Worst Mistakes made by the Axis during World War II

The Axis Worst Mistake?

  • Italy's Invasion of Greece

    Votes: 37 13.0%
  • Germany's Invasion of Russia

    Votes: 133 46.8%
  • Japan's Attack on Pearl Harbor

    Votes: 106 37.3%
  • Hitler's Declaration of War on the United States

    Votes: 109 38.4%
  • Hitler's Fixation on Wonder Weapons

    Votes: 56 19.7%
  • Hitler's Underestimation of Sea Power

    Votes: 32 11.3%
  • Germany's Repression of the Occupied Territories

    Votes: 90 31.7%
  • The Inability of the Axis to Get Spain and Turkey to Join the Fight

    Votes: 13 4.6%

  • Total voters
    284

Rex Romanum

Banned
What was the Axis worst mistake in WWII?
The three major Axis powers — Germany, Japan, and Italy — committed a host of catastrophic errors during the war. But some of these miscalculations were considerably worse than others. Here are the most significant blunders made by the Axis during WWII. The list, which is ordered (somewhat) chronologically, addresses planning and strategic errors rather than operational ones.
1. Italian Invasion of Greece
The campaign commenced on October 28, 1940, but things did not go well. The Greeks immediately counterattacked, forcing the 530,000 Italian troops back. In March 1941, a subsequent Italian counterattack likewise failed. Embarrassed for his Italian ally, and eager to see the situation settle in the Balkans, Hitler came to the rescue, culminating in the complete defeat of Greece on April 23, 1941.

But the damage was done. Germany was forced to commit troops during a time when it could ill afford to do so. It forced Germany to delay its attack on Russia by five weeks — a precious amount of time that could have precluded the Wehrmacht from having to fight during the Russian winter. Indeed, Hitler was inclined to agree during the last days of the Reich, blaming Mussolini for the delayed attack on Russia, and Germany's subsequent defeat. Not all historians agree with this assessment, but some contend that, at the very least, it prevented Germany from consolidating its position in North Africa.
2. German Invasion of Russia, aka Operation Barbarossa
The ensuing attack on the morning of June 22, 1941, was the largest military confrontation in human history, creating a front line that extended 1,000 miles (1,600 km) from north to south (practically the distance from Seattle to Los Angeles). At the outset, the operation involved three million Axis soldiers (across 117 army divisions), 3,580 tanks, 7,184 artillery guns, 1,830 planes, and 750,000 horses. In defense, the Russians amassed 132 army divisions, including 34 armoured divisions.

The attack, which would have been visible from space, began well. A little over two weeks in, some 300,000 Russians had been captured. But then, in a fatal miscalculation, Hitler paused to divert forces from Army Group Centre to the south towards Kiev. The delay proved disastrous, stalling the attack on Moscow and forcing the ill-equipped German troops to fight in one of the worst Russian winters ever recorded. Germany never recovered. The Wehrmacht was not able to sustain its pressure on Moscow, instead fighting, and eventually retreating, from all Russian sectors.
3. Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
Japan, like its Axis ally earlier in the year, decided to push ahead despite the odds. And indeed, projections showed that the U.S., should it enter the war, would eventually be able to regroup and trounce Japan. Japan's military leaders rationalized that a major offensive in the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia) was necessary to secure the much needed rubber and oil. To stave off the Americans, Japan planned its attack on Pearl Harbor. The operation was intended to destroy important American fleet units, buy Japan precious time as it mounted its Southern Operation, and strike a severe blow to U.S. morale.

When the infamous attack came on December 7, 1941, the Japanese achieved a limited victory; American aircraft carriers were out at sea on exercises and were untouched by the assault. These same carriers would strike a crushing blow to the Japanese fleet a mere six months later at the Battle of Midway. But more to the point, the U.S. was officially in the war. The Japanese could not handle the ensuing onslaught, nor could it keep up with U.S. production rates. Or its level of technology, as witnessed by the dropping of two atomic bombs in 1945.
4. Hitler's Declaration of War on the United States
Not content to let a sleeping dog lie (or at least a snoozing dog), Hitler declared war on the US on December 11, 1941 — three days after Pearl Harbor. But according to the Tripartite Pact, Germany was under no obligation to do so. It just promised to help Japan if it were attacked. Recognizing this, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop stalled for time when, on December 8, Japanese Ambassador Oshima demanded that Germany declare war on America. Ribbentrop, rightfully, recognized the untenable position Germany would find itself in by doing so.

