Why didn't the Soviet Union support Abyssinia in the 30s...
- Thread starter raharris1973
- Start date
1) Stalin cared about Europe more than the world.
2) Ethiopia was a feudal monarchy, much like czarist Russia.
3) What could they have done? They had as many friends as North Korea does today.
Bonus) European Social Democrats were derided as Social Fascists during the early Depression, as the USSR believed communism would spread due to the economic woes. Hence the KPD and the SPD being at each other's throats. After this strategy failed (understatement there!), the Popular Fronts returned.
2) Ethiopia was a feudal monarchy, much like czarist Russia.
3) What could they have done? They had as many friends as North Korea does today.
Bonus) European Social Democrats were derided as Social Fascists during the early Depression, as the USSR believed communism would spread due to the economic woes. Hence the KPD and the SPD being at each other's throats. After this strategy failed (understatement there!), the Popular Fronts returned.
Delta Force
Banned
Abyssinia was the only Eastern Orthodox state outside of Europe, and Imperial Russian foreign policy often had religious motivation behind it. The Soviets obviously wouldn't be taking religion into account with their foreign policy, and apart from coming from the same religious tradition Abyssinia and Russia/the Soviet Union had no reason to be particularly interested in each other.
Dirk_Pitt
Banned
Which hopefully you understand was a very ironic policy that was shot full of holes...
Alex Richards
Donor
Because Abyssinia represented everything that the USSR detested. A feudal, highly religious, monarchical system in which the power of church and Emperor were entrenched through the private ownership of land by a small group of people. From their point of view, it would be far better for Italy to conquer the place, destroy the social hierarchy and infrastructure, and then be thrown out by an uprising of the populace who could be supported from outside and would be more likely to create a state that was closer to the Marxist ideal.
Not to mention that this was still the period when interventionism was on the back foot in favour of 'socialism in one country'.
Not to mention that this was still the period when interventionism was on the back foot in favour of 'socialism in one country'.
Cook
Banned
No, actually anti-imperialism started right off the bat with Lenin and anti-imperialist propaganda, directed principally at the British Empire, was the main theme of Soviet propaganda throughout the 1920s. Because Stalin embraced Collective Security in the 1930s in an effort to counter the rise of Hitler, anti-imperialist propaganda dropped away and Stalin avoided anything that he thought would antagonise the British and French.
Abyssinia was landlocked, so any attempt to ship arms to the Haile Selassie would have needed to go through French or British territory where there was the risk of discovery, which would have resulted in a damaging international incident. Worse, since any Soviet armaments ship would have to enter the Red Sea via the Suez Canal, there was the potential that the British would board and search it there, as was their right by treaty, resulting in an even worse international incident guaranteed to outrage the British since it involved the Suez Canal: lifeline to their empire in the east.
Aside from that, Abyssinia wasn’t seen as having an military hope of defending itself; Stalin would have been seen as backing a loser. It’s one thing to condemn Mussolini at the League of Nations, which the Soviets did, it is another to risk angering the British for the sake of a cause already doomed to fail.
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Anaxagoras
Banned
And even then it was only Anti-imperialism-as-long-as-it-is-not-our-imperialism more than anything else.
FWIW, here is Trotsky's analysis:
"Experience quickly proved that participation in the League of Nations, while adding nothing to those practical advantages which
could be had by way of agreements with separate bourgeois states, imposes at the same time serious limitations and obligations.
These the Soviet Union is performing with the most pedantic faithfulness in the interest of its still unaccustomed conservative
prestige. The necessity of accommodation within the League not only to France, but also to her allies, compelled Soviet
diplomacy to occupy an extremely equivocal position in the Italian-Abyssinian conflict. At the very time when Litvinov, who was
nothing at Geneva but a shadow of Laval, expressed his gratitude to the diplomats of France and England for their efforts "in
behalf of peace", efforts which so auspiciously resulted in the annihilation of Abyssinia, oil from the Caucausus continued to
nourish the Italian fleet. Even if you can understand that the Moscow government hesitated openly to break a commercial treaty,
still the trade unions were not obliged to take into consideration the undertakings of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. An
actual stoppage of exports to Italy by a decision of the Soviet trade unions would have evoked a world movement of boycott
incomparably more real than the treacherous "sanctions", measured as they were in advance by diplomatists and jurists in
agreement with Mussolini. And if the Soviet trade unions never lifted a finger this time, in contrast with 1926, when they openly
collected millions of rubles for the British coal strike, it is only because such an initiative was forbidden by the ruling
bureaucracy, chiefly to curry favor with France. In the coming world war, however, no military allies can recompense the Soviet
Union for the lost confidence of the colonial peoples and of the toiling masses in general. " http://www.marxist.com/classics-old/trotsky/revolution_betrayed.html
"Experience quickly proved that participation in the League of Nations, while adding nothing to those practical advantages which
could be had by way of agreements with separate bourgeois states, imposes at the same time serious limitations and obligations.
