WI: Grant comes east in 1862, Pope stays west

This ACW scenario, for a change, is about the U.S. war effort doing better than in real life, rather than worse. Namely - Let's say that Grant takes more defensive precautions before the battle of Shiloh, rather than being caught completely unprepared by A. S. Johnston. As a result, rather than overrunning part of Grant's forces and pushing them back the attack stalls early on. (Johnston, who was ridiculously foolhardy, still wants to lead from the front lines and still gets shot). The casualty totals are somewhat better for the Union and Buell isn't as necessary. This means that Grant doesn't get quite the wave of bad publicity and reputation for being a butcher that he got in real life. As a result, two months later when Lincoln is looking for a hard-driving western general to come to Virginia, Grant gets the nod rather than John Pope.

So, how is Grant likely to do commanding the Army of Virginia against Lee? Also, in Grant's absence, how well will Pope and Buell handle the western theater?
 
Oh, and another question - who's likely to replace Grant in command of the Army of the Tennessee?
 
Oh, and another question - who's likely to replace Grant in command of the Army of the Tennessee?

Probably Rosecrans, Thomas, or Sherman. Let's look at each one.

IOTL, when Pope was transferred, Rosecrans took over the Army of the Mississippi. He was originally a divisional commander in that army. So he was thought of well. But Rosecrans would have to be transferred to aother army instead of simply being promoted up the chain. So probably not.

IOTL when Halleck kicked Grant upstairs, he promoted Thomas to be field commander of most of the Army Tennessee. Thomas was originally a divisional commander in Buell's army. Halleck organized his forces into "wings" lead by Pope, Buell, and Thomas, so Halleck obviously held Thomas in high regard.

The third possibility is promotion from within the Army of the Tennessee. Since Grant looks golden in this scenario, it is possible he gets to recommend/pick his own replacement. In which case, we need to look at which general Grant holds in most esteem. This is probably either Sherman, Prentiss, or WHL Wallace. All fought well at IOTL's Shiloh. Which one Grant picks probably depends on how well they did ITTL. IOTL, WHL Wallace was killed from wounds in the battle, and Prentiss was captured in the Hornet's Nest. There may have been an antipathy between Prentiss and Grant, so either Sherman or WHL Wallace is likely. However, Sherman still has a bad reputation to live down, and he hasn't had his future successes. Nor are Grant and Sherman all that close yet.

So I think the most likely candidate would either be WHL Wallace or George H. Thomas.
 
OK, Lee is screwed. There is no way he is beating Grant so the war end in late 1863 or early 1864 I guess.

Grant is in command of the Union Army of Virginia during the Northern Virginia Campaign then in late summer 1862.

Grant will be similar to Pope. His promotion is likely to be resented, and he doesn't have the same reputation that he did in 1864. Still, victories at Donelson and Shiloh will be worth something. He also has better temperament and talents than Pope.

Grant will have the same objectives as Pope: 1) defend Washington and the Shenandoah Valley, and 2) draw Lee away from McClellan and attack him.

Lee always tried to understand the mind of his opposing general. Likely he will be respectful of Grant's own success, and Lee doesn't have the reputation yet that he earned IOTL. He will still determine McClellan won't attack, and will therefore try to destroy Grant's Army of Virginia in detail.

Lee will likely be aggressive in tactics attack Grant, but probably won't risk dividing his forces. Most likely we'll get stalemate where Grant stays on the field after an inconclusive battle. He waits for McClellan's Army of the Potomac to arrive, and together they will pursue Lee.

Grant and McClellan will likely not get along, and Lee will try to exploit that. Sensing Grant is the better officer, he will likely try to destroy McClellan next, but McClellan's own paranoia and caution will likely prevent it.

Face with two armies in the field, Lee is likely pushed south with the possibility of Richmond falling before end of 1862. Presumably, when Richmond falls, Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation.

Assuming Grant does well, Lincoln promotes him to theater command. He either combines both armies against Lee to lead himself, or he is in the same role in 1864/1865 IOTL. Lincoln probably kicks McClellan upstairs as a training and organizing role, but without field command and without influence on strategy.

When 1863 begins, the Confederacy will be in a bad position with a provisional capital elsewhere - maybe Atlanta. War is probably over before year's end as the Mississippi River is finally taken, and Grant presses south from Virginia into North Carolina. With the Confederacy split in two, and not having the resources of Virginia, it'll be tough.

