Allied landing in Calabria - Axis forces cut off ?

Magnum · Sep 2, 2014

OTL

Even though heavy resistance from German forces in Sicilly continued in the last week of July and first week of August, the eventual outcome of the campaign was pretty much clear at that point. Even Axis commanders admitted this on July 27th. BY the 29th, Kesselring reported to Hitler that he would need 3 days to perform a succesfull evacuation, starting August 1st.

Between 1–10 August, over 12,000 men, 4,500 vehicles and 5,000 tons of equipment were evacuated, whilst the bulk of the evacuation took place from 11-17 August. In total, the Germans evacuated some 52,000 troops (including 4,444 wounded), 14,105 vehicles, 47 tanks, 94 guns, 1,100 tons of ammunition and about 20,700 tons of gear and stores.

The allies proved inacapable of interdicting the straits due to heavy AA fire, narrow waters with a strong current and coastal artillery covering them. What they did try was launch brigade-sized amphibious assaults in Sicilly on August 15th in order to trap the Germans. However, the speed of the Axis withdrawal was such that these operations "hit air".

What if...

Anticipating a victory in Sicilly, and determined to prevent the escape of Axis forces, the Allies plan for landings in Calabria, far enough from Reggio di Calabria that coastal Artillery and AA fire are not an issue, but close enough that troops can advance overland quickly and subject the straits to direct fire, thus shutting down naval traffic and effectively trapping German forces on the island ?

First draft of proposed landings:

Any time between July 29th and August 1st would have been ideal.

From what I found, the area at the time was defended by 1st Parachute Division headquarters and the 1st Parachute Regiment, commanded by Richard Heidrich (with the rest of the division having been sent as reinforcements to Sicily), along with Italian units (which I couldn't identify wrt both numbers and quality).

So, at first glance, a determined amphibious assault by (at least) two brigandes, plus airborne landings* and naval gunfire support could very well have achieved the aim of establishing a foothold in Calabria and thus trapping axis forces.

* 2nd parachute brigade and two battalions of 4th parachute brigade (UK) were biding their time in Tunisia, whilst at least some elemnts of the remainder of 1st Airborne division (UK) and 82nd Airborne (US) could be mobilized for the operation after their deployment to Sicilly).

Cook · Sep 2, 2014

Certainly Kesselring's great fear was a landing in Calabria to cut off his forces retreating towards Messina. I would suggest the Gulf of Squillace though; at Catanzaro where the peninsular is both at its narrowest there and it is the least hilly terrain in all of Calabria. Less than 10,000m of land separates the Gulf of Squillace from the Gulf of Santa Eufemia; important because the M101 howitzer's maximum range was 11,000m. This still puts your landings within range of tactical air support fighters operating from bases near Syracuse. It only requires one landing site then to isolate the remaining forces in Calabria and Sicily.

Magnum · Sep 2, 2014

I thought about that, but figured that

1. it would hardly interfere with the evacuation per se
2. it would leave the troops there vulnerable to a counterattack from both the evacuated units (now bottled up in the toe of Italy) and reinforcements that would be sent from the north

That's why, IMO, landing closer to Reggio is preferable, because it allows you to shut it down and prevent any units from evacuating in the first place almost on day 1. The fact that it allows more time for fighters to stay around is also a minor bonus, but which apparently was all the allied commmanders ever thought about...

EDIT: On second thought, it might not be such a bad idea, provided the Allies are able to properly reinforce the landings - that way, the trapped formations are still annihilated, and the Germans also lose forces they may sent from up north in the counterattack.

OTOH, if the Germans push harder and quicker than expected, it could be a disaster for the allies, who would not only prevent the Germans from escaping, but also lose a couple of divisions in the process !!!!

Since allied commanders usually went with the less risky option, they may choose to land closer to Reggio IMHO.

Carl Schwamberger · Sep 2, 2014

What naval minefields were set off these landing sites?

Magnum · Sep 2, 2014

Carl Schwamberger said:
What naval minefields were set off these landing sites?

