WI: Stirling not ordered
- Thread starter merlin
- Start date
I'll bite. Much depends on timing and priorities. Supermarine might have been the chosen manufacturer of the heavy bomber before all vestiges of their production site were erased. They had better things to do anyway. The Sunderland was an expensive per-unit build and Coastal Command didn't yield a big stick nor did it seem to have the people with the power to wield that stick. Short's production rates didn't win any awards for quick builds. So, what's your agenda?
Supermarine's heavy bomber, the Reginald Mitchell designed 316, looks absolutely brilliant- on paper. Performance numbers close to the Mosquito, on four early Merlins- and a bomb load half again that of the Lancaster. The problem is that I don't think they had much of a chance of getting it into production even before the Luftwaffe bombed the design office.
Obviously it is quite hard to be specific, but considering the delays, teething troubles and development issues of the Spitfire, how expensive in man hours they were to produce, and scaling up the problems to a four engined heavy, betting on the 316, or the Hercules engined 318 version, would have been a gamble unlikely to produce results until well into winter '43- 44. Would sacrificing years of Stirling service have been worth a British equivalent of the B-29 no earlier than the Battle of Berlin?
Obviously it is quite hard to be specific, but considering the delays, teething troubles and development issues of the Spitfire, how expensive in man hours they were to produce, and scaling up the problems to a four engined heavy, betting on the 316, or the Hercules engined 318 version, would have been a gamble unlikely to produce results until well into winter '43- 44. Would sacrificing years of Stirling service have been worth a British equivalent of the B-29 no earlier than the Battle of Berlin?
Seems so far everyone is jumping to conclusions - re: Supermarine. However, that wasn't the question.
Judging by the time production stopped in mid 1940 at Short's Belfast factory, there wouldn't be any change as far as the Bristol Bombay was concerned, but flying boats could be different.
Presumably if they didn't get a bomber order the flying boat production would continue.
Judging by the time production stopped in mid 1940 at Short's Belfast factory, there wouldn't be any change as far as the Bristol Bombay was concerned, but flying boats could be different.
Presumably if they didn't get a bomber order the flying boat production would continue.
Depends on whether the RAF felt they needed more flying boats, and considering how much of Cinderella service Coastal Command was combined with how powerful Bomber Command's influence was I'd say not that much with an order to start sub-contracting to build another company's bomber arriving with great alacrity.
The problem is that it's not a hard question to answer; they were producing another useful type, they would have gone on doing that, the Stirling didn't really do anything that the Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Warwick, Heyford or any of the rest of Bomber Command's also-rans couldn't do and probably should have been cancelled, there were a shade under 2400 Stirlings built which means that much factory space and about 9500- plus spares- engines released for use on other aircraft, um, what was the issue under question again?
Stirlings genuinely were dangerously bad. Halifax and Lancaster crews used to cheer and applaud when they heard the Stirling force was going to a target too, because it meant the flak and fighters would concentrate on the easier targets, the Stirlings, and their chances went up.
Without them, well, Bomber Command's casualty lists might have been a bit smaller, maybe a few hundred more Sunderlands, Short Brothers might have been taken over sooner, subcontract work, probably another couple of thousand Wellingtons.
The Victory Bomber would have been practically uninterceptable- what were the estimates, 370mph cruise, 440 dash, at 45,000ft to 2,500 miles with one Grand Slam? The priority to finish the detail design was never there, though, and even if it was a more solid design and inherently more practical than the 316, you'd need a direct hit on the Air Ministry and starting again with new people to make it happen. I agree, it is a "should have been", but not a probable one.
Stirlings genuinely were dangerously bad. Halifax and Lancaster crews used to cheer and applaud when they heard the Stirling force was going to a target too, because it meant the flak and fighters would concentrate on the easier targets, the Stirlings, and their chances went up.
Without them, well, Bomber Command's casualty lists might have been a bit smaller, maybe a few hundred more Sunderlands, Short Brothers might have been taken over sooner, subcontract work, probably another couple of thousand Wellingtons.
The Victory Bomber would have been practically uninterceptable- what were the estimates, 370mph cruise, 440 dash, at 45,000ft to 2,500 miles with one Grand Slam? The priority to finish the detail design was never there, though, and even if it was a more solid design and inherently more practical than the 316, you'd need a direct hit on the Air Ministry and starting again with new people to make it happen. I agree, it is a "should have been", but not a probable one.
If estimated performance were real, you'd probably have heard more about the Vickers Windsor, a smaller version of how the "Victory" would have been, made worse.
Estimated performance is a subject in it's own right, or wrong far more often, and there are, I agree, a couple of good reasons to be highly doubtful of it; most of them being that manufacturers tend to exaggerate, in some cases wildly, sometimes out of wishful thinking- don't realise or subconsciously gloss over the problems, pretend in their heads that everything is going to go well- or in some cases out of conscious fraud or for political reasons, grossly oversell their aircraft.
