A True and Better Alamo Redux

A True and Better Alamo Redux​

Part I: Moreel’s Gambit

(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)

...Most discussions of the pivotal battles of Wake Island focus on the multiple naval engagements that took place around the atoll during the early months of the War in the Pacific. Yet few give adequate mention to the immense efforts that took place from 1939 - 1941 which enabled the island’s defenders to resist the initial attacks and come to pose such a nuisance to the Japanese plans of Pacific mastery…

…Though the strategic usefulness of Wake Atoll had long been recognized by the Americans and the US Navy in particular, work on turning the island into a valuable naval base was continually delayed. As early as 1921 when Hector Bywater in his book Sea-Power in the Pacific wrote

Of considerably more importance [than Midway] is Wake Island which lies 1,300 miles east of the Marianne group on the direct route between Hawaii, Guam, and Manila. The conversion of Wake Island into a well-defended fueling station would materially assist in consolidating this vital line of communications. (1)

Yet due to budget cutbacks and a desire for peace, Bywater’s recommended preparations languished and Wake remained unused until the arrival of Pan-American Air Ways in 1935...

...Though viewed as a militarily provocative act by the Japanese, the establishment of a Pan-American airport for its fleet of flying boats in the summer of 1935 was only partially supported by the American government. Some surveys followed, yet the nation’s strong isolationist sentiment prevented any efforts at fortification or base improvement even after Japan declared that she would no longer abide by the Washington treaty. Despite the efforts of Army, Navy, and nascent Air Force planners to incorporate Wake into America’s defensive plans, for several key years the political will to properly establish Wake as a base simply did not exist. Though not apparent at the time, on December 1st 1938 a board, headed up by the outgoing commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet Arthur J. Hepburn delivered a report commissioned six months early to the Secretary of the Navy and in so doing provided a turning point. In his report Hepburn recommended that the Atoll be fortified and transformed into a base capable of supporting a system of other bases conducive to US Operations in the region...

...Hepburn’s recommendations met with stiff resistance from the isolationist lobby in Congress and a mere month after the submission of the report the battle lines had been drawn in Washington. Initially content with solely excluding Guam from efforts at reinforcements, the isolationist lobby was encouraged by their relatively easy victory and turned their eyes on the planned construction to take place on Wake. It was their hope that by limiting American base construction west of the 180th Meridian they could prevent Roosevelt from “provoking” what was surely to be a costly war with the Japanese. Attacking provisions for Wake in the House Appropriations Committee, they managed to banish “The Wake Project” to military limbo, or so they thought (2)...

...Were it not for the cunning actions of Rear Admiral Ben Moreel, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the construction of military facilities on Wake might have languished for months, if not years more. Yet unlike the plethora of isolationists in Congress, Moreel recognized the urgency required to prepare for war. Following the surrender of Japan, Moreel remarked that the race to fulfill Hepburn’s recommendations was “the greatest single construction contract in the history of the world in point of money value, diversity of character, and dispersion over vast distances.” He then continued by stating “I consider it one of my few genuine achievements in life, that in striving to complete this project I contributed to the safety of this nation, its initial victories, and now its ultimate victory over the Japanese.” (3)

...Rather than advocate outright for the fortification of Wake, Moreel instead requested that the Army Corps of Engineers receive a million-dollar authorization to develop ship channels at Wake. He hoped that this kind of routine, peacetime work the corps performed at ports all over the United States would be seen as innocuous enough to escape the ravages of the isolationists. Once Congress had given its consent it would be hard pressed to prevent further construction and would be far more amenable to taking measures that ensured its investment did not fall into Japanese hands (4)...