These the Soviet Union is performing with the most pedantic faithfulness in the interest of its still unaccustomed conservative
prestige. The necessity of accommodation within the League not only to France, but also to her allies, compelled Soviet
diplomacy to occupy an extremely equivocal position in the Italian-Abyssinian conflict. At the very time when Litvinov, who was
nothing at Geneva but a shadow of Laval, expressed his gratitude to the diplomats of France and England for their efforts "in
behalf of peace", efforts which so auspiciously resulted in the annihilation of Abyssinia, oil from the Caucausus continued to
nourish the Italian fleet. Even if you can understand that the Moscow government hesitated openly to break a commercial treaty,
still the trade unions were not obliged to take into consideration the undertakings of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. An
actual stoppage of exports to Italy by a decision of the Soviet trade unions would have evoked a world movement of boycott
incomparably more real than the treacherous "sanctions", measured as they were in advance by diplomatists and jurists in
agreement with Mussolini. And if the Soviet trade unions never lifted a finger this time, in contrast with 1926, when they openly
collected millions of rubles for the British coal strike, it is only because such an initiative was forbidden by the ruling
bureaucracy, chiefly to curry favor with France. In the coming world war, however, no military allies can recompense the Soviet
Union for the lost confidence of the colonial peoples and of the toiling masses in general. " http://www.marxist.com/classics-old/trotsky/revolution_betrayed.html
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
So the reasons for the difference in policy between the 1890s and 1930s seem to cluster into three main categories:
A) Lack of interest and loss of any religious motive the second time around, unlike the first (Plumber, Delta Force and eliphas8)
B) Ideological revulsion with Abyssinia, their backwardness is worse than imperialism (Alex Richards)
C) Diplomatic caution, above all, fear for relations with Britain and France. (Cook, David Tenner, & Plumber a little bit)
A) Lack of interest and loss of any religious motive the second time around, unlike the first (Plumber, Delta Force and eliphas8)
B) Ideological revulsion with Abyssinia, their backwardness is worse than imperialism (Alex Richards)
C) Diplomatic caution, above all, fear for relations with Britain and France. (Cook, David Tenner, & Plumber a little bit)
nit pick, Ethiopia isn't and wasn't Eastern Orthodox, Eastern Orthodoxy views the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as the head of the Church, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church is a Oriental Orthodox Church that views the Coptic Pope in Alexandria as the head of the Church.
Ultimate Paragon
Banned
So many religious differences are hair-splitting, aren't they? 
But to answer your question...
Simple: they had no reason to. Maybe if they were at odds with Mussolini's Italy for one reason or another, they'd see it as realpolitik, but other than that, I can't think of any realistic way to have them support Abyssinia.
But to answer your question...Simple: they had no reason to. Maybe if they were at odds with Mussolini's Italy for one reason or another, they'd see it as realpolitik, but other than that, I can't think of any realistic way to have them support Abyssinia.
So many religious differences are hair-splitting, aren't they?
well, only in so far as mixing up Catholics and Greek Orthodox because they're both catholic would be hair-splitting
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Between the three main reasons, I would see C) as most decisive.
The religious factor A) is sort of odd, but I guess true. Doctrinally, the Ethiopian Coptic and Russian Orthodox churches have a different rite and christology, but I guess at some point, I wonder when, there was some sort of agreement they had something in common (kind of like Papal acceptance of Maronites into the RC communion).
While obviously that was not going to be a compelling rationale in the officially atheist USSR, there would have been plenty of ideological justification for support of Abyssinia: 1) By this point in time (1935) the USSR was endorsing Collective Security against aggression. It sent volunteers to Spain a year later to demonstrate commitment to that point. 2) ...and of course anti-imperialism, support of national independence, even if under a non-communist (like Nationalist China or Turkey) or even monarchical (Afghanistan, Iran) native regime).
