amount of crusader timelines on this forum.
 
Changing is the only one up there I see as being close to the solution, changing the Empire only keeps the targets for the Papists in the West for the most part, but there are plenty of muslim states in christendom's way, especially in Iberia.

That bunks numbers 1 and 2 so the only choice would be the source of the madness in the first place.
 
Changing Western Europe is the most safe choice but would ask for some PoDs in the Xth century.
Allow me to repost something I made some times ago.

Crusades are the logical evolution of the christianised institution of milites through the XIth century and the reinforcement of clerical institutional power. If violence against Christians from a class whom whole legitimacy was based on warfare was frowned upon, the logical outcome for milites, in order to be religiously legitimized, was to use this violence to serve Christians.

I would really really disagree with what Danth proposed as objective of Crusades : protecting pilgrims was already a thing at least one century before (as well armed pilgrimages), Mediterranean basin already was under latin dominance at this point (that's actually one feature that allowed Crusades to be a thing : without italian presence in ME already established, there would be no reinforcement or ravitail possible in first place), and "uniting Europe" is at best a romanticist vision (would it be only because Europe as a concept didn't existed).

Legitimisation of violence and more generally of a military-based social class (less nobility as a whole strictly speaking than milites, aka warring nobility) that is in the direct continuation of Truce of God and XIth councils (it did help that Urban II was issued from this nobility, and most able to speak to them as they could agree with) played the most important part there.
The consequences : conquest, loot and else was more issued from warring than a real planned objective (The constant infighting and hesitation of the nobles supposedly leading the expedition point that).

Eventually, what you would need is a weakened papacy, maybe no HRE in order to butterfly away the Ottonian Reform, making Rome unable to really support movements as Peace of God or at least having them remaining under local religious control, and therefore and while more or less respected, not really susceptible to gather as much.

It wouldn't butterfly away religious expeditions, would it be only because they already existed by then, but it would remain a more regional concern, directed against Arabo-Andalusian or Arabo-Africans.

If not...Well, butterflying away the late Macedonian disorders and Turkish advance may do something about the IOTL conditions of the First Crusade, but you'd still , IMO, see something akin appear with the religious restructuration of Western Europe and the Italian domination of Mediterranean basin.

EDIT : Didn't see "Levantine" in the OP. Then 2) Is probably the easiest, then, at short term.
Though Italian maritime dominance and growing Western Europe may eventually comes to that, giving that Byzantium wasn't in best position to take back Palestine even if resolving its immediate issues with Turks, Pechenegs and Normans.
If you want to play safe, you'd still need a Xth century PoD.
 
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raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
I grant everyone an extension - 10th century PoDs are permissible.

What would y'all suggest now that we've got 195 years to work with instead of just 95?
 
I grant everyone an extension - 10th century PoDs are permissible.
Oh, then what I proposed above : screw HRE and/or Ottonian Reforms, make the Peace of God movement more of a local thing, and you may limit more christianisation of feudal society.

It's not going to be much prettier in Western Europe, and you'd still have religious expeditions, but they won't be Crusades.

Just have Muslim states adopt a custom of forbidding noninterference with People of the Book who enter their lands. Boom done.
It's not really obvious that Muslims were really bothered on preventing pilgrimages. Apart from Al-Hakim, the Fatimid Caliph of the early XIth, there's no real sign of persecution.

Granted, this persecution last in the memories, but it was exceptional and al-Hakim delusional enough to not care about such custom (which wasn't needed, giving there was no, at my knowledge, real interdiction to Christians moving in).

The problem is more about Turks, on two stances : they were extremely aggressive when it came to conquests, and expanding quickly both on Christians (which provoked the IOTL Call in first place) and on Muslims as well (which provoked a raise of banditry in the region whom pilgrims a convenient target).
 
lol what if the Crusaders and local Muslims allied against the Turks

By the time Crusaders arrived in Middle-East, Turks basically won and dominated geopolitically-wise. Which let only Byzantium (and the more or less coherent alliance is what made the First Crusade initially) and Fatimids. And allying with the latter would have caused some issues.

