WI Franco-British early intervention in the Winter War

9

Viewing the Finnish all year port of Petsamo as too vulnerable to a Soviet assault The Western Allies (Fr-Br) or WA decide to seize North Norway (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) in breach of Norwegian neutrality. The calculation is that the seizure will be defensible from any Norwegian and/or German counter as long as the railway south out of the region can be destroyed in the initial landings.



If Sweden refuses military transit, existing road routes to the north of Sweden shall be employed to lay logistic lorry route and then a rail route from Narvik into Finland via Troms. The existing rail route from the ports near Bodo south can be used to feed into a defence line and prefabricated air strips. The existing Hattfjelldal Airfield will have wooden planks flown in (plus Sandnessjøen, Bodø, Narvik and Harstad will be given a steel grid deck as they are accessable from the coast). It is thought that ?? and Mo i Rana could also support an air base.


Norway narrows to a front 15 miles across west of Rosvik, with 10 miles of that above the snow line.

There is some legal precident for forced access where transit is refused and this is a good oportunity to constrain KM U-boat activities from both coasts of the North Sea. It is also felt strategically useful to limit German imports of Swedish iron ore through the all year port of Narvik.

Should forces attempt to by-pass the narrow front of defence in the south of Nordland through Sweden then this offers a golden opportuity to also force the north of Sweden with all the high volume iron ore mines. Then the existing rail line from Narvik to Lulea could also be employed to support Finland against Germany's ally.

Either way an initial campaign in northern Finland should seek to seize the Kola peninsula to secure Petsamo as another logistic port. Vadso in Finnmark will be a useful starting off point and logistic base for the northern arm of such a campaign alongside Petsamo.

To improve the international credentials of the venture the Polish Indepentent Highland Brigade and the Canadians shall make up part of the initial forces.

Is this going to be developed into a timeline?

It seems like the initial goal of aiding Finland might realistically be achieved, but Feance will soon fall and the positions will be evacuated. All that will have been accomplished is antagonizing Norway and the Soviet Union. The Swedes might get unwillingly dragged into it as well, and the United States might take a dim view of invading neutral countries. The campaign would be a dead end at best and a catastrophe of war with a superpower" magnitude at worst.

I'm more of a researcher than a writer. All a bit dry. Anyone that feels there is potential for a TL and or story here, feel free to pick up th ball and run.

If France collapses, all the more reason to hold in North Norway. This isn't the same as otl where there the counter invasion was reactive and not prepared to go the distance. This could be the one place where Britain can win at a time of much losing.

Germany hasn't even landed yet. The message could go out that the WA will push south if Germany tries anything. Otherwise North Norway will be the only region of Norway occupied. Explosive charges rigged but not blown on the rails south maybe.

Hostile reception?

To be ready, destroyers and mine trawlers patrolling off the coast of Namsos and Tronhiemfjord are loaded with troops with plans for landing and taking the ports and airfields. It is thought that the trawlers may reach the inland port of Trondhiem unchecked as they appear to be peaceful fishing boats.

A radio signal confirming possession of the airfield at Trondhiem will scramble airbourne forces from the north and Scotland.

Trondhiem is within range of Kinloss. That is with a full bomb load. As a transport and with the option of refueling at Bodo? No problem.

Landings on the south and western coasts will attempt to gain Alesund, Bergen and Stravanger at the same time as the surprise assaults in the near north.

It looks pretty interesting so far and I hope you continue it.

When exactly is this supposed to be taking place?

Early in the Winter War 'window'. Strangely the WA were expecting it, or at least had a plan for it. Like plan R4, but more pre-emptive.

30 November 1939 – 13 March 1940
(3 months, 1 week and 5 days)

Lets say that they use Dec 25th for maximum surprise. Operation Wonderland.
In initial landings in Nordland and North Norway:

• Polish Independent Highland Brigade,

• French Foreign Legion 13th demi-brigade (two battalions), three battalions of Chasseurs Alpins,

• British 146th Brigade (Polar Bears), 24th Guards Brigade and 4th Queen's Own Hussars (armoured) Rgt (battalion size unit)

• Canadian 1st Brigade made up of Battalions from Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), The 48th Highlanders of Canada and The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment
• The 4th QOH were armed with 30x A10 Cruiser MkII CS with a 3.7inch breech loading smoothbore^ and 36x Vickers Light Tank Mk.VIA

The 4thQOH was Churchill's old regiment and he put in a special request that they be attatched as an armoured contingent. A supply nightmare for planners. As they had to come up with a way to unload them in Bodø and keep them in fuel and ammunition. The combat support (CS) tanks loaded mostly smoke to cover advancing infantry, with two HE shells. Later supplies would include a much higher proportion of HE shells, but still they would be in short supply.