...Yet even a proposal as innocuous as Moreel’s plan to improve the harbor at Wake faced stiff resistance from those opposed to projecting America’s power too far abroad. Still, through some shrewd politicking, Moreel and by extension the Navy was able to push the proposal past the House Rivers and Harbors Committee by a single vote and get the requisite funding for their project by a similar margin. With the proper permissions in hand, both the Navy and the Corps of Engineers acted before Congress could change its mind, dispatching the 2000 ton dredge Raymond and 150 men to the isolated Atoll to begin work. Little did they know that they would face one of the toughest assignments of their career and that they would be contributing to one of the greatest battles in American history (POINT OF DIVERGENCE. See Footnote #5)...

...Upon arriving at the Atoll on June 3rd 1939 after a long journey, the Engineers and Naval officers found it to be inhospitable to say the least. Though they had familiarized themselves with the reports of Pan-Am’s construction teams to prepare for the project only when they saw and began to experience the Atoll did they realize what they were up against. Needless to say, the complex dredging and demolition operations that followed would be the defining moment of many of the engineers’ careers...

…Before examining the numerous preparations that took place in 1941, it is prudent to reacquaint ourselves with the physical layout of the atoll itself. A “V” shaped atoll, Wake is divided into 3 islands, Wake proper which forms the “body” of the V and upon which the main airbase was built, and Wilkes and Peale Islands that form the tips of the V. The entire atoll is roughly 2600 acres, most of which was covered in low dense brush unlike many other Pacific island atolls. Yet despite being a relatively small atoll, Wake possesses over 21 miles of coastline, itself surrounded by treacherous coral reefs that extend from 30-1100 yards beyond it...

...Prospects for inter-service rivalry on such a project ran high, yet fortunately, early snags were avoided as the Engineers suggestion to alter the Navy’s original plan for a ship channel were accepted quite quickly. Rather than cut through over a thousand of yards of exposed coral reef to put the channel in the mouth of the “V” of the Atoll, it was decided quite early on to focus on an easier route that enlarged the channel between Wilkes Island and Wake Island into the lagoon. This decision proved to be quite fortuitous given the difficulties involved. Had it gone another way, vital harbor facilities might still lay uncompleted as the final preparations took place in 1941 (6)...

...As the Raymond’s cutting bit began to break up the dense coral and limestone table of the Atoll, it soon became apparent that this project was an entirely different ball game. What was a fairly modest project soon ballooned in cost as more spare parts were promptly ordered to deal with the constant breakdowns that were sure to happen, along with hundreds of tons of demolition equipment which would allow personnel to continue the work begun by Pan-Am of clearing the Lagoon of coral heads. Over the next few months, initial breakdowns were overcome and strategies were formed to deal with the harsh terrain and corrosive climate of Wake. By the beginning of Winter 1939 work had reached its expected pace and the soaring costs of the operation were beginning to subside (7)...

...Fortunately for Moreel, the mounting costs of the Wake Project came at the perfect time politically as Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia and invasion of Poland severely weakened the hand of isolationist politicians. Not only were said politicians unable to halt ongoing work at Wake, they also failed to prevent the slough of defense related legislation that soared through Congress in 1940. This legislation saw over ten million dollars allocated to base improvements at Wake that would allow it to host not only seaplanes, but Marine fighters, Army Air Corps bombers, and submarines. News of the additional workload arrived just as the Engineers were finishing their initial project. Though none of them looked forward to yet more months of battle against the Atoll’s seemingly impenetrable coral, all of them recognized the hefty paychecks that awaited them come the conclusion of their contract (8)...

...Fortunately, this new wave of construction required no new learning curve and the experienced men of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Yards and Docks responded admirably. With remarkable speed they set about completely transforming the Atoll’s lagoon into what it would later become known for. Though they managed to accomplish little else in the six months prior to the arrival of the first contractors in January 1941, their contributions were absolutely foundational to future events. The extensive dredging and demolition work that occurred over the course of June 1939- January 1941 could only have occurred in times of peace. As they packed up and prepared to leave, they left behind not only an exceptional harbor in Wake’s lagoon, but a well-established base camp, dock and logistic system that considerably sped up the construction of other base facilities...