The war could end with a siege of Atlanta as Grant comes form the north while Thomas/Sherman comes from the west.
 
Grant is in command of the Union Army of Virginia during the Northern Virginia Campaign then in late summer 1862.

Grant will be similar to Pope. His promotion is likely to be resented, and he doesn't have the same reputation that he did in 1864. Still, victories at Donelson and Shiloh will be worth something. He also has better temperament and talents than Pope.

Grant will have the same objectives as Pope: 1) defend Washington and the Shenandoah Valley, and 2) draw Lee away from McClellan and attack him.

Lee always tried to understand the mind of his opposing general. Likely he will be respectful of Grant's own success, and Lee doesn't have the reputation yet that he earned IOTL. He will still determine McClellan won't attack, and will therefore try to destroy Grant's Army of Virginia in detail.

Lee will likely be aggressive in tactics attack Grant, but probably won't risk dividing his forces. Most likely we'll get stalemate where Grant stays on the field after an inconclusive battle. He waits for McClellan's Army of the Potomac to arrive, and together they will pursue Lee.

Grant and McClellan will likely not get along, and Lee will try to exploit that. Sensing Grant is the better officer, he will likely try to destroy McClellan next, but McClellan's own paranoia and caution will likely prevent it.

Face with two armies in the field, Lee is likely pushed south with the possibility of Richmond falling before end of 1862. Presumably, when Richmond falls, Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation.

Assuming Grant does well, Lincoln promotes him to theater command. He either combines both armies against Lee to lead himself, or he is in the same role in 1864/1865 IOTL. Lincoln probably kicks McClellan upstairs as a training and organizing role, but without field command and without influence on strategy.

When 1863 begins, the Confederacy will be in a bad position with a provisional capital elsewhere - maybe Atlanta. War is probably over before year's end as the Mississippi River is finally taken, and Grant presses south from Virginia into North Carolina. With the Confederacy split in two, and not having the resources of Virginia, it'll be tough.

The war could end with a siege of Atlanta as Grant comes form the north while Thomas/Sherman comes from the west.


I see Lee trying to take refuge in audacity as that worked for him before. Grant being Grant won't be intimidated and defeat Lee but certainly not destroy him. Lee retreats with Grant following and McClellan being McClellan will dawdle thinking half the Rebel Army is waiting to jump him. I agree Lee will try to jump McClellan and he may be able to drive him back but not destroy him. Grant then jumps him again, winning again and McClellan is kicked upstairs somewhere. Lee will now be more cautious with Grant and Lee will be slowly but steadily pushed backwards.
 
I see Lee trying to take refuge in audacity as that worked for him before. Grant being Grant won't be intimidated and defeat Lee but certainly not destroy him. Lee retreats with Grant following and McClellan being McClellan will dawdle thinking half the Rebel Army is waiting to jump him. I agree Lee will try to jump McClellan and he may be able to drive him back but not destroy him. Grant then jumps him again, winning again and McClellan is kicked upstairs somewhere. Lee will now be more cautious with Grant and Lee will be slowly but steadily pushed backwards.

McClellan resents Grant and will most likely spread rumors of him drinking.

Of course this having the opposite effect when Grant actually beats the crap out of Lee whilst McClellan dawdles.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
OK, Lee is screwed. There is no way he is beating Grant so the war end in late 1863 or early 1864 I guess.

This is very, very far from certain. Even outnumbered two-to-one, Lee got the best of Grant in the Wilderness and that was without Jackson. In this scenario, he'd be outnumbered by a much less narrow margin and have Jackson as well. I think Grant would do better than Pope, but that's not saying much.
 
It's an interesting idea, but it's fraught with danger for poor Grant. McClellan, due to his popularity, is unlikely to be sidelined and still ends up with a separate command. He's likely to maneuver against Grant in the background and spread rumors about him.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Pope's largest challenges as CG of the Army of the Virginia

This ACW scenario, for a change, is about the U.S. war effort doing better than in real life, rather than worse. Namely - Let's say that Grant takes more defensive precautions before the battle of Shiloh, rather than being caught completely unprepared by A. S. Johnston. As a result, rather than overrunning part of Grant's forces and pushing them back the attack stalls early on. (Johnston, who was ridiculously foolhardy, still wants to lead from the front lines and still gets shot). The casualty totals are somewhat better for the Union and Buell isn't as necessary. This means that Grant doesn't get quite the wave of bad publicity and reputation for being a butcher that he got in real life. As a result, two months later when Lincoln is looking for a hard-driving western general to come to Virginia, Grant gets the nod rather than John Pope. So, how is Grant likely to do commanding the Army of Virginia against Lee? Also, in Grant's absence, how well will Pope and Buell handle the western theater?