The decision to do nothing in Abyssinia while doing something in Spain still requires a little explanation though.
I can see a plausible Marxist argument for (B) a feeling that the Haile Selassie feudal regime was more socially regressive than even Italian colonialism under dynamic bourgeois-imperialist auspices. However, did any one really articulate that point of view in the Soviet Union or COMINTERN at the time? I sort of doubt it.
That leaves us with (C) Diplomatic caution. Again, two things need explaining.
1) Why would Abyssinia have been more risky for the USSR than intervention in Spain or China? After all, the western powers were protesting and sanctioning the Italians, and this would reinforce their stand. Also, supporting a reactionary monarch in Abyssinia seems politically safer vis-a-vis the west than intervention in Spain. The first is a clear-cut case of opposing aggression and championing national independence, whereas in Spain, the issue of protecting the Republic and opposing the Fascists was more tied up with domestic social revolution, which gave the British and French conservatives the heebie-jeebies.
2) How is the landlocked geography of Abyssinia in the 1930s any different from Russian supported Abyssinia in the 1890s? The answer is it was not. Tsarist Russia's aid to Abyssinia had to pass through Suez to get to the Red Sea, and colonial powers, France and Italy, controlled all Abyssinia's routes to the coast, with Eritrea, Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia. I don't even know if the Mahdi held any ports in the 1890s, but I doubt Russians transited through Mahdist territory.
So then it seems to me that the decisive element allowing for Russian aid to Abyssinia in the 1890s, but constraining Soviet aid in the 1930s was a different French attitude towards arms deliveries going to Djibouti. In the 1890s, the French encouraged Russian involvement in East Africa. In the 1930s, they probably would have opposed it, most likely because France was trying to win over Italian support in containing Germany at this time. So fundamentally, an advantage Menelik had was that France at the time wanted to frustrate Crispi, while Haile Selassie's disadvantage was France wanted to kiss Mussolini's derriere.
Lastly, Cook brings up the idea of the Soviets not wanting to back a loser. I can see the point, although before the fighting everyone was not sure the Italians would win, or win completely. I would think that with some of the more basic Soviet infantry kit and basic training, Haile Selassie's could have become quite a bit more deadly to the Italians, even if not enough to survive. Also, the situation has almost no chance of escalating to touch Soviet territory, unlike say the China situation.
Would the British really have been so disturbed about arms deliveries that they'd do this:
All Italian forces were passing through the canal, and the British government and public opinion were very outraged by Italian aggression in Abyssinia, would HMG turned on a dime and become yet more outraged at others trying to help Abyssinia?
It seems to me that this would have applied with equal force if the Japanese tried to help Abyssinia, as they considered doing, and as others have brought up on the board. Also, I heard Germany sold Ethiopia weapons. Were they ever delivered? If so, what route did they follow and why didn't it cause international outrage?
Thoughts?
The religious factor A) is sort of odd, but I guess true. Doctrinally, the Ethiopian Coptic and Russian Orthodox churches have a different rite and christology, but I guess at some point, I wonder when, there was some sort of agreement they had something in common (kind of like Papal acceptance of Maronites into the RC communion).
While obviously that was not going to be a compelling rationale in the officially atheist USSR, there would have been plenty of ideological justification for support of Abyssinia: 1) By this point in time (1935) the USSR was endorsing Collective Security against aggression. It sent volunteers to Spain a year later to demonstrate commitment to that point. 2) ...and of course anti-imperialism, support of national independence, even if under a non-communist (like Nationalist China or Turkey) or even monarchical (Afghanistan, Iran) native regime).
The decision to do nothing in Abyssinia while doing something in Spain still requires a little explanation though.
I can see a plausible Marxist argument for (B) a feeling that the Haile Selassie feudal regime was more socially regressive than even Italian colonialism under dynamic bourgeois-imperialist auspices. However, did any one really articulate that point of view in the Soviet Union or COMINTERN at the time? I sort of doubt it.
That leaves us with (C) Diplomatic caution. Again, two things need explaining.
