Syria continues fighting in Yom Kippur War

What if Syria made the decision to try and keep fighting after Egypt agreed to the ceasefire? Could they achieve success before the full weight of Israeli military comes down on them?

From wiki: "The Syrians prepared for a massive counteroffensive to drive Israeli forces out of Syria, scheduled for October 23. A total of five Syrian divisions were to take part, alongside the Iraqi and Jordanian expeditionary forces. The Soviets had replaced most of the losses Syria's tank forces had suffered during the first weeks of the war.

However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations imposed its ceasefire (following the acquiescence of both Israel and Egypt). Abraham Rabinovich claimed that "The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday [October 22] created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him, but its implications could not be ignored. Some on the Syrian General Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so Egypt would feel obliged to continue fighting as well.... Others, however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's efforts to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would not come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking Damascus".[26]

Ultimately, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad decided to cancel the offensive. On October 23, the day the offensive was to begin, Syria announced that it had accepted the ceasefire, and ordered its troops to cease-fire, while the Iraqi government ordered its forces home."
 
No Victor, No Vanquished gets into this a bit. IIRC, the Iraqi army had entered the fray and the Arabs were actually preparing to counterattack when the war ended. The ceasefire was so disgusting to Baghdad the Iraqi army simply quit the field without further discussion with Syria. In terms of Egypt not coming to Syria's assistance, that might have been true with strong Israeli forces in the Sinai, but the weaker Israel made itself, the more tempted Egypt would presumably be.
 
Since the counterattacking forces would be working in a situation of complete Israeli air superiority, to the extent of essentially zero Arab air forces over the battlefield, they would be chewed up pretty badly. Such mobile SAMs that the Syrians had had been mostly trashed.

Simply replacing hardware, in this case tanks &/or SAM systems, does nothing to provide trained crews (most tank crews of killed tanks either died/wounded when hit or captured), nor improve the tactics. The Iraqi Army (and Air Force) of 1973 have zero combat experience, so I would expect their performance against trained and experienced Israeli air and ground forces to be at least as bad if not worth than their performance in Gulf Wars I & II.

Sure, such a counterattack will cost the Israelis some personnel and materiel casualties, but will cost the Arabs way way more, and you'll see the stop line on the Syrian front much closer to Damascus than it was OTL, and unlike OTL you won't see as much of a pullback by the Israelis from the stop line to the more permanent armistice line.

Once the fighting has stopped on the Egyptian front, the Israelis can move forces to the Syrian front as defending against a potential resumption of by the Egyptians or Jordanians on the lines of the Suez Canal and Jordan River is much easier given geography/added depth and now the Israelis are on both sides of the Suez Canal.

Odds are overwhelming that the counterattack discussed in the PoD will be a disaster for the Arabs militarily and politically. You might see Assad get kicked out one way or another as a result of this, and if the Iraqis forces take big losses the leaders in Baghdad may become unemployed. This will increase disunity among the Arab leaders/countries.

When you have lost a war, and lost badly, its time to take the best deal you can get. "you got to know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em."
 
Since the counterattacking forces would be working in a situation of complete Israeli air superiority, to the extent of essentially zero Arab air forces over the battlefield, they would be chewed up pretty badly. Such mobile SAMs that the Syrians had had been mostly trashed.

That would have been news to the Syrians at the time, that their SAM network had been trashed.

Sure, such a counterattack will cost the Israelis some personnel and materiel casualties, but will cost the Arabs way way more, and you'll see the stop line on the Syrian front much closer to Damascus than it was OTL, and unlike OTL you won't see as much of a pullback by the Israelis from the stop line to the more permanent armistice line.

The threat was not the immediate counterattack per se. The threat was that Israel was facing the prospect of a long term war that, like Germany in Russia in 1941, it could not win due to the wild disparity in numbers and that it's army and economy (which couldn't stay mobilized forever) would be bled white. On the Arab side, aside from the Israeli's superior tactical skills and operational ability to push the offensive, the threat to a long war was an inevitable US intervention, which meant the Arabs could not realistically win either a long war or a short war.