Pope's largest challenges as CG of the Army of the Virginia were:

a) Halleck declined to take the field and serve as an army group commander; given his record as such in the west after Shiloh and before Corinth, that may be a wash, although if nothing else, if Halleck was in the field, McClellan would have had to be a little less Achillles sulking in his tent - at the same time, Halleck's behavior regarding Grant was inexcusable;
b) McClellan makes Montgomery look like Eisenhower when it comes to serving as commander of a joint force, and everyone McClellan served with was in the same army;
c) His corps commanders: Banks, Sigel, and McDowell. When McDowell is the best subordinate Pope had, it's actually pretty remarkable Pope was able to do what he did do at 2nd Manassas;
d) Those guys: Lee and Jackson and Longstreet.
e) John Pope: capable enough as a corps-level commander on the Mississippi (okay, facing McCown, but still), he was not capable as an army-level commander, certainly not with the forces available for the Army of Virginia.

As capable as Grant is, even he would have a difficult time dealing with a-d, above; simply not being John Pope is something, but probably not enough.

As far as who replaces Grant as the replacement for Halleck, the problem is the central-east Tennessee theater and the west Tennessee-Mississippi theater are diverging; given WT Sherman's performance at Shiloh, he is the obvious choice for the Mississippi. The dark horse on the river is Pope. The best choice for the central-east Tennessee theater is Thomas.

An interesting alternative to Pope for the "westerner called east" would have been a) Buell and/or b) Rosecrans, both of whom had "decent" relationships with McClellan, while Buell had basically started out in the Army of the Potomac as a division commander before he was sent to Kentucky.

Best,
 
Grant would have a very difficult time with Pope's command, for reasons outlined above. That said, he isn't John Pope and he is Sam Grant after all, so Second Manassas might not be the career-busting cluster-fuck it was for Mr. 'I have my headquarters in the saddle''. It's really difficult to speculate how things might go. Too many variables in the mix.But rather suspect Lee won't be going into Maryland that summer after he's tangled a time or two with Grant.
 
Grant's big successes (in the east) mostly weren't from amazing tactical or strategic brilliance, but from a solid understanding of his advantages (manpower and material) and the will to exploit them. Even heavily outnumbered, Lee actually got the best of him as often as not; Grant just kept coming anyway and the Confederacy didn't have the manpower to do anything about it.

In 1862 the Confederates DO have the manpower to retaliate, and the advantage of manpower is largely wasted when McClellan is leading any of it. If it was any other general except McClellan, I'd say that Grant's willingness to just keep fighting would prove decisive, but here he either needs to pull back or have his army destroyed through attrition.

However, one caveat: Lincoln recognized the value of Grant's persistence, and may well have responded to McClellan sitting around while Grant fought multiple major battles against the bulk of Lee's forces by removing McClellan. It doesn't even really matter who replaces him - somebody willing to fight is enough.
 
Grant's big successes (in the east) mostly weren't from amazing tactical or strategic brilliance, but from a solid understanding of his advantages (manpower and material) and the will to exploit them. Even heavily outnumbered, Lee actually got the best of him as often as not; Grant just kept coming anyway and the Confederacy didn't have the manpower to do anything about it.

In 1862 the Confederates DO have the manpower to retaliate, and the advantage of manpower is largely wasted when McClellan is leading any of it. If it was any other general except McClellan, I'd say that Grant's willingness to just keep fighting would prove decisive, but here he either needs to pull back or have his army destroyed through attrition.

However, one caveat: Lincoln recognized the value of Grant's persistence, and may well have responded to McClellan sitting around while Grant fought multiple major battles against the bulk of Lee's forces by removing McClellan. It doesn't even really matter who replaces him - somebody willing to fight is enough.


This is wrong on so many levels it isn't funny.
1) Grant's tactical brilliance was shown both in the Vicksburg and Chattanooga Campaigns Both are studied in military academies and collages to this day.

2) Grant, not Les, was the one to think in Army Groups. The Army of the Potomac was only one of the armies Grant was only one of the armies Grant was commanding to trap Lee. Lee never looked past the Army of Northern
Virginia while Grant looked at the US Army as a whole.

3) In six weeks Grant moved Lee to a position which even Lee said only doomed him to defeat in the long run. That being the James River.