...Surprisingly, the Japanese failed to take into account the extensive nature of the American dredging project, regarding it as little more than a minor, albeit expensive, expansion to the Pan-Am facility on the island. As a result their efforts to expand their bases in the Marshalls continued apace and little was done to account for increased American activity on Wake (9)...

...Arriving on January 9th, the transport William Ward Burrows brought with it, not only more supplies, but 76 civilian contractors under Nathan D. Teters. With the dredging completed these men were to usher in a new era and focus on constructing the airfield, seaplane base, and other vital land based facilities. Over the coming months, the Ward and a few other transports would make the long journey to Wake and unload hundreds more. Taking advantage of the foundational work done by the Corps of Engineers, Teters’ men were able to begin carving a road network and airfield out of the dense brush of the main island almost immediately after landing their supplies and expanding the humble engineers encampment that had been built over a year and a half prior (10)...

...Still, in spite of the millions of dollars already poured into the Atoll and the millions already to come, upon the departure of the Corps of Engineers and the Raymond no real defensive measures were present on the island. In fact, the only real military asset on the island was fifty thousand gallons of aviation gas in a recently constructed storage unit near the Pan-Am base as per Hepburn’s original recommendation. Other than that, nothing but a handful of small arms kept the strategic atoll out of Japanese hands. Though this certainly played a role in preventing the Japanese from reacting too strongly, it nevertheless presented a striking problem to Admiral Husband J. Kimmel when he replaced Richardson as CINCUS in January 1941 (11)...

Footnotes
1. This quote and author is entirely from OTL.

2. All OTL.

3. First half of the quote is from OTL, the second half...

4. Again all OTL.

5. At last we get to the Point of Divergence. In OTL Moreel’s proposal just barely failed to cut the mustard and it was killed by the House Rivers and Harbors Committee by ONE VOTE. Now if that’s not a POD, I don’t know what is!

6. This decision was reached by the civilian contractors for the same reason when their dredging operations began in June 1941. I see no reason why a similar decision wouldn’t be reached in OTL.

7. In OTL Wake presented a number of challenges to construction efforts such as high winds, corrosive sea spray, and effervescent coral dust. In TTL the Engineers have been dealing with these factors for over a year and a half meaning that subsequent construction efforts will be well prepared.

8. Initial plans were for Wake to host six submarines, two dozen PBYs, and one carrier air group. In OTL the plans for the submarine base were only hastily drawn up and assumed that Wake and Midway were identical. In TTL these plans are better thought out and tailored to Wake.

9. Japan didn’t really react to American construction efforts in OTL, seeing their own efforts as satisfactory. I don’t see why it would be different in TTL.

10. Teters’ OTL experience was almost completely different as no dredging work had been done and no base existed at all. As a result, unloading supplies took 19 days and an entirely new base needed to be constructed from scratch. In TTL, Teters has a massive headstart on OTL.

11. Again, similar to OTL in terms of defensive preparations. In OTL, Hepburn recommended that at the very least, the Navy should fund the expansion of Pan-Am’s fuel depot so that Navy PBYs could make some use of the base should war come early. Kimmel is OTL of course.
 
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Very nice job. As Jim, said, I am going to love to see what you do here in the second version of it.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Two questions:

1) You mention a 150-strong ACoE party; these are soldiers, I take it?

2) You mention Teters' and the CPNAB construction team; these are civilians, correct?

Thanks - interesting idea for a POD.

Best,
 
Hizzah! chip chip Churrah! :D:p I am glad to see this Back Fearless Leader, been one of my fav TL's and much looking forward to seeing the repercussions of a Pacific War that, to say the least, doesnt go on Japans OTL Timetable so to speak :cool: Gracias! :D
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Okay - does the Corps of Engineers party

Yes and Yes

Okay - does the Corps of Engineers party stay on the atoll? Obviously, if so, personnel will rotate in an out, but they would be armed to the standards of a detached engineer construction company...

Along with individual weapons, probably at least 4-8 HMGs; my guess would be watercooled M1917, aircooled M2 .50, or a mix.