Honestly, I have no idea. If any1 does, feel free to chime in.

As a question, assuming there were these big-ass minefields, would they really negate any allied ability to land there ?

Dathi THorfinnsson · Sep 2, 2014

Magnum said:
As a question, assuming there were these big-ass minefields, would they really negate any allied ability to land there ?

Somewhere, there MUST be a cartoon picture to illustrate this, with dozens of fat pink bottoms bobbing on the surface of the ocean....

Cook · Sep 2, 2014

There was no Italian coastal equivalent of the West Wall on the Atlantic coast; Italy's coastline was simply too long and the time and resources that the Germans could apply to the task too limited. Kesselring thought that the Allies could effectively land nearly anywhere on the peninsular; throughout the Italian campaign he had to hold forces back along both coasts in case the Allies carried out another landing further up and cut him off. The Day of Battle by Rick Atkinson is the book to get hold of, that and James Holland's Italy's Sorrow. John Follain's Mussolini's Island is also useful.

Look More Closely Later · Sep 2, 2014

Allied landing in Calabria - Axis forces cut off?

Cook:
I have a nasty feeling that (at least in the original timeline) there may not have been any spare landing craft available in the Mediterranean for this operation you propose for the end of July. In the original timeline, on September 21st 1943, Churchill was asked in the House of Commons why the main attack on Italy had taken until the start of September to launch and Churchill replied that the allies' landing craft had all been engaged in Southern Sicily until the start of August, and then it had been necessary to take them back to Africa for repair and reloading before they could be used again - all of which took time, of course. [1]
Churchill certainly gives a shortage of available and ready landing craft as a reason for the holdup or cancellation of other operations after Sicily in his History of the Second World War.

*****
[1] See Chapter IX of Volume V, 'Closing the Ring', of Churchill's History of the Second World War.

Simon · Sep 2, 2014

I'm sure I can remember reading somewhere just a short while ago that due to some sort of communications/command cock-up that most of the heavy bombers that were available in the theatre weren't used but instead went out and hit other targets instead. If that's the case then even with the heavy anti-aircraft defences the Germans might have been able to dig up it's going to make their job a hell of a lot more difficult if they're under almost round-the-clock aerial bombardment, might not be enough to completely close the straits but potentially slow them down and allow the Allies to capture a lot more men and matriel.

Magnum · Sep 3, 2014

Look More Closely Later said:
Cook:
I have a nasty feeling that (at least in the original timeline) there may not have been any spare landing craft available in the Mediterranean for this operation you propose for the end of July. In the original timeline, on September 21st 1943, Churchill was asked in the House of Commons why the main attack on Italy had taken until the start of September to launch and Churchill replied that the allies' landing craft had all been engaged in Southern Sicily until the start of August, and then it had been necessary to take them back to Africa for repair and reloading before they could be used again - all of which took time, of course. [1]
Churchill certainly gives a shortage of available and ready landing craft as a reason for the holdup or cancellation of other operations after Sicily in his History of the Second World War.

*****
[1] See Chapter IX of Volume V, 'Closing the Ring', of Churchill's History of the Second World War.

However, there were landing craft available, and this is proven by the fact that the Allies landed TWO brigades at different locations in Sicilly to cut off the Germans on August 15 for exactly ZERO results, as the Germans had already passed by...

The initial stage of the landing I'm proposing would again require those two brigades to be put ashore by landing craft, nothing more, nothing less. Along with the paratroopers and naval and air support, they should be able to easily deal with the overstreched German Fallschirmjager regiment easily.

Look More Closely Later · Sep 3, 2014

Landing Craft

Magnum said:
However, there were landing craft available, and this is proven by the fact that the Allies landed TWO brigades at different locations in Sicilly to cut off the Germans on August 15 for exactly ZERO results, as the Germans had already passed by...

The initial stage of the landing I'm proposing would again require those two brigades to be put ashore by landing craft, nothing more, nothing less. Along with the paratroopers and naval and air support, they should be able to easily deal with the overstreched German Fallschirmjager regiment easily.