Once the fighting has stopped on the Egyptian front, the Israelis can move forces to the Syrian front as defending against a potential resumption of by the Egyptians or Jordanians on the lines of the Suez Canal and Jordan River is much easier given geography/added depth and now the Israelis are on both sides of the Suez Canal.

The ceasefire in the Sinai took some time to firm up. The Israelis would have been quite rash to weaken themselves against the Egyptians before the situation was fully in hand.

When you have lost a war, and lost badly, its time to take the best deal you can get. "you got to know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em."

I've no idea how you decided Syria had lost the war militarily when we've already established that Syria and Iraq were about to counterattack on a very large scale.
 

rohala

Banned
How many tanks had the Soviets sent to Syria? How many had the Americans sent to Israel?

The experience from the previous fighting suggests that the Iraqis had particularly poor performance when attacking with armour, while the Syrians needed a considerable numerical superiority to achieve success.
 
While Israel would have issues with a truly long term war, an additional 2-3 weeks is certainly doable with acceptable "pain". The USSR was able to trade space for time to acquire skills and build up (or actually rebuild) its military. Syria can't do that, once Israel reaches Damascus and isolates not enters it, then what?

A key question is, and I don't know the answer to this, how many TRAINED armor/tank crewmen were available in Syria to man those new tanks? Likewise any other new equipment (such as aircraft), who is trained and not wounded/killed/captured so can make it work.

Evidence is that Iraqi forces are not going to be any more effective than Syrians were, perhaps not even. Infantry that can just about load/fire rifle, tankers that can sort of drive tank, load cannon are truly cannon fodder in the true sense of the word, and expecting them to do better than troops who were considered fully trained is foolish.
 
While Israel would have issues with a truly long term war, an additional 2-3 weeks is certainly doable with acceptable "pain". The USSR was able to trade space for time to acquire skills and build up (or actually rebuild) its military. Syria can't do that, once Israel reaches Damascus and isolates not enters it, then what?

A key question is, and I don't know the answer to this, how many TRAINED armor/tank crewmen were available in Syria to man those new tanks? Likewise any other new equipment (such as aircraft), who is trained and not wounded/killed/captured so can make it work.

Evidence is that Iraqi forces are not going to be any more effective than Syrians were, perhaps not even. Infantry that can just about load/fire rifle, tankers that can sort of drive tank, load cannon are truly cannon fodder in the true sense of the word, and expecting them to do better than troops who were considered fully trained is foolish.

When Israel gets closer to Damascus they'll have to contend with Syria's most elite troops, the Defense Companies, not sure if they will have any impact?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Companies_(Syria)

What would be the goal in surrounding Damascus? Its seems like it would be hard the city has a dozen or so military bases, defensive points, around it plus ample food supplies from the Ghouta agricultural area. They in theory could just sit in the city indefinitely without much worry.
 
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rohala

Banned
While Israel would have issues with a truly long term war, an additional 2-3 weeks is certainly doable with acceptable "pain". The USSR was able to trade space for time to acquire skills and build up (or actually rebuild) its military. Syria can't do that, once Israel reaches Damascus and isolates not enters it, then what?
Israel reaching Damascus means a substantial offensive, heavy casualties, and probable failure.

A key question is, and I don't know the answer to this, how many TRAINED armor/tank crewmen were available in Syria to man those new tanks? Likewise any other new equipment (such as aircraft), who is trained and not wounded/killed/captured so can make it work.
Good question. Probably Syria had to rely on mobilized reservists. Not unlike Israel but without Israel's regular reserve training AFAIK.

Infantry that can just about load/fire rifle, tankers that can sort of drive tank, load cannon are truly cannon fodder in the true sense of the word, and expecting them to do better than troops who were considered fully trained is foolish.
See above comment. Reservists are also fully trained, although maybe rusty and less cohesive. To that I should add that while in terms of tank crews Syria may have needed to mobilize reservists, I doubt that was the case in infantry. Casualties weren't that heavy and Syria had active troops to move around to replace losses.
 