Not at lot, but a little more than small arms alone.

Looking forward to what you do with this.

Best,
 
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Okay - does the Corps of Engineers party stay on the atoll? Obviously, if so, personnel will rotate in an out, but they would be armed the the standards of a detached engineer construction company...

It looks like, to me at least, the Corps left and the civilians moved in.
 
You're missing a 'not' here, I think
Not only were said politicians able to halt ongoing work at Wake, they also failed to prevent the slough of defense related legislation that soared through Congress in 1940.

'not able' or 'unable', surely.
 
USMC-M-Wake-1.gif


This is a map of Wake in OTL. In TTL, the difference so far is that A sizable chunk of the Atoll's lagoon has been dredged, including the chunk around the proposed seaplane base. The channel between Wilkes and Wake proper is over twice as big as well. Finally though construction hasn't started, the sub base has already been dredged for (Located roughly where the contractors camp was in OTL. A loading/unloading dock exists off the lagoon shore of OTL's Camp 1. Also the airfield is much longer than OTL's was at this point, stretching all the way to roughly where Camp 1 is on the map.

Okay - does the Corps of Engineers party stay on the atoll? Obviously, if so, personnel will rotate in an out, but they would be armed the the standards of a detached engineer construction company...

Along with individual weapons, probably at least 4-8 HMGs; my guess would be watercooled M1917, aircooled M2 .50, or a mix.

Not at lot, but a little more than small arms alone.

Looking forward to what you do with this.

Best,

It looks like, to me at least, the Corps left and the civilians moved in.

Yeah...Though the Engineers did have some MG's with them during their construction period, they took them with them when they left in January 1941. The Corps is gone by '41 and has been replaced by civilian contractors.

You're missing a 'not' here, I think


'not able' or 'unable', surely.

D'oh! Thanks! Fixed!
 
Very happy to see this return!!!:)

Save the Utah.....and if you want to make things more interesting, take the 8 inch turrets off of Lexington or Saratoga (as was done to Saratoga OTL, but earlier) add two of them to Utah and leave the 5 inch 38's in place that were installed during the summer 1941 overhaul....

she could steam to Wake in November 1941 with a whole bunch of stuff on board as well....
 
Save the Utah.....and if you want to make things more interesting, take the 8 inch turrets off of Lexington or Saratoga (as was done to Saratoga OTL, but earlier) add two of them to Utah and leave the 5 inch 38's in place that were installed during the summer 1941 overhaul....

she could steam to Wake in November 1941 with a whole bunch of stuff on board as well....

What purpose would such work serve other than to appease the gods of cool? AFAIK the Utah was an AA gunnery training ship, I'm not sure why she would need 8" guns for that role...
 
Part II: Finishing Touches
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)

...When compared with the tortuous pace of the dredging operation, Teters’ efforts to build the island’s airfield, seaplane base, and road system seemed to fly by. Though this is partly attributable to Teters’ excellent character and managerial skills, it would have been all but impossible to achieve the pace that he did without the port improvements wrought by the Corps of Engineers and the vital experience gained over the year and half they occupied the atoll...

...In spite of the furious pace of construction in early 1941, military installations remained sorely lacking. Though plans had been drawn up for the defense of the Atoll as early as May 1939, little had been done to put those plans into action. Despite the fact that the airfield and seaplane base were all but finished by early August 1941, no plans existed to move the requisite units into place, nor had any defensive equipment or garrison troops arrived...

…Any serious practical thought of fortifying the island was delayed until April 18th 1941 when Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, possessed of a sense of urgency and alarmed at Wake’s defenseless state, petitioned the Chief of Naval Operations in what would later become a prophetic study, saying:

“The strategic importance of Wake is increasingly evident...To deny Wake to the enemy, without occupying it ourselves would be difficult; to recapture it if the Japanese should seize it in the early period of hostilities, would require operations of some magnitude. Since the Japanese Fourth Fleet includes transports, and troops with equipment especially suited for landing operations, it appears not unlikely that one of the initial operations of the Japanese may be directed against Wake.