I'm unclear now if you're proposing that the historical August 15th operations take place in Calabria instead on August 15th or an alternate history where more landing craft were manufactured earlier and were available in the Mediterranean by the summer of 1943 (which Churchill would adore, I'm sure... Avalanche (Salerno) and Shingle (Anzio) show his love for amphibious attempts to turn a flank if the resources were there.

)
Edit:
Apologies to you (and Cook) for mixing you up. It was a late night post here.

Look More Closely Later · Sep 3, 2014

Calabria Landings

Matters of landing craft aside, though, I assume any landing would need to be as far south-west as possible to:
1) be as close to allied supply bases as possible.
2) be as close to any airbases in Sicily that the allies might be able to use at this point as possible.
3) be as far away from German/Italian airbases in mainland Italy as possible.
4) be as far away from any forces counter-attacking the beach from the north as possible. (A bit of a problem if any attempt at a trap gets caught between the Germans evacuating Sicily and forces coming in from the North, squashing the landing forces flat.)

All of which several other posters already seem to have said!

Magnum · Sep 3, 2014

Look More Closely Later said:
I'm unclear now if you're proposing that the historical August 15th operations take place in Calabria instead on August 15th or an alternate history where more landing craft were manufactured earlier and were available in the Mediterranean by the summer of 1943 (which Churchill would adore, I'm sure... Avalanche (Salerno) and Shingle (Anzio) show his love for amphibious attempts to turn a flank if the resources were there. )
Edit:
Apologies to you (and Cook) for mixing you up. It was a late night post here.

IOTL, the initial plan for the invasion of Sicilly envisaged landing at every major port (except Messina in the north-east) because it was thought the landing craft could not do the job of supplying the troops on the beaches and that a more conventional supply route was necessary. This plan was discarded since it required a too great dispersion of forces and, fortunately for the Allies, the landing craft prooved apt at landing supplies on the beaches.

As it was, the allies were burning through a lot of supplies at that very critical moment in the battle by launching attacks against entrenched German positions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Troina and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Centuripe). Not only did these attacks force the landing craft to ship extra supplies to the beaches, they also pushed the Germans further north-east, closer to their evacuation point, whilst also shortening their lines (allowing them to evacuate more easily).

At the time these attacks were launched, there wasn't really any urgent need for them (beacuse, with Reggio secured, Axis forces weren't really going to go anywere), and they could have easily been delayed untill 1) the bulk of the landings in Calabria were over and 2) once the regular ports became operational (early august).

So, in short, Troina and Centuripe are not launched untill around August 10th, keeping the Germans further from Messina and supply consumption low, whilst the landings take place as outlined before (no later than August 2nd, preferably sooner).

Plus, this was not an alien concept to the Allied commanders, who tried to do just this on August 15th (landings to the enemy rear to cut him off), it's just that they were waaay too conservative about it (probably one of their biggest flaws throughout the war)

Doing this operation ensures that the Germans lose 4 crack divisions (1st Fallschirjaeger, Hermann Goring, 15th and 29th PanzerGrenadier) and the Italians the 200k men they deployed OTL. It also gives the Allies a beachhead on mainland Italy a full month earlier

Gannt the chartist · Sep 3, 2014

The outcome in sicily is not in doubt against OTL allied forces.

The OTL baytown was XIII corps, so - where you going find a spare 4 divisions?

Even it is feasible ( sure lets forget about air cover, the guys we are currently fighting and supply, not to mention the italian surrender negotiations, it looks real cool on the map.).

The Allied commanders may have been cautious, but they won. As in destruction of powers of resistance, unconditional surrender, occupation for generations, dismemberment of society and rewriting in our image, won. Not the pissant march through the capital kind, but did that as well.

Magnum · Sep 4, 2014

Gannt the chartist said:
The outcome in sicily is not in doubt against OTL allied forces.

Of course its not in doubt - everyone pretty much recognized it. What's your point ?