Good question. Probably Syria had to rely on mobilized reservists. Not unlike Israel but without Israel's regular reserve training AFAIK.

See above comment. Reservists are also fully trained, although maybe rusty and less cohesive. To that I should add that while in terms of tank crews Syria may have needed to mobilize reservists, I doubt that was the case in infantry. Casualties weren't that heavy and Syria had active troops to move around to replace losses.

Worse comes to worse they could always throw in the various military academy cadets.
 
So, if the U.S. were to stay out, Syria could have in theory defeated Israel in a prolonged conflict?

By defeated i meaning halting the Israel offensive towards Damascus and expelling them from Syrian territory.
 
This is actually a fascinating topic, and one that might have the potential for major butterflies.

For instance, let's assume the war continues. Israeli forces reach Damascus. Syria refused to surrender, and instead throws in whatever marshalling reserves its got, together with a gathering Iraqi force.

What then? Can Israel take Damascus? That's going to get nasty. Urban warfare is always messy as hell, and the Israeli's are operating on extended supply lines, and don't have a lot of ability to sustain long term mobilization.

So do we see a protracted siege of Damascus, while Israel hopes to mop up the remaining Syrian forces. And if so, can it decisively eradicate Syria's ability to resist, along with Iraqi forces, or before Iraqi forces can take the field.

What ability does Israel have to maintain long term operations in Syria. Or better yet, to occupy significant parts of Syria, particularly if there is a resistance campaign by the population and by Irregulars. This may turn into a huge headache. Essentially, it would be Israel's 1982-2000 Lebanese occupation experience on crystal meth - faster, harder, and bloodier.

Which might in turn have its own consequences for Lebanon. I'd suspect that a long term violent occupation on its borders, lots of refugees, would destabilize the country even faster and nastier. But without a Syrian partner/adversary in the partition and occupation of Lebanon, what happens? Does Israel stay out? Invest further and deeper? Occupy the whole of Lebanon? Or carve off a chunk and let the civil war run wild elsewhere? Or confront an Iraq/Syria UAR occupation?

More, if there's a wholesale collapse of the Syrian government, while Iraq is taking the field, does that give the Baathists of Baghdad an opportunity to consolidate a united Syrian/Iraqi United Arab State? Which might have major consequences for the rise or failure to rise of Saddam Hussein, the Iran/Iraq War, the Kuwait Invasion, etc.

If, on the other hand, the Syrian's are able to reconsolidate and deploy an effective fighting force... then what? Does Israel get dragged into a long term war? What happens if the Iraqi forces come into play? Will the ceasefire on the Egyptian border hold? Will the Israeli nukes start to fly? Will the United States be forced to invervene directly?

It's a wild card.
 
This is actually a fascinating topic, and one that might have the potential for major butterflies.

For instance, let's assume the war continues. Israeli forces reach Damascus. Syria refused to surrender, and instead throws in whatever marshalling reserves its got, together with a gathering Iraqi force.

What then? Can Israel take Damascus? That's going to get nasty. Urban warfare is always messy as hell, and the Israeli's are operating on extended supply lines, and don't have a lot of ability to sustain long term mobilization.

So do we see a protracted siege of Damascus, while Israel hopes to mop up the remaining Syrian forces. And if so, can it decisively eradicate Syria's ability to resist, along with Iraqi forces, or before Iraqi forces can take the field.

What ability does Israel have to maintain long term operations in Syria. Or better yet, to occupy significant parts of Syria, particularly if there is a resistance campaign by the population and by Irregulars. This may turn into a huge headache. Essentially, it would be Israel's 1982-2000 Lebanese occupation experience on crystal meth - faster, harder, and bloodier. .

Here how i see the battle for Syria going tell me what you think

The Israeli's defeat the Syrian/Jordanian/Iraqi counterattacking forces and advance onto Damascus. Hafez al Assad moves his government to safety in Lakatia province, calls up several hundred thousand reservists, and orders his forces to hold the capital to the end.

The Israelis advance on Damascus, bash through the cities defensive ring, and after months of heavy urban warfare are able to seize most of the Syrian capital. The two major points of resistance left would be Mount Qasioun and Ghouta.

