The USN had VADM Robert Ghormley, who was in command of the Solomons area for the first three months of the Guadalcanal campaign. He was too pessimistic, refused several requests to reinforce the island, fearing that if the reinforcements sent were lost, areas in the rear (New Calodonia, for example) would be vulnerable to attack. He was a close friend of Admrial Nimitz, who was initially reluctant to fire him, but Nimitz's staff convinced him to do so, and Bull Halsey replaced him as area commander.
Also, any flag officer (RADM Ralph Christie, RADM Jimmy Fife, and RADM Robert English all come to mind) who refused to listen to submarine, destroyer, and torpedo plane crews about the wretched torpedoes those elements were issued. Mainly because those officers in command-especially in the sub force, had been involved in designing torpedoes, they were reluctant to admit they'd made mistakes. The higher-ups in the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance also come to mind-especially VADM "Spike" Blandy-the head of BuOrd. It took field fixes-which BuOrd reluctantly admitted worked, before torpedoes began working right.
As far as the Army goes, not His Majesty MacArthur, but LTGEN Richard Southerland, his Chief of Staff: mainly because of his insistence that all air orders come to him for approval before being submitted to the boss, that the Far East Air Force was wrecked on the ground on 8 Dec 41. Hap Arnold never forgave anyone connected with MacArthur for that. It took MAJGEN George Kinney taking over 5th Air Force and Kinney getting unrestricted access to MacArthur before Southerland stopped interfering with Air Force matters.