But Hitler disagreed. He was concerned that the US would get a head start and simply declare war on Germany anyway. He may have also felt a sense of obligation to his Axis ally, fearful of a potential falling out. Moreover, he thought Japan would give the Americans considerable trouble — perhaps even defeat then. With the US out of the way, the Japanese could then join Germany in their common struggle against Russia. But as subsequent events revealed, this was not meant to be; entry into the war morphed the US into a superpower, providing the much-needed punch to the Allied effort.
5. Hitler's Fixation on Wonder Weapons, aka Wunderwuffen
Hitler was obsessed with the so-called wonder weapons — the V1 and V2 rockets (a precursor to intercontinental ballistic missiles), jet aircraft (which was not a bad idea, just not a decisive one), and massive tanks. Indeed, on this last point, Hitler was insistent that Germany produce extremely large tanks. This created considerable strain on the already overstretched tank production industry, and a drain on much needed material to produce working tanks. Hitler got this idea from Eastern Front reports about Russia's huge, almost impossible-to-destroy Russian KV tanks, and later JS 1 and JS 2 tanks. Problem was, these were fully functional and proven tanks. They were fairly fast on the battlefield, had a good anti-infantry protection and so on. As for the German answer, the model Mause, it was a useless mountain of steel. Its speed was 3 km per hour, had no small arms protection.
6. Hitler's Underestimation of Navy or Sea Power
Germany, with all its powerful forces on land, did not have the sea power to stage the invasion of Britain. When preparing for the war, Hitler failed to recognize the importance of the British fleet as a significant threat. In the final analysis, it was Allied sea power which salvaged the situation. Indeed, the Second World War was a war of logistics. It's impossible to know what greater success Germany might have had in the Atlantic (or elsewhere), and what further destruction it could have inflicted on Allied convoys, had the German Navy been given even the minimum sea power required for waging a global war.
7. Nazi Repression on the Occupied Territories
As the Germans ploughed through a region primed for liberation, they simply replaced one repressive regime with another. As illustrated in Timothy Snyder's Bloodlands, Nazi ideology and racism trumped practicality and common sense. Perceiving the Slavic people as "subhumans" (untermensch), the Nazis could not accept cooperation. Moreover, like the Jews, Slavs were to be uprooted from these lands, replaced by German pioneers (Hitler was very inspired by the North American example).

By the time the war was over, the Germans killed 9.3 million people in Eastern Europe (5.4 million of them dying in the Holocaust). The harsh treatment of people in the occupied territories created a super-hostile environment for the Wehrmacht bases of operation. Partisan activity was a constant thorn in the side of the German army, as witnessed by the brutality of Nazi reprisals.
8. The Inability of the Axis to Get Spain and Turkey to Join the Fight
Spain was a member of the Axis during the war, but it never committed troops to the effort. Led by fascist dictator Francisco Franco, the country steadfastly refused to enter into the thrall. Spain was worried about cutting its oil imports from the US and engaging in yet another war (the Spanish Civil War still fresh in memory). Hitler tried to persuade Franco, but in return he asked for large quantities of grain, fuel, armed vehicles, military aircraft and other armaments. Hitler was so frustrated he threatened to annex Spanish territory. No agreement was ever reached. Hitler famously told Mussolini, "I prefer to have three or four of my own teeth pulled out than to speak to that man again!"

Declaring itself neutral soon after the start of the war, Turkey was concerned about a conflict with the Soviet Union. In June 1941, after its neighbor Bulgaria joined the Axis, Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. Things stayed like this until 1944 when Turkey declared war on the Axis powers. For Germany, this represented a blown opportunity.
Poll is made as multiple choice to get a more balanced result.
 

nbcman

Donor
Other - Starting the war(s) in the first place. The Axis powers had no chance of victory.
 
One of the choices I made was Germany's declaration of war against the US which was even worse than the Japanese one. At least Japan could and did gain something from it in the short term, Germany could gain all of nothing from declaring war on the US. The US had no territory that Germany could grab even in its wildest dreams and so made sense only from someone who was completely insane, unfortunately in more ways than one that someone ran Germany.
 