If Wake be defended, then for the Japanese to reduce it would require extended operations of the naval forces in an area where we might be able to get at them; thus affording us opportunity to get at naval forces with naval forces. We should try, by every possible means, to get the Japanese to expose naval units. In order to do this, we must provide objectives that require such exposure.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is considered essential that the construction work now in progress on Wake be proceeded with and that the eventuality of war should not interrupt it. To this end, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, believes that defense installations and defense forces should be established on Wake at the earliest possible date, even at the expense of slowing down construction. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that in the absence of defense forces, construction on Wake, in the event of war, is subject to serious interruption or even complete stoppage, through enemy action.

It is therefore recommended that units of a marine defense battalion be progressively established on Wake as facilities there permit.”
(1)…

...Fortunately, Kimmel’s recommendations, unlike those of the Hepburn Report did not fall completely on deaf ears and on June 23rd 1941, as Hitler’s panzers were rolling into the Soviet Union, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized the establishment of elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion on Wake Atoll “as soon as practicable”. This order became the rallying cry for immediate action by the Pacific fleet, and on August 1st 1941, advance elements of the battalion under Major James Devereux began loading the USS Regulus(2)…

…However, recently released private papers reveal that efforts to fortify Wake Atoll actually began much earlier than the arrival of the Marines on the island on the 19th of August (3). In fact almost immediately after the CNO authorized the establishment of the Marines on the island, work had begun, through backchannels, string pulling, favor calling, and perhaps blackmail to aid them in their efforts. The exchange that occurred between the powers that be and courageous Marine administrators during the summer of 1941 is a testament to the classic quote which reads “Good generals think about tactics, great generals think about logistics.” Marine administrators were quick to note that the CNO’s plans were simply unfeasible for the paltry number of Marines being sent to Wake. Not only were the Marines, less than 200 strong at the time, supposed to construct coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, ostensibly using only hand tools, they were to do so without any aid from the civilian contractors on the island who were slated to depart. In addition they were expected to serve as stevedores, as the port facilities had not yet been built, and later refuel Army Air Force B-17 bombers as they transited from Hawaii to Clark Field in the Philippines (4). Such responsibilities would certainly have sucked up more man hours than the Marines had at their disposal and distracted them from their primary duties of preparing to defend the island. Possessed of an urgency uncommon to the administrative apparatus around them, a network of people began to labour to ensure that Wake Island could be adequately defended…

…Efforts to aid the Marines in their efforts to fortify Wake began innocently enough, as attempts were made to facilitate cooperation between the lavishly supplied force of 1200 civilian laborers on the island and the Marines. Initial hopes were paltry in comparison to later concessions, the loaning of bulldozers, trucks, and other heavy equipment (5). Yet the intransigence of some civilian and military authorities provoked an equally drastic response on the part of the Marines. Their insistence on removing all construction personnel and equipment once the airfield and seaplane base were completed, thereby forcing the Marines to ship in their own was simply unacceptable. Though details remain unclear, the results of their actions are not, by the time Major Devereux and the first Marines arrived on the island, the 1200 men working on building the naval air base had been effectively placed under Marine control. As both the airfield and seaplane base were nearly finished, Marine projects were to receive the highest priority in regards to men and equipment. In general the attitude of the men on Wake Atoll from August 1941 onward is best summed up in a line from a communique to the island “For all intents and purposes your men are to behave as if the Japanese declared war yesterday.” (6)…

…This fit in perfectly with the urgency felt by the commander of the Marines, the recently assigned Major James Devereux. The urgency felt by Devereux had been a major factor in the decision to put him in charge of the island. Strict and by the book, Devereux was tough but fair. Knowing he was working against the clock, he pushed all of his men, Marine and civilian to their limit in order to prepare for what he saw as a quickly approaching inevitable conflict. Though at only 5’5”, not a man of impressive stature, Devereux surprised many with his willingness to work alongside his men, and subject himself to the same grueling construction work…