Notably because Fatimids had control of Jerusalem that they just took back from Turks some months ago (they tried to convince Crusaders to not advance further, but the governor just seem to not have understood Jerusalem was what they wanted), but also because Crusaders allied themselves with local sunnit rulers that wanted Fatminids out of Palestine and supplied Crusaders along the way.

And of course, al-Hakim policies on Christians weren't exactly forgotten, and Crusaders didn't gave a flying relic of St Copros about the actual Fatimid policies.

In any way, the poor Latin knowledge of Middle-Eastern geopolitics may have prevented to build such alliance a priori, before reaching the region itself.
 
If you delay/prevent the Fatimid reconquest of Palestine (or have the Crusades get there earlier), would an alliance then be possible?
 
If you delay/prevent the Fatimid reconquest of Palestine (or have the Crusades get there earlier), would an alliance then be possible?
That seems unlikely : Latin States weren't fully formed by the late XIth century, and they strived to expand their immediate coastal and hinterland presence that were relativly limited (hence why Crusaders wanted reinforcements from Europe, which failed in 1101).

Depending from at least basic support from local Muslim elites, and being at odds with Fatimids that searched to hold and expand their presence in the region...I'm not sure it would happen at least in a first time.

That said, I'd need to check better about Fatimid inner policies in the XIIth century to be more certain.
 
Let John Tzimiskes live at least until Basil II is older and more ready to rule than when he became sole emperor OTL.

Before his death he managed to seize quite a chunk of the Levant and arguably could have retaken Jersualem if circumstances were tweaked a little bit.
 
First of all, the first Crusade was based on the breaking of the political order in the Middle East between the Arab rulers and Buyyids and Byzantium regarding christian pilgrimage and respect of each other's borders. However at the rise of the Saljuk empire and their victories against Byzantium at Manzikert and more importantly their conquest of the levant against the Fatmid Sultanate. This led to the persecution and massacre of pilgrims enroute to Jerusalem, and broke previous unsaid agreements between the Byzantium and the Fatmids and even the Abbasids.

Thus, upon hearing of the troubles in the Holy Land, Pope Urban II called the crusade with the pretext of saving their "brethren". This can be seen in the literature of famous crusader propagandist like Bernard of Clairvaux. If the Saljuks would not have broken the status quo in the Middle East the Crusades in the near east would not have happened or at least have not been so dramatic. With out a Saljuk enemy, the Knights of Western Europe would join the crusade on their front door against the Almoravids, Taifa Sultanates and the future Almohads in Spain and North Africa. Also the Baltuc crusade would become more famous and would draw crusaders of origins not just confined to Germany or the Germanic speaking world.

So in short the best way to stop the Levantine crusades is too remove the Saljuk empire and keep a Shiite dominated Egypt and Levant who are not nearly as aggressive when it comes to persecution and when it comes to warring against Byzantium. It would also do wonders to keep the Abbasids strong in Iraq rather than a little Baghdad rump state, if in a more powerful situation the Abbasids would worry more about conquering Iran and Egypt than invading Byzantium or persecuting Christian pilgrims.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
By the time Crusaders arrived in Middle-East, Turks basically won and dominated geopolitically-wise. Which let only Byzantium (and the more or less coherent alliance is what made the First Crusade initially) and Fatimids. And allying with the latter would have caused some issues.

Notably because Fatimids had control of Jerusalem that they just took back from Turks some months ago (they tried to convince Crusaders to not advance further, but the governor just seem to not have understood Jerusalem was what they wanted), but also because Crusaders allied themselves with local sunnit rulers that wanted Fatimids out of Palestine and supplied Crusaders along the way.

Well I suppose as Governor of Jerusalem he needed to try to convince them to not advance. What would the governor, or the larger Fatimid regime have done differently if they'd realized the Crusaders were bound and determined to get Jerusalem? Offer to trade it for some other territory the Crusaders had and an alliance? Did the governor neglect defenses because he thought he could talk the Crusaders out of attacking?