Deleted member 1487

Alienating the Eastern peoples was a huge mistake. They should have agreed to work with the UPA in 1941 instead of killing them, same with most of the Baltic governments. Going for dominance and colonization instead of a Brest-Litovsk series of allied Eastern governments was a huge mistake.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Insurgent_Army#Formation
In a memorandum from August 14, 1941 the OUN (B) proposed to the Germans, to create a Ukrainian Army “which will join the German Аrmy ... until the latter will win” (preferable translation: "which will unite with the German Army ... until [our] final victory"), in exchange for German recognition of an allied Ukrainian independent state.[41] The Ukrainian Army was planned to have been formed on the basis of DUN (Detachments of Ukrainian Nationalists - Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsiоnalistiv) and specifically on the basis of the “Ukrainian legion”, at that time composed of two battalions “Nachtigall” and “Roland.” These two battalions were included in the Abwehr special regiment “Brandenburg-800”. However, these proposals were not accepted by the Germans, and by the middle of September 1941 the Germans began a campaign of repression against the most proactive OUN members.

A captured German document of November 25, 1941 (Nuremberg Trial O14-USSR) ordered: "It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reichskommissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated..."[43] By the end of November 1941, both the “Ukrainian Legions” Roland and Nachtigall were disbanded and the remaining soldiers (approximately 650 people) were given the option of signing a contract for military service after being transferred to Germany for further military training. At the same time (end of November 1941) the Germans started a second wave of repression in Reichskommissariat Ukraine specifically targeting OUN (B) members. Most of the captured OUN activists in Reichskommissariat Ukraine however, belonged to OUN (M) wing.


Despite the stated opinions of Dmytro Klyachkivsky and Roman Shukhevych that the Germans were a secondary threat compared to their main enemies (the communist forces of the Soviet Union and Poland), the Third Conference of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - held near Lviv from 17–21 February 1943 - took the decision to begin open warfare against the Germans[46] (OUN fighters had already attacked a German garrison earlier that year on 7 February).[47] Accordingly, the OUN (B) leadership on March 20, 1943 issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the German auxiliary police (Ukrainische Hilfspolizei) in 1941-1942 to desert with their weapons and join with UPA units in Volhynia. This process often involved engaging in armed conflict with German forces as they tried to prevent desertion. The number of trained and armed soldiers who now joined the ranks of the UPA was estimated to be between 4 and 5 thousand.[46]


Anti-German actions were limited to situations where the Germans attacked the Ukrainian population or UPA units.[48] Indeed, according to German Eastern Front General Ernst Kostring, UPA fighters "fought almost exclusively against German administrative agencies, the German police and the SS in their quest to establish an independent Ukraine controlled by neither Moscow nor Germany."[49]


During the German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on police stations and military convoys. In the region of Zhytomyr insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland.[50] The UPA was able to send small groups of raiders deep into eastern Ukraine.


According to the OUN/UPA, on May 12, 1943, Germans attacked the town of Kolki using several SS-Divisions (SS units operated alongside the German Army who were responsible for intelligence, central security, policing action, and mass extermination), where both sides suffered heavy losses.[51] Soviet partisans reported the reinforcement of German auxiliary forces at Kolki for the end of April until the middle of May 1943 [52]


In June 1943, German SS and police forces under the command of General von dem Bach-Zelewski, chosen by Himmler and seen as an expert in anti-guerrilla warfare, attempted to destroy UPA-North in Volhynia during Operation "BB" (Bandenbekämpfung).[53] According to Ukrainian accounts, the initial stage of Operation “BB” (Bandenbekämpfung) against the UPA had produced no results whatsoever. This development was the subject of several discussions by Himmler's staff that resulted in General von dem Bach-Zelewski being sent to Ukraine.[54] He failed to eliminate the UPA, which grew steadily, and the Germans, apart from terrorizing the civilian population, were virtually limited to defensive actions.[55]