Gannt the chartist said:
The OTL baytown was XIII corps, so - where you going find a spare 4 divisions?

Why do you need 4 spare divisions ? To defeat one Fallschirmjaeger regiment ? At the time Baytown was launched, the 4 crack german divisions had already evacuated to the mainland whilst reinforcements kept streaming in from the north. This is NOT the case on August 1st.

Plus, Monty himself, the master of caution, called the operation "ineffective" before even beginning it.

Gannt the chartist said:
sure lets forget about air cover

110km to the southern landing zone, 150km to the northern one from allied airfield around Siracuse. Totally doable.

Gannt the chartist said:
the guys we are currently fighting

How are they forgetting about them ? They are just doing a bigger, better version of the maneuver they attempted OTL.

Gannt the chartist said:
and supply

As soon as the regular ports become operational (which, according to the Churcill qoute, we can infer took place at the beginning of August anyway) the Allied forces in Sicilly will have more than enough supplies to sustain a continued offensive against Axis forces (which by the way won't be getting ANY supplies any more except for what can be flown in by transport planes, ergo not much)

Gannt the chartist said:
not to mention the italian surrender negotiations

How is trapping and destroying the only significant German force in southern Italy, plus landing on the mainland, going to adversly affect the surrender negotiations ?

Gannt the chartist said:
The Allied commanders may have been cautious, but they won. As in destruction of powers of resistance, unconditional surrender, occupation for generations, dismemberment of society and rewriting in our image, won. Not the pissant march through the capital kind, but did that as well.

The overt caution displayed by allied commanders costed them more lives down the line IMO, as well as delaying the end of the war and thus costing untold numbers of hapless souls in the concentration and work camps their lives as well.

To give a few examples:

Norway
The Home Fleet, instead of engaging German ships near Bergen and effectively gaining control over western Norway, turned tail and ran after a single destroyer was sunk by the LW.

BEF
Despite being ordered to do so by the PM, Lord Gort did not initiate a full-scale counterattack towards the south.

Crete
Caution for the lives of his men caused the New Zeeland commander to withdraw from the German paras at a critical location despite outnumbering them, effectively sealing the fate of Crete

North Africa
Despite a vast superiority, Monty made no serious attempts to destroy Rommel's fleeign forces after El Alemain, allowing them to retreat to Tunisia

Anzio
What should have been an agressive push designed to dislodge the entire German line and liberate Rome months in advance turned into the OTL mess because the Allied commander was too cautios to advance.

Falaise pocket
Need I say more ?

Magnum · Sep 5, 2014

A last question: assuming this goes through with success, what are the possible implications for the remainder of the Italian campaign and beyond ?

For one, increased use of the transports will likely push back the date on when the next big amphibious landing can take place, OTOH the Allied ground advance might reach Salerno by September anyway. Could we maybe see a landing at Ostia/Rome in conjunction with the Italian surrender ?

Carl Schwamberger · Sep 5, 2014

Magnum said:
A last question: assuming this goes through with success, what are the possible implications for the remainder of the Italian campaign and beyond ?

One item will be Kesselrings proposal for a defense of southern Italy will be a non starter. With several more German mech divisions lost in Sicily, or at least rendered ineffective for a few weeks Kesselring may not even make such a proposal. That means the original German plan to establish a main zone of resistance in northern Italy and slowly withdraw to it is likely to be executed.

Magnum said:
For one, increased use of the transports will likely push back the date on when the next big amphibious landing can take place, OTOH the Allied ground advance might reach Salerno by September anyway. Could we maybe see a landing at Ostia/Rome in conjunction with the Italian surrender ?

If ULTRA or other intelligence sources reveal the decision to withdraw to north Italy then yes the plans to attack directly to Rome in September could be executed. Operation Giant was ordered and nearly executed, Its airborne force was actually taking off and forming up when the cancellation order came. So, with less German resistance in south Italy Op Giant is more likely to proceed.