And that's interesting about the Crusader alliance with Sunnite leaders, what was the benefit and justification for each side in that alliance? I suppose those were local Sunni Arab leaders, not tied to the Seljuks?


In any way, the poor Latin knowledge of Middle-Eastern geopolitics may have prevented to build such alliance a priori, before reaching the region itself.

---If attempted, could the Fatimids really have been convinced to align with the Crusaders and Byzantines against the Ottomans, yielding Jerusalem to the Crusaders but otherwise terms favorable to the Fatimids?

I know there was poor Latin knowledge of local geopolitics, but I would have thought that possibly some Papal reps, or at least some Italian merchants, could have come up with the idea.

And of course, al-Hakim policies on Christians weren't exactly forgotten, and Crusaders didn't gave a flying relic of St Copros about the actual Fatimid policies.

Of course from a rhetorical point of view the fact that the Fatimids, rather than the Seljuks who arguably provoked Crusader actions, controlled Jerusalem when the Crusaders took it undermines the argument about the Crusades being a defensive war or a restorative, counter-offensive war, rather than aggression.

“Self-defense,” in the sense of an imminent threat, was not a reason for going to war against the Muslim powers that held the Levant. In that sense, the oft-repeated trope that the Crusades (i.e., the Jerusalem campaigns) were defensive is disingenuous, to say the least.”

Even in a more extended sense of protecting lives and property of pilgrims there’s some elements of at least debateable justifiability in the taking of Jerusalem. The power that the Pope and the Byzantine Emperor in 1095 had cited as most provocative and abusive of pilgrims in Jerusalem was the Seljuk Sultanate. And indeed early on the Crusaders fought the Seljuks. But by the time the Crusaders got to Jerusalem, it was under the rule of the Fatimid Caliphs, non-participants in Seljuk provocations. So the continued campaign to take Jerusalem at that point was not even a counter-offensive or reprisal, but aggression pure and simple. Of course, naturally the Crusaders were all armed and armored up had gotten almost all the way there, and would have felt let down stopping short of Fatimid held territory (ie, I know stopping would have been unrealistic) but they were stretching the boundaries of Augustinian just war theory pretty darn far (as they did in most wars in Europe also of course).
 
What would the governor, or the larger Fatimid regime have done differently if they'd realized the Crusaders were bound and determined to get Jerusalem?
Well, they did tried to make an agreement with Crusaders earlier in mid-1097 to congratulate Byzantines for their reconquest of Anatolia, and proposing them to share Syria.
They didn't exactly understood that Latins weren't Byzantine mercenaries but a force of their own, while they adressed to the offer to them which was neither answered positively or negatively. Eventually they just took Jerusalem from Turks from themselves.

Offer to trade it for some other territory the Crusaders had and an alliance?
Giving up Jerusalem would have been a terrible demonstration of weakeness that Fatimids couldn't have made. They already lost Northern Syria, Ifriqiya, and known a succession crisis.
If al-Afdhal complied this much to what was seen as a bunch of misfits, his position would have been perillous.

Furthermore...Trade it for what? Antioch? Would have been extremely risky to let Jerusalem (that was close to Egypt and its ressources) for a further and isolated places that was more cut from their cores and more prone to fall to Turks.

Did the governor neglect defenses because he thought he could talk the Crusaders out of attacking?
No, he didn't. Jerusalem was one of the hardest sieges the First Crusade had to make, comparable only with Antioch in term of Latin losses.
Not to mention he expelled all Christians from the city (as many cities did to prevent treacheries at the benefit of Crusaders), which kinda backfired (basically, it's one of the things that made Eastern Christians pro-Crusaders to begin with).

Altough he may have neglected to properly clean the countryside around : a Crusader leader, trying to do what bears does in woods, recovered the wood from the siege engines Fatimids used some months ago to take the city.