From July through September 1943, as a result of an estimated 74 clashes between German forces and the UPA, the Germans lost more than 3,000 men killed or wounded while the UPA lost 1,237 killed or wounded. According to post-war estimates, the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid-to-late 1943 in Volhynia: in July, 35; in August, 24; in September, 15; October–November, 47.[56][57][58][59] In the fall of 1943, clashes between the UPA and the Germans declined, so that Erich Koch in his November 1943 report and New Year 1944 speech could mention that “nationalistic bands in forests do not pose any major threat” for the Germans.[60]


In autumn 1943 some detachments of the UPA attempted to find rapprochement with the Germans. Although doing so was condemned by an OUN/UPA order from November 25, 1943, these actions did not end.[61] In early 1944 UPA forces in several Western regions engaged in cooperation with the German Wehrmacht, Waffen SS, SiPo and SD.[62][63][64] However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to state that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and German forces, because the UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against the repressive actions of the German administration.[65]
For example, on January 20, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hours long firefight with a group of 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded.[66] In March–July 1944 a senior leader of OUN(B) in Galicia conducted negotiations with SD and SS officials, resulting in a German decision to supply the UPA with arms and ammunition. In May of that year, the OUN issued instructions to "switch the struggle, which had been conducted against the Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets.".[67]
A major waste of resources for both sides.
 
Source...

What was the Axis worst mistake in WWII?1. Italian Invasion of Greece2. German Invasion of Russia, aka Operation Barbarossa3. Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor4. Hitler's Declaration of War on the United States5. Hitler's Fixation on Wonder Weapons, aka Wunderwuffen6. Hitler's Underestimation of Navy or Sea Power7. Nazi Repression on the Occupied Territories8. The Inability of the Axis to Get Spain and Turkey to Join the FightPoll is made as multiple choice to get a more balanced result.

For the record, opening post's source looks to me as if it may be the following site: http://io9.com/the-8-worst-mistakes-made-by-the-axis-during-world-war-1514922468
;)
 
I'm torn between Pearl Harbor and Barbarossa. I think avoiding the others would have only delayed the inevitable, but those two changed the war for the worst for the Axis. I think Barbarossa has a slight edge just because the US would probably have been drawn into the conflict either way, while the Soviet Union might have waited until the two sides crippled each other and then moved in.
 
Other - Starting the war(s) in the first place. The Axis powers had no chance of victory.

My actual vote was for the Germans declaring war on the Americans, Barbarossa and their obsession with wonder weapons, but I second nbcman. For the Germans, the only winning move was not to play.
 

Deleted member 1487

I don't think you could say that the DoW on the US is necessarily the wrong move given the situation; the US was going to try to come in eventually and the DoW enabled the Germans to inflict very heavy shipping losses before the US could organize its naval defenses; rather than letting the US build up in peace and then DoW Germany when they were ready the Germans got in their and created a shipping crisis that probably helped them far more than it hurt in the long run assuming the US was going to come in by the end of 1942 anyway.
 
My actual vote was for the Germans declaring war on the Americans, Barbarossa and their obsession with wonder weapons, but I second nbcman. For the Germans, the only winning move was not to play.

For Germany not turning east and declaring war on The Soviet Union and the USA .. They could have stood pat and been happy with their conquests .. England would have given in eventually .. Germany had Warsaw to the Rhine
 
Repression is the biggest, by far.

Lack thereof, circa WW1, is what allowed KaiserReich Germany to beat Tsarist Russia in a land invasion.

Everything else, even the wunderweapons a la Hitler, was for the most party a product of diplomatic inertia.

There was no reason, except senseless muddled decision making, that prevented the wehrmacht to arm Ukranian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Belorussian, etc milita and then throw them at the Russian Front lines.

That effort alone could have been the tipping point to toppling the Soviet Regime.
 
i'm gonna go with "All of the above and then some", mainly for reasons stated earlier in the thread
 
Other and all the above. Allowing Hitler, Tojo and friens, and Bennie Boy to come to power and start the War was a screwup that killed Untold Millions.
 
Repression is the biggest, by far.

Lack thereof, circa WW1, is what allowed KaiserReich Germany to beat Tsarist Russia in a land invasion.

Everything else, even the wunderweapons a la Hitler, was for the most party a product of diplomatic inertia.

There was no reason, except senseless muddled decision making, that prevented the wehrmacht to arm Ukranian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Belorussian, etc milita and then throw them at the Russian Front lines.

That effort alone could have been the tipping point to toppling the Soviet Regime.