1) Why would Abyssinia have been more risky for the USSR than intervention in Spain or China? After all, the western powers were protesting and sanctioning the Italians, and this would reinforce their stand. Also, supporting a reactionary monarch in Abyssinia seems politically safer vis-a-vis the west than intervention in Spain. The first is a clear-cut case of opposing aggression and championing national independence, whereas in Spain, the issue of protecting the Republic and opposing the Fascists was more tied up with domestic social revolution, which gave the British and French conservatives the heebie-jeebies.
2) How is the landlocked geography of Abyssinia in the 1930s any different from Russian supported Abyssinia in the 1890s? The answer is it was not. Tsarist Russia's aid to Abyssinia had to pass through Suez to get to the Red Sea, and colonial powers, France and Italy, controlled all Abyssinia's routes to the coast, with Eritrea, Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia. I don't even know if the Mahdi held any ports in the 1890s, but I doubt Russians transited through Mahdist territory.
So then it seems to me that the decisive element allowing for Russian aid to Abyssinia in the 1890s, but constraining Soviet aid in the 1930s was a different French attitude towards arms deliveries going to Djibouti. In the 1890s, the French encouraged Russian involvement in East Africa. In the 1930s, they probably would have opposed it, most likely because France was trying to win over Italian support in containing Germany at this time. So fundamentally, an advantage Menelik had was that France at the time wanted to frustrate Crispi, while Haile Selassie's disadvantage was France wanted to kiss Mussolini's derriere.
Lastly, Cook brings up the idea of the Soviets not wanting to back a loser. I can see the point, although before the fighting everyone was not sure the Italians would win, or win completely. I would think that with some of the more basic Soviet infantry kit and basic training, Haile Selassie's could have become quite a bit more deadly to the Italians, even if not enough to survive. Also, the situation has almost no chance of escalating to touch Soviet territory, unlike say the China situation.
Would the British really have been so disturbed about arms deliveries that they'd do this:
All Italian forces were passing through the canal, and the British government and public opinion were very outraged by Italian aggression in Abyssinia, would HMG turned on a dime and become yet more outraged at others trying to help Abyssinia?
It seems to me that this would have applied with equal force if the Japanese tried to help Abyssinia, as they considered doing, and as others have brought up on the board. Also, I heard Germany sold Ethiopia weapons. Were they ever delivered? If so, what route did they follow and why didn't it cause international outrage?
Thoughts?
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Another point is that Stalin, like the leaders of the western powers, may not have wanted to drive Mussolini into closer relations with Hitler. That he distinguished at this time between the two regimes may be seen from his famous remarks at the Seventeenth Party Congress, "Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But it is not a question of fascism here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best relations with that country. " http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SPC34.html
Spain: The coup against the Popular Front in Spain was a nightmare situation to a man who had seen the strongest Communist Party in the West fall to the Nazis just a few years before. Stalin was always far more interested in Europe than the world, even after WWII. Khrushchev is the one who made a big push towards the Third World.
China: Stalin didn't give more than token support of the Communists until after WWII. He viewed the defeat of Japan by a united China as more important than communists fighting Chiang.
Yes. In the 1890s, Russia was used by France as a counterweight to Germany. In the 1930s, France deliberately stayed far away from such a thing because they didn't want to provoke Germany into war. This is in addition to the USSR being very unpopular in establishment Western circles at the time. Iran is probably the closest example in today's world (reviled by pretty much everyone but their clients.)
(B) seems pretty unlikely to me. The Soviets consistently ridiculed arguments that the imperialists were bringing progress and civilization to the underdeveloped world. And it is notorious that when expedient they could support reactionary governments in what would be called the Third World, even while these governments were jailing Communists.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Yes, I was referring to Soviet aid to Nationalist China in the 20s and 30s, not aid to the Chinese communists, to underline that the Soviets could support a non-communist regime for a good geopolitical cause.
On Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists - we're learning a bit more about it. For much of the pre-Sino-Japanese war the Communist movement was too small to absorb as much aid as the Nationalists. They tended to deliver aid mainly in the form of cash and in-kind training, educational and medical services. The Communists were left to capture weapons themselves.
Agreed they isolated the Soviets more, although after '35 there were some schizophrenic attempts to work with the Soviets, Stalin-Laval Pact, etc.
I think the main thing it comes down to is both Stalin and the French thought it would be more convenient if the Stresa Front worked, and Italy and Germany kept separate. So, the Soviets were not going to get ahead of everybody else on Abyssinia. They were much more vigorous opposing the Italians only later, when the Italians were working in parallel with the Germans in Spain.