Lee was never Grant's equal let alone superior.
 
This is wrong on so many levels it isn't funny.
1) Grant's tactical brilliance was shown both in the Vicksburg and Chattanooga Campaigns Both are studied in military academies and collages to this day.

2) Grant, not Les, was the one to think in Army Groups. The Army of the Potomac was only one of the armies Grant was only one of the armies Grant was commanding to trap Lee. Lee never looked past the Army of Northern
Virginia while Grant looked at the US Army as a whole.

3) In six weeks Grant moved Lee to a position which even Lee said only doomed him to defeat in the long run. That being the James River.

Lee was never Grant's equal let alone superior.

Yep. Grant was the preeminent general of the civil war. That he understood the nature and need of the war and so - unlike every other general, blue and grey - didn't pause after a battle, but kept pushing on was not because he was a dull, bloodthirsty pounder but that he knew the strategic need of his campaigns.

Considering the thing about the Wilderness above - Grant came out of that battle with what he wanted (albeit at a high cost; although a lower proportion than the Confederates), Lee did not. Whi was the victor?
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Grant's tactical brilliance was shown both in the Vicksburg and Chattanooga Campaigns Both are studied in military academies and collages to this day.

He was talking specifically about the east.

Lee was never Grant's equal let alone superior.

But what if the odds between them had been even, rather than Grant having a two-to-one advantage in manpower and being vastly better equipped?

Considering the thing about the Wilderness above - Grant came out of that battle with what he wanted (albeit at a high cost; although a lower proportion than the Confederates), Lee did not. Whi was the victor?

I don't think one can definitively say one side or the other won the Battle of the Wilderness. Tactically, Lee smashed in both of Union's flanks and inflicted much heavier casualties than he suffered, even though he had about half of the men Grant had. That's a pretty astounding achievement. Had Ewell allowed Gordon to mount his assault on the Union right flank earlier than he actually did, the tactical outcome would have been even worse for Grant.

Of course, in fighting this battle, Lee suffered casualties that could not be replaced and he failed in his objective to halt Grant's offensive at the outset. From a long-term military point of view, Grant had begun the painful process of wearing Lee down through attrition. Yet Grant also failed to inflict a decisive defeat upon Lee and allowed suffered casualties which, from a political point of view, were very dangerous; every man falling to rebel bullets without a decisive result was like a drip of acid onto Lincoln's reelection chances. And Confederate hopes for victory rested in 1864 on Lincoln losing at the polls.

We tend to view the Wilderness as "leaning Union" because the Union eventually won the war. Had the Confederacy eventually won, we would interpret it differently even if the events of the battle had played themselves out in the same manner.
 
He was talking specifically about the east.
Where Grant lost not single campaign. Lee lost a number of them including West Virginia , Antietam and Gettysburg. If he can't smash McClellan he suere as hell not smashing Grant.

But what if the odds between them had been even, rather than Grant having a two-to-one advantage in manpower and being vastly better equipped?
Lee would have lost in the long run. Grant lost not a single campaign in which he was a general Lee lost several.


I don't think one can definitively say one side or the other won the Battle of the Wilderness. Tactically, Lee smashed in both of Union's flanks and inflicted much heavier casualties than he suffered, even though he had about half of the men Grant had. That's a pretty astounding achievement. Had Ewell allowed Gordon to mount his assault on the Union right flank earlier than he actually did, the tactical outcome would have been even worse for Grant.


And still would have won, it wasn't that close. Grant isn't Little Mac he didn't panic the entire war.

Of course, in fighting this battle, Lee suffered casualties that could not be replaced and he failed in his objective to halt Grant's offensive at the outset. From a long-term military point of view, Grant had begun the painful process of wearing Lee down through attrition. Yet Grant also failed to inflict a decisive defeat upon Lee and allowed suffered casualties which, from a political point of view, were very dangerous; every man falling to rebel bullets without a decisive result was like a drip of acid onto Lincoln's reelection chances. And Confederate hopes for victory rested in 1864 on Lincoln losing at the polls.

Lincoln also smashed McClellan in the actual election. A stalemate at Wilderness isn't going to stop Sherman taking Atlanta.

We tend to view the Wilderness as "leaning Union" because the Union eventually won the war. Had the Confederacy eventually won, we would interpret it differently even if the events of the battle had played themselves out in the same manner.