It wasn't "senseless muddled decision making" that lead to the Wehrmacht, the SS, and the Einsatzgruppen to wage a war of extermination in the East: it was part and parcel of the Nazi ideology. Hitler, and the rest of his bugfuck crazy buddies, were, well, bugfuck crazy: they had zero desire to pull a Brest-Litovsk II: Electric Boogaloo, and set up client states in the Ukraine and the Baltics. That's what a sane, pragmatic government would have done, but a sane, pragmatic government also would have stopped with the Sudentland (and maybe negotiating for the return of the Polish Corridor), instead of declaring war on the three greatest powers on Earth at the same time.
 
For Germany not turning east and declaring war on The Soviet Union and the USA .. They could have stood pat and been happy with their conquests .. England would have given in eventually .. Germany had Warsaw to the Rhine

Trouble is that at some point not far after they decide to sit and do nothing the economy goes "lol nope" and falls to pieces.
 

tenthring

Banned
The worst decision the Axis made was Nazi political-economy, which were pretty much a total failure.

I don't agree that Hitler started the war for economic reasons (he cared little for economics, and his decisions in 1936 make clear what his goals were), but I do think that economics made the war inevitable. It was the only way to keep the Nazi economy afloat, and therefore the only way to keep the Nazi's in power. Even if you get rid of Hitler this is still a problem.

The only way for the Germans to win any war is if the can develop a political economy capable of achieving and exploiting reasonable aims.

That's one reason why you can actually see WW1 Germany winning. It had some goals, could feasibly achieve them, and could become a successful stable society afterwards. Yes, they were not easy and the strategic position Wilhelm put them in 1914 was dumb, but there was a conceivable way out where they make peace if circumstances swing the right way. Hitler achieved the WW1 dream of defeating France...and it did nothing towards stabilizing German society.
 
Alienating the Eastern peoples was a huge mistake. They should have agreed to work with the UPA in 1941 instead of killing them, same with most of the Baltic governments. Going for dominance and colonization instead of a Brest-Litovsk series of allied Eastern governments was a huge mistake.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Insurgent_Army#Formation

A major waste of resources for both sides.

Repression is the biggest, by far.

Lack thereof, circa WW1, is what allowed KaiserReich Germany to beat Tsarist Russia in a land invasion.

Everything else, even the wunderweapons a la Hitler, was for the most party a product of diplomatic inertia.

There was no reason, except senseless muddled decision making, that prevented the wehrmacht to arm Ukranian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Belorussian, etc milita and then throw them at the Russian Front lines.

That effort alone could have been the tipping point to toppling the Soviet Regime.

I see a typical state of people not understanding what Hitler was after with the invasion of Russia: the entire Nazi plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union was predicated on racism. It was colonialism ported from Africa and Asia to Europe.

Hitler's goal was to secure industry and raw resources for the Reich, but before the invasion the Wehrmacht's economics section pointed out that even if conquered, the Soviet Union would actually be a net drain on German resources for years to come, particularly after the ravages of war. Simply feeding the conquered Soviet population would be a huge draw on Nazi stocks and transport. Hitler's solution was as simple as it was immoral. Kill the Soviet population.

The atrocities perpetrated on the Soviet citizenry were not some regrettable unpleasantness the invasion could have done without. They were a key factor in making the whole venture worthwhile to Nazi Germany. Without them, the invasion loses any economic legitimacy.
 
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I see a typical state of people not understanding what Hitler was after with the invasion of Russia: the entire Nazi plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union was predicated on racism. It was colonialism ported from Africa and Asia to Europe.

Hitler's goal was to secure industry and raw resources for the Reich, but before the invasion the Wehrmacht's economics section pointed out that even if conquered, the Soviet Union would actually be a net drain on German resources for years to come, particularly after the ravages of war. Simply feeding the conquered Soviet population would be a huge draw on Nazi stocks and transport. Hitler's solution was as simple as it was immoral. Kill the Soviet population.

The atrocities perpetrated on the Soviet citizenry were not some regrettable unpleasantness the invasion could have done without. They were a key factor in making the whole venture worthwhile to Nazi Germany. Without them, the invasion loses any economic legitimacy.

This. The Nazi's genocidal tendencies were a feature, not a bug.
 
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