There are quite a few myths regarding CS tanks that stem from the 1940 campaign. At that time, A9 & A10 CS tanks (armed with 3.7-inch CS howitzers – often referred to as a 'mortar') were allocated mainly smoke, with only two HE rounds per tank. However, even those two HE rounds were in many cases not issued due to supply issues and I've never found a single example of 3.7-inch HE being used in 1940 (but lots of complaints that they didn't have any). This was caused by the fact that nowhere near enough 3.7-inch HE rounds had been manufactured due to the pre-war assumption that smoke would be the most useful round and would be the majority ammo type carried by CS tanks.

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Bodø 1938

The rapid deployment of these forces by sea inspired the later advance of troops into Belgium by the same method, securing a perimeter around the port of Antwerp.*

^3.7" OQF Mk I
Caliber:94mm/3.7"
Length of tube 55.5"
overall length:59.2"
Weight: 222lb
Muzzle velocity: 620fps
Weight of shot 10.5lb (Smoke and Starshell), 10.9lb (HE)
Vehicles fitted:CS versions of A9, A10, A13

*yes I have another POD butterflying off - I'm not a good writer.

What forces do the WAllies intend on deploying to fight the Soviets in Finland? Is Operation Pike being given more consideration?

If the British and French to go in to aid and defend Finland, do they also seize Russian assets and ships? Will the US stay out of it or might they join in an embargo/seizing assets?

Pike is another theatre (ME >> Baku) so only a continued war against the Soviets will bring it about. So that all depends on how long the Finns hold out. So, in part, that depends on what the WA bring to the party.

Aircraft, both supplied to Finland
P-39
Hurricane
Buffalo

and operated from Norway
Whitley
Hampden
Wellington

The Polish Independent Brigade
A scratch Norwegian Volunteer Brigade
The Polar Bears
French FL demi-Brigade + 3x Chasseurs Alpins

75mm and 18pdr field artillery

Mills bombs...

Any ideas how this is going to pan out?

perfectgeneral, have you given thought to the political side of this thing? I see several problems on that front. For example, how do you propose the Anglo-French have the needed political will to go for it in mere weeks after the war broke out, in addition to getting the resources and troops in place? We are after all talking about blatantly invading two neutrals. At this point it would make the British and the French seem almost as bad as the Germans to many in the remaining neutral nations, especially the US.

IOTL, the Allies did not move during the Winter War because Finland didn't officially make a request for help. And that was considered at the time the politico-legal figleaf they would need to have at least something to justify the damage done to Norwegian and Swedish neutrality - even in late February the British and French diplomats were dogging the Finns to get that request. The Finns were not ready to send it because they saw that the Norwegians and especially the Swedish were playing hard ball with declining the transit rights - as told to them by the Swedish cabinet in no uncertain terms. Simply put, the Finnish government thought that to make that request would be to plunge most of the Nordic area into the war along with Finland. IOTL the Finnish cabinet were not ready to do that decision, as they saw that it would not be worth it - the help that would realistically arrive would be too little and too late.

The Anglo-French can go in without that request, of course, but doing it would both add another internal political hurdle, and remove a big part of the international justification of joining the fight, increasing the flak they would get for it from foreign governments as well as local opposition. It presents difficulties for an early intervention, in other words.

Together with explaining the political will and various mechanics of the early intervention here, we should consider in which schedule can the Allies guarantee they have a significant amount of troops deployed in Southern Finland to bolster the Isthmus Front. That is what would be ultimately relevant to the Finnish political and military leadership in December. The amount of troops and the time it takes for them to arrive would be very important, as this was a war where the defender initially expected to only last for some weeks without foreign help.

We would also have to take into account the damage caused to Finland by a Sweden that through the Allied attack is technically at war against Finland - that is especially in the case Finland made the official request for help to London and Paris. Finland received a lot of material help from and through Sweden during the war, as well as volunteer soldiers. Losing all this beginning late December would make a big dent, and there would be necessarily a lag in January at the very least during which these losses of resources can't be replaced by Anglo-French help.