It would have taken a miracle for the CSA to win at that late date. For one thing it isn't going to stop Sherman taking Atlanta.
So no Lee isn't going to beat Grant , at most he stalemates him. If he can't smash Pope or Burnside, by destroying the AOTP, he certainly can't smash up Grant.
 
Lee achieved a series of draws against Grant, some better than others, before losing completely. Historical context always determines whether such battles were victories for who. Grant always met Lee blow for blow. Both completely destroyed lesser commanders. Simply put, they are an equal match.

Since the Union does have an advantage in numbers, draws against Grant's Army of Virginia allows the extra Union troops - whether under the command of McClellan, Grant, or someone else - to be decisive elsewhere in the same theater. This is a bad position for Lee to be in.

Grant understood better than Lee how the tactical lead to the operational and then strategic. Lee should not have depended on so many direct assaults to defeat the Union armies - he would win spectacular victories, but at huge cost to his men that the South could not keep up. Grant always preferred an indirect maneuver despite the bloody reputation he got because of the Wilderness (which Lee avoided despite his own high casualties, Malvern Hill, and Pickett's Charge because by then he was already a legend). Lee was skilled enough to frustrate Grant in that attempt until the James River and then Appomattox. But with better luck, he could have done it earlier.

Lee is good enough to stalemate Grant alone, but he isn't fighting Grant alone. Either the Army of the Potomac is going to do something, or Grant will become the leader of the super enlarged Union armies of late 1862 and early 1863 in which case he has the same dynamics as in 1864/1865.

More important, without the dramatic victories of 2nd Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, Lee's legend won't become as established as OTL.

Grant's biggest problem is that he'll have to deal with much political intrigue, and that he has to deal with a lot of subordinates who need to be cashiered. He'll need a good amount of time before any force becomes "his" army and he raises the best officers under his command.
 
Lee achieved a series of draws against Grant, some better than others, before losing completely. Historical context always determines whether such battles were victories for who. Grant always met Lee blow for blow. Both completely destroyed lesser commanders. Simply put, they are an equal match.

Since the Union does have an advantage in numbers, draws against Grant's Army of Virginia allows the extra Union troops - whether under the command of McClellan, Grant, or someone else - to be decisive elsewhere in the same theater. This is a bad position for Lee to be in.

Grant understood better than Lee how the tactical lead to the operational and then strategic. Lee should not have depended on so many direct assaults to defeat the Union armies - he would win spectacular victories, but at huge cost to his men that the South could not keep up. Grant always preferred an indirect maneuver despite the bloody reputation he got because of the Wilderness (which Lee avoided despite his own high casualties, Malvern Hill, and Pickett's Charge because by then he was already a legend). Lee was skilled enough to frustrate Grant in that attempt until the James River and then Appomattox. But with better luck, he could have done it earlier.

Lee is good enough to stalemate Grant alone, but he isn't fighting Grant alone. Either the Army of the Potomac is going to do something, or Grant will become the leader of the super enlarged Union armies of late 1862 and early 1863 in which case he has the same dynamics as in 1864/1865.

More important, without the dramatic victories of 2nd Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, Lee's legend won't become as established as OTL.

Grant's biggest problem is that he'll have to deal with much political intrigue, and that he has to deal with a lot of subordinates who need to be cashiered. He'll need a good amount of time before any force becomes "his" army and he raises the best officers under his command.

Yeah , I see Army politics as a bigger problem for Grant than Lee is.
 
Yeah , I see Army politics as a bigger problem for Grant than Lee is.

Considering its Sigel, Banks and McDowell. Each one would rather think they can command the army better.

Its basically three different "McClernard's" for Grant in one go. He might start drinking again.
 
Considering its Sigel, Banks and McDowell. Each one would rather think they can command the army better.

Its basically three different "McClernard's" for Grant in one go. He might start drinking again.

Add that to the fact that Grant will be under considerable pressure to attack immediately (he will most likely not have time to organize his staff the way he would like) and McClellan is still going to be sulking like OTL, you get a recipe for a real sucker punch to Grant's career.

Grant might start off spectacularly, but Lee will stalemate him somewhere, and has the capability (unlike in 1864) to launch a wide ranging counter attack which could throw Grant off balance. Cue a long line of jealous subordinates blaming everything on Grant.

Grant could win the resulting campaign, but the poisonous atmosphere of intrigue and petty rivalry would really throw the Union army off balance, which is a boon to Lee and no one else. Most likely the army's confidence in Grant is shattered and Lincoln may then be forced to replace him.
 
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