Ghouta, and eastern Damascus, in particular will present a major problem for the Israelis. The Syrians will be fighting from good terrain with a lot of food at their disposal. The areas is also large and even if surrounded infiltration, in and out, is likely. Bashar al Assad after three years of trying has yet to drive the Syrian rebels from Ghouta, despite having the area surrounded by tens of thousands of troops and using weapons of all kinds, even chemical.

After taking a majority of Damascus, the Israelis will probably move into southern Syria perhaps raise some Druze militias. They may also have to clear the Qalamoun Mountain range to prevent attacks, from there, on Israeli troops in Damascus which will be a very annoying operation.

From here I'm not sure, probably the Israelis get locked in years of never ending guerrilla warfare until some settlement occurs.

I'm interested in what everyone thinks?
 
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Here how i see the battle for Syria going tell me what you think

I frankly don't have enough expertise in the local history and geography to venture a detailed opinion. I'd love to see this discussed more comprehensively.


The Israelis advance on Damascus, bash through the cities defensive ring, and after months of heavy urban warfare are able to seize most of the Syrian capital. The two major points of resistance left would be Mount Qasioun and Ghouta.

Does Israel have 'months' to engage in heavy urban warfare? Or the willingness to take those sorts of casualties. And even when the city is taken (most of it) that seems to be the beginning of problems, not just an end. You have a hostile population in chaos. How do you occupy that and maintain order easily?


From here I'm not sure, probably the Israelis get locked in years of never ending guerrilla warfare until some settlement occurs.

Where would an Iraqi force/reinforcements fit in?
 
the Iraqis did pretty poorly in OTL against the Israelis... an entire brigade of tanks was effectively destroyed when they launched an attack and blithely moved right into a 'box' of Israeli units who destroyed the Iraqis without so much as a single Israeli tank getting hit by enemy fire. Later, the Iraqis, Syrians, Saudi Arabians, and Jordanians all tried to coordinate attacks on the Israelis, but inter-Arab coordination was pretty bad... they never seemed to launch attacks at the same time, and managed to hit each other with their artillery. Of course, most of this was Arab forces attacking defending Israelis... if the Israelis tried to move forward against them, things might go differently...
 
I frankly don't have enough expertise in the local history and geography to venture a detailed opinion. I'd love to see this discussed more comprehensively.




Does Israel have 'months' to engage in heavy urban warfare? Or the willingness to take those sorts of casualties. And even when the city is taken (most of it) that seems to be the beginning of problems, not just an end. You have a hostile population in chaos. How do you occupy that and maintain order easily?




Where would an Iraqi force/reinforcements fit in?

The problem the Israelis have is that the Syrian population will fight them to the end. When the French came in by contrast, according to my Syrian friend, the population of Damascus wasn't really that hostile to them.

The Israelis if they wanted to could always try and exploit ethnic differences in the country, which is why i mentioned the Druze. Maybe they could reconstruct this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Druze_state

Israel i think will have to finish major operations against Damascus in like 3 months, which is similar to how long they put Beirut under siege. After that they can partially demobilize and focus efforts on clearing the problem areas in and around Damascus. Whether they can do this is the question, i myself am skeptical

Iraqi forces i'm not sure perhaps they can form up, with other Syrian forces, near Homs in central Syria and make a push down the main M-5 highway towards Damascus.

Question will Jordan support Syrian guerrilla actives, cross border raids, in southern Syria? If so this could cause some issues.
 

rohala

Banned
Israel cannot remove forces from the Egyptian front. It was a slow processs as it was historically. With Syria fighting it is impossible to withdraw forces without Egypt reentering the conflict.