And that's interesting about the Crusader alliance with Sunnite leaders, what was the benefit and justification for each side in that alliance?
Kick Shi'a Fatimids out of Syria and keep balance with Turks, mostly, but also not antagonize Crusaders. Better be their friend than not.

Which kinda worked, until Latins decided they wanted a bigger tribute (after the Crusade tough) which ended with all coastal states being defeated and integrated to the diverse Latin states.

I suppose those were local Sunni Arab leaders, not tied to the Seljuks?
In the case of Tripoli, it was an Egyptian family set up by Fatimids, which they broke from to treat with Turks.


If attempted, could the Fatimids really have been convinced to align with the Crusaders and Byzantines against the Ottomans, yielding Jerusalem to the Crusaders but otherwise terms favorable to the Fatimids?
I suppose you meant Seljuks? :)

Anyway...That's gonna be really hard. For the diverse reasons listed in the previous posts and above, I don't think it would really be doable, not unless having Fatmids being screwed around more, not representating much of a threat, which would have mean Latins attacking them sooner or later.

I know there was poor Latin knowledge of local geopolitics, but I would have thought that possibly some Papal reps, or at least some Italian merchants, could have come up with the idea.
Italian merchants weren't exactly doves : while the Crusaders usually demonstrated some restrain (Yes, I know that's an hard pill to swallow when it comes to their advance in Syria and the capture of Jerusalem, but they were ususally so more than others), Genoese didn't really gave a flying relic of St. Copros, as pointed out by how they did in the Siege of Tripoli.

Sure, they would have tried to compromise if Crusaders threatened their commercial interests in Egypt, but they didn't. Even Byzantines, that were more or less allies with Fatimids, just looked away ("I wonder what Rus' is doing right now")

Of course from a rhetorical point of view the fact that the Fatimids, rather than the Seljuks who arguably provoked Crusader actions, controlled Jerusalem when the Crusaders took it undermines the argument about the Crusades being a defensive war or a restorative, counter-offensive war, rather than aggression.

I'm not really sure what you mean there. For what matter, in Crusader view point (because that's what we're discussing right now), the difference between Fatimids and Turks wasn't clearly established. For all they know, they did the very same thing than the latter, if not worse with al-Hakim (on which persecutions had an echo in the West).
I may have missed sources, but the whole background for the First Crusade was being a counter-offensive war, not only against the recent Turk advence in Anatolia, but to recover as much from what was lost from the previous Arab conquests.

I'm not too sure that capture of Jerusalem is the best ground to pull a

"Aha! So you weren't about religious war from the beggining!
- Damn, you! And I would have gotten away with it, too, if it weren't for you meddling kids!"

That's simply loosing the point by miles : Crusades weren't armed pilgrimages, weren't only against Turks, but mixing the milites mentality with a re-evangelised western society in order to counter what was seen as one new wave of Islamic advance since the VIIIth century.

“Self-defense,” in the sense of an imminent threat, was not a reason for going to war against the Muslim powers that held the Levant. In that sense, the oft-repeated trope that the Crusades (i.e., the Jerusalem campaigns) were defensive is disingenuous, to say the least.”
Which trope, unless you're discussing XIXth century historiography, is rarely invocated, the reasons usually pointed out being extremly multiple.

I'm sorry, but that's not even close of what is Crusader historiography since decades.
 

GdwnsnHo

Banned
I've gone with changing the Islamic states - not because it is the only way, but because it is best from the point of view of the crusades.

Essentially make it so that there is no clear winner in the turkish succession crisis where Alp Arslan took over - and have an independent Persia assert itself under Nizam al-Mulk/other Persian ruler.

Throw an arabian challenger for the Caliphate into the mix, and you have a 3-way civil war for the Caliphate between the Persians, Arabs and Egyptians, and the turks bleeding themselves dry in the north.