…It should be noted that much of the feverish work that took place in the late summer and early autumn of 1941 would not have been possible without the cooperation of Lieutenant Elmer B. Greey, the USN’s construction representative and Teters. These men in addition to the other labourers on the island had no real qualms in aiding the Marines, in fact the real resistance came from officials elsewhere, primarily in Washington. Had they been less cooperative it is highly unlikely that as much work would have been accomplished in fortifying the island. As it was, their willingness to pool everything from construction equipment to food greatly ameliorated the American position on the Atoll (7)…

…The arrival of the Marines and the prioritization of defensive works put an end to many of the smaller final projects being undertaken by the civilian workforce, or at the very least severely retarded them. Creature comforts and provisions for the still unfinished seaplane base were put on hold in order to ensure that the island did not first fall into enemy hands…

…Aided by nearly 1200 civilian workers, work on Wake’s defensive positions progressed rapidly. Though the Marines lacked many critical parts or spares for the guns themselves, the infrastructure surrounding the guns had been largely completed by the end of September 1941. All of the guns had been emplaced camouflaged and sandbagged, large underground magazines had been constructed, and an underground telephone network had been completed linking all the batteries to a central command post (8)…

…The garrison at Wake also received a steady trickle of supplies from the most unlikely of sources. An inventive clerk found a way to ensure that vital parts for the island’s gun batteries made the treacherous journey to the island onboard the dozens of Army Airforce B-17 bombers that transited through the region. Ironically, as most of these bombers would be destroyed on the ground at Clark Field during the opening days of the Pacific War, their task in carrying rangefinders, spare parts, and gunnery director parts, to Wake would prove to be one of their few solid contributions to the war effort…

…As the fortifications around Wake began to be completed, work on civilian projects resumed and the task of the Marine garrison began to shift towards preparing for the defense of the island. Standard tables of organization required a force of roughly 1000 men on the island to man the various guns and provide a significant mobile reserve. Even with war on the horizon, this proved to be too much, even for the intrepid body of bureaucrats working to supply the garrison. What could not be supplied quantitatively was made up for in quality, as certain fields were emphasized over others. Rather than request mere riflemen, requests were made for gunnery crews, radar sets and operators, as well as for surplus weaponry(9)…

…Having worked under the Marines for over a month, many of the civilian contractors had developed an affinity to the leathernecks. Furthermore, they had been impressed with the need to aid in the defense. It was decided that it would be prudent to be able to defend themselves if the Japanese were to attack, and so as early as October 1941, groups of volunteers began to drill and train with the Marines to fill in for their lack of manpower. Usually these men served as assistants on the desperately understaffed AA batteries, or as extra riflemen. Civilian authorities also proved helpful in arranging the inclusion of defense related materiel to the islands(10)...

…The next large infusion of Marines occurred on the 1st of November with the arrival of the USS Castor. Though the arrival of dedicated gunnery crews and gunnery directors for the 3 and 5 inch batteries should not be discounted, by far the most important were the arrival of the SCR-268 fire-control radar, the SCR-270B search radar, and their operators. All told, roughly 220 personnel were added to the total strength on the island that day (11)…

…With the arrival of the vital radar sets, Wake’s defensive preparations were roughly finished. After their emplacement, the Marine garrison, less than half its official strength, began to increase the frequency of drills and training exercises. A particular focus was given to the undermanned AA gunnery crews who by this point included a large number of civilian volunteers. As the war loomed ever closer, these drills became increasingly realistic and regular in the hopes of being ready for an inevitable Japanese attack (12)…

…What would be the final piece of the initial portion of Wake’s final defenses arrived mere days before the Japanese attack. The men and machines of VMF-211 arrived on the island between November 28th and December 4th. Ground support staff for the squadron arrived first onboard what would be the last peacetime supply shipment to the Marines onboard the USS Wright. On December 4th 12 F4F-3 Wildcats, flying off the USS Enterprise safely landed on the island with the aid of a PBY Catalina. Unfortunately, these men would only have a few days to familiarize themselves with their new surroundings…