There is still the question of what Stalin does. He would get the news of the plans at an early stage through his "contacts" in Britain. Going by the OTL, the fact that the Allies are jumping in with both feet would likely make Stalin both to order a significant bolstering of the forces and a renewed attack against Finland and to start looking for a quick exit before the Allied resources are really brought to bear. So forcing the Finns to the negotiation table by a show of force and then forcing on them "reasonable" peace terms in the vein of the OTL Moscow Peace. And so for the purposes of this TL, we should expect a quicker and stronger Red Army attack in January - early February - it will be a bloody mess, of course, due to having to rush it, but the situation will be seen by Stalin as "do or die". So the Finnish troops would ITTL be also under a bigger strain in January-February than IOTL, and if denied the Swedish help, they might start wearing out before the Allies even manage to fight their way out of Northern Sweden.

Something to think about, maybe.

perfectgeneral, have you given thought to the political side of this thing? I see several problems on that front. For example, how do you propose the Anglo-French have the needed political will to go for it in mere weeks after the war broke out, in addition to getting the resources and troops in place? We are after all talking about blatantly invading two neutrals. At this point it would make the British and the French seem almost as bad as the Germans to many in the remaining neutral nations, especially the US.

IOTL, the Allies did not move during the Winter War because Finland didn't officially make a request for help. And that was considered at the time the politico-legal figleaf they would need to have at least something to justify the damage done to Norwegian and Swedish neutrality - even in late February the British and French diplomats were dogging the Finns to get that request. The Finns were not ready to send it because they saw that the Norwegians and especially the Swedish were playing hard ball with declining the transit rights - as told to them by the Swedish cabinet in no uncertain terms. Simply put, the Finnish government thought that to make that request would be to plunge most of the Nordic area into the war along with Finland. IOTL the Finnish cabinet were not ready to do that decision, as they saw that it would not be worth it - the help that would realistically arrive would be too little and too late.

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You may have mis-read the proposition. Here the Wallies will only be forcing access in Northern Norway, with clear demarcation on the day of the event. Adverse reaction involves further occupation the next day, but still only of Norway. Given notice of day one and the plan to skirt around Sweden, do they get the invite from Finland?

We would also have to take into account the damage caused to Finland by a Sweden that through the Allied attack is technically at war against Finland - that is especially in the case Finland made the official request for help to London and Paris. Finland received a lot of material help from and through Sweden during the war, as well as volunteer soldiers. Losing all this beginning late December would make a big dent, and there would be necessarily a lag in January at the very least during which these losses of resources can't be replaced by Anglo-French help.

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Does not apply as Sweden is still 'neutral' (allowed the transit of 100,000 German railcars with 2 million men in them in 1941+).

Together with explaining the political will and various mechanics of the early intervention here, we should consider in which schedule can the Allies guarantee they have a significant amount of troops deployed in Southern Finland to bolster the Isthmus Front. That is what would be ultimately relevant to the Finnish political and military leadership in December. The amount of troops and the time it takes for them to arrive would be very important, as this was a war where the defender initially expected to only last for some weeks without foreign help.

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Here is the issue. For both sides it becomes a race against time. No change for the WAllies, but this could catch the Soviets on the hop, as plan R 9 or whatever it is called becomes operation Wonderland at very short notice. The Wallies don't know they are going to doit until 3-4 weeks beforehand. This is why the initial force is small. Not a problem for the initial landings as logistics are limited anyway. The problem comes once the northern ports are open and Finnish expectations are raised.

There is a chicken/egg thing that ensures the Wallies have a plan for this too (or they wouldn't have the will for plan R9).

Perhaps it involves this putting pressure on Belgium to accept NOW help or have it thrust upon them? A prepared defence in Belgium is a better proposition than OTL trying to get past the refugees. Time enough to bring heavy units forward via Antwerp. Lots of camoflaged, reverse slope (if any), Matildas acting as surprise pill boxes that can jockey for position. The French had a lot of stuff that didn't get in position in time. A large and logistically hard to manoeuvre army. Harder to punch through the Ardennes forest if it is in French hands.

Christmas of 1939 is pretty quiet on the western front. Reinforcements are not needed yet. These could be fed into Finland with UOR for the addition of Fur coats (drawn from high society and their Farriers), white oversmocks, cold weather boots, double walled tents, primus stoves, longjohsn/combination/onesies, more socks and gloves. Later stages of this are bound to get to Philby as he will be warned that he can expect more Soviet spy attempts!

Thoughts?

ps UOR = Urgent Operational Requirement
After the balloon goes up stocks of all these can be seized from high street shops, but manufacturers need some notice to get further stocks made for follow up troops. Part of the initial execution of Operation Wonderland. Very hush-hush that troops are headed for Petsamo and need cold weather gear. Peacetime stores of such things as skis will be limited to a few specialist shops in Scotland. The Canadians will have bought those up. Enough for a ski platoon or two of skilled volunteers.

perfectgeneral said:

You may have mis-read the proposition. Here the Wallies will only be forcing access in Northern Norway, with clear demarcation on the day of the event. Adverse reaction involves further occupation the next day, but still only of Norway. Given notice of day one and the plan to skirt around Sweden, do they get the invite from Finland?