The people the specs are being pitched to want them to be accurate, because they're going to have to make decisions based on all of this, and the British air ministry seem to have been particularly bad at allowing for fudge factors- assuming the manufacturers were being wildly optimistic, at best quoting mark IX specifications for a mk I product. Granted some were worse than others, Shorts seem to have been something of a shambles, but there were some real possibilities that were thrown out or required unnatural persistence on part of the designers, because the ministry thought they were exaggerating and allowed too large a fudge factor.
Supermarine's proposed long range Spitfire, for instance; the Mosquito; Libellula; Miles' M52, although not a fighter; the Hurricane had a hard enough time of it. I'll think of others in a moment. The ministry did not trust the manufacturers on this one, and this did have a corrosive and ultimately destructive effect on Britain's aircraft industries as a whole. You can fill books- and Tony Buttler has- with manufacturers' brilliant ideas that the ministry wouldn't let them follow up, and the bad faith and micromanagement that slowed down those that did until they were almost too late.
The Windsor did at least fly, and it's numbers are odd; I wonder if those speeds and altitude aren't an estimate, but what was achieved by the prototypes? Look at it; long wings, smooth nose, it looks the part of a high speed, high altitude aircraft. Compared to the Lincoln which ended up getting the gig, it's a sports car next to a land rover. It's a lot lighter, too. If those numbers are right, something else was badly wrong as it really didn't come anywhere near its' potential. Should have been a generation ahead, instead it looks worse.
I wouldn't have expected that big a cockup from Barnes Wallis, though, should have reckoned he'd be able to get a reasonably close estimate if anyone could. Production nightmare barely begins to describe it, but those design decisions were sacrifices in the interests of performance- which should have been a lot higher, so what went wrong?
The people the specs are being pitched to want them to be accurate, because they're going to have to make decisions based on all of this, and the British air ministry seem to have been particularly bad at allowing for fudge factors- assuming the manufacturers were being wildly optimistic, at best quoting mark IX specifications for a mk I product. Granted some were worse than others, Shorts seem to have been something of a shambles, but there were some real possibilities that were thrown out or required unnatural persistence on part of the designers, because the ministry thought they were exaggerating and allowed too large a fudge factor.
Supermarine's proposed long range Spitfire, for instance; the Mosquito; Libellula; Miles' M52, although not a fighter; the Hurricane had a hard enough time of it. I'll think of others in a moment. The ministry did not trust the manufacturers on this one, and this did have a corrosive and ultimately destructive effect on Britain's aircraft industries as a whole. You can fill books- and Tony Buttler has- with manufacturers' brilliant ideas that the ministry wouldn't let them follow up, and the bad faith and micromanagement that slowed down those that did until they were almost too late.
The Windsor did at least fly, and it's numbers are odd; I wonder if those speeds and altitude aren't an estimate, but what was achieved by the prototypes? Look at it; long wings, smooth nose, it looks the part of a high speed, high altitude aircraft. Compared to the Lincoln which ended up getting the gig, it's a sports car next to a land rover. It's a lot lighter, too. If those numbers are right, something else was badly wrong as it really didn't come anywhere near its' potential. Should have been a generation ahead, instead it looks worse.
I wouldn't have expected that big a cockup from Barnes Wallis, though, should have reckoned he'd be able to get a reasonably close estimate if anyone could. Production nightmare barely begins to describe it, but those design decisions were sacrifices in the interests of performance- which should have been a lot higher, so what went wrong?
The Air Ministry set a maximum wingspan for the Stirling design in a boneheaded attempt to keep the weight of the plane down, this of course led to the fun of having to thicken and reshape the wing plus and forcing the weird angle they were mounted at to compensate. It's why the other aircraft that were designed around the specification also had a smaller wingspan than might have been expected.
IIRC the original S29 design by Shorts did share the 114 foot wing span of the Sunderleand. The limit on span of 100ft in the specification issued by the AM had nothing todo with ensuring that aircraft fitted withiin existing hangers but was device used to stop the bombers becoming too big in the eyes of the AM.
Unfortunetly to be truly effective that bomb would need to land sometime in late 36 early 37 
Stirlings built by Austin
Austin built 620 of the 2,400 odd Stirlings produced. As they switched to building Lancasters, the most logical thing for Austin to do is build another 620 Lancasters. They would probably have to be Lancaster Mk II aircraft with Hercules engines.
However, as the first Austin built Stirling was completed in August 1940 it would probably be 191 Manchesters built instead of the Stirling Mk I and 429 Lancasters built instead of the Stirling Mk III. That is unless the Manchester is turned into the Lancaster at least 2 years earlier.
Austin built 1,032 Battles between December 1938 and December 1940. The firm also built 300 Hurricanes, the first flying on 8th October 1940. So another alternative is to build 800 extra Hurricanes instead of the first 200 Stirlings.
And while we are at it 400 Hurricanes instead of the last 400 Austin built Battles.
Austin built 620 of the 2,400 odd Stirlings produced. As they switched to building Lancasters, the most logical thing for Austin to do is build another 620 Lancasters. They would probably have to be Lancaster Mk II aircraft with Hercules engines.