Israeli forces in Syria by the time of the historical cease fire date are worn down to some 380 tanks. The Syrians lost most of their tanks in previous fighting, but if the Soviets are replenishing their losses they hold the initiative. I don't see how the Israelis can attack, let alone take Damascus.
 
the Iraqis did pretty poorly in OTL against the Israelis... an entire brigade of tanks was effectively destroyed when they launched an attack and blithely moved right into a 'box' of Israeli units who destroyed the Iraqis without so much as a single Israeli tank getting hit by enemy fire. Later, the Iraqis, Syrians, Saudi Arabians, and Jordanians all tried to coordinate attacks on the Israelis, but inter-Arab coordination was pretty bad... they never seemed to launch attacks at the same time, and managed to hit each other with their artillery. Of course, most of this was Arab forces attacking defending Israelis... if the Israelis tried to move forward against them, things might go differently...

Would Iraq be in a position to step into a Syrian power vacuum.

I imagine that Iraq would be pretty hard to strike. Certainly there's no realistic hope of a successful or viable overland attack deep into Iraqi territory. I would imagine that Israeli air forces have superiority, but then again, they don't have unlimited range.

So I'd see a situation where Iraq maintains an intact command and control structure, and can easily re-establish control and contact with its elements in Syria.

In contrast, Syria's command and control systems are well within Israeli striking distance, both by land and air. So I could see a situation where, assuming that Syria stays in the war and things go to pieces for them, their government and civil and military command and control systems fall apart, and the Iraqi's are in a position to sweep up the country.

We might, for instance, see a situation where there's a temporary partition of Syria between Iraq and Israel, where Israel essentially holds an angry and rebellious chunk of territory captive at the outer limits of its logistical ability, while beyond that logistic wall, the Iraqi's consolidate and build. I don't think it would be stable or sustainable. But I think that the inertia would work steadily against Israel.
 
Interested in everyones opinion on this

If we base it on this map the country can be divided up: http://fanack.com/uploads/pics/Syria_frenchmandate_map_03.jpg

The Alawites break off an form their own state.

The Iraqis annex the territory that was roughly the State of Aleppo.

The Israelis take over the old State of Damascus/Druze areas and set up some kind of Sunni/Christian/Druze secular unity government.


You know... you seem to be interested in this, but I'm not sure that anyone else is. You'll note that the comments are not exactly aflame.

You want my advice.... Just do it. Do a mini-timeline, or a maxi-timeline. You seem to be relatively knowledgeable, and I suspect that you have the tools and information sources to dig more deeply.

So why don't you just go ahead and do it. I think that even if no one else reads it, you'd still find it profoundly satisfying and interesting to do the work yourself and write it up.

It's possible that you'd get nay sayers arguing with you. But that's okay. On my major timelines, I've had to fight constantly with arguers. But it's made for productive discussion.

So go for it.

As for the map, not so sure about it. Even if the Israelis are able to make a deal with the Druze and foment a Druze mini state, they're still occupying a chunk of territory and a population greater than Israel itself. A hostile, restive territory that would be impossible to disarm. I don't know that Israel has the resources to manage that. Look at the expenses of occupying Lebanon (albeit, that was a long term occupation).
 
You know... you seem to be interested in this, but I'm not sure that anyone else is. You'll note that the comments are not exactly aflame.

You want my advice.... Just do it. Do a mini-timeline, or a maxi-timeline. You seem to be relatively knowledgeable, and I suspect that you have the tools and information sources to dig more deeply.

Already doing one on a similar conflict, it's in my sig :p

Israel is not going to be able to take Damascus, although if the Syrian air defence network has been taken out, Israel can advance to the gates of Damascus (the dry riverbed of the Nahar al-Awaj, roughly 30km south of the city) and fortify a defensive position there. If Egypt and Jordan are still out for the count, the IAF will be able to strategically bomb the living shit out of Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. Meanwhile, if it looks like the Syrian government is collapsing, the Druze in the Jebal region might defect, especially if the Israelis offer them unlimited support in arms and control over the fertile Hauran plateau.

Short of Soviet intervention, Nixon withdrawing military support, or the IDF being extremely stupid and trying to enter Damascus for glory's sake, Syria will end up with an Israeli-backed parastate on the edge of their capital. The humiliation would likely cause the Assad regime to collapse. Likely successor regimes would either be a Ba'athist or non-Ba'athist military faction, with the off-chance that a general uprising in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood takes control.
 
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