[snip]

Does not apply as Sweden is still 'neutral' (allowed the transit of 100,000 German railcars with 2 million men in them in 1941+).

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Well, you did include the follow-up plan of grabbing the Swedish iron ore area and thus bringing Sweden in to the war in your opening post. And as there is no rail route from Norway to Finland, the Swedish Iron Ore Railway would be needed if the Anglo-French are to bring any serious amounts of stuff to Finland.

Otherwise they are stuck with using the single road running roughly along the Finno-Swedish border from Kilpisjärvi on the Norwegian border at the tip of the Finnish "arm" (current Highway 21), 430-500 kilometers to the nearest railhead, whether in Rovaniemi or Tornio. That is over 400 kilometers one way, on a narrow gravel road in nearly Arctic winter conditions. Just north of the Bothnian Bay, on the level of the southern reaches of this overland route, in January and February 1940 the thermometer dipped down below -10 C on 53 days, below -20 C on 25 days and below -30 C on 11 days.

EDIT: It seems that the northern part of the road, between Kilpisjärvi and Kaaresuvanto, was constructed for military use in 1941-42- it might be that it does not even exist as anything more than a foot path in 1940. The other option would be to use the road from Enontekiö (current Road 93) towards Kautokeino (and finally Alta on the coast) in Finnmark, but it would add at least 150 km and also that road's condition/capacity in 1940 is highly suspect - it was rebuilt as a main road only in the early 60s.

Finland can't supply or support the trucks needed, so those, along with the fuel, etc, would have to be provided by the Allies. And after that you would still be in Lapland - 800 km to go to the Karelian Isthmus, even if now by rail. The Finnish railways were overburdened as it was, so it wouldn't be quick or easy even after that.

In broad outlines the same qualifications apply to using the Petsamo route in winter, too.

In other words, invading Sweden is not theoretically necessary, but it just might make the plan doable in a logistical sense in the time available if the railway line Narvik-Tornio could be used. The Finnish cabinet and military HQ know the above, so expect them to be very sceptical even if the Allies would promise they will respect Swedish neutrality.

I always thought that the proposal for Franco-British military intervention on behalf of Finland, as well as the French proposal to bomb the Russian oil fields at Baku, was so stupid that it's astounded anyone could have ever given them serious consideration. Why on Earth would the British and the French want to push the Soviet Union into an open and direct military alliance with Nazi Germany against them?

Anaxagoras said:

I always thought that the proposal for Franco-British military intervention on behalf of Finland, as well as the French proposal to bomb the Russian oil fields at Baku, was so stupid that it's astounded anyone could have ever given them serious consideration. Why on Earth would the British and the French want to push the Soviet Union into an open and direct military alliance with Nazi Germany against them?

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On the other hand, cutting the iron ore AND the oil to Germany could make sense.

Sure, it was incredibly risky, the Soviets could push into Iran, threatening UK's own main supply, and/or threaten British India. And the Germans could invade Romania and take its oil (they did OTL after all).

Even by April 1940, the British weren't well prepared to fight in the snow. The French Chausseurs Alpins were better set up I believe.

Interesting idea, but what happens when the Germans storm into France? Furthermore, this might end up gluing Stalin and Hitler together for a little longer than intended. Hitler's reaction would be interesting.

if the bris bomb bakus oil production what happens to the red army once the germans decide it's time to stab them in the back?

Realpolitik said:

Interesting idea, but what happens when the Germans storm into France? Furthermore, this might end up gluing Stalin and Hitler together for a little longer than intended. Hitler's reaction would be interesting.

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Exactly - this might be putting both Britain and France in a nastier situation than OTL. Wasn't both the USA/Britain/France alliance and the USSR more or less the same two sorts of enemies in Hitler's view? This probably means a longer Nazi-Soviet alliance against France and Britain..

Anaxagoras said:

I always thought that the proposal for Franco-British military intervention on behalf of Finland, as well as the French proposal to bomb the Russian oil fields at Baku, was so stupid that it's astounded anyone could have ever given them serious consideration. Why on Earth would the British and the French want to push the Soviet Union into an open and direct military alliance with Nazi Germany against them?

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because The Soviets and Nazi's were in open and direct military alliance, as near as France and the UK could tell. Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, dividing up Poland, etc