This should create such an unstable environment that the Byzantines can exploit to regain the Levant - which would render the need or request for the crusades unnecessary. Not that it is a given, but even an Ummah that has bled itself dry over the Caliphate will be a great opportunity for the Byzantines, and deny any need for a Levantine crusade. (And seeing the other thread exists - might lead to sending all that additional manpower to N.Africa :D )
 
Throw an arabian challenger for the Caliphate into the mix, and you have a 3-way civil war for the Caliphate between the Persians, Arabs and Egyptians, and the turks bleeding themselves dry in the north.
As you said, it would certainly create a really unstable situation, and amongst the consequences, the growing western pilgrimages would most certainly encounter much dangers, from banditry to blunt attacks.
Which would probably trigger enough reactions to have at the very least, armed expeditions, giving the Latin mindset was at this point ready for that, no matter what Byzzies would say.

(And seeing the other thread exists - might lead to sending all that additional manpower to N.Africa :D )
Which would raise the question of "Why", but that's for the other thread indeed.
 

GdwnsnHo

Banned
As you said, it would certainly create a really unstable situation, and amongst the consequences, the growing western pilgrimages would most certainly encounter much dangers, from banditry to blunt attacks.
Which would probably trigger enough reactions to have at the very least, armed expeditions, giving the Latin mindset was at this point ready for that, no matter what Byzzies would say.

Not convinced that the Latins would be needed - they may seek to help, but given how much the Romans want to reclaim their old turf, then by invading the Fatamid-held Levant - and crushing banditry they come across, that now-purged banditry could lead to the Roman intervention being seen as a sign of relief and a return to the rule of law - leading to a potentially amicable occupation of the area. (Amicable to the locals, Romans and Latins that is - the Fatamids are certainly going to be angry). Perhaps it isn't a gargantuan difference, but there is no Manzikert in this scenario, as such the Romans will be stronger than any of their enemies. Which I reckon would mean that whilst there may be some Latin troops joining in (and there maybe settler-pilgrims) it doesn't have the same characteristics IMO as the crusades themselves.

At the worst - assuming Roman success, you may have some Mesopotamian Crusaders (question was Levantine, so I consider it met), or Egyptian Crusaders (more likely I think, since the Romans just took half the Fatamid territories) taking advantage of a civil war in the muslim world (not likely successfully.
 
Not convinced that the Latins would be needed
The point is not about Crusaders being needed by Byzantines, the point is about Crusaders being convinced they are needed to deal with a growingly more unstable situation that prevents the safety of more and more popular Palestinian pilgrimages while that the fusion between milites mentality and classical medieval Christianism is already done.

they may seek to help, but given how much the Romans want to reclaim their old turf, then by invading the Fatamid-held Levant
Actually, the question is how much they wanted to reclaim their old turf : there's reasons why they allied with Fatimids, why they didn't pushed too much on Syria (preferring making the Emirate of Alep a client), why Basile II failed to take Tripoli, Roman III being humiliated face to the pocket dynasty of Mirdasids while trying to annex Alep, etc.
Without mentioning the Norman and Pechengeg pressure on their western borders in the same time, we can ask indeed at which point Byzantines didn't felt they had to limit their expansion, and focus on more strategical regions (such as Armenia) or places more christianized (Armenia being such far more than XIth Syria or Palestine).

So far, arguing of a more important disorder in Middle-East (that wouldn't be that much different from the IOTL situation) wouldn't logically lead to Byzzie-wank.

and crushing banditry they come across, that now-purged banditry could lead to the Roman intervention being seen as a sign of relief and a return to the rule of law - leading to a potentially amicable occupation of the area.
That's, and I'm sorry to say that, is basically wishful thinking.
Once again, the whole Xth and XIth history of Middle-East was about civil wars and geopolitical disorders. It never allowed Byzantines to appear like saviors of the day, or made their campaigns in the region easier or in anyway "amicable occupation".

Even the occupation of Armenia was met with quite big hostility from Armenians, which shared more features with Byzantines than any other people around, but Arab/Arabized Syrian and Mesopotamian populations would have simply accepted if not welcomed Byzantine troops? I, to say the least, have a really hard time swallowing this pill.
 
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