Note that there were two versions of Op Giant. Giant II was aimed at Rome. Giant I was originally aimed at the airfields near Napoli in support of Op Avalanche. As with Giant II the strength of the German forces on and near the airborne objectives near Napoli made them extremely high risk operations. With this alternative withdrawl of the Germans the risks in the Giant I & II operations are a little less.

There was also consideration of aiming the Allied 5th Army at the coast adjacent to Napoli. That was discarded fairly early in the planning sessions as air fighter cover would have been nearly non existant

Other amphibious or littoral operations further north are restricted by conditions in the Adriatic, or the German presence on Sardinia. The latter makes the October execution of Operation Brimstone against Sardinia a given. It may even be given priority over all else after Rome, leading to its execution a few weeks earlier. The conclusion of operations Brimstone and Firebrand vs Sardinia and Corsica provides a Allied air and naval base wedged up into the thigh of the German position in the western Mediterranean. From the air bases there medium ranges twin engined bombes and fighter planes like the P47 can reach deeper into occupied Europe and add their weigh to the destruction of the German AF. OTL the USAAF wasted no time in doing this and two months after Corsica was captured six wings of USAAF and French medium bombers were permanetely based there, along with a proportionate number of fighter units. By early spring 44 the Sardinian/Corsican airfields could support surges of over 2000 bombers and fighters in operations over south France.

A German decision to leave south & central Italy in the early autum of 1943 eliminates any incentive for a Anzio style flanking operation in the late autum or winter. That allows either moving the amphib fleet to the UK earlier, allowing a May execution of the Overlord/Neptune operations. Or, or executing a attack in south France to seize Marsailles sometime during January-April.

Magnum · Sep 9, 2014

Carl Schwamberger said:
snip

If Allied and Italian forces secure Rome instead of the Germans, I think it's pretty much a given that, with headquearters intact and issuing orders, Italian units will be much more adept at not letting themselves be disarmed by handfulls of German soldiers.

In Rhodes and Sardinia, the Italian garrisons outnumbered local German units by large margins - if they are ordered to take them out, they will probably succed. In the case of Rhodes, its means an operational airfield for the British in the area which allows them to repel any German counterattacks against their invasion of the Dodecanese Islands. This has potential butterflies, since it will likely trigger a strengthening of air defenses at Ploiesti at the expense of other areas, as well as an increase of troops stationen in Greece - thus making an earlier attack into France much more feasible.

Speaking of which, how do you reckon a February landing at Marseille or a Normandy landing in May would fare ?

EDIT: Could this also have potential butterflies regarding the future Italian political situation, like, for instance, the monarchy surviving or the communists enjoying less support ?

Simon · Sep 9, 2014

Magnum said:
Could this also have potential butterflies regarding the future Italian political situation, like, for instance, the monarchy surviving or the communists enjoying less support ?

Don't know about the communists but if the Italian royal family do their switch-over of Victor Emmanuel III abdicating for Umberto II to take over with him being in place for a good year or eighteen months as head of the legitimate government fighting with the Allies and avoiding a lot of the chaos in Rome then I think it could make a fair difference. IIRC there was only something like a million votes in it come the referendum, whether it would be enough to swing half a million votes is an interesting question.

Look More Closely Later · Sep 9, 2014

Crossing the Channel

The historical Normandy landings as I understand it were constrained by requiring a specific phase of the moon (to assist in the night and pre-dawn parts of the operations) and tide times (so that the kind of landing that they were planning for could take place on the beaches) to take place - conditions which only occurred on a few days each month.
Questions of logistics aside, once a cross-channel operation can only take place on a few days in any given month, I think you *have* to plan for a late spring/early summer landing because you have to maximise your chance of getting favourable weather conditions for your landing. Bad weather in the channel can play havoc with your naval elements (including possibly incapacitating at least some of the troops supposed to make the landings with severe seasickness) and (in the case of fog/cloud) mess up your air-drops of parachute troops or your ability to use air power to support troops on the beaches.
*****
I don't know if conditions in the Mediterranean would be favourable to planning for a landing in any scale on the south coast of France earlier in the year; they might well be.