However, as the first Austin built Stirling was completed in August 1940 it would probably be 191 Manchesters built instead of the Stirling Mk I and 429 Lancasters built instead of the Stirling Mk III. That is unless the Manchester is turned into the Lancaster at least 2 years earlier.
Austin built 1,032 Battles between December 1938 and December 1940. The firm also built 300 Hurricanes, the first flying on 8th October 1940. So another alternative is to build 800 extra Hurricanes instead of the first 200 Stirlings.
And while we are at it 400 Hurricanes instead of the last 400 Austin built Battles.
Last edited:
Fair's fair, Hitler was one of the best weapons the Allies had.
Even so, that would amount to a ~5.8% increase in Lancasters just there.
Last edited:
With hindsight Spec. B.12/36 should have been cancelled ASAP or not issued at all. More P.13/36 bombers, i.e. the Halifax and Manchester/Lancaster should have been ordered instead. Preferably the latter.
The Air Ministry should have cancelled the Supermarine B.12/36 so the design team could concentrate the "Dumbo" naval attack aircraft and improving the Spitfire.
Hindsight also tells us that the effort Short's design team put into the Stirling and the Super Stirling would have been better spent on the S.32 airliner and improving the Sunderland.
E.g. in 1936 the Air Ministry could have said to Arthr Gouge, "Instead of a 4-Hercules heavy bomber, we want a you to design a 4-Hercules flying boat to compliment the 2-Hercules boat Saunders Roe are developing to Spec. R.1/36." As a result the Sunderland Mk IV/Seaford would be ready for production in the second half of 1940. The RAF could have up to 1,750 of them instead of the Stirlings built at Rochester and Belfast. Most of the 750 Sunderlands built in the real world would also be built to this standard too.
Last edited:
That also made me remember that the Supermarine submission to R.1/36 was considered superior to the Saunders Roe Lerwick but the Air Mininistry wanted the firm to concentrate on the Spitfire and B.12/36.
It probably wouldn't be ready in time, but I like the idea of Supermarine doing its R.1/36 instead of the B.12/36 with production of the aircraft subcontracted to Saro. In the real world built the Supermarine Walrus and Sea Otter amphibians was transferred to Saro so the Supermarine factory could concentrate on Spitfire production.
Had the Supermarine R.1/36 been a better aircraft than the Lerwick it could have been kept in production after the initial 21 with the amphibian production being taken over by another firm.
It probably wouldn't be ready in time, but I like the idea of Supermarine doing its R.1/36 instead of the B.12/36 with production of the aircraft subcontracted to Saro. In the real world built the Supermarine Walrus and Sea Otter amphibians was transferred to Saro so the Supermarine factory could concentrate on Spitfire production.
Had the Supermarine R.1/36 been a better aircraft than the Lerwick it could have been kept in production after the initial 21 with the amphibian production being taken over by another firm.
NOMISRRUC - thanks for the reply.
B.12/36 was deemed 'heavy' whilst P.13/36 was 'medium' and the latter had already had B.1/35 cancelled - its spec. being too similar (the Warwick was the only of that to survive.
I would have gone for the Boulton-Paul P.90 initially came second after Vickers which was then eliminated after Wellington commitments.
According to BSP the 'Dumbos' that were ordered were for research purposes on the variable-incidence wings.
I agree about Shorts concentrating on Flying-Boats, but just as the Sunderland was the Military version of the 'C' Class Empire Flying-Boat (designed for trans-Atlantic air-travel), so there should have been a military version of the 'G' Class Flying-Boat - OTL just a few aircraft converted.
Granted that Coastal Command was the Cinderella Service, at the start of the war of the 19 squadrons, 8 of these had the Anson, 6 were flying boat squadrons, 2 with the Vildebeeste,, and only 1 with the 'modern' Hudson.
So as a consequence of no Stirling there would be more Sunderlands, and their design team would be busy with the 'G' Class version for VLR.
B.12/36 was deemed 'heavy' whilst P.13/36 was 'medium' and the latter had already had B.1/35 cancelled - its spec. being too similar (the Warwick was the only of that to survive.
I would have gone for the Boulton-Paul P.90 initially came second after Vickers which was then eliminated after Wellington commitments.
According to BSP the 'Dumbos' that were ordered were for research purposes on the variable-incidence wings.
I agree about Shorts concentrating on Flying-Boats, but just as the Sunderland was the Military version of the 'C' Class Empire Flying-Boat (designed for trans-Atlantic air-travel), so there should have been a military version of the 'G' Class Flying-Boat - OTL just a few aircraft converted.
Granted that Coastal Command was the Cinderella Service, at the start of the war of the 19 squadrons, 8 of these had the Anson, 6 were flying boat squadrons, 2 with the Vildebeeste,, and only 1 with the 'modern' Hudson.
So as a consequence of no Stirling there would be more Sunderlands, and their design team would be busy with the 'G' Class version for VLR.