…Yet they would not be alone, for the Wright also delivered 63,000 gallons of gasoline, 50 more gunners, and the island’s new commander, Winfield S. Cunningham. As the ranking officer on the island Cunningham assumed the office previously held by Devereux of Island commander, however as he was far less familiar with the defensive situation on the island, Cunningham was prepared to defer to Devereux until such time that he was (13)…

…For the duration of 1941, it had felt like the Japanese could attack at any minute. A constant sense of urgency and some help from higher command had enabled Devereux, the 1st Marine Defense Battalion, and the often overlooked civilian contractors to do something quite extraordinary. In the course of only 4 months they had managed to complete an impressive set of fortifications. Though they remained critically undermanned at the outbreak of the war, possessing less than half of their authorized strength, they had managed to create a defensive bulwark that would catch the Japanese completely by surprise…

Footnotes
1. Kimmel quote is an abridged one from OTL.

2. In OTL Devereux only became commander of the island on October 15th replacing Major Lewis A. Hohn a friendly but laxidaisical commander who lacked a sense of what was coming and the ability to control his men.

3. Date is again from OTL, Major Lewis A. Hohn, the original commander of the advance detachment (Replaced by Devereux on October 15th), 4 other officers and 173 enlisted men arrived on the island in OTL on this date.

4. All of these responsibilities were held by the Marines in OTL and inhibited their work on preparing the island for war.

5. Though there would be some cooperation between the Marines and civilians along these lines in OTL. A strict separation between the two groups was maintained even after the events of December 7th until the island’s surrender on the 23rd. Upon surrendering the civilian laborers were taken prisoner along with the rest of the island’s defenders and subjected to a harrowing ordeal. Most were shipped to China. Those that remained on the island laboured on coastal defenses until an American raid prompted the Japanese to execute them and bury them in a mass grave.

6. Though there was mounting pressure to enact a measure to this end for the duration of 1941, no concrete actions were taken. The Marines were forced to construct the coastal and AA batteries on Wake using little more than hand tools, sweat, and a little ingenuity.

7. Devereux’ urgency, coupled with the fact that much of the civilian contractor’s work had been already accomplished means that fortification work that was neglected in OTL becomes the primary focus. A manpower shortage within the Marine Corps coupled with the need for local expertise is the primary cause for the conscription of the civilian contractors. In OTL both Greey and Teters did as much as they could to try and aid the Marines, lending them equipment to help emplace the 5 and 3 inch guns. However in TTL, cooperation goes far beyond that in order to help put the finishing touches on Wake’s defense.

8. Compare this to OTL where on December 6th 1941, the telephone line was all above ground, and the various batteries, while emplaced, lacked many necessary features and fortifications.

9. In OTL the construction work was not nearly as advanced requiring more brute labour. Wake in TTL is more prepared and ready to accept said shipments. Furthermore all of the civilians and 20% of the military personnel (non-Marines) were unarmed during the Japanese invasion, not so in TTL…

10. Again there was some degree of cooperation between the civilians and the Marines in OTL. Volunteers helped man machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons beginning in November. More resources, cooperation, and urgency means that TTL’s civilian volunteers get more training for longer and are thus better prepared.

11. In OTL this equipment was on a barge being transported to the Atoll when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour. Given the advanced state of Wake’s defenses in TTL, they’re sent a bit early.

12. Having completed their fortification works, the Marines are now free to do something they did precious little of in OTL, actually prepare for the defense of the island.

13. Mostly OTL, however in TTL fewer civilian workers arrive with the Wright due to more pressure for Marine gunners to man the AA batteries. The 50 gunners sent in TTL are above and beyond what was sent in OTL.

 
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iddt3

Donor
How much are you changing relative to the Original TL? Everything seems pretty familiar so far, but I'm not inclined to do a line by line comparison of the two. Keep